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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the contribution of the US Supreme Court 
(USSC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the vertical and 
horizontal allocation of power. Said differently, it answers the two 
following questions: How do both Courts draw the line between the realm 
of politics and judicial process? How do they allocate power between the 
Union and its component States? After examining standing, the political 
question doctrine, negative and positive integration and liability in damages 
on both sides of the Atlantic, it is concluded that both Courts should not 
always look for “substantive” constitutional benchmarks. The reason lies in 
that sometimes the latter may turn to be either questions deemed too 
political for judicial resolution or insufficient to control congressional or 
Community legislative powers. Additionally, the judicial department should 
also pay due regard to a “process” review. This type of review would 
operate at two levels. At first stage, Courts should solve flaws in the 
procedure by which the political institutions adopt their decisions. For 
instance, this would be the case where procedures neglect “discrete and 
insular” minorities, or where they entrench incumbent political majorities. 
Thus, judicial review would be principled upon understanding “democracy” 
as an intangible value that cannot succumb to majoritarian pressures. At a 
second stage, Courts should also examine whether, in their deliberations, 
political actors pay due account to all interests at stake, particularly, to those 
not represented in the political process. 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Statutory Declaration 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by myself without any 
external unauthorised help, that it has been neither presented to any 
institution for evaluation nor previously published in its entirety or in parts. 
Any parts, words or ideas, of the thesis, however limited, which are quoted 
from or based on other sources, have been acknowledged as such without 
exception. 
 4 
Acknowledgments 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Takis 
Tridimas, for his ongoing support and guidance. During the last three years I 
really enjoyed our discussions on EU law and on life in general. 
 
I am also grateful to Fundación Caja Madrid for funding the second and 
third year of my PhD studies. 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my friends, Ariane Demeneix and 
Pascal Berghe, for helping me with the proofreading.  
 
I am very grateful to my parents and sisters for their never-ending 
encouragements and for always reminding me to be inspired by what 
Antonio Machado once wrote,  
 
 
“Caminante, son tus huellas 
el camino y nada más; 
caminante, no hay camino, 
se hace camino al andar. 
 
Al andar se hace camino 
y al volver la vista atrás 
se ve la senda que nunca 
se ha de volver a pisar” 
 
 
 
For being the way she is, I owe Isabelle much more than the dedication of 
my PhD Thesis. 
 5 
ABBREVIATIONS 
  
American Bankruptcy Industry 
Law Review  
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 
American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal 
Am. Bankr. L.J 
American Journal of 
Comparative Law 
Am.J.Comp.L. 
American Journal of 
International Law 
Am. J. Int'l L. 
American Journal of Political 
Science  
AJPS 
Arkansas Law Review Ark. L. Rev. 
British Journal of Criminology Brit. J. Criminol. 
Brooklyn Law Review Brook. L. Rev. 
California Law Review Cal. L. Rev. 
California Western Law 
Review 
Cal. W. L. Rev. 
Chicago-Kent Law Review  Chi.-Kent L. Rev 
Columbia Journal of European 
Law  
Colum.J.Eur.L. 
Columbia Law Review Colum. L. Rev. 
Common Market Law Review CML Rev. 
Constitutional Commentary Const.Comment. 
Cornell Law Review Cornell L.Rev.. 
Duke Environemental Law & 
Political Forum 
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y 
F. 
Duke Law Journal Duke L.J. 
European Business Law 
Review 
EBL Rev. 
European Competition Law 
Review  
ECLR 
European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review 
E.E.E.L.R. 
European Journal of Law and 
Economics 
Eur J Law Econ 
European Law Journal Eur. L. J. 
European Law Review E. L. Rev. 
European Public Law EPL 
Florida State University Law 
Review 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
Fordham International Law 
Journal 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 
George Washington 
International Law Review 
Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 
George Washington Law 
Review 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
Hamline Law Review Hamline L. Rev. 
Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
 6 
Harvard Law Review Harv. L. Rev. 
Hasting Constitutional Law 
Quarterly  
Hastings Const. L.Q 
Hofstra Law Review Hofstra L. Rev. 
Illinois Law Review Ill. L. Rev. 
International Comparative 
Law Quarterly  
ICLQ 
International Journal of 
Constitutional Law  
ICON 
Irish Journal of European Law  I.J.E.L. 
Journal of Law and Policy J.L.& Pol'y 
Journal of Law and Politics J.L.& Pol. 
Kentucky Law Journal Ky.L.J. 
Lewis & Clark Law Review Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
Michigan Law Review Mich. L. Rev. 
Minnesota Law Review  Minn.L.Rev 
Modern Law Review  MLR 
New York University Law 
Review 
N.Y.U. L Rev. 
Northwestern University Law 
Review 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Notre Dame Law Review Notre Dame L. Rev. 
Oklahoma City University Law 
Review 
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 
Oregon Law Review  Or. L. Rev. 
Revue du Marché Unique 
Européen 
RMUE 
Rutgers Law Review Rutgers L. Rev. 
San Diego Law Review  San Diego L.Rev 
South Dakota Law Review S.D.L.Rev. 
Stanford Law & Policy Review Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 
Stanford Law Review Stan. L. Rev. 
Suffolk University Law Review Suffolk U.L.Rev. 
Supreme Court Review Sup. Ct. Rev. 
Temple Law Review Temp. L. Rev. 
Texas Law Review Tex. L. Rev. 
Transportation Practitioners 
Journal 
Transp.Prac.J. 
University of Chicago Law 
Review 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 
University of Colorado Law 
Review 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 
University of Kansas Law 
Review 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 
University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 
Villanova Law Review Vill. L. Rev. 
Virginia Law Review Va. L. Rev. 
William & Mary Law Review  Wm. & Mary L. Rev 
Wisconsin Law Review Wis. L. Rev. 
 7 
Yale Law Journal Yale L. J. 
Yearbook of European Law YEL 
 
 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................... 5 
 
TABLE OF CASES ..................................................................................... 11 
 
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 23 
 
CHAPTER I 
Standing Doctrines in the US and in the EU ........................................... 30 
I.- Standing under Article III US Constitution and Article 230 EC ......... 35 
A.- General Overview. – Concept and Purposes................................ 35 
1.- Concept .................................................................................... 35 
2.- The purpose of Standing .......................................................... 38 
B.- Standing and public applicants..................................................... 40 
1.- Standing of the US Government, States and Members of 
Congress............................................................................................... 41 
2.- Concluding Remarks................................................................ 46 
C.- Standing and private applicants ................................................... 47 
1.- “Injury-in-fact”......................................................................... 47 
2.- “Individual concern” and “General Grievance”....................... 51 
3.- Direct Concern and the Causation Requirement under Article 
III US Constitution............................................................................... 59 
II.- Standing as a "Jurisdictional Shifting Strategy” .............................. 66 
1.- Article 234 EC, an alternative remedy? ................................... 66 
2.- “No jurisdictional shifting” strategy under US law ................. 70 
III.- Standing before national courts: Article III US Constitution a 
complying example ...................................................................................... 72 
IV.- Conclusion ....................................................................................... 76 
 
CHAPTER II 
The Political Question Doctrine in the US and in the EU .............. 79 
I.- The Political Question Doctrine and the US Supreme Court............... 80 
A.- Concept ........................................................................................ 80 
B.- The Normative Justification......................................................... 82 
C.- The Rise and Fall of the Political Question Doctrine .................. 84 
II.- The Political Question Doctrine and Foreign Policy ....................... 93 
III.- Political Questions in the EU ......................................................... 100 
A.- Article 7 TEU and the Guarantee Clause................................... 100 
B.- Judicial Review and European Elections ................................... 103 
C.- Self-governance of the European Parliament............................. 106 
D.- Treaty Amendments ................................................................... 110 
E.- Foreign Policy ............................................................................ 111 
1.- Horizontal dimension............................................................. 112 
2.- US Flexibility vs. EU Rigidity: Expanding judicial control over 
the CFSP ............................................................................................ 114 
3.- Vertical Dimension ................................................................ 119 
IV.- Concluding Remarks...................................................................... 123 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
Negative Integration: The Dormant Commerce Clause And Article 28 
EC .............................................................................................................. 129 
I.- Constitutional Limits on State Regulatory Powers ............................ 132 
II.- Constitutional Foundation and Normative Evolution .................... 134 
III.- Discriminatory State Measures ...................................................... 139 
A.- Facial and Material Discrimination............................................ 139 
B.- The American “Virtually per se rule of invalidity” and Article 30 
EC 142 
C.- Special Provisions ...................................................................... 145 
D.- Discrimination to the benefit of one single operator.................. 146 
E.- The Market-Participant Exception and Congressional Superseding 
Powers. ................................................................................................... 149 
IV.- Non-Discriminatory State Measures .............................................. 152 
A.- The Pike Balancing Test ............................................................ 152 
B.- The Principle of Mutual Recognition and Mandatory 
Requirements.......................................................................................... 155 
C.- Keck:  non-discriminatory selling arrangements fall outside 
Article 28 EC.......................................................................................... 158 
V.- Extraterritorial and inconsistent state regulations: An example, the 
Internet ....................................................................................................... 165 
VI.- A Comparison: Beyond discrimination?........................................ 170 
VII.- Conclusions.................................................................................... 174 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Positive Integration: The Commerce Clause and Article 95 EC ......... 176 
I.- The Principle of Enumerated Powers applied to the Commerce Clause
 177 
A.- The History of the Commerce Clause until Lopez..................... 177 
B.- The Lopez-Morrison-Raich Trilogy: The beginning and the end of 
“the federalist revolution” ...................................................................... 183 
1.- United States v Lopez: The beginning.................................... 183 
2.- United States v Morrison:  The Confirmation........................ 187 
3.- Gonzales v Raich: The end?................................................... 188 
4.- The Lopez and Morrison Legacy after Raich......................... 191 
C.- The Necessary and Proper Clause: An alternative approach. .... 193 
II.- The Principle of Attribution applied to Article 95 EC................... 195 
A.- Article 95 EC (ex 100a EEC) and Titanium Dioxide ................ 195 
B.- The Tobacco Saga in three acts.................................................. 198 
1.- Act I. – Tobacco Advertising I ............................................... 198 
2.- Act II. – BAT, Arnold André and Swedish Match. ................. 204 
3.- Act III. - Tobacco advertising II ........................................... 208 
C.- Article 308 EC: a “Scalia-like” alternative? .............................. 212 
III.- Enumerated Powers Compared ...................................................... 213 
A.- Can the Community criminalise the possession of cannabis under 
Article 95 EC?........................................................................................ 213 
B.- Appreciable distortions of competition...................................... 216 
 10 
C.- Concluding Remarks.................................................................. 217 
IV.- Other Solutions to Counterbalance the Centripetal Trend ............. 218 
A.- Reliance on the Political Process ............................................... 218 
B.- Controlling the Exercise of Commercial Power ........................ 222 
1.- The Principle of Proportionality ............................................ 222 
2.- The principle of Subsidiarity.................................................. 225 
V.- Conclusion ..................................................................................... 228 
 
CHAPTER V 
The Principles of Sovereign Immunity of States and Non-Contractual 
State Liability Compared ........................................................................ 230 
I.- The Principle of Sovereign Immunity of States under US Law......... 232 
A.- Concept ...................................................................................... 232 
B.- Legal Basis of State Sovereign Immunity.................................. 234 
C.- Why has the USSC endorsed States’ immunity? ....................... 241 
D.- Alternative Remedies ................................................................. 245 
1.- United States as a Plaintiff ..................................................... 245 
2.- Suits for Prospective relief: Ex parte Young .......................... 247 
3.- Suits for retrospective relief: state official’s liability............. 250 
II.- The Principle of State Liability under EC Law.............................. 254 
A.- Concept ...................................................................................... 254 
B.- The Break-trough: Francovich ................................................... 256 
C.- Legal Basis ................................................................................. 259 
1.- Principle of Effectiveness ...................................................... 259 
2.- Principle of Loyal Cooperation: Article 10 EC ..................... 261 
D.- From filling in a lacuna to a General Principle: Joined Cases 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III ............................................... 262 
E.- Conditions of State Liability ...................................................... 264 
1.- The law infringed was intended to confer rights on individuals.
 265 
2.- Serious breach ........................................................................ 266 
3.- Direct casual link.................................................................... 268 
F.- Liability of the national judiciary............................................... 270 
III.- Structural Differences and State Financial Implications................ 275 
A.- Structural differences: EC Directives and the Principle of “Anti-
Commandeering” ................................................................................... 276 
1.- Some theoretical views on Commandeering.......................... 276 
2.- The EU and the US ................................................................ 278 
3.- State Liability and Commandeering....................................... 280 
4.- Köbler: a functional substitute for the absence of an appellate 
jurisdiction. ........................................................................................ 283 
B.- Remedies and the State Treasuries............................................. 286 
1.- America’s antagonism between past remedies and future rights
 286 
2.- The ECJ’s convergent view on remedies ............................... 289 
IV.- Conclusions.................................................................................... 291 
 
CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 295 
ANNEX ..................................................................................................... 310 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 313 
 11 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
EU Case-Law 
 
• ECJ Cases 
 
Joined Cases 19/62 to 
22/62  
Fédération nationale de la boucherie en gros 
and Others v Council [1962] ECR 491 
Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission [1963] ECR 95 
Case 6/64  Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 
Cases 9/70  
Frans Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein [1971] 2 
ECR 825 
Case 8/74  Procureur du Roi v Dasonville [1974] ECR 837 
Case 41/74  Van Duyn v the Home Office [1974] ECR 1337  
Case 72/74  
Union Syndicale and Others v Council [1975] 
ECR 401 
Case C-43/75  Defrenne v Sabena, [1976] ECR 455 
Case 59/75  
 
Pubblico Ministero v Manghera [1976] ECR 
91 
Case 60/75  Russo v AIMA [1976] ECR 45 
Case 33/76  
Rewe v v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 
Case 45/76  
Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen 
[1976] ECR 2043 
Joined Cases 103 and 
145/77  
 
Royal Scholten-Honig v Intervention Board for 
Agricultural Produce, [1978] ECR 2037 
Case 106/77 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA [1970] ECR  629 
Case 78/85  
 
Group of the European Right v Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1753 
Case 120/78 
 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
I-649 
Case148/78  Ratti [1979] 1629 
Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795 
Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 1993 
Case 158/80  Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805. 
Case 75/81 
 
Joseph Henri Thomas Blesgen v Belgian State, 
[1982] ECR 1211 
Case 124/81  
Commission v United Kingdom (UHT Milk) 
[1983] ECR 203 
Case 249/81 
Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 
4005 
Case 286/81 
Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij BV [1982] ECR 4575 
Case 40/82 
Commission v United Kingdom, [1984] ECR 
2793 
Joined Cases 177 & 
178/82  
Criminal proceedings against Van de Haar 
[1984] ECR 1797 
Case 191/82  Fediol v Commission [1983] ECR 2913 
Case 222/82  
Apple and Pear Development Council v Lewis 
[1983] ECR 4083 
Cases 15/83  Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171 
Cases 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727 
Case 207/83  
Commission v UK (Origin Marking) [1985] 
ECR 1202 
 12 
Case 294/83  
Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v Parliament 
[1986] ECR 1339 
Joined Cases 60 and 
61/84 
Cinéthèque SA and others v Fédération 
nationale des cinémas français [1985] ECR 
2605 
Case 152/84  
Marshall v Southampton and South-West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 
723 (Marshall I) 
Case 178/84  
Commission v Germany (“Beer Purity Case”) 
[1978] ECR1227 
Case 222/84  
 
Johnston v RUC [1986] ECR 1651 
Case 53/85  
 
AKZO Chemie and AKZO Chemie UK v 
Commission [1986] ECR 1965  
Joined Cases 67/85, 
68/85 and 70/85  
Van der Koy and Others v Commission [1988] 
ECR 219  
Case 282/85  DEFI v Commission [1986] ECR 2469 
Case 314/85  
Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] 
ECR 4199 
Case 222/86  UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097 
Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark[1988] ECR 4607 
Case C-45/87  
Commission v Ireland (Dundalk Waters) [1988] 
ECR 4929 
Case 106/87  Asteris [1988] ECR 5515 
Case 302/87 
European Parliament v Council (Comitology 
case) [1988] ECR 5615  
Case 382/87 
R. Buet and Educational Business Services 
(EBS) v Ministère public [1989] ECR 1235 
Case C-21/88  
Du Pont de Nemours Italiana [1990] ECR I-
889 
Case 152/88  Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR 2477 
Case C-23/89 
Quietlynn Limited and Brian James Richards v 
Southend Borough Council, [1990] ECR I-3059 
Case 45/89  
Commission v Council (Generalized Tariff 
Preferences) [1987] ECR 1493 
Case C-106/89  Marleasing [1990] ECR I- 4135 
Case C-188/89  Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR-I 3313 
Case C-213/89 
The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport ex 
parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR 
I-2433 
Case C-221/89  
The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, 
ex parte Factortame Ltd and others 
(“Factortame II”) [1991] ECR I-3905 
Case 300/89 
Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide) 
[1991] ECR I-2867 
Case C-309/89  Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853 
Case C-340/89  
Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- 
und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357 
Case C-367/89  
Richardt and 'Les Accessoires Scientifiques 
[1991] ECR I-4621 
Case C-2/90  Commission v Belguim, [1992] ECR I-4431 
Joined Cases C-6/90 and 
C-9/90 
Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and 
others v Italian Republic, [1991] ECR I-5357 
Case C-68/90  
Blot and Front national v Parliament [1990] 
ECR I-2101 
Case C-70/88  
Parliament v Council, (Chernobyl) [1990] ECR 
I-2041 
Joined cases C-87/90, C- Verholen and others v Sociale 
 13 
88/90 and C-89/90  Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-
3757 
Joined Cases C-1/90 & 
176/90 
Aragonesa de Publicidad, [1991] ECR I-4151 
Case C-313/90  
CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR 
I-1125 
Joined Cases C-330/90 
and C-331/90  
López Brea and Hidalgo Palacios [1992] ECR 
I-323 
CasesC-126/91 
Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der 
Wirtschaft e.V. v Yves Rocher GmbH [1993] 
ECR I-2361, 
Case C-155/91 
 
Commission v Council (Waste 1) [1993] ECR I-
940  
Case C-213/91  
 
Abertal and Others v Commission [1993] ECR 
I-3177 
Joined Cases C- 267 and 
268/91  
Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck 
and Daniel Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097 
Case C-271/91  
Marshall v Southampton & SW Hampshire 
Area Health Authority, [1993] ECR I-4367 
Joined cases C-277/91, 
C-318/91 and C-319/91  
Ligur Carni and Others v Unità Sanitaria 
Locale, [1993] ECR I-6621 
Case  C-314/91  Weber v Parliament [1993] ECR I-1093 
Case C-91/92  
Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl, [1994] ECR I 
3325 
Case C-275/92  Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039 
Case C-292/92 
Hünermund and others v 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg 
[1993] ECR I-6787. 
Case C-319/92  
Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnarztliche 
Vereinigung Nordhein, [1994] ECR I-425 
Case C-350/92  Spain v Council [1995] ECR I- 1985 
Case C-359/92 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-3685 
Case C-391/92  
Commission v Greece (Baby Milk) [1996] ECR 
I-1621 
Case C-19/93 P  
Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] 
ECR I-3319  
Joined Cases C-46/93 
and C-48/93 
Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd 
and others, [1996] ECR I-1029 
Case C-51/93  Meyhui [1994] ECR I-3879 
Case C-69/93  Punto Casa v Capena, [1994] ECR I-2355 
Case C-187/93 
Parliament v Council (Waste 2)  [1994] ECR I-
2857 37 EC) 
Joined Cases C-367 and 
377/93  
 
FG Roders BV and Others v Inspecteur der 
Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1995] ECR I-2229  
Case C-384/93  Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141 
Case C-387/93  Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663 
Case C-392/93 
The Queen v H. M. Treasury, ex parte British 
Telecommunications plc [1996] ECR I-1631, 
also 
Case C-412/93  Leclerc-Siplec [1995] ECR I-179 
Case C-470/93  Mars [1995] ECR I-1923 
Case C-5/94  
The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas, [1995] 
ECR I-2553 
Case C-55/94  Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165 
Case C-63/94 Belgapom v ITM Belgium [1995] ECR I-2467 
 14 
Case C-137/94  R v Secretary of Health, [ 1995] ECR I-3407  
Joined Cases C-178, C-
179, C-188 to 190/94  
Dillenkofer and others v Budesrepublik 
Deutschland [1996] ECR I-4845 
Case C-209/94 P  
Buralux and Others v Council [1996] ECR I-
615 
Joined cases C-197/94 
and C-252/94  
Société Bautiaa v Directeur des Services 
Fiscaux des Landes and Société Française 
Maritime v Directeur des Services Fiscaux du 
Finistère [1996] ECR I-505 
Joined Cases C-321 to 
324/94 
Criminal proceedings against Jacques Pistre 
and other [1997] ECR I-2343. 
Case C-83/94  Leifer and Others [1995] ECR I-3231 
Case C-10/95P  Assocarne v Council [1995] ECR I-4149 
Joined Cases C-34 to 
36/95  
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini 
and others, [1997] ECR I-3843 
Case C-124/95  
 
the Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v HM 
Treasury and Bank of England, [1997] ECR I-
81. 
Case C-189/95  Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909. 
Case C-265/95  Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 
Case C-293/95P 
Odigitria AAE v Council and Commission 
[1996] ECR I-6123 
Case C-321/95P 
Greenpeace & Others v Commission [1998] 
ECR I-1651 
Case C- 368/95  
Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und 
vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 
[1997] ECR I-3689 
Case C-1/96  
Compassion in World Farming [1998] 
ECR I-1251 
Case C-15/96  Schoning-Kougebetopolou [1998] ECR I-47 
Case C-114/96  Kieffer and Thill [1997] ECR I-3629 
Case C-170/96  
Commission v Council, (Airport Transit Visa) 
[1998] ECR I-2763 
Case C-319/96  
Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v 
Skatteministeriet [1998] ECR I-5255 
Case C-95/97  
 
Région Wallonne v Commission [1997] ECR 
I-1787  
Case C-180/97  
Regione Toscana v Commission [1997] ECR 
I-5245 
Case C-189/97  Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-4741 
Case C-209/97  Commission v Council, [1994] ECR I-3681 
Case C-269/97  
Commission v Council (Beef Labelling) [2000] 
ECR I-2257  
Cases C-273/97  
Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of 
State for Defence [1999] ECR I-7403 
Case C-302/97  Konle v Austria, [1999] ECR I-3099 
Case C-414/97  Commission v Spain [1999] ECR I-5585 
Case C-424/97  
Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche 
Vereinigung Nordrhein (No.2) [2000] E.C.R. I-
5123 
Case C-437/97  EKW [2000] ECR I-1157 
C-285/98  
Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[2000] ECR I-69 
C-352/98P  
Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergadem and 
Goupil v Commission, [2000] ECR I-5291 
Case C-376/98  
Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco 
Advertising I ) [2000] ECR I-8419 
Case C-379/98  PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the 
 15 
presence of Windpark Reußenköge III GmbH 
and Land Schleswig-Holstein, [2001] ECR I-
2099 
Joined Cases C-397 & 
410/98  
Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others (C-397/98), 
Hoechst AG and Hoechst (UK) Ltd (C-410/98) 
v Commissioners of Inland Revenue and HM 
Attorney General [2001] ECR I-1727 
C-398/98  Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-07915 
Case C-405/98 
 
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet 
international [2001] ECR I-1795. 
Case C-423/98  Alfredo Albore [2000] ECR I-5965 
Case C-448/98  Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663 
Case C-452/98  
Nederlandse Antillen v Council [2001] ECR 
I-8973 
Case C-67/97 
Criminal proceedings against Ditlev Bluhme, 
[1998] ECR I-8033 
Case C-74/99  
The Queen v Secretary of State for Health and 
Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and 
Others [2000] ECR I-8599. 
Case C-174/99 P  Parliament v Richard [2000] ECR I-6189  
Case C-390/99  Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607 
C-453/99 
Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-
6297 
Case C-50/00P  
 
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council 
(UPA) [2002] ECR I-6677  
Case C-112/00  Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 
Case C-118/00  
 
Gervais Larsy v Institut national d'assurances 
sociales pour travailleurs independents 
("Inasti") (No.2) [2001] E.C.R. I-5063 
Case C- 129/00  Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-14637 
Case C-253/00  
 
Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA and Superior 
Fruiticola SA v Frumar Ltd and Redbridge 
Produce Marketing Ltd [2002] ECR I-7289 
Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977 
Case C-416/00  Morellato [2003] ECR I-9343 
Case C-13/01  
Safalero Srl v Prefetto di Genova [2003] ECR 
I-8679 
Case C-63/01  
Samuel Sidney Evans v The Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
and The Motor Insurers' Bureau [2003] ECR I-
14447 
C-224/01  Köbler v Autria [2003] ECR I-10239  
Case C-243/01  Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-13031 
Case C-322/01  
Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 
DocMorris NV [2003] ECR I-14887 
Case C-488/01 P  Martinez v Parliament [2003] ECR I-13355 
Case C-491/01 
The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex 
parte British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-
11453 
Case C-491/01  
British American Tobacco  [2002] ECR 
I-11453 
Case C-71/02 
 
Karner v Troostwijk, [2004] ECR I3025 
Case C-216/02 
Österreichischer Zuchtverband für Ponys, 
Kleinpferde und Spezialrassen v 
Burgenländische Landesregierung [2004] ECR 
I-10683 
Case C-222/02  Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik 
 16 
Deutschland, [2004] ECR I-9425 
Case C-239/02  Douwe Egberts [2004] ECR I-7007 
Case C-263/02 P  Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425 
Case C-434/02  Arnold André, [2004] ECR I-11825 
Case C-438/02  
Criminal proceedings against Krister Hanner 
[2005] ECR I-04551 
Case C-78/03P  
Commission v Germany (ARE case) [2005] 
ECR I-10737 
C-131/03P  
Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission 
[2006] ECR I- 7795 
C-173/03  Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177 
Case C-176/03  
Commission v Council, (Criminal Penalties 
Case) [2005] ECR I-7879. 
Case C-208/03P  
Jean-Marie Le Pen v Parliament [2005] ECR I-
6051 
Case C-209/03  
The Queen (on the application of Dany Bidar) v 
London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills, [2005] ECR I-
2119 
Case C-210/03 Swedish Match, [2004] ECR I-11893. 
Case C-380/03 
Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] 
ECR I-11573 
Case C-470/03  A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl [2007] ECR I-2749 
Case C145/04  Spain v United Kingdom, [2006] ECR I-7917 
Joined Cases C-154/04 
and C-155/04  
Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] 
ECR I-6451 
Joined Cases C-158 and 
159/04  
Alfa-Vita [2006] ECR I-8135 
Case C-170/04  
Rosengren and Others v Riksåklagaren [2007] 
ECR I-04071 
Case C-300/04  Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055 
Case C-354/04 P  
 
Segi v Council [2007] ECR I-1579 
Case C-434/04  
 
Ahokainen and Leppik, [2006] ECR I-9171  
Case C-91/05  Commission v Council, 20 May 2008, n.y.r. 
Case C-142/05  Mickelsson and Roos, 14 December 2006, n.y.r 
Case C-362/05 P  
Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR 
I-4333 
Case C-402/05  Kadi v Council, 3 September 2008, n.y.r.  
Case C-432/05  Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271 
C-440/05 Commission v Council, n.y.r. 23 October 2007 
 
 
• CFI Cases 
 
Case 11/82  
 
Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission 
[1985] ECR 207 
Case T-113/89  
Nefarma and Bond van Groothandelaren in het 
Farmaceutische Bedrijf v Commission [1990] 
ECR II-797 
Case T-138/89  
NBV and NVB v Commission [1992] ECR 
II-2181 
Case T-435/93  
 
ASPEC and Others v Commission [1995] ECR 
II-1281 
Case T-442/93  
AAC and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-
1329 
Case T-472/93  Campo Ebro v Council [1995] ECR II-421 
 17 
Joined Cases T-480/93 
and T-483/93  
Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission 
[1995] ECR II-2305 
Case T-572/93  
Odigitria AAE v Council and Commission, 
[1995] ECR II-2025 
Case T-585/93  
Greenpeace & Others v Commission [1995] 
ECR II-2205 
Case T-266/94  
Skibsværftsforeningen and Others v 
Commission [1996] ECR II-1399 
Case T-353/94  Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 
Case T-380/94  AIUFFASS and AKT  [1996] ECR II-2169 
T-387/94  
 
 
Asia Motor France v Commission [1996] ECR 
II-961 
Case T-174/95  
Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council [1998] 
ECR II-2289 
Case T-102/96  
 
Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753  
Case T-135/96  UEAPME v Commission [1998] ECR II-2335 
Case C-404/96 P  
Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] 
ECR I-2435 
Case T-38/98  ANB v Council [1998] ECR II-4191 
Joined Cases T-172, 
175 and 178/98 
Salamander v European Parliament  & 
Council, [2000] ECR II-2487 
Case T-13/99  
Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II-
3305 and 
Case T-70/99  Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II-3495 
Joined Cases T-222/99, 
T-327/99 and T-329/99  
Martinez and Others v Parliament [2001] ECR 
II-2823 
Case T-212/00  
Nuove Industrie Molisane v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-347 
Case T-353/00  Le Pen v Parliament [2003] ECR II-1729 
Joined Cases T-377/00, 
T-379/00, T-380/00, T-
260/01 and T-272/01  
Philip Morris and Others v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-1 
Case T-177/01  
Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-2365 
Case T-223/01  
Japan Tobacco Inc. & JT International v 
European Parliament & Council [2002] ECR 
II-3259 
Case T-243/01  
 
Sony Computer Entertainment  Ltd. v 
Commission [2003] ECR I-4189  
Cases T-306/01 Yusuf v Council [2005] ECR II-3533  
T-315/01  Kadi v Council [2005] ECR II-3649 
Case C-486/01 P  
National Front v Parliament [2004] 
ECR I-6289 
Case T-154/02  
Villiger Söhne GmbH v Council, [2003] ECR II-
1921 
Case T-228/02  
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple 
d'Iran v Council [2006] ECR II-04665 
Case T-229/02  PKK v Council, judgment of 3 April 2008, n.y.r. 
Case T-231/02  SNF SA v Commission, [2004] ECR II-3047 
Case T-333/02  
 
Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council, 
not published in the ECR; 
Case T-338/02  Segi and Others v Council [2004] ECR II-1647 
Case T- 60/03  
Regione Siciliana v Commission [2005] ECR II-
4139 
CaseT-327/03  
Al-Aqsa v Council, judgment of 11 July 2007 
n.y.r. 
Case T-47/04  Sison v Council, judgment of 11 July 2007, 
 18 
 n.y.r. 
Joined CasesT-236/04 
and T-241/04 
EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-4945 
Case T-253/04  
Kongra-Gel and Others v Council, judgment of 
3 April 2008, n.y.r. 
 Case T-91/07  WWF-UK v Council, n.y.r. of 2 June 2008 
Case T-215/07R 
Donnici v Parliament  
 
Order of the 13 December 2007 (Joint Cases 
pending C-393/07 and C-9/08) 
 
 
US Case-Law 
 
• U.S Supreme Court Cases 
 
Chisholm vs. State of Georgia, 2 US. 419  (1793) 
Marbury v Madison,  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137  (1803) 
Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (Wheat) 304  (1816) 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316  (1819) 
Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264  (1821) 
Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat.) 1  (1824) 
Martin v Mott, 25 US (12 Wheat.) 19, 30  (1827) 
Cooley v Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex 
rel.Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 
(1852) 
Paul v Virginia, 75 US (8 Wall) 168  (1868) 
Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118  (1869) 
New Hamsphire v Louisiana, 108 US 76  (1883) 
Clark vs. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) 
Kimmish v Ball, 129 US 217  (1889) 
Hans vs. Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890) 
United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 US 1  (1895) 
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564  (1895) 
Smith v. Reeves , 178 U.S. 436  (1900) 
Gunter vs. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 US 273  (1906) 
Kansas vs. United States, 204 US 331  (1907) 
Georgia v Tennessee Cooper Co., 206 US 230 (1907) 
Ex parte Young, 209 US 123  (1908) 
Southern Railway Co. v United States, 222 US 20  (1911) 
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 US 342  (1914) 
Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251  (1918) 
Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447 (1923) 
Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co, 263 US 413  (1923) 
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v Lord, 262 US 172  (1923) 
DiSanto v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34  (1927) 
Fidelity Natural Bank & Trust Co. of Kansas City v Swope, 
274 US 123  
(1927) 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262  (1932) 
Mintz v Baldwin, 289 US 346  (1933) 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi , 292 U.S. 313  (1934) 
Baldwin v GAF Seelig, Inc, 294 US 511  (1935) 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v Radford, 295 US 555  (1935) 
Scherchter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 US 495  (1935) 
United States v Butler, 297 US 1  (1936) 
Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238  (1936) 
Ashton v Cameron County Dist., 298 US 513  (1936) 
Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633  (1937) 
NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 US 1  (1937) 
 19 
United States v Carolene Products Co. , 304 US 144 (1938) 
Tennessee Electric Power Co v Tennessee Valley Authority, 
306 US 118 
(1939) 
Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433  (1939) 
United States vs. Shaw, 309 US 495  (1940) 
Unites States vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 
US 506  
(1940) 
United State v Darby, 312 US 100  (1941) 
Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111  (1942) 
Georgia v Pennsylvania R Co, 324 US 439  (1945) 
Prudential Insurance Co., v Benjamin, 328 US 408  (1946) 
Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549  (1946) 
Gardner vs. New Jersey, 329 US 565  (1947) 
Testa v Katt, 330 US 386  (1947) 
C & S. Air Lines v Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) 
Hood & Sons, Inc v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 534  (1949) 
Dean Milk Co v City of Madison, 340 US 349  (1951) 
Doremus v Board of Education of Hawthorne, 342 US 429  (1952) 
Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483  (1954) 
Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1  (1958) 
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186  (1962) 
Parden vs. Terminal R. CO., 377 U.S. 184  (1964) 
Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533  (1964) 
Katzenbach v McClung,  379 US 294  (1964) 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479  (1965) 
United States v Guest, 383 US 745  (1966) 
Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83  (1968) 
Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429  (1968) 
Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486  (1969) 
Pike v Bruce Church Inc., 397 US 137  (1970) 
Association of Data Processing Service Organization v Camp, 
397 US 150  
(1970) 
Perez v United States, 402 US 146  (1971) 
Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Narcotic 
Agency, 403 US 388  
(1971) 
Orlando v Laird, 404 US 869  (1971) 
Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727  (1972) 
Lake Carriers Association v MacMullan, 406 US 498  (1972) 
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1  (1972) 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205  (1972) 
Gilligan v Morgan, 413 US 1  (1973) 
Linda RS v Richard D, 410 US 614  (1973)   
O’Shea v Littleton, 414 US 488  (1974) 
Eldelman v Jordan,  415 US 651  (1974) 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166  (1974) 
Schlesinger v Reservist Commission to Stop the War, 418 US 
208  
(1974) 
Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 US 102  (1974) 
United States v Maine 420 US 515  (1975) 
United States v Florida, 420 US 531  (1975) 
Eastland v Unite States Servicemen’ Fund, 421 US 491  (1975) 
Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490  (1975) 
Craig v Boren, 429 US 190  (1976) 
Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438  (1976) 
Matthews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335  (1976) 
Great A & P. Tea Co v Cottrell, 424 US 366  (1976) 
Simon v Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 
US 26  
(1976) 
 20 
Washington v Davis, 426 US 229  (1976) 
Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US 794 (1976) 
National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833  (1976) 
Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445  (1976) 
Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 
U.S. 333 
(1977) 
Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267  (1977) 
Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 232  (1978) 
Exxon Corp. v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117  (1978) 
Baldwin v Montana Fish and Game Commission, 436 US 371  (1978) 
Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518  (1978) 
Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617  (1978) 
Hutton v Finney, 437 US 678 (1978) 
Butz v Economou, 438 US 478  (1978) 
Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91  (1979)   
Japan Line Ltd. v City of Los Angeles, 441 US 434  (1979) 
Babbitt v United Farm Workers, 442 US 289  (1979) 
Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996  (1979) 
Lewis v BT Invest. Managers Inc, 477 US 27  (1980) 
Reeves Inc, v Stake, 447 US 429  (1980) 
Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 
452 US 264  
(1981) 
FERC v Mississippi, 456 US 742  (1982) 
Edgar v MITE Corp, 457 US 624  (1982) 
Harlow v Fitzgerald,  457 US 800  (1982) 
Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991  (1982) 
Alfred L Snapp & Son, Inc. v Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) 
United States v Texas, 143 US 621  (1982) 
Valley Forge Christian College v American United for the 
Separation of Church and State, 454 US 464  
(1982) 
District of Columbia Court of Appeal v Feldman, 460 US 462  (1983) 
City of Los Angeles v Lyon, 461 US 95  (1983) 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Haldermann, 465 US 89 (1984) 
United Building and Construction Trades Council v Mayor of 
Camden, 465 US 208  
(1984) 
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke , 467 
U.S. 82 
(1984) 
Allen v Wright, 468 US 737 (1984) 
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 
528  
(1985) 
Brown-Forman Distiller Corp. v NY State Liquor Authority 
476 US 573  
(1986) 
Maine v Taylor, 477 US 131  (1986) 
Davis v Bandermer, 478 U.S. 109  (1986) 
CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69 (1987) 
Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635  (1987) 
New Energy Co. of Ind. V Limbach, 486 US 269  (1988) 
Felder v Casey, 487 US 131  (1988) 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 US 605  (1989) 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. , 491 U.S. 1  (1989) 
Healy v Beer Institute 491 US 324   (1989) 
United States Department of Labor v Triplett, 494 US 715  (1990) 
Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 US 149  (1990) 
United States v Munoz Flores, 495 US 385  (1990) 
Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356  (1990) 
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n vs. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Tribe 
of Oklahoma, 498 US 505  
(1991) 
Power v Ohio, 499 U.S. 400  (1991) 
 21 
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak , 501 U.S. 775  (1991) 
Fort Gratior Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources, 504 US 353  
(1992) 
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555  (1992) 
New York v United States, 505 US 144  (1992) 
Nixon v United States, 506 US 224  (1993) 
Scweiker v Chilicky, 487 US 412 (1994) 
FDCI v Meyer, 510 US 471  (1994) 
C&Carbone, Inc. v Town of Clarkstown,  511 US 383  (1994) 
Associated Indus. of Missouri v Loham, 511 US 641   (1994) 
Oregon Waste System, Inc. v Department of Environmental 
Quality of Ore., 511 US 93  
(1994)  
West Lynn Creamery, Inc v Healy, 512 US 186, 210  (1994) 
United States v Lopez, 514 US 549  (1995) 
United States Term Limited v Thornton, 514 US 779  (1995) 
Seminole Tribe vs. Florida, 517 US 44 (1996) 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc v Town of Harrison, 520 US 
564  
(1997) 
Idaho v Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 US 261  (1996) 
City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) 
Raynes v Byrd, 521 US 811 (1997) 
Printz v Unites States, 521 US 898  (1997) 
Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83 (1998) 
Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11  (1998) 
Clinton v City of New York , 524 U.S. 417  (1998) 
College Savings Banks vs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education, 527 US 666  
(1999) 
Alden vs. Maine, 527 US 709 (1999) 
Friends of the Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services,  528 
US 167  
(1999) 
Jones v United States, 529 US 848  (2000) 
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363  (2000) 
Bush v Gore (Bush II) , 531 US 98  (2000) 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62  (2000) 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598  (2000) 
Solid Waste Agency  of North Cook County v United States 
Army Corps of Engineers,  531 US 159  
(2001) 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356  (2001) 
Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 
535 US 613  
(2002) 
Hillside Diary Inc, v Lyons, 539 US 59 (2003) 
American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396  (2003) 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 US 
721  
(2003) 
Virginia v Hicks, 539 US 113  (2003) 
NIKE, Inc. v Kasky, 539 US 654  (2003) 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 524 US 507  (2004) 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v Hood, 541 U.S. 
440  
(2004) 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267  (2004) 
Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509  (2004) 
Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1  (2005) 
American Trucking Assns, Inc. v Michigan Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 545 US 429 
(2005) 
Granholm v Heald, 544 US 460 (2005) 
Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 548 US 356  (2006) 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 
399 
(2006) 
 22 
Handam v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557  (2006) 
Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497  (2007) 
Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation, 127 S Ct. 2553  (2007) 
Keith Lance v Coffman, 549 US _ (2007) 
United Haulers Association v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority, 550 U.S. _ 
(2007) 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _  (2008) 
 
 
• Federal Courts of Appeal 
 
Doe v Bush, 322 F.3d 109  (1st Cir. 2003) 
Orlando v Laird, 443 F.2d 1039  (2d Cir.) 
DaCosta v Laird, 471 F.2d 1146  (2d Cir. 1973) 
United States v City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187  (3d. Cir. 1980) 
United States v Salomon, 563 F.2d 1121  (4th Cir. 1977) 
Ford Motor Company v Texas Department of 
Transportation, 264 F.3d 493  
(5th Cir. 2001) 
Village of Elk Grove Village v Evans, 997 F. 2d 328, 
329  
(7th Cir. 1993) 
United States v Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295  (9th Cir. 1979) 
United States v Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 10398  (9th Cir. 2005) 
ACLU v Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149  (10th Cir. 1999) 
United States v Maxwell, 386 F. 3d 1042  (11th Cir. 2004) 
United States v Maxwell, 446 F. 3d 1218  (11th Cir. 2006) 
Mitchell v Laird, 488 F.2d 611  ( DC Cir. 1973) 
 
• US District Courts 
 
American Libraries Associations v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(1997) 
Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v Spitzer, No. 00 Civ. 7274, 2000 
WL 1694307  
(2000) 
 
• State Courts 
 
Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler, 55 F Supp. 2d 
737 (ED Mich. 1999)  
(1999) 
PSINet, Inc v Chapman, 108 F Supp 2d 611 (WD Va 2000);  (2000) 
 State v. Heckel, 143 Wash. 2d 824, 24 P.3d 404 (2001). (2001) 
 
 23 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Federalist no 51, James Madison stated that, in order to 
protect individual liberty, the US Constitution had submitted the Federal 
Government to two different levels of checks and balances1. On the one 
hand, the principle of separation-of-powers ensures that all branches of the 
Federal Government stand on an equal footing and that no branch will 
prevail over the other. On the other hand, by limiting the competences of the 
Federal Government, the principles of federalism guarantee that component 
States have sufficient powers to defend their citizens from the federal 
tyranny. Hence, he concluded that, since “[t]he different governments will 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself”, 
this system of “double security”2 provides a structural framework within 
which individual rights are protected.  
 
In the same way, the EC Treaty also lays down a system of double 
verification. First, though the principle of institutional balance is more 
limited than the principle of separation of powers in that it does not imply 
an equal distribution of powers among the institutions, it is nonetheless a 
constitutional principle which prevents a Community institution from 
encroaching on the prerogatives of the others3. Secondly, by virtue of the 
principle of attribution of competences, Community institutions have 
limited competences and consequently, the lawfulness of their action is 
conditioned upon the finding of the proper legal basis in the Treaty4. Thus, 
one can affirm that in both legal orders, there are, though different, 
horizontal and vertical “checks and balances”, which operate as structural 
framework in which individual rights are protected. 
 
The purpose of this PhD dissertation is therefore to examine the 
contribution of the US Supreme Court (USSC) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in ensuring the “double security” devised by Madison. Yet, 
                                                 
1 THE FEDERALIST No 51, at 67. (James Madison) (Lester DeKoster Ed., 1976) 
2 Ibid 
3 JP JACQUES, The Principle of Institutional Balance, (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp 383-391  
4 S WEATHERILL, Competence Creep and Competence Control, (2004) 23 YEL, pp 1-54. 
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the aim is not to look at the way in which both Courts allocate power 
between the Legislature and the Executive. The reason is that both the EC 
Treaty and the US Constitution have laid down a very different institutional 
framework and accordingly, a comparative study, albeit possible, arguably 
would be heavily influenced by this original difference. Instead, this thesis 
will centre its focus on the principle of separation-of-powers as applied to 
the judiciary itself. As opposed to the different constitutional setting of the 
US political branches and the EU political institutions, the USSC and the 
ECJ play an analogue role in constitutional governance.5 Accordingly, our 
first aim is to compare how the USSC and the ECJ have drawn the line 
between the realm of politics and the purview of the judiciary. Secondly, 
assuming that the EU is a federal system6, this dissertation subsequently 
attempts to explain how both Courts allocate powers between, on the one 
hand, the Union and, on the other hand, the States. By addressing selective 
questions, the vertical allocation of powers will be explored in two different 
yet complementary ways. At first, the extent of the Union and state 
regulatory powers is examined and subsequently, the consequences of the 
violations of federal and Community law by the States.   
 
Of course, far from being in isolation, vertical and horizontal 
allocations of powers are deeply intertwined: in federal systems, courts are 
often called upon to decide whether and to what extent the protection of 
federalism ought to be trusted to the political process. In the affirmative, not 
only would the judicial department restrict its own powers vis-à-vis the 
other branches of government, but determinations at federal level would 
also become final. In the negative, the judicial department would become 
                                                 
5 RONSELFED, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and 
the U.S. Supreme Court, (2006) 4 ICON, pp. 618-651 (holding that they both allocate 
power [1] among the branches of government, [2]  and between the states and the Union 
and [3] they both protect fundamental rights and economic liberties) 
6 K LENEARTS, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, (1990) 38 
Am.J.Comp.L., pp 205-264 (The author opines that there are two rule-of-law principles 
governing American federalism, namely [1] a dual constitutional structure and [2] the 
capacity of the federal government to act directly upon the people. In this regard, he 
believes that the European Union meets both requirements. First, by allocating powers 
among the Community institutions (horizontal dimension) and between the Union and its 
Member States (vertical dimension), the ECJ has “constitutionalised” the EC Treaty. 
Secondly, by virtue of the doctrine of direct effect, Community law may bestow judicially 
enforceable rights and impose obligations on individuals.) 
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the final arbiter of the federalist debate to the detriment of a dialogue among 
the different political actors. Needless to say, one does not need to write a 
doctoral thesis to know that ideal answers are to be found somewhere in the 
middle. However, this thesis does not seek to find the “optimal solution” to 
these two questions. Rather, after explaining in the light of the relevant 
case-law why, and how, the USSC and the ECJ have reached converging or 
diverging outcomes, our ultimate goal is to signal positive judicial strategies 
that, in our view, would help defining, on the one hand, the role of courts 
vis-à-vis the political process and, on the other hand, reconciling federal 
interests with states’ autonomy.  
 
In spite of an ever-increasing enthusiasm for transatlantic 
constitutional law7, an analogue study as the one to follow has not yet been 
undertaken. Most of the studies are self-contained and limited to a particular 
issue of constitutional law8. It is true that valuable contributions have been 
made9. However, due to the recent developments in the case-law of both 
                                                 
7 A ARNULL, The Americanization of EU Law Scholarship, in ARNULL, EECKHOUT & 
TRIDIMAS (eds.) Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis 
Jacobs (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp 415-431. 
8 There are of course exceptions like the excellent comprehensive work undertaken in the 
mid 1980’s by M CAPELLETTI, M SECCOMBE and J WEILER (eds.), Integration 
Through Law, (Florence: EUI, 1986). More recently NICOLAIDIS and HOWSE (eds), The 
Federal Vision : Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the US and the EU (OUP, 2002) 
and De BURCA & SCOTT, Law & Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford & Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2006) 
9 Chapter 1: JC REITZ, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, (2002) 50 Am.J.Comp.L., 
pp 437. R.S KAY, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: A Comparative Analysis, in  RS 
KAY (Ed), Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: Comparative Perspective, (Brussels, 
Bruylant: 2006), pp 1-40; A STONE, “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review 
and Why It May Not Matter”, (2003) Mich. L. Rev., pp 2744-2780; Chapter 2: no relevant 
comparative study for our purposes was found; Chapter 3: DP KOMMERS & M 
WAELBROECK, Legal Integration and the Free Movement of Goods: The American and 
European Experience, in Cappelletti & Others, Op cit, pp 224; M POIARES MADURO, 
We, the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998); F STRUMIA, Citizenship and Free Movement: European 
and American Features of a Judicial Formula for Increased Comity, (2005) 12 
Colum.J.Eur.L., 713-79; Chapter 4- G BERMANN, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: 
Federalism in the European Community and the US, (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev., ; E 
YOUNG, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary 
Tales From American Federalism, (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L Rev., p 1612-1737; D 
HALBERSTAM, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal System, 
(2004) 90 Va. L. Rev., p731-834 and Comparative Federalism and the issue of 
Commandeering, pp 213-251 in Nicolaidis & Howse, op cit, F SANDER, Subsidiarity 
Infringement before the European Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a 
Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism?, (2006) 12 Colum. J. Eur. L., pp 517-71; 
Chapter 5: DJ MELTZER, Member state liability in Europe and the United States, (2006) 
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courts, in particular the federalism revolution of the Rehnquist Court, most 
of the literature is largely out-of-date. Besides, another shortcoming is that 
comparative studies tend to rely excessively on secondary sources. By 
contrast, this dissertation proposes to draw its conclusions directly from the 
latest case-law of both courts, without, nonetheless, obviating the doctrinal 
discussions on both sides of the Atlantic. The advantage of this 
methodology is twofold. First, it provides the reader with a factual 
framework to understand the rulings of both Courts. Secondly, not only does 
it facilitate comparisons, but it also enables answering whether in similar 
factual contexts, similar rulings would have been obtained. 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. To begin with, in order to 
evaluate how the USSC and ECJ draw the line between judicial procedure 
and political process, first we must examine how both courts interact with 
private and public litigants. If the constitutional design (or rather its judicial 
interpretation) favours public law litigation brought by private actors while 
barring access to the political branches, direct judicial intervention into the 
realm of politics becomes more difficult. Indeed, courts would not directly 
address inter-branches conflicts, but rather exercise “their traditional 
function in constitutional cases” namely, redressing the violation of 
constitutional or federal rights by public actors. On the contrary, if debates 
among political institutions are welcomed, even without requiring any harm, 
it is more difficult for the courts not to become involved in policy-making. 
Accordingly, by looking at standing rules in the US and in the EU, chapter I 
examines whether the litigating structure in the US and in the EU facilitates 
or rather hinders judicial intrusions into politics. By examining the case-law 
of both courts, it is maintained that, while standing under Article III US 
Constitution has been read as preventing the federal courts from violating 
the principle of separation-of-powers, this is not the case in the EU. The 
ECJ interprets Article 230 EC as welcoming political debates among 
political actors, while largely shifting “normal judicial business” to the 
                                                                                                                            
4 ICON, 39-83; J PFANDER, Member State Liability and Constitutional Change in the 
United States and Europe, (2003) 51 Am.J.Comp.L., 237-274 and Kobler v Austria: 
Expositional Supremacy and Member State Liability, (2006) 17 EBL Rev., pp 275-297 
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national courts. It is a jurisdictional rule, rather than an implement of the 
separation-of-powers. 
 
Next, in the absence of a constitutional structure preventing the 
judicial department from starting policy-making, it is still possible for the 
courts to exclude certain “substantive” questions on the ground that they are 
“too political”. To this effect, the USSC has coined the “political question 
doctrine”, pursuant to which, by virtue of textual constitutional basis or 
prudential considerations, absolute deference to the political branches takes 
place. It is thus a substantial limitation on judicial review. Although the ECJ 
has not formally adopted this doctrine, it is still interesting to verify whether 
it has been implicitly embraced. In this regard, after explaining its American 
rise and fall as well as its continuing importance in foreign affairs, Chapter 
II is devoted to searching for a political question doctrine in a European 
context. It is concluded that both Courts converge in adopting a post-
Baker10 reading of the doctrine, that is, judicial intervention must be 
underpinned by democratic principles and the protection of human rights. 
That does not mean that the ECJ does not pay due account to the 
institutional capacities of the political institutions. On the contrary, recent 
cases on terrorism show that the Community Courts11 have opted for a 
balance. Whereas policy decisions are not second-guessed, their 
implementation must comply with procedural individual rights.  
 
In Chapters III and IV, the regulation of interstate commerce is taken 
as the paradigmatic example to examine how the judiciary allocates 
regulatory powers between the Union and the States. This allocation takes 
place in two ways.  
 
On the one hand, both the US Constitution and the EC Treaty 
entrusts the judiciary with the enforcement of constitutional and treaty 
provisions protecting interstate trade, that is, the internal market is protected 
                                                 
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 
11 In this thesis, the term “Community Courts” alludes to the ECJ and the Court of First 
Instance (CFI). The case-law of the recently created Civil Service Tribunal is not taken into 
account. 
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through “negative integration”. In this regard, Chapter III is devoted to a 
comparative study between the Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) and 
Article 28 EC. There, it is argued that the USSC enforces the DCC as only 
forbidding discriminatory state measures, while leaving “balancing” to the 
States. Conversely, Article 28 EC goes beyond discrimination, Keck12 
notwithstanding. The reason for this divergence lies in that the US and EU 
internal markets have reached different levels of market integration, and that 
the USSC has a higher level of trust of the institutional capacities of state 
legislatures. From these differences, it is inferred that a way of improving 
the Keck doctrine would be for national courts to defer to the national 
legislatures when examining non-discriminatory selling arrangements. Yet, 
courts would still examine that national legislators, in their deliberations, 
provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that they have seriously reflected 
upon the negative effects that market organisation rules may have on free 
movement of goods.  
 
On the other hand, both the US Constitution and the EC Treaty 
empower Congress and the Community to enact commercial legislation, that 
is, the internal market is set-up trough “positive legislation”. However, this 
vast grant of power does not imply that the powers of the Union are 
unlimited. Quite the contrary, both the US and the EU constitutional system 
recognise the principle of enumerated powers and the principle of 
attribution respectively. However, after examining the case-law of both 
Courts, it is concluded that the enforcement of this principle does not suffice 
to contain the competence creep. In looking for alternative or additional 
means to safeguard federalism, this Chapter finally advocates for a 
“process-oriented” review, whereby, in exercising their competences, both 
Congress and the EC legislator properly examine the values of federalism.  
 
 Further, not only does the vertical allocation of powers take place in 
examining the extent of regulatory powers corresponding to each level of 
governance, but also by measuring the effects of state action or inaction 
                                                 
12 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 
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when violating federal and Community law. In this regard, Chapter V 
attempts to answer why the USSC and the ECJ have given opposite answers 
to the possibility of suing States for damages. After examining the relevant 
case-law of both Courts, it is concluded that, on the one hand, structural 
differences and, on the other hand, the interaction between state treasuries 
and remedies provide an explanation for diverging views on state liability 
for damages. At the same time, this divergence also influences the way both 
Courts apprehend the principle of supremacy of federal and Community 
law. Whereas in the EU, this principle is indissolubly linked to providing 
Community rights with adequate remedies, the USSC has opted for a 
“schism”. Article VI US Constitution is therefore interpreted as providing 
mechanisms to ensure that States sufficiently abide by “the rule of federal 
law”, regardless of federal rights violated in the past.  
 
Finally, while not attempting to devise a theory of judicial review, it 
is concluded that, when drawing the line between politics and the judicial 
process as well as when considering allocation of powers between the Union 
and its component states, courts should not narrow their focus to finding 
“substantive” benchmarks. Whereas providing substance to the US 
Constitution and the EC Treaty remains a necessary function of the 
judiciary, courts sometimes lack the expertise and institutional capacities to 
do so. Likewise, at times putting flesh on the bones of a constitutional text is 
not sufficient to preserve horizontal and vertical balances of powers. 
Accordingly, both the USSC and the ECJ should also pay due regard to a 
“process review”, which operates in two ways. First, courts should be 
vigilant that the political process is underpinned by democratic values. 
Secondly, instead of always adopting a stand-alone approach to provide 
ideal answers, it is maintained that courts should also cooperate with 
political actors to find such answers. 
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Chapter I 
 
Standing Doctrines in the US and in the EU 
 
In Marbury v Madison13, the US Supreme Court (USSC) was caught 
by the horns of the most famous constitutional dilemma ever decided. It had 
to choose between applying Article III of the US Constitution14 and a 
conflicting federal statute. Chief Justice Marshall opted for the former, and 
thus, judicial review was born. Ever since, all American courts have been 
empowered to declare that “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void”15. Additionally, not only did the Chief Justice 
announce this constitutional institution, but he also indicated the way in 
which judicial review would operate in federal courts16. This dilemma did 
not arise as an abstract constitutional question referred by the political 
branches, but it was anchored in a factual context. Indeed, the Marbury 
Court’s ultimate goal was to clarify whether Mr. Marbury was entitled to his 
commission. The annulment of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was a mere 
procedural incident necessary to solve the dispute. Judicial review was “a 
mean to an end” and not an end in itself. Two centuries after Marbury was 
delivered, the USSC still holds these findings true. Judicial review may only 
occur in adversarial contexts capable of resolution through the judicial 
process. As Monagham puts it, “constitutional adjudication [meaning 
compliance of public law actors with the Constitution] is still viewed as a 
by-product of preventing unjustified injury to private interests”17. Thus, the 
notion of “injury” is the key element allowing the federal judiciary to call in 
the Constitution. Accordingly, only parties having suffered injuries resulting 
from constitutional violations may seek judicial review. Standing, 
                                                 
13 Marbury v Madison,  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
14 See Annex  
15 Ibid, 176 
16 JC REITZ, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, (2002) 50 Am.J.Comp.L., pp 437. R.S 
KAY, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: A Comparative Analysis, in  RS KAY (Ed), 
Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: Comparative Perspective, (Brussels, Bruylant: 
2006), pp 1-40 
17 HP MONAGHAN, Constitutional Adjudication: the Who and the When, (1973) 83 Yale 
L. J., pp 1363-1397 
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understood as the procedural capacity to bring proceedings and to have a 
court decide on the merits, may be employed to reinforce the “Marbury 
paradigm” of judicial review. As a matter of fact, the USSC has relied on 
Article III US Constitution to restrict the universe of possible applicants to 
those proving an “injury” capable of being redressed by judicial 
intervention. “Injury” appears as the condicio sine qua non for applicants to 
invoke constitutional justice. From the standpoint of the USSC, without a 
factual substratum provided by a relevant injury, the federal judiciary is not 
entitled to “say what the law is”18. 
 
Has the EU followed the American model of judicial review? Is 
standing used to reinforce a certain paradigm of constitutional justice? 
Before answering these questions, a distinction must be drawn between 
judicial review of “Community measures” and of “national measures”. This 
distinction is completely irrelevant under American constitutional law. In so 
far as they act within their respective jurisdictions, both state and federal 
courts may declare both federal and state law unconstitutional. However, in 
the EU, it is not the case. While Community Courts enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction to annul Community acts19, it is only for national courts to 
declare an act of national law incompatible with the EC Treaty20. Therefore, 
the EC Treaty allocates the power of judicial review between Community 
and national courts in accordance with the origin of the measure challenged.  
 
As for judicial review of Community measures, the EU model 
mirrors the system established by the Austrian, German, French, 
Portuguese, Spanish and the more recent Eastern European Constitutions21. 
The EU has a centralised system of judicial review of Community measures.  
In pursuance with Article 230 EC, while Community institutions and the 
                                                 
18 Marbury, 137 
19 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199 
20 However, in some occasions, the ECJ extracts from the questions referred by the national 
court those elements of the legal and factual background concerning the interpretation of 
Community law that would allow the national court to solve the dispute before it. See e.g. 
Joined Cases C-330/90 and C-331/90 López Brea and Hidalgo Palacios [1992] ECR I-323, 
para 5, and Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239, para 60 
21 Kay, Op cit, p 3. See also A STONE, “Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review 
and Why It May Not Matter”, (2003) Mich. L. Rev., pp 2744-2780 
 32 
Member States need not prove any interest in bringing proceedings, private 
parties must overcome very strict standing rules to directly access the 
Community Courts. Therefore, following the Kelsenian model of judicial 
review22, Article 230 EC lays down preferential standing rules to the benefit 
of the political institutions. Direct actions are construed as a mean of 
favouring horizontal and vertical debates among the Member States and the 
Community institutions. Relieving injuries of private parties caused by 
“unconstitutional” Community measures is rather a marginal objective of 
this treaty provision. Therefore, one may argue that Article 230 EC does not 
emulate the American model of judicial review. 
 
However, Article 230 EC does not present the full picture. Along 
with direct challenges, the validity of Community measures may be also 
contested indirectly. In the light of Article 234 EC, when, in order to solve 
the dispute before it, a national court questions the validity of a Community 
measure, it must suspend proceedings and refer the matter to the ECJ. The 
latter will then rule over this constitutional question and send the case back 
to the national court for its final resolution. Indirect challenges are vital for 
the European system of remedies to comply with the principle of judicial 
protection. Bearing in mind that private applicants seldom have direct 
access to the Community Courts, the ECJ believes that it is for national 
courts to facilitate indirect challenges23. Hence, the system of referral laid 
down in Article 234 EC presents some common elements with the 
“Marbury paradigm”. There is an underlying storyline providing a factual 
background. Perhaps most importantly, the constitutional question arises as 
a by-product to resolve unjustified injuries. Yet, two major differences 
persist. First, by contrast to the American model, it is not the trial court 
which examines the validity of the challenged Community measures, but a 
distant court sitting in Luxembourg. Arguably, the relevance of the factual 
input is thus watered-down24. Secondly, since litigants may not compel 
                                                 
22 H KELSEN, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and 
American Constitution, (1942) 4 The Journal of Politics, pp 183-200 
23 Case C-50/00P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council (UPA), [2002] ECR I-6677; 
Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425 
24 Stone Sweet, Op cit, p 2771 
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national courts to make a reference, the system of preliminary rulings is not 
a judicial remedy, but a tool of judicial cooperation25. Accordingly, in order 
to safeguard the dialogue with national courts, the ECJ may be called upon 
to examine Community measures even when litigating parties have suffered 
no injury. Conversely, in spite of the existence of patent injuries, the ECJ 
cannot intervene without a national court willing to start dialoguing. As a 
result, the ECJ has difficulties in elucidating the real purpose of the 
preliminary reference proceedings.  
 
In relation to national measures, national courts enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction to set aside national law conflicting with the EC Treaty. 
Although the ECJ has sometimes decided the case before it26, for the final 
decision rests with the national courts alone as to whether national law is 
compatible with the EC Treaty. What type of judicial review takes then 
place before national courts? National courts are not compelled to embrace a 
precise standing doctrine when reviewing the consistency of national law 
with the EC Treaty27. Nevertheless, as all national procedural law, standing 
rules are subjected to two limitations, namely the principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence. Provided that national procedural law complies with these 
two limitations, the ECJ does not impose a particular model of judicial 
review. To some extent, the same applies to American state courts. The 
USSC has ruled that Article III of the US Constitution does not bind state 
courts even when adjudicating over federal questions. When seeking the 
annulment of either a federal or state law, parties litigating before state 
courts are not necessarily required to show an injury. Besides, some states 
grant political state actor with free-standing to bring proceedings. Of course, 
state standing rules must comply with Due Process28. In addition, it is also 
argued that the latter cannot be stricter than the requirements contained in 
Article III. Accordingly, “federal” standing rules set a minimum threshold 
for state courts when adjudicating over federal questions. 
 
                                                 
25 Opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA, Op cit, para 42.  
26 See supra fn 20 
27 Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271 
28 § 1  XIVth Amendment  US Constitution in Annex  
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From the foregoing, one can draw four immediate implications. 
First, while in the US, judicial review is vested to federal and state courts on 
an equal basis, in the EU it is exercised by the courts of the legislature 
adopting the challenged act. Secondly, the US federal jurisdiction does not 
distinguish between private and public applicants. Thirdly, in so far as the 
preliminary reference procedure is subjected to the varying dynamics of 
judicial dialogue, analogies with the American model must be examined 
with caution. Finally, one may draw some parallelism between state and 
national rules of standing. Both must comply with minimum requirements. 
Yet, once they are fulfilled, European and American States are free to adopt 
liberal standing rules.  
 
This chapter aims to compare the standing doctrines in the US and in 
the EU. For the purpose of clarity, judicial review is defined broadly, so that 
it includes review of both legislative statutes and administrative action. The 
reason is twofold. In both EU and US, the same standing rules apply 
regardless of whether a statute or an administrative act is challenged. 
Additionally, on both sides of the Atlantic, most of the case-law has been 
provided by administrative litigation. The chapter is divided into three parts. 
Part I attempts to compare “locus standi” under Article 230 EC with the 
standing doctrine emanating from Article III US Constitution. Its first 
section starts by evaluating whether the rules of standing under the two 
systems have the same objectives. Next, it proceeds to examine why the 
USSC refuses to grant “special plaintiff status” to the political branches and 
States. Section two then compares “locus standi” of private applicants under 
Article 230 (4) EC with the US case-law. In particular, it is discussed 
whether the Plaumann formula entails a higher admissibility threshold than 
the prohibition to vindicate “generalized grievances” under Article III. This 
section also examines whether the “traceability” and “redressability” 
elements can be found under Article 230 EC. Part II looks at standing under 
Article 230 EC as a “jurisdictional shifting” strategy. Having examined the 
failed attempts made by AG Jacobs in UPA and the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) in Jégo Quéré to liberalize standing, this chapter evaluates whether 
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the USSC takes into account the availability of a state forum when denying 
access to federal courts. Part III is dedicated to analysing standing before 
national courts. It is argued that the ECJ does not require “actio popularis”. 
Still, it is also maintained that the adoption of the Plaumann formula by 
national legislatures is unacceptable. Thus, when challenging national law, 
it is suggested that standing under Article III US Constitution would comply 
with the standards of judicial protection imposed by the ECJ for national 
courts. Finally, this Chapter concludes with two important findings. On the 
one hand, it welcomes the step taken by the USSC in favouring litigation by 
States as a check in the congressional delegation of powers. On the other 
hand, it considers that private applicants have better chances of challenging 
unconstitutional measures under Article III, than under the combined effect 
of Articles 230 and 234 EC.  
I.-   Standing under Article III US Constitution and Article 230 EC  
 
A.-  General Overview. – Concept and Purposes 
 
1.-  Concept 
 
Under the US Constitution, standing addresses the question “whether 
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues”29, that is, whether the applicant has a “personal stake in 
the outcome of the controversy”30. As Tribe points out, standing can be 
distinguished from the other elements of justiciability in that it primarily 
focuses on the applicant31. The USSC has consistently stated that “the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”32 
namely, the applicant must prove that he has suffered [1]“an injury in fact”, 
that the latter is [2]“causally connected” to the actions of the defendant, and 
that the injury can [3] “be redressed” by a favourable judicial intervention33. 
                                                 
29 Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 95 (1975) 
30 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) 
31 LH TRIBE, American Constitutional Law  Volume I, ( Foundation 3rd Ed. 2000) , pp385-
386 
32 Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560 (1992) 
33 Idem. 
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The intangible nature of these elements implies that Congress may never 
override them by statutory grant. For instance in Lujan v Defenders of 
Wildlife, the USSC quashed a federal statute conferring standing upon 
applicants having suffered no injuries. In addition, the USSC has also laid 
down additional prudential rules which, though may be superseded by 
Congress, deny standing to applicants having suffered [1] “a general 
grievance shared in substantial equal measure by all or a large class of 
citizen”, where the plaintiff is not asserting [2] “his own legal rights”, or 
where the claim does not fall within [3]“the zone of interests” protected by 
the statute or constitutional norm invoked34.  
 
As for Community law, “locus standi” under Article 230 EC can be 
defined as the personal capacity to bring direct actions challenging the 
validity of Community acts before the Community Courts35. In accordance 
with this treaty provision, this capacity varies depending on the identity of 
the applicant. Where the latter is a Member State, the Commission, the 
Council or the European Parliament (“privileged applicants”), the Treaty 
provides that they may challenge any reviewable act, regardless of “a lack 
of interest in bringing proceedings”36. In an intermediate position, the third 
paragraph of Article 230 enables the European Central Bank and the Court 
of Auditors to institute annulment proceedings in defense of their 
prerogatives (“semi-privileged applicants”). By contrast, where the 
applicant is a private person or entity or a political subdivision of the State37 
(“private or non-privileged applicants”), standing rules are rigorously strict. 
The fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC lays down three different scenarios 
under which private applicants satisfy standing rules. First, a private 
applicant may challenge a decision addressed to him. Secondly, he may also 
challenge a decision “in the form” of a regulation. Finally, he may bring an 
                                                 
34 Valley Forge Christian College v American United for the Separation of Church and 
State, 454 US 464, 474-475 (1982) 
35 P CRAIG & G De BURCA, EU LAW , Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, OUP:2003), p 
486-487 
36 Case 45/89 Commission v Council (Generalized Tariff Preferences) [1987] ECR 1493 
para 3 
37 See Case C-95/97 Région Wallonne v Commission [1997] ECR I-1787, para 6 Case C-
180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission [1997] ECR I-5245, para 6. Case C-452/98 
Nederlandse Antillen v Council [2001] ECR I-8973, para 50 
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annulment action against a decision addressed to a third party. In the last 
two cases, he is required to show a “direct and individual concern”.  The 
first type of case is straightforward and unsurprisingly, most of litigation has 
concentrated in the other two. Further, from the wording of Article 230 EC, 
it appears that a private applicant is only allowed to contest the validity of 
Community acts when they are “in substance” a decision. On the contrary, 
purely legislative measures could only be annulled by privileged or semi-
privileged applicants. However, since Codorniu38, the ECJ has consistently 
recognised that the conferral of standing does not depend on the legislative 
or administrative nature of the challenged act, but rather on private 
applicants being directly and individually concerned39.  
 
From both definitions, one may infer that there is no equivalent to 
“privileged applicants” under Article III US Constitution. All litigants, 
either private or public, must demonstrate they have suffered a relevant 
injury. As for private applicants, just like US notion of “injury-in-fact”, the 
ECJ also requires some sort of “harm”. Indeed, the Community Courts have 
consistently stated that private applicants must have an “interest in bringing 
proceedings”40. Besides, as explained below, an applicant is individually 
concerned when she manages to prove that the challenged act adversely 
affects her in particular way.  Furthermore, it appears that there is an 
element of causation in both the notion of “direct concern” under Article 
230 EC and in the notions of “traceability and redressability” of Article III. 
As for the prudential elements of Article III, it appears that the ECJ also 
opposes to applicants filing annulment actions with a view to remedying 
                                                 
38 Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, para 19 See also Joined Cases T-
480/93 and T-483/93 Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2305, 
para 66; T-243/01 Sony Computer Entertainment  Ltd. v Commission [2003] ECR I-4189 
para 59 
39 A ARNULL, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment since Codorniu, (2001) 
38 CML Rev., pp 7-52; 23. JA USHER, Direct and Individual Concern- An Effective 
Remedy or a Conventional Solution, (2003) 28 E. L. Rev., pp 575-600; 577-578. S 
ENCHELMAIER, No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest Developments, and Non-
Developments, in the European Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on Art. 230(4) EC, (2005) 
YEL, pp 173-221; 176-77 
40 Case 53/85 AKZO Chemie and AKZO Chemie UK v Commission [1986] ECR 1965, para 
21; and, by analogy, Case C-19/93 P Rendo and Others v Commission [1995] ECR I-3319, 
para 13; Case C-174/99 P Parliament v Richard [2000] ECR I-6189, para 33; and Case 
C-362/05 P Wunenburger v Commission [2007] ECR I-4333, para 42 
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“generalized grievances”. In the same way, few exceptions notwithstanding, 
the ECJ is also reluctant to granting third-parting standing. Finally, it seems 
that the “zone of interests” test is already subsumed under the notion of 
individual concern. Indeed, when examining whether the applicant is 
individually concerned, the Community Courts already examine whether 
“the interests sought to be protected by the complainant [fall] within the 
zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the [relevant] statute”41. A 
further comparative analysis of these elements will be undertaken in the 
pages below, but prior to this the purpose of standing on each side of the 
Atlantic is examined. 
 
 
2.-  The purpose of Standing 
 
In the US, the federal standing doctrine has evolved from being 
considered as a utilitarian device rendering litigation more concrete, and 
thus facilitating the task of federal judges, into an implement of the principle 
of separation of powers42. At first stage, the USSC ruled that standing was a 
prudential or discretionary instrument which improved the quality of 
litigation. By rejecting that the standing doctrine could raise separations of 
powers problems43, the USSC held that standing aimed at preventing federal 
courts from adjudicating over “ill-defined facts over constitutional issues” 
and cases having “a hypothetical or abstract character”44. However, since 
Allen v Wrights45, the real purpose of standing has been to implement the 
principle of separation of powers46. Particularly, Justice Scalia maintains 
                                                 
41 Association of Data Processing Service Organization v Camp, 397 US 150, 153 (1970) 
42 J LEONARD & J C BRANT, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, 
and the Framer’s Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, (2001) 54 Rutgers L. 
Rev., pp-7-33. 
43 Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 100 (1968) 
44 Baker v Carr, 204 
45 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984). See also Valley Forge, 464. Lujan, 571-78. Steel 
Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 93-102 (1998). Raynes v Byrd, 521 US 
811, 819-20 (1997).  
46 This jurisprudential shift is well illustrated by Steel Co v Citizens for a Better 
Environment, Op cit, where the USSC rejected to follow a “hypothetical jurisdiction”, 
pursuant to which “where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the 
prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction 
denied”, federal courts could proceed on the merits. Thus, Steel Co demonstrates that even 
 39 
that the law on standing must be understood as confining courts to their 
traditional and limited role of protecting minorities, rather than enabling the 
clarification of constitutional provisions to the benefit of the majority. In his 
famous article, he stated that owing to its lack of political accountability, the 
judicial department is ill-fitted to protect interests of the majority, which are 
better safeguarded by the political branches47. Later, in Lujan v Defenders of 
Wildlife, writing for the USSC, he added that since the Take Care Clause of 
Article II of the US Constitution48 calls for a dividing line between the 
powers of the Executive and the Judiciary, whereby the latter cannot replace 
the former in its constitutional assigned task of generally enforcing federal 
legislation; standing rules must be interpreted in the light of this 
constitutional mandate49. 
Thus, standing is currently seen as a self-imposed limit which guarantees 
that “the proper role of the courts in a democratic society”50 is respected, 
that is to say, in order for the courts to adjudicate on the merits, the 
applicant must prove that he has suffered an “injury”, which separates him 
from the majority and hence, his claim can be “appropriately resolved 
trough the judicial process”51. As a result, it can be affirmed that the USSC 
has opted for a private law model of constitutional adjudication, in which, 
by virtue of the principle of separation of powers, standing rules are 
construed as fully and exclusively committed to confining federal courts to 
solving individual disputes. 
  
Under Article 230 EC Treaty, does standing also operate as an 
implement of the principle of separation of powers? I would suggest a reply 
in the negative. It is true that the ECJ conferred standing to the European 
Parliament, in spite of the then wording of EC Treaty suggesting the 
                                                                                                                            
if a case shows a sufficient degree of “concreteness”, the separation of powers may still 
prevent federal courts from adjudicating on the merits. 
47 A SCALIA, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, (1983) 17 Suffolk U.L.Rev., pp 894-895 
48 See Annex  
49 Lujan, 571-78. See also Dissenting Chief Justice Roberts. Jr. in Massachusetts v EPA, 
549  US_ (2007) 
50 Allen, 750 
51 Lujan, 560 
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contrary52. By allowing the Parliament to lodge annulment proceedings in 
order to defend its prerogatives, the ECJ sought to re-establish the inter-
institutional balance disturbed by the Council. Yet, the application of this 
principle did not respond to the reasons alluded by the USSC in Allen or 
Lujan. The ECJ applied the principle with a view to guaranteeing an 
“equality of arms” between the political institutions. The conferral of 
judicial access upon the European Parliament was the only way of 
protecting its political power. However, Article 230 EC was never construed 
as to impeding the ECJ from encroaching upon the realm of the political 
institutions. Thus, the purpose of Article 230 EC is to encourage a 
constitutional debate among the Member States and the Community 
Institutions, while shifting the “normal judicial business”, understood as 
redressing individual injuries, to the national courts53. It enshrines a 
“jurisdictional principle”, whereby Luxembourg becomes the principal 
judicial venue for the Community political actors, while attributing the 
primary role in defending private interests to the national courts. As a result, 
whereas Article III standing has a “horizontal” dimension which enables the 
USSC to draw the line between the law and politics, standing under Article 
230 EC has a “vertical and jurisdictional” one. 
B.- Standing and public applicants 
 
One could suggest that the unequal treatment under Article 230 EC 
between privileged and non-privileged applicants encompasses the different 
roles assigned by the EC Treaty. Whereas Member States and Community 
Institutions operate as “Guardians of the Treaties”, individuals or entities 
only initiate proceedings in order to protect their private interests. 
                                                 
52 The original version of Article 230 EC did not include the European Parliament and thus, 
the ECJ refused to confer standing on it either as a privileged or non-privileged applicant. 
See Case 302/87, European Parliament v Council, [1988] ECR 5615 (Comitology case). 
However, alluding to the principle of institutional balance, the ECJ subsequently changed 
its opinion and decided to grant standing to the European Parliament, but only to actions 
capable of hindering its prerogatives.  See Case C-70/88, Parliament v Council, 
(Chernobyl) [1990] ECR I-2041.This ruling was codified in the following Treaty 
Amendments and finally, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice, the European 
Parliament reached the status of privileged applicant 
53 A ARNULL, ‘The Action for Annulment: A case of Double Standards?’ in D. O’KEEFE 
& A. BAVASSO (eds), Judicial Review in European Union Law: Essays in Honour of 
Lord Slynn (Kluwer 2000), pp 177-190 
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Consequently, as it occurs in the European States which followed Kelsen’s 
model, direct access to Community Courts should be granted to the political 
actors, since they are the ones adopting the norms in the first place. On the 
contrary, the law, as an expression of “voluntas popularis”, should be 
shielded from capricious attacks of a few. Otherwise, the proper functioning 
of Community Institutions would be unnecessarily disturbed54.  
 
On the contrary, in lawsuits brought by the Federal Government, 
members of Congress and States, the existence of an “injury-in-fact” 
remains an admissibility requirement. Although the USSC does not oppose 
proceedings brought by the public litigants when asserting their own 
sovereign or proprietary interests55, it is suspicious when they represent the 
interests of third parties. The reason is that concern for the separation of 
powers and federalism dominate the rationale of the USSC even more 
intensively than with private standing. However, the USSC’s case-law has 
not always been crystal clear.  
 
 
1.-  Standing of the US Government, States and Members of Congress 
 
While the USSC allows the Federal Government to protect the 
general interest of the public when enforcing specific statutory schemes, it 
has struggled to determine when to do so in the absence of a supporting 
statute. Suffice it to juxtapose In re Debs56 against US v Salomon57 and US v 
Mattson58. While in the first case, the USSC conferred standing to the 
United States in order to prevent railway strikers from injuring the general 
welfare and regardless of the lack of pecuniary interest in bringing 
                                                 
54J SCHWARZE, The Legal Protection of the Individual against Regulations in European 
Union Law, (2004) 10:2 EPL, pp 288-290 (holding that traditionally, direct action against 
Community Acts was entrusted to the Member States and the Community Institutions. 
Individuals acting as applicants were rather the exception); pp 287-288. 
55 For States see: Georgia v Pennsylvania R Co, 324 US 439, 443 (1945); New Hampshire 
v Louisiana, 108 US 76, 91 (1883); For the US Federal Government:  US v Florida, 420 US 
531(1975); US v Maine 420 US 515 (1975) For Members of Congress: Powell v 
McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969) 
56 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) 
57 US v Salomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977) 
58 US v Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979) 
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proceedings, in Salomon and Mattson, two US Courts of Appeal reached the 
opposite conclusion. They found that conferring standing would entail an 
excessive encroachment of the Executive upon congressional domains. 
Indeed, in the absence of a statutory authorisation, it is not possible to 
ascertain whether Congress actually intended to ban the activity challenged 
by the Federal Government, which would displace state law and constraint 
individual liberty. Otherwise, the non-democratic process of litigation 
would decide matters of paramount public importance, leading to a 
“government by injunction [which] is anathematic to the American judicial 
tradition”59. 
 
Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances, States have been 
conferred standing to sue as “parens patriae”. Where the health and well-
being of its residents are put at risk, a State may intervene to defend them60. 
This was the case in Georgia v Tennessee Cooper Co., where Georgia 
sought an injunction against a private company located in Tennessee, which 
was contaminating the plaintiff’s air and mountains. Owing to the fact that 
Georgia owned little of territory affected, the USSC acknowledged that it 
was not suing in its own interest, but in its “quasi-sovereign” capacity61. 
Additionally, the USSC has also conferred standing where a State wishes to 
vindicate “not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the 
federal system”62.  Moreover, the USSC has pointed out that a good 
indication to determine whether a State acting as “parens patriae” has 
standing is to determine whether this type of injuries is “one that the State, if 
it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign making 
powers”63. Nevertheless, in Massachusetts v Mellon, the USSC stated that 
States could not institute proceedings against the Federal Government, by 
invoking parens patriae standing to protect their citizens from the operation 
of an allegedly unconstitutional federal statute.64  
 
                                                 
59 US v City of Philadelphia,  644 F.2d 187 (3d. Cir. 1980) 
60 Georgia v Tennessee Cooper Co., 206 US 230, 236-38 (1907) 
61 Ibid, 236-38  
62 Alfred L Snapp & Son, Inc. v Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607-608 (1982) 
63 Ibid, 607  
64 Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 485-86 (1923) 
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However, nearly a century later, the USSC reconsidered its 
approach. In Massachusetts v EPA65, with a view to combating global 
warming, a group of States, local corporations and private organisations 
sought to enforce, in relation to the emission of four greenhouses gases, the 
application §202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, according to which the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is obliged to regulate the emission 
of any air pollutant from new motor vehicles. In particular, Massachusetts 
stated that if global warming continued, it would certainly loose a 
substantial portion of its coastal property. On the contrary, by considering 
that these emissions inflicted a widespread harm, the EPA maintained that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Considering that only one of the plaintiffs 
needed to have standing to review the merits of the case, the USSC 
examined the claim of the State of Massachusetts. First, the USSC stated 
that, by contrast to Lujan where the plaintiff was a private association, this 
case involved a State, which is “not [a] normal litigant […] for the 
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction”66. Secondly, the USSC pointed 
out that the facts of this case were similar to the ones in Georgia v 
Tennessee Copper Co, inferring that Massachusetts’ desire to preserve its 
sovereign territory was well-founded. Additionally, the USSC based its 
finding on the idea that standing could operate to counterbalance the transfer 
of competences from States to the Union. Indeed, since Massachusetts had 
lost its law-making powers to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for new 
vehicles, not only was the EPA in charge of protecting it, but Congress had 
also laid down an additional safeguard consisting of “a concomitant 
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as 
arbitrary and capricious”67. Thus, the USSC concluded that these 
circumstances entitled Massachusetts to “a special solicitude”68. Expressing 
his dissent, Chief Justice Robert Jr. stressed that, while in Georgia v 
Tennessee Copper Co. the defendant was a private corporation, in this case 
a State was asserting a quasi-sovereign interest against the Federal 
Government. Hence, by recalling Massachusetts v Mellon, the Chief Justice 
                                                 
65 Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
66 Ibid, 512 
67 Ibid, 513 
68 Ibid, 514 
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contested the USSC’s findings. In a footnote, the USSC replied that 
dissenting Justices had erred in granting Mellon with such broad reading. It 
drew a distinction between cases where a State tries “to protect her citizens 
from the operation of federal statutes” and cases where “a State asserts its 
rights under federal law”. Whereas in the first case, Mellon remains 
applicable, in the latter it does not. One can thus affirm that, although in 
Massachusetts v EPA the USSC did not overrule Mellon, it did narrow down 
its scope. It seems that Mellon only remains applicable where a State is 
challenging the applicability of a federal statute to its citizens. Conversely, 
where a State is seeking the enforcement of a federal statute, standing is 
granted as a check on the Federal Agencies’ delegated powers. 
 
Finally, the USSC is reluctant to grant standing to Members of 
Congress alleging the “loss of political powers”69 caused either by the inter-
branch or intra-branch disputes. The reason is that the so-called 
“institutional injuries” involve separation-of-powers considerations, in 
relation to which the USSC has proved to favour great deference to the 
political process. Indeed, it is argued that where institutional cleavages do 
not affect private rights, federal courts should abstain from entering a 
political debate70. First, a distinction must be drawn between cases where 
congressmen do not possess the fiat of their respective Houses of Congress 
to institute proceedings and cases where they do. In the former case, since 
legislative power is not individually vested on each member of Congress but 
on the body as a whole, standing should be denied. Accordingly, legislators 
should be powerless to litigate without their House’s approval71. Secondly, 
the USSC also appears to distinguish between cases where an institutional 
injury provokes the “abstract dilution”72 of legislators’ votes and where it 
                                                 
69 Idem 
70 AC AREND & CB LOTRIONTE, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present and Future 
of Legislator Standing, (2002) 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, pp 209-282.  
71 Ibid. Authors reinforce this argument by referring to corporate law. The members of a 
board do not have any powers to act individually. Nor can they start proceedings to defend 
the board’s interest without its approval. See pp 277-281. However, while this limitation 
seems accurate for “interbranch” injuries, it is troublesome where institutional injuries are 
caused by some legislators to their fellows. 
72 Raines, 826 
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generates their nullification. In Coleman v Miller73, half of the Senators of 
the Kansas legislature opposed the ratification of Child Labor Amendment 
to the US Constitution. The vote was split. However, with the view to 
breaking the tie, the Lieutenant Governor intervened in favour of 
ratification. In order to stop Kansas authorities from certifying the 
amendment, the 20 opposing Senators and four members of the Kansas 
legislature sought injunctive and declaratory relief. On direct appeal, the 
USSC first noted that if the Lieutenant’s intervention were declared 
unlawful, plaintiffs’ vote would have sufficed to stop the ratification 
process. Thus, standing was granted on the ground that the Lieutenant’s 
intervention had deprived the plaintiffs’ votes from all validity. By contrast, 
in Raines v Byrd, five members of Congress challenged the constitutionality 
of the Line Item Veto Act, which empowered the President to cancel certain 
expenditures or fund provisions financing certain projects without censoring 
the entire bill. Indeed, the Line Item Veto Act gave great flexibility to the 
President to cancel legislation, since he could approve the bill while 
refusing the accompanying projects. Plaintiff invoked the earlier findings of 
the USSC in Coleman and argued that the challenged act “dilute[d] their 
Article I powers” and undermined the “effectiveness of their votes”. 
However, the USSC differentiated Coleman on two grounds. On the one 
hand, the plaintiffs’ votes were given full effect, “they just had lost that 
vote”. On the other hand, not only did the plaintiffs maintain their legislative 
power in passing or rejecting appropriation bills, but they could also regain 
the power lost by voting to repeal the act or by exempting a given 
appropriation bill74. Thus, while the plaintiffs in Coleman were deprived of 
all means to reverse the ratification process, the members of Congress in 
Raines had alternative legislative means to address the problem. Hence, the 
USSC concluded that a “dilution” of legislative powers did not suffice to 
confer standing. 
 
 
                                                 
73 Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) 
74 Raines, 822-821 
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2.-  Concluding Remarks 
 
Neither the United States, nor the States, nor members of Congress 
acting as a plaintiff enjoy the same standing status as the EU institutions and 
Member States. There is no “special regime” under Article III US 
Constitution. Indeed, in Raines v Byrd, writing for the USSC, Justice 
Rehnquist stated: “There would be nothing irrational about a system that 
granted [congressional] standing; some European constitutional courts 
operate under one or another variant of such a regime. (…) But it is 
obviously not the regime that has been obtained under our Constitution to 
date. Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III 
courts”75. Therefore, the absence of privileged applicants under the US 
Constitution implies that the federal courts will not act as direct arbiters of 
vertical and horizontal constitutional disputes. As suggested by Marbury, 
the existence of “a private injury” arises as the main procedural requirement 
all litigants, private or public, must demonstrate. Indeed, in Clinton v City of 
New York76, the USSC subsequently declared void the Line Item Veto Act. 
But, this time proceedings were brought by a private corporation responsible 
for the operation of public health care in New York and Idaho potatoes 
farmers. They alleged that President’s Clinton cancellation of certain 
provisions of the Balance Budget Act of 1997 and of the Tax Relief Act of 
1997 respectively amounted to a liability of several billions of dollars and to 
the loss of tax benefits. By contrast to Raines, the USSC granted standing to 
the applicants, holding that they “had a personal stake” in having an actual 
injury redressed rather than an “institutional injury” that is “abstract and 
widely dispersed”77.  
 
Yet, Massachusetts v EPA shows that the USSC is willing to accept 
“special solicitudes” from States checking upon federal agencies’ delegated 
powers. What is the most relevant aspect of this case? Perhaps, it is that the 
USSC granted greater standing rights to Massachusetts than it would have to 
private individuals.  In effect, had a private individual brought the same suit, 
                                                 
75 Ibid, 828 
76 Clinton v City of New York , 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
77 Ibid, 430 
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it would have been certainly dismissed. Holding that global warming affects 
all of us equally, the USSC would have ruled out the lawsuit under the 
“general grievance” exception. Accordingly, since no private applicant 
could control the legality of the federal agency, the USSC might have 
considered that it was legitimate for States to step-in. Besides, States 
become allies with Congress in checking that the federal government 
faithfully executes federal law. As a result, by applying relaxed standing 
rules when States act as “parens patriae” plaintiffs, the USSC has enhanced 
their role in controlling congressional delegation of powers. However, 
though this ruling brings American States close to their European 
counterparts, there is still a major difference. Whereas Mellon still prevents 
American States from challenging a federal statute on the ground that it 
violates the constitutional rights of their citizens, the EU Member States can 
normally do so.   
 
C.- Standing and private applicants 
 
The objectives of this section are threefold. First, the following 
paragraphs try to determine whether there is an equivalent under Article 230 
EC to the “injury-in-fact” requirement. Secondly, some parallelisms and 
distinctions will be drawn between the notion of “individual concern” and 
the “generalized grievance” exception. Finally, the same operation will be 
undertaken regarding the notion of “direct concern” and the “causation 
requirement” under Article III US Constitution.   
 
1.-   “Injury-in-fact”  
 
Stemming from Article III US Constitution, the notion of “injury-in-fact” is 
the constitutional core of the  US standing doctrine. Paradoxically, it did not 
appear until 1970, when Association of Data Processing Service 
Organization v Camp78 (ADPSO) was delivered. Traditionally, in order to 
determine whether the case was judicially cognizable, the Court employed 
                                                 
78 ADPSO, supra note 41 
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the “legal interest”79 test, according to which the plaintiff had to prove that 
the defendant had adversely affected his statutory or common law rights 
(arising out of property, contract, tort or privilege). Thus, the “legal 
interest” test was easily met where rights of a private nature were involved. 
On the contrary, where the plaintiff tried to assert public rights, his claim 
was often dismissed80. However, this test, which seemed consistent with the 
economic and social policies of the liberal state of the XIXth and early XXth 
centuries, could no longer cope with the incipient regulatory and 
administrative State born with the New Deal81. Thus in ADPSO, the USSC 
felt the urgent need to initiate “the trend toward enlargement of the class of 
people who protest against administrative action”82. Writing for the USSC, 
Justice Douglas rejected the legal interest test by affirming that the applicant 
no longer needed to show an “invasion of protectable legal interests” which 
“goes to the merits”. He stressed that “[t]he question of standing [was] 
different”83  and introduced a new test whereby standing would be conferred 
to applicants demonstrating an injury-in-fact. The ruling in ADPSO has two 
immediate implications. On the one hand, it suggests that the introduction of 
the “injury-in-fact” test aimed at liberalising standing, so that increasing 
administrative and regulatory action no longer escaped from judicial review. 
On the other hand, it also shifted the focus of standing from a legal 
interpretation of the norm invoked to a factual inquiry.  
 
The USSC has also pointed out that, although plaintiffs “do not have 
to wait for the consummation of the threatened injury to obtain relief”84, the 
“injury-in-fact” must be “distinct and palpable”, “concrete”, “certainly 
impeding”, “real and immediate”, “actual or imminent”, as opposed to 
                                                 
79 Tennessee Electric Power Co v Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 US 118(1939) In this 
case, the USSC denied standing to the applicants, which were private power companies and 
whose market interests were adversely affected by the respondent’s competition in this 
market. The USSC held that, since no statutory or common law right was being invaded by 
the Federal Agency, it had to refrain from hearing the merits of the case.  
80 For instance, whereas beneficiaries of governmental programs and competitors did not 
have standing to sue, companies submitted to federal regulation did. See CR SUNSTEIN, 
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev., pp 1436-81 
81 J Leonard & JC Brand, supra note 42, pp15-23 
82 ADPSO, supra note 78, 154   
83 Ibid, 153 
84 Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1000 (1982).  
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“conjectural” or “hypothetical”85.  For instance in Lujan v Defenders of 
Wildlife (DoW), an environmental association challenged a new joint 
regulation of the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries 
Service interpreting § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The challenged 
regulation made consultation no longer necessary between one of these two 
agencies and other federal agencies prior to adopting measures adversely 
affecting endangered species located in foreign nations. In order to prove 
that it had suffered an injury, the plaintiff relied on the affidavits of two of 
its members, who sustained that the challenged regulation would prevent 
them from doing “some day” trips abroad to directly observe endangered 
species. However, owing to the lack of “any description of concrete plans, 
or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be”,86, the USSC 
concluded that DoW’s members had suffered no “actual or imminent” 
injury. However, in Friends of the Earth (FoE) v Laidlaw Environmental 
Services87, the USSC reached a different outcome in a similar factual 
background. By contrast to the plaintiff in Lujan, FoE did provide evidence 
showing that its members had suffered injuries resulting from the 
defendant’s illegal pollutant activities, which could not “be equated with 
speculative “some day intentions to visit endangered species halfway 
around the world”88. 
 
Is there an equivalent to the “injury-in-fact” requirement under 
Article 230 (4) EC? The answer must be in the affirmative. As starting 
point, this treaty provision requires private applicants to demonstrate “an 
interest in bringing proceedings”89, which must be “vested and present”90. 
For instance, in NBV and NVB v Commission, Dutch associations entrusted 
                                                 
85 JG ROBERTS Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, (1993) 42 Duke L.J., pp. 
1223-32. In his article, the current Chief Justice quotes the following cases: Gladstone, 
Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91 (1979),  Schlesinger v Reservist Commission to 
Stop the War, 418 US 208 (1974), Babbitt v United Farm Workers, 442 US 289 (1979), 
City of Los Angeles v Lyon, 461 US 95 (1983), O’Shea v Littleton, 414 US 488 (1974), 
Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 US 149 (1990)  
86 Lujan, 564. 
87 Friends of the Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services,  528 US 167 (1999) 
88 Ibid, 184. 
89 See supra note 40. See also  Antillean Rice Mills, supra note 38, para 59; Case T-102/96 
Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, para 40, and Case T-212/00 Nuove Industrie 
Molisane v Commission [2002] ECR II-347, para 33 
90 Case T-138/89 NBV and NVB v Commission [1992] ECR II-2181, para 33-34 
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with protecting the interests of the Netherlands banking sector brought 
annulment proceedings against a European Commission decision granting a 
negative clearance to an interbank agreement on the grounds that it did not 
have an intra-community effect. The applicants did not object the operative 
part of the decision, but they challenged a statement of the European 
Commission noting that the agreement restricted competition significantly. 
The applicants maintained that national courts could rely on this statement 
to declare the agreement unlawful, while disagreeing with the European 
Commission over its territorial effects. However, the CFI rejected this 
argument stating that it was based “upon future and uncertain situations”. 
In any case, uncertainties over the scope of the agreement could be solved 
by a reference to the ECJ. Besides, a change in the territorial effects of the 
agreement would enable the European Commission to reassess its position, 
after which the applicants could institute judicial proceedings. Since 
applicants “retain the possibility of asserting their rights in future”, the CFI 
dismissed the application. Hence, it seems that both the USSC and 
Community Courts would dismiss actions based on “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical” interests. 
 
Another common feature is that litigants’ interests can be “economic 
or otherwise”91. Indeed, since ADAPSO, the USSC has repeatedly 
recognised that the “injury-in-fact” requirement does not need to be of an 
economic nature. For instance, the USSC has qualified environmental 
harms92, racial discrimination on housing practices93, the diminished ability 
to receive racially desegregated education94, failure to obtain public 
information95, and an adverse judgment issued by a state court96 as 
“injuries-in-fact”. Likewise, in Greenpeace and other v the Commission, the 
CFI recognised that it is not necessary to assert an economic interest in 
order for an applicant to have locus standi.  
                                                 
91 ADAPSO, Op cit, 152.  
92 Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972) 
93 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) 
94 Allen v Wright, supra note 45, 738. However, the claim was dismissed because the 
applicants failed to prove a causal link between the injury suffered and the challenged 
governmental action. See infra pp 3 
95 Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) 
96 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 US 605 (1989) 
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2.-   “Individual concern” and “General Grievance” 
 
From the above, one may suggest that Article 230 (4) EC and Article 
III require private applicants to demonstrate that their interests have been or 
are likely to be adversely affected. However, while both Article 230(4) EC 
and Article III US Constitution bar injuries common to the general 
population, the latter does not require the applicant’s injury to be singled out 
from all others. 
 
a) Individual Concern 
The notion of “individual concern” was defined by the ECJ in 
Plaumann, where it held that “persons other than those to whom a decision 
is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision 
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other 
persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as 
in the case of the person addressed”97. In this case, a German importer of 
clementines sought to annul a European Commission decision addressed to 
Germany refusing to partially suspend custom duties on clementines 
imported from third countries. After enouncing the aforementioned formula, 
the ECJ held that the applicant was not individually concerned because he 
was only affected by reason of pursuing a commercial activity, which “may 
at any time be practised by any person”. Put differently, since both the 
applicant and any prospective importers of clementines would be affected 
by the contested measure in the same way, he did not have sufficient 
standing.  
 
It follows that the notion of individual concern not only excludes 
“actio popularis” applicants, but it goes further. It renders Community 
Courts directly inaccessible for applicants who fall within the scope of 
application of the challenged measure, but who cannot be differentiated 
                                                 
97 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v Commission, [1963] ECR 95 
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from other persons also affected by it. Indeed, even if, by virtue of objective 
or factual criteria, the number of persons harmed by the challenged act can 
be determined, the ECJ has held that this situation does not suffice in itself 
to confer standing98.  
 
Due to the notoriously strict construction of the Plaumann formula, 
when do private applicants have standing? It has been suggested that 
applicants must belong to “a closed category” to which a defined number of 
persons sharing peculiar attributes belong and which is no longer accessible 
to others once the contested measure has entered into force. It is true that it 
is possible for there to be more than one applicant individually concerned. 
Still, the broader the category becomes, the more difficult it is for them to 
have locus standi99. Authors have also identified three paradigms where the 
ECJ has held that applicants were individually concerned100. The first is 
where, in adopting the contested measure, a Community institution has 
failed to comply with its procedural obligations vis-à-vis the applicant. In 
Sofrimport101, a European Commission Regulation imposed a temporary ban 
on the importations of Chilean apples. However, when adopting the 
contested regulation, the European Commission did not follow the 
Council’s instructions to identify the importers whose cargo was in transit 
during the relevant period. Hence, the ECJ concluded that the applicant, 
whose apples were in transit when the regulation was enacted, was 
individually concerned and proceeded to rule on the merits. In the second 
paradigm,  the contested measure contains an express reference to the 
applicant’s name. For instance, Council regulations listing the names of the 
persons on whom economic sanctions must be imposed by the Member 
States. Lastly, standing is granted where the adoption of the contested 
measure leads to the nullification of the applicant’s “in rem” rights. In 
                                                 
98 Case C-213/91 Abertal and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-3177, para 16, and Case C-209/94 
P Buralux and Others v Council [1996] ECR I-615, para 24; Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro v Council 
[1995] ECR II-421, para 33 
99 TC HARTLEY, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: 2003), pp 362-
364 
100 Echelmaier, supra note 39, pp 183-91. See also Arnull, Op cit, pp 32-40 (holding that 
individual applicants must advance a “closed class” argument, a “specific right” argument 
or a “pre-adoption procedure argument”) 
101 Case 152/88, Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR 2477 
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Codorniú102, a Spanish producer of sparkling wines brought an annulment 
action against a Council regulation reserving the designation “grand 
crémant” to sparkling wines produced in Luxembourg and some regions of 
France. The ECJ noted that, decades prior to the entry into force of the 
contested regulation, the applicant had registered the trade mark “grand 
crémant de Codorniú” in Spain. Thus, it held that, since the regulation at 
issue would amount to the deprivation of its intellectual rights, the applicant 
was individually concerned103. However, the ECJ has stated that 
interferences with the soundness of contractual relationships entered into 
prior to the adoption of the contested act are not a sufficient ground to 
comply with the Plaumann formula104. Likewise, the ECJ refuses to 
extrapolate the conclusions drawn in Codorniú to cases where, as opposed 
to the nullification of rights, the challenged act only entails economic 
disadvantages for the applicant. As a result, the Codorniú paradigm has 
been applied restrictively105.  
 
b) Generalized Grievance 
The USSC has stated that applicants, whose claim relies on 
“generalized grievances” common to the general population, lack standing 
to sue in federal courts106. Again, it seems that the reason justifying the 
denial of standing in these cases lies in that the alleged harm is abstract and 
of an undefined nature. Additionally, in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 
Justice Scalia also alluded to the principle of separation of powers, stressing 
that “these injuries” are better addressed in a political forum. As opposed to 
alleging generalized grievances, applicants must assert a concrete and 
                                                 
102 Codorniú, supra note 38 
103 More recently, see Cases T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II-3305 
and T-70/99 Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II-3495. In Alpharma, the applicant brought 
an annulment action against a Council decision withdrawing from the market an antibiotic 
of which it was the largest trader and supplier. The CFI did not confer standing because of 
its prevailing market position, but on the ground that, in accordance with the Community 
legislation, it was the only person entitled to seek an authorisation to market the product. 
The same rationale was followed in Pfizer. 
104 Sofrimport, Op cit, paras 11-13; Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission 
[1985] ECR 207, para 28 - 31 
105 Arnull, supra note 39, pp 32-40  
106 It is noteworthy mentioning that from the case-law of the USSC, one cannot clearly 
determine whether the requirement of “generalized grievance” has a constitutional or 
prudential nature. See Akins, supra note 95, 23 
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individuated injury. For instance, the USSC has consistently rejected that an 
injury resulting from the violation of a right “to have the Government act in 
accordance with law”107 could confer standing. In Schlesinger v Reservist 
Committee to Stop the War, a pacifist organisation sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief against members of Congress, who were also reservists108, 
arguing that they were in breach of the Incompatibility Clause of the US 
Constitution109.  However, the USSC denied standing. First, it 
acknowledged that the injury asserted by the plaintiff (non-observance of 
the Incompatibility Clause) was an abstract interest “undifferentiated from 
that of all other citizens”. Secondly, the USSC affirmed that the abstract 
nature of the injury deprived it from casting the dispute “in a form 
traditionally capable of judicial resolution”110. Lastly, the USSC enounced 
that requiring the injury to be concrete ensured that constitutional 
adjudication does not take place unnecessarily. A concrete injury removes 
the claim from the realm of speculation, limits judicial relief to a particular 
factual scenario and prevents courts from “govern[ing] by injunction”111. 
Therefore, from its ruling in Schlesinger, one can affirm that the USSC’s 
rationale rests on a very simple syllogism: an injury shared by all members 
of the public has an abstract nature, abstracts injuries precludes federal court 
from adjudicating, ergo a widely shared injury precludes judicial 
adjudication.  For the same reasons, the USSC is also reluctant to grant 
standing to voters112 and to tax payers113.  
 
                                                 
107Lujan, 576. See also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 
(1972); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra note 85, United States 
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
108 Schlesinger,  210-11 
109 See Article I, § 6, Clause 2  US Constitution  in Annex  
110 Schlesinger, 218 
111 Ibid, 222 
112 Keith Lance v Coffman, 549 US _(2007) 
113 Massachusetts v Mellon, supra note 64, 486-487 (1923). However, in Flast v Cohen, 
supra note 43, the USSC agree to grant standing to tax payers, provided that two conditions 
were fulfilled, namely [1] the challenged congressional statute was adopted under the 
Taxing and Expending Clause of the US Constitution, and [2] there has been a violation of 
a constitutional provision which specifically limits the federal taxing and spending powers.  
However, the USSC has subsequently interpreted this exception rather restrictively. See 
United States v Richardson, supra 107, 175 and Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
127 S Ct. 2553 (2007) 
 55 
However, in order to have access to federal courts and though the 
alleged injury must be concrete and individuated, it does not need to be 
unique. Indeed as concurring Justice Kennedy pointed out in Lujan, “[w]hile 
it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged 
action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a 
concrete and personal way.”114 Federal Elections Committee (FEC)  v Akins 
illustrates well this point. There, a group of voters complained to the FEC 
on the non-enforcement of record-keeping and disclosing obligations laid 
down on the Federal Elections Committee Act (FECA) against the 
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). When the case 
reached the USSC, the FEC argued that respondents lacked standing to sue. 
It stressed that they had suffered a “generalized grievance” which barred 
access to federal courts. However, the USSC disagreed. First, it stated that 
the purpose of the FECA was to inform the general public about the 
contributions and expenditures of political committees. Therefore, the injury 
“consist(ed) of their inability [...] to obtain information that, respondent’s 
view of the law, the statutes require[d] that AIPAC make public”115. The 
USSC then went on to affirm that even if the injury was widely shared, 
Congress had rendered it sufficiently concrete for judicial adjudication. 
Hence, the USSC ruled that persons who filed the complaint against the 
FEC had suffered an “injury-in-fact” sufficiently “concrete and particular” 
for the purposes of Article III116. One can affirm that, in order for a claim to 
comply with the “injury-in-fact” requirement, the decisive criterion is not 
whether the injury is widely shared, but rather whether it is sufficiently 
concrete. Indeed, the ruling of the USSC in Akins evinces that the syllogism 
previously enounced in Schlesinger sometimes fails. Indeed, although 
“abstract” and “widely shared” “[o]ften go hand to hand”, it is not always 
the case “and where harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has 
                                                 
114 Lujan, supra note 32, 581 
115 Akins, supra note 95, 21 
116 Dissenting Justice Scalia argued that the USSC’s findings were inconsistent with its 
previous ruling in United States v Richardson. However, the USSC replied that, by contrast 
to Richardson where a “logical nexus” between the respondent status and the constitutional 
provision invoked was missing, Congress had made clear that the main purpose of the 
FECA was “to protect individual from the kind of harm they say they have suffered”.  
Besides, the USSC stressed that this case did not involve taxpayer standing but rather voter 
standing. (Ibid 22) 
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found injury in fact”117. Moreover, if in Lujan the USSC considered that 
Congress could erase by statutory grant the requirement of “injury-in-fact”, 
Akins demonstrates that, once Congress has defined with sufficient precision 
the protected interest (right to information), whether the injury is widely 
shared becomes irrelevant. Further, by contrast to Schlesinger118, where the 
alleged injury resulted from violating a structural provision of the US 
Constitution, in Akins the injury suffered by the respondent was due to a 
violation of a statutory right. It follows that where a breach of general 
directives of the US Constitution is invoked as the legal basis for an injury, 
the USSC is willing to defer to the political process. On the contrary, 
regardless of whether it is common to the general public, an injury resulting 
from the violation of a statutory right is sufficient to confer standing119.  
 
c)  Concluding Remarks 
 
The examination of the case-law of both Courts seems to show that 
the test deployed by the ECJ under the Plaumann formula is stricter than the 
generalized grievance exception. Provided that “the harm is concrete”, the 
USSC will not take into account the number of persons affected by 
governmental action. However, in addition to requiring a concrete injury, 
the ECJ will still evaluate whether the applicant’s harm presents some 
distinctive features absent in other parties affected.  
 
First, this argument is demonstrated by the fact that the USSC would 
find an “injury-in-fact” in cases where the Community Courts rule that the 
applicant was individually concerned. For instance, in view of its case-law it 
is likely that in applying the criteria earlier described, the USSC would have 
granted standing to the applicants in Sofrimport or Codorniu120. In both 
cases, applicants suffered a concrete and immediate injury. In the first case, 
                                                 
117 Ibid, 24 
118 See also Richardson, Hein and Lance v Coffman. 
119 CR SUNSTEIN, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, (1999) 147 U.Pa.L.Rev., pp 613-675. He welcomes the ruling of the USSC in 
Akins.  
120 Same applies to cases like Alpharma and Pfizer 
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the importer of Chilean apples would have lost its cargo and in the second, 
the Spanish company would have suffered the expropriation of its trade 
mark. Secondly, this argument also demonstrates that in cases where the 
USSC denies standing, the ECJ would most probably reach the same 
outcome. In effect, the ECJ would have also declared inadmissible an action 
like the one filed in Lujan or Schlesinger. In Lujan, applicant could not 
distinguish itself from any other environmental association or any other 
person interested in protecting the wild life. The same applies for 
Schlesinger. The Community Courts would not have spent much time in 
dismissing an action filed by EU citizens arguing that a MEP’s mandate is 
invalid under the EC Treaty. Finally, where the USSC grants standing, it 
does not follow that the ECJ would declare the action admissible. In this 
regard, it seems that the federal courts would have granted standing to the 
applicant in Plaumann121. The injury he adduced was “distinct and 
palpable”, “concrete”, “certainly impeding”. Since the enquiry of the 
federal courts stops here, they would not have examined whether, by 
engaging in the same activities as the applicant, the importation of 
clementines was opened to other traders. In the same way, divergences 
between the two courts would appear where the plaintiff is an environmental 
association122. Suffice it to juxtapose Laidlaw case with Greenpeace and 
                                                 
121 Same applies to cases like  Abertal, Buralux and Campo Ebro, supra note 98 
122 One can draw the following parallelisms between “associational standing” under Article 
III US Constitution and under Article 230 EC. See generally, Hunt v Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) and T-38/98 ANB v Council 
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Community law expressly granted procedural powers on trade associations. (See Joined 
Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Koy and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 219 and 
Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125; Case 191/82 Fediol v 
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other v the Commission123 . In the latter case, 16 individuals, two local 
environmental associations and Greenpeace brought an annulment action 
against a European Commission decision granting Spain financial assistance 
for the construction of two power plants in the Canary Islands. Just as in 
Laidlaw, most of the individual applicants were local residents who 
sustained that the construction of the power plants would harm their health, 
economic resources, quality of life and the local flora and fauna. By 
recalling the ECJ’s case-law, the three environmental associations argued 
that, since some of their members were also local residents individually 
concerned by the contested decision, they had standing. The CFI began by 
recognising that environmental protection could be considered as a “peculiar 
attribute” or “defining circumstance”.  However, it went on to state that the 
fact that applicants were local residents, fishermen or farmers did not suffice 
to grant standing, since the measure “was likely to impinge […] any person 
residing or staying temporarily in the areas concerned”124. As for 
associations, owing to the lack of standing of their members and since they 
were not themselves individually concerned, the CFI refused to grant 
standing. On appeal, referring to the ruling of the USSC in Sierra Club v 
Morton, applicants invited the ECJ to follow the US example by adopting 
more liberal standards which would guarantee an adequate level of judicial 
protection. However, the ECJ refused to do so, holding that indirect 
                                                                                                                            
Commission [1983] ECR 2913), associations litigating in the US federal jurisdiction enjoy 
a better position. They just have to accommodate their pleadings so as to argue that [1] one 
of its members is injured and that [2] they act within the scope of its founding purposes. 
Yet, the problem with the “atomization” of collective interests lies in that the interests of a 
group are sometimes more than the mere aggregation of individual ones. Often, 
associations are required to balance conflicting internal voices which raise admissibility 
questions. See N EDMONDS, Associational Standing for Associations with Internal 
Conflicts of Interests, (2002) 69 U.Chi.L.Rev., pp 351-377 
123 Case T-585/93, Greenpeace & Others v Commission, [1995] ECR II-2205. Confirmed 
on appeal by Case C-321/95P, Greenpeace & Others v Commission, [1998] ECR I-1651. 
See also Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-241/04 EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-4945 and more recently, T-91/07 WWF-UK v Council, n.y.r. of 
2 June 2008. In the future, it is very likely that Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community Institutions and Bodies, will modify the lack of standing for environmental 
association (given that its article 12 provides that after unsuccessfully requesting the 
internal review of the administrative act, environmental associations may bring annulment 
actions based on environmental law against acts of the Community Institutions concerned)  
See A KEESSEN, Reducing the Judicial Deficit in Multilevel Environmental Regulation: 
the Example of Plant Protection Products (2007) 16 E.E.E.L.R. pp. 26-36 
124 Ibid, 54. 
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challenges ensure sufficient access to judicial relief. As opposed to the 
American experience, Greenpeace demonstrates that associations 
challenging a Community measure, and relying on the protection of 
collective interests as a basis for standing, will not have direct access to 
Community Courts.  
 
Moreover, Akins deserves a special mention. Would the ECJ grant 
standing to applicants requesting a Community Institution to enforce the 
disclosure of documents originating with third parties? The reply must be in 
the affirmative. In the light of Article 255 EC, any EU citizen has the right 
to access to the documents of the Community institutions. Where a 
Community institution refuses to disclose all or part of the documents 
requested, its decision can be challenged under Article 230 EC. Since the 
challenged decision would be addressed to the applicant, the latter does not 
need to prove he was individually or directly concerned. Furthermore, the 
CFI has ruled that applicants do not need to provide any reason for their 
request. Accordingly, informational standing is submitted to “a special 
regime” which seeks to “strengthen[…] the democratic character of the 
institutions and the trust of the public in the administration”125.   
  
3.-  Direct Concern and the Causation Requirement under Article III US 
Constitution 
 
a) Direct Concern 
This notion introduces the element of causation into standing rules. 
A measure is of direct concern to the applicant if his legal position is 
definitively defined by the challenged act, and it is not subordinated to the 
addressee’s discretion126. Thus, if the challenged act does not give room for 
discretion, the applicant is directly concerned. This is the case of measures 
which are “in substance” a regulation127 or measures whose implementation 
                                                 
125 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council [1998] ECR II-2289, paras 65-67 
126 Enchelmaier, Op cit, p 115 
127 Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission, supra note 38, para 63 
 60 
is purely automatic128. The ECJ has held that not only must the notion of 
discretion be assessed in relation to the wording of the contested act, but due 
regard must also be paid to the context of its adoption, that is, an applicant 
would be directly concerned if factual circumstances refrain the addressee 
from using its discretion129. In Piraiki-Patraiki, Greek companies 
challenged a European Commission decision which authorised France to 
restrict the importation of Greek cotton yarn. One could argue that, owing to 
the fact that France could decide whether to make use of the authorisation or 
not, applicants were not directly concerned. However, the ECJ took a 
different view. It held that since, prior to the adoption of the contested 
measure, France had set up a system of licences which already restricted 
such imports, the possibility of not making use of the authorisation was 
“entirely theoretical”. 
 
Furthermore, although the ECJ formally admits that private 
individuals may bring an annulment action against a “genuine” Directive, 
the truth is that locus standi has never been granted130. One could justify 
such denial in that Directives are Community measures addressed to the 
Member States which do not impose legal obligations upon individuals and 
thus, their legal position cannot be affected. On the contrary, this argument 
could be rejected by sustaining that refusing to grant standing where 
Member States enjoy no discretion would render the notion of “direct 
concern” meaningless for Directives131. The CFI has not replied to this issue 
openly, instead it has been rather generous in determining the degree of 
discretion enjoyed by the Member States when implementing a Directive132. 
                                                 
128 Case C-404/96 P Glencore Grain v Commission [1998] ECR I-2435, para 41; Case 
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Council, [2002] ECR II-3259, paras 50-56. There, a group of tobacco manufacturers and 
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In addition, recent cases demonstrate that the CFI is avoiding answering this 
question, by first deciding whether the applicants are individually 
concerned133.    
b) Causation: Traceability and Redressability. 
In addition to having suffered an “injury-in-fact”, not only must the 
plaintiff prove that the challenged governmental action is “fairly 
traceable”134 to the injury suffered, but also that the judicial relief requested 
“will remove the harm”135. As Nichol Jr. indicates, traceability and 
redressability respond to different justifications. Whereas traceability can be 
understood as the inherent corollary to the requirement of injury, which 
necessarily entails to be attributed to the defendant; by refraining courts 
from becoming embroiled in purely advisory opinions, redressability 
ensures that judicial intervention is not futile136. In Allen v Wright, several 
parents of black students sought injunctive relief against the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), alleging that its failure to deny tax exempted status 
to a broader range of racially discriminatory private schools had led to a 
diminished ability of their children to receive a desegregated education. 
Although the USSC accepted that an injunction could contribute to 
redressing the alleged injury, it held that the injury could not be attributed to 
the IRS’ misapplication of tax exemptions, but “result[ed] from the 
independent action of some third party not before the court”137. Hence, 
standing was denied not because of a missing link between the injury and 
                                                                                                                            
traders selling cigarettes under the trade mark “MILD SEVEN” sought to annul article 7 
Directive 2001/37/EC, which from 30 September 2003 prohibited “texts, names, trade 
marks and figurative or other signs suggesting that a particular tobacco product is less 
harmful than others”. From the wording of this article, one could reasonably deduce that 
the Directive would prohibit the use of the word “mild” for tobacco products, even more so 
if one bears in mind that this word was mentioned in recital 27 of the preamble of the 
Directive. However, the CFI understood this reference in the preamble as a mere 
suggestion. It stated that Member States could still give full effect to article 7, while not 
prohibiting the use of such word. Thus, owing to the broad drafting of article 7, the CFI 
concluded that it was for the national legislators, or where appropriate for national courts, 
to define the precise contours of the prohibition laid down therein. As a result, since the 
addressees of the measure retain discretionary powers, standing was denied. 
133 Case T-154/02, Villiger Söhne GmbH v Council, [2003] ECR II-1921, para 43. Case T-
231/02, SNF SA v Commission, [2004] ECR II-3047. 
134 Allen v Wright, supra note 45, 753 fn 19 
135 Warth v Seldin, supra note 29,505 
136 GR NICHOL Jr., Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprinciple Use of Judicial 
Restraint, (1981) 63 Ky.L.J., pp 185-226; 193-198 
137 Ibid, 757 
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the judicial relief requested (redressability was met), but due to the fact that 
the injury could not be attributed to the defendant’s behaviour (traceability 
was not). 
 
Further, the USSC has also refused to confer standing where the 
harm was not capable of being redressed. In Linda RS v Richard D138, a 
Texan statute provided that any parent failing to provide support for his or 
her children was subject to criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, state 
authorities interpreted the statute as only referring to married parents. Linda 
RS, the mother of an illegitimate child who was not receiving any support 
from the father, challenged the non enforcement of the statute on the ground 
that it was contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. However, the USSC 
ruled that were the statute enforced against the father of her child, it would 
only lead to his prosecution and eventual conviction, but it did not assure 
that her child would receive financial support from him. In the same way, in 
Simon v Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization139, several indigents 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a ruling of the IRS, pursuant 
to which, in order to receive tax exemptions, charitable hospitals were no 
longer required to treat indigents to the full extent of their financial 
capacities, instead offering emergency room services was enough. 
Nevertheless, the USSC pointed out that the judicial remedy sought did not 
guarantee that the plaintiffs would receive an extensive medical treatment. 
The USSC pointed out that hospitals could opt to forego tax benefits, rather 
than to offer expanded treatments to indigents. These two judgments have 
been eagerly criticised on the grounds that, while assessing whether judicial 
relief will redress the harm, the USSC does not take into consideration the 
deterrent effects of legislation. In Linda RS, by imposing criminal penalties, 
the state legislator sought to reinforce the obligation to provide child 
support. In the same sense, the findings in Eastern Kentucky are also in 
sharp contrast with the fact that taxation aims at promoting certain private 
parties’ activities, while excluding others. Thus, by omitting in its reasoning 
the influential character of legislation on third parties’, one can suggest that 
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the USSC’s conclusions appear to be inconsistent with the cannons of 
statutory interpretation140. Perhaps, that is why the USSC has lately 
reconsidered its approach and starts to defer to congressional intent. In 
Laidlaw, the USSC allowed an environmental association to petition for 
civil penalties, holding that remedies seeking to abate an ongoing behaviour 
or prevent its recurrence provide a form of redress141. Likewise, in 
Massachusetts v EPA, when discussing the probability of stopping global 
warming by cutting down new-car- greenhouse emissions, the USSC held 
that the Clean Air Act imposed upon the defendant the obligation to stop or 
slow it142. By contrast to the requirement of “injury-in-fact” in relation to 
which the USSC follows a high degree of scrutiny143, the empirical and 
complex nature of redressability demonstrates that Congress is better suited 
for determining the adequate correlation between legal rights and judicial 
remedies144. Nevertheless, deference must not be confused with capitulation 
and where congressional general assumptions do not properly respond to the 
characteristics of a particular case, it is for federal court to assure the 
redressability of the alleged injury. A rebuttable presumption in favour of 
the legislature’s objectives appears to strike a proper balance between the 
constitutional nature of redressability and its interaction with statutory 
rights. 
 
                                                 
140 Nichol Jr., supra note 136, pp 204 
141 Ibid, 185-86. As the dissent pointed out, this finding appears to contradict the ruling of 
the USSC in Linda RS. However, the USSC replied that the difference between this case 
and Linda RS are twofold. On the one hand, the USSC considers that in Linda RS, the 
enforcement of the statute would lead to the imprisonment of the delinquent father which 
would probably undermine his capacity to provide child support. On the other hand, the 
USSC suggested that its ruling in Linda RS would be different, had the dismissal of the 
criminal penalty been subject to the payment of child support. (see , fn 4). 
142 Nichol Jr, 222 See also Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497, 519-20 (2007) fn 23 quoting 
Village of Elk Grove Village v Evans, 997 F. 2d 328, 329 (CA7 1993)  
143 HR KRENT, Laidlaw: Redressing the Law of Redressablity, (2002) 12 Duke Envtl. L. & 
Pol'y F., pp 90-92 
144 Besides, as Krent indicates, deference to congressional judgments on redressability 
“makes sense both as a matter of policy and formal separation of powers doctrine”. On the 
one hand, deference to Congress is consistent with the principle of separation of powers in 
that courts do not have empirical data available to determine the deterrence force of certain 
remedies, which varies from one statutory context to another. On the other, Krent argues 
that, since congressional assessments would play a pivotal role in the USSC’s assertions of 
redressability, deference will improve the quality of legislation and will entail a greater 
degree of public scrutiny. Ibid, pp 108 
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c) Concluding Remarks 
 
In the US, attacking the legality of governmental action in order to 
correct private behaviour requires a double causal connection. First, the 
injury must be attributed to the government. Secondly, the injury must be 
capable of being redressed by judicial intervention.  
 
Under Article 230 EC, there is no equivalent to the second limb of the 
causation requirement. By contrast to injunctive and declaratory relief, 
annulment actions normally produce ex tunc effects145. Besides, in the light 
of Article 233 EC, the Community institution whose act has been annulled 
is obliged to give full effect to the judgment of the Community judiciary. 
Accordingly, compliance with the judgment may require the Community 
Institution “to take adequate steps to restore the applicant to its original 
situation”146. By their own nature, annulment actions are capable of 
redressing the injury suffered by the applicant.  
 
Moreover, would the Community judiciary have decided Allen in the 
same fashion? It is doubtful that the ECJ would have considered the parents 
of black public school children to be “individually” concerned. Indeed, not 
only the applicants but all parents of black students had an interest in 
bringing proceedings. But assuming they were, the reply must be in the 
negative. The ECJ would have first evaluated whether the IRS’ failure to 
cancel tax exemptions to private schools led to a change in the legal position 
of the applicants. In this regard, if the annulment of a Community act 
contributes to restoring the applicant to its original legal position, it implies 
inter alia that the contested measure had actually produced legal effects, 
even if third parties were also involved in the chain of causation. 
Conversely, if the Community act does not produce legal effects, an 
annulment action becomes futile since the legal position of the applicant 
remains intact in the first place. Said differently, the approach of the ECJ 
can be distinguished from Allen in that there is no dissociation between 
                                                 
145 Craig & De Burca, Op cit, pp 540-2 
146 Antillean Mills, supra note 38, para 60 ; T-387/94 Asia Motor France v Commission 
[1996] ECR II-961 
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“traceability” and “redressability”. On the contrary, both are insolubly 
connected.  This illustrated by cases like Nefarma, Phillip Morris147and 
Postbank v Commission148, on the other hand. Accordingly, had the 
Community judiciary found that the IRS’ failure contributed to redressing 
the injury of the parents of public school black children, it would have 
entailed that the contested omission produced legal effects vis-à-vis the 
applicants. 
 
In relation to direct concern, would the USSC have granted standing to 
the applicants in Piraiki-Patraiki? The issue would not have been examined 
under the standing doctrine, but under “ripeness”, that is, federal courts 
would examine whether it is more suitable to adjudicate at a latter date 
(Needless to say, the deadline of two months to lodge an annulment action 
prevents the ECJ in Piraiki-Patraiki from exercising this option). In 
determining when a claim is ripe for review, the USSC applies a two-
pronged test. On the one hand, the claim must be fit for judicial 
determination, no further factual development being necessary (fitness test). 
On the other hand, a delayed intervention would cause substantial hardship 
to the applicant (hardship test). Therefore, the question that arises is whether 
USSC would have waited for France to use its authorisation to limit Greek 
imports before intervening. In relation to the fitness test, no further factual 
inquiry was necessary. It was clear from the written procedure that, though 
France could decide not to use its authorisation, this possibility was purely 
theoretical. As for the hardship strand, the applicant had entered into 
contracts of sales with French customers. They argued that the adoption of a 
quota system would prevent them from carrying the contracts out. Thus, the 
applicants risked significant economic repercussions. Besides, the USSC 
has found hardship where the enforcement of a statute or regulation is 
                                                 
147 Case T-113/89 Nefarma and Bond van Groothandelaren in het Farmaceutische Bedrijf 
v Commission [1990] ECR II-797, paras 95 and 96 ; Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-
380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01 Philip Morris and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-1 
confirmed by C-131/03P Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I- 7795 
148 Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 
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certain, irrespectively of delays in commencing of proceedings149. It follows 
that the USSC would have declared the action ripe for review. 
 
II.-   Standing as a "Jurisdictional Shifting Strategy”  
 
1.-  Article 234 EC, an alternative remedy? 
 
As the previous section shows, the Plaumann formula operates as an 
important barrier to the admissibility of annulment actions brought by non-
privileged applicants. It has been argued that the strictness of standing rules 
could cast doubt on their compatibility with the general principle of judicial 
protection150. Indeed, the case-law of the Community Courts reveals that it 
is sufficient for the harm not to be “unique” to dismiss the application as 
inadmissible. However, instead of reformulating the notion of individual 
concern, the ECJ has replied that the Treaty lays down a complete system of 
remedies where judicial protection of private parties’ rights is ensured. 
Judicial protection must not be examined in the light of one remedy alone, 
but in conjunction with other remedies. Difficulties in having access to one 
can be redeemed by the wide availability of others. Hence, where Article 
230(4) EC forecloses direct access to the Community Courts, private parties 
may seek indirect judicial review. It follows that compliance with the 
principle of judicial protection is conditioned upon the adequacy of indirect 
challenges. In this regard, although it has exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the validity of Community measures, the ECJ has paradoxically decided to 
shift the burden of guaranteeing the effectiveness of alternative remedies 
onto the national legal systems. By relying on Article 10 EC, the ECJ has 
compelled national legislators to adapt national procedural law so as to 
facilitate access to national proceedings where the validity of a Community 
act can be incidentally raised and referred to the ECJ151. 
                                                 
149 E.g. Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 US 102 (1974); Lake Carriers 
Association v MacMullan, 406 US 498 (1972) 
150 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA, [2002] ECR I-6677, para 2 fn 5 and 6.  
151 UPA, supra note 23, [2002] ECR I-6677, para 42. 
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a) Opinion of AG Jacobs in UPA 
In UPA v Council, Advocate General (AG) Jacobs opined that 
indirect challenges are not the appropriate means of challenging the 
annulment of Community acts. In particular, he criticised the traditional 
view that the preliminary reference procedure was an adequate alternative to 
Article 230 EC.  First, preliminary reference proceedings are not a remedy 
available to private parties as a matter of right. National courts enjoy 
discretion when referring a question to the ECJ and even if, under the third 
paragraph of Article 234 EC, courts of last instance are obliged to refer, they 
do not have to do so following the applicants’ instructions152. The way in 
which the question referred is defined falls within the exclusive competence 
of the national courts. Secondly, preliminary reference proceedings entail 
long delays and increase costs. Thirdly, although it has been accepted by the 
ECJ that a national court may grant interim relief against a Community 
measure, the conditions to do so are notoriously strict. Therefore, difficulties 
with interim measures are important. Lastly, this alternative remedy fails 
where the Community measure challenged does not require further 
implementing national measures. In these cases, AG Jacobs wrote 
“[i]ndividuals cannot be required to breach the law in order to gains access 
to justice”153. Thus, noting that indirect challenges were ill-fitted to provide 
a satisfactory degree of judicial protection, the Advocate General concluded 
that the notion of individual concern needed to be reformulated. In this 
sense, he acknowledged that nothing in the Treaty precluded the ECJ from 
abandoning Plaumann and suggested that a person should be individually 
concerned where a Community measure has a “substantial adverse effect on 
his interests”154.  This suggested test would have granted standing to the 
applicants in cases like Plaumann or Greenpeace155. Additionally, it is 
noteworthy that this test would have brought standing rules under Article 
230 EC closer Article III of the US Constitution. While generalized 
                                                 
152 This “flaw” was raised again by AG Mengozzi in Case C-354/04 P Segi v Council 
[2007] ECR I- 01579, para 95 
153 Opinion AG Jacobs in UPA,  para  40-44 
154 Ibid, 60.  
155 T TRIDIMAS & S POLI, Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4) EC : The 
Return of Euridice?, in Continuity and Change in EU Law, Essays in Honour of Sir Francis 
Jacobs, (OUP, 2008), pp 70-89 
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grievances seem to be left out, the AG himself stated that this test was not 
influenced by the number of parties injured. However, his proposal was 
rejected by the ECJ, consolidating, once again, its reticence towards 
relaxing standing rules. 
 
But, why did the ECJ reject this new test? More than raising fears of 
opening the floodgates156; the AG’s proposal entails accepting a radical 
redefinition of the roles of the Community and the national courts vis-à-vis 
private applicants. National courts would stop being the primary venue for 
remedying private injuries caused by Community legislation. Instead, it 
would be for the CFI to grant prospective relief. In addition, since “locus 
standi” would no longer serve to allocate functions between the Community 
and national judiciary, it would accomplish a new purpose. Perhaps, 
emulating the USSC, “individual concern” would be read as an implement 
of the principle of “inter-institutional balance”, whereby claims brought in 
the “mere interest of the law” would be shifted either to the political process 
or to proceedings brought by privileged applicants. Finally, remedying 
injuries caused by unlawful Community measures of general application 
would no longer be a marginal function of the Community Courts. 
Accordingly, “traditional judicial business” would not be odd to the 
Community Courts.  
b) The CFI ruling in Jégo-Quéré 
The vindications of AG Jacobs did not fall into oblivion after being 
rejected by the ECJ. In Jégo-Quéré157, the CFI was heavily influenced by 
his opinion, though the new test it proposed was not so ambitious. The case 
involved a French fishing company which challenged a European 
Commission regulation defining the size of mesh for fishing nets. In 
applying the Plaumann formula, the CFI concluded that the applicant lacked 
standing. However, it stated that, since Community Law required no 
implementation at national level, denying standing would amount to 
                                                 
156 The AG replied that an increase in the number of actions would be manageable, see 
paras 79-81   
157 Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v Commission, [2002] ECR II-2365. 
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depriving the applicant from any adequate remedy158. In effect, the CFI 
acknowledged that the only way in which the applicant could initiate 
national proceedings was by infringing Community law and consequently, 
being subject to administrative sanctions. Since demanding this from the 
applicant would be contrary the principle of judicial protection, the CFI 
opted for reformulating the notion of individual concern. By contrast to the 
AG, the CFI limited its ruling to covering the remedial lacuna evinced by 
the facts of this case. It stated that the applicant would be regarded “as 
individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that 
concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in 
a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or 
by imposing obligations on him.”159 Hence, after indicating that this new test 
rendered the number of affected persons of no relevance, it concluded that 
the applicant had standing to seek the annulment of the contested act.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the ECJ overruled the findings of the CFI160. First, it 
repeated that Community law provided a complete system of legal remedies 
which ensures that the rights of private persons are judicially protected. 
Secondly, by virtue of Article 10 EC, it is for the Member States to secure 
the availability of indirect challenges before national courts161. Last but not 
least, it concluded that the notion of “individual concern” could not be 
modified via judicial interpretation, but only by amending the Treaty. In so 
doing, the Community institutions and the Member States were implicitly 
                                                 
158 The CFI also maintained that actions for damages against the Community were not an 
adequate remedy to test the validity of Community Act. On the one hand, such actions 
cannot remove the unlawful act from the Community legal order. On the other, actions for 
damages have a narrower scope of application than annulment actions. Whereas the latter 
may censure any violation of Community law, the former only sanction on infringements 
which are sufficiently serious. See para 46    
159 Ibid, 51. 
160 Jégo-Quéré was not the last time the ECJ overruled the CFI.  In fact, Tridimas & Poli, 
Op cit, 84-89, argued that post-UPA developments show that the latter has been less 
restrictive than the former when applying Plaumann. See Case C-78/03P Commission v 
Germany (ARE case) [2005] ECR I-10737.  
161 The “Jégo-Quéré” scenario is not possible in the United Kingdom where private 
applicants can seek declaratory relief against Community measures fully directly effective 
or the UK government’s intention to implement a Directive. See Joined Cases C-103 and 
145/77 Royal Scholten-Honig v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, [1978] ECR 
2037. Case C-74/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others, [2000] ECR I-8599. See C-491/01 British American 
Tobacco  [2002] ECR I-11453. 
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invited to decide whether, by liberalizing standing before the Community 
judiciary, a greater degree of judicial protection would be attained162. In 
effect, Article 263 TFEU seems to have accepted this invitation. It codifies 
the ruling of the CFI in Jégo-Quéré, but limits its application to Community 
administrative measures of general application. Hence, regarding legislative 
measures, if the Treaty of Lisbon were ratified, the situation would remain 
unchanged163. 
2.-  “No jurisdictional shifting” strategy under US law 
 
In ASARCO, the USSC ruled that standing rules under Article III  US 
Constitution do not bind state courts, even when adjudicating over federal 
questions164. Provided that Due Process is complied with and in so far as 
state rules of procedure do not discriminate against federal causes of 
action165, States are free to regulate “who” may raise constitutional issues166. 
However, some commentators maintain that, though it is seldom the case, 
States cannot adopt stricter standing rules than those contained in Article III. 
The reasons given are threefold, namely a higher threshold of justiciability 
would be contrary to the Supremacy of Federal law167, it would unduly 
burden federal rights168 and be contrary to congressional intent169. 
 
                                                 
162 Jégo-Quéré, supra note 23,  paras. 33-36 
163 Usher, supra note 39, pp 598-600. See also A WARD, Locus Standi under Article 
230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a Coherent Test for a “Wobbly Polity”, (2003) YEL, pp 
45-77 (the author favours this distinction arguing that legislative and executive measures of 
the Community cannot be subject to the same standing rules. The reason is that the “status 
quo” for legislative measures enhances the participation of the European Parliament in the 
decision-making process and thus, contributes to fostering the democratic input of the 
Community. However, she posits that, in the absent a majoritarian argument, executive 
measures should be subject to an even stricter control).  
164 ASARCO, supra note 96, 617 See also Virginia v Hicks, 539 US 113, 120 (2003) 
165 Testa v Katt, 330 US 386 (1947) 
166 Malinski v New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) 
167 See WA FLETCHER, the “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court 
Adjudication of Federal Questions, (1990) 78 Cal. L. Rev., pp 263-304; 291-293 (holding 
that stricter standing rules would be contrary to Testa) N GORDON & D GROSS, 
Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Courts, (1984) 59 Notre Dame L. Rev., pp1145-
1190. (holding that the Supremacy Clause obliges state courts to vindicate federal rights 
even if similar rights are held non-justiciable) 
168 S HERMAN, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and State Courts, (1989) 54:4 Brook. L. Rev., 
pp 1057-1135 (opining that stricter standing rules would be “outcome determinative” and in 
the light of Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 (1988), they should be disregarded) 
169 PJ KATZ, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing, and the Reverse-Erie 
Doctrine Analysis, (2005) 99 Nw. U. L. Rev., pp 1315-1354 
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States, which depart from Article III standards, are often generous in 
allowing citizen, tax-payer and legislator standing170. Consequently, state 
courts have become an alternative forum to raise federal questions171. In 
particular, environmental associations, which after Lujan saw how access to 
the federal judiciary became difficult, are enthusiastic about litigating before 
state courts172. This possibility, nevertheless, immediately raises questions 
as to the uniformity of Federal law. Since standing rules are binding upon 
all federal courts including the USSC, there could be cases where state court 
rulings deciding upon federal questions would be definitive and decisive173.  
 
Unsatisfied with different standards, some scholars argued in favour 
of applying federal standing rules in state courts, at least when ruling over 
federal questions174. Others maintain that disparity should be preserved in 
the light of state procedural sovereignty175. The USSC settled the debate for 
a half-way solution. On the one hand, rulings of state courts adjudicating 
over federal questions, but without fulfilling the “case and controversy” 
requirements of Article III, do not produce “res judicata” effects for federal 
courts as to the questions of law176. On the other hand, ASARCO partially 
safeguards the role of the USSC as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
In this regard, two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, it is required that the 
prevailing party lacked standing under Article III US Constitution177. By 
contrast, where the non-Article III plaintiff looses in a state court, his claim 
cannot reach the USSC178. Thus, ASARCO has an “asymmetric nature”. Its 
detractors argued that traditionally, state courts have been reluctant to 
                                                 
170 H HERSHKOFF, State Courts and The “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, (2001) 114:7 Harv. L. Rev., pp 1833-1941. 
171 Virginia v Hicks, Op. Cit, 121 
172 CS ELMENDORF, State Courts, Citizens Suits and the Enforcement of Federal 
Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, (2001) 110:6 Yale L. J., pp 1003-1044.  
173 After NIKE, Inc. v Kasky, 539 US 654, 662 (2003) (Stevens Concurring) it appears that 
ASARCO does not apply to “interlocutory rulings that merely allows trial to proceed” in a 
state court. 
174 Fletcher, Op. cit, 263-295. Katz, Op cit, (holding that divergent standing doctrines 
would distort congressional statutory policy)  
175 BA STERN, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal “Case and Controversy” 
Requirement on State Courts, (1994) 69  N.Y.U. L Rev., pp 77-124   
176 Co. of Kansas City v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 130-131 (1927); Doremus v Board of 
Education of Hawthorne, 342 US 429, 434 (1952); ASARCO, Op cit, 621 
177 ASARCO, 623-24  
178 Doremus, Op cit  
 72 
uphold federal law at the cost of state law and hence, the USSC’s position 
gives standing to the wrong party179. Yet, as a non-Article III plaintiff does 
not have access to federal forum, an adverse state court decision changes 
nothing vis-à-vis “the world of the federal jurisdiction”180. Additionally, 
along with meeting the other elements of justiciability, the USSC requires 
that the state court judgment “causes direct, specific and concrete injury” to 
the petitioner181. Therefore, the arguments underpinning ASARCO try to 
strike a proper balance between182 accepting that some state constitutions 
may assign a different role to their judicial department from the one 
attributed by Article III to the federal judiciary183, and ensuring the uniform 
application of federal law.   
 
III.-   Standing before national courts: Article III US Constitution a 
complying example 
 
In the light of the principle of procedural autonomy and in the absence 
of Community harmonising legislation, national rules of procedure 
determine who is entitled to challenge national law in breach of Community 
law. However, national procedural rules may neither discriminate against a 
claim based on Community law (principle of equivalence), nor render 
excessively difficult or practical impossible the exercise of Community 
rights (principle of effectiveness)184. At the same time, nothing prevents the 
Member States from laying down more favourable procedural rules to the 
enforcement of Community rights185. Indeed, the principle of effectiveness 
and equivalence are just a minimum protection.  
 
                                                 
179 Fletcher, Op. cit, 281-282 
180 Stern, Op cit, 113  
181 ASARCO, 623-24 
182 Stern, Op Cit, p 103 
183 Hershkoff, Op. cit, pp 1905 (holding that in the light of States’ constitutional history, 
different separation of powers concerns and lack of federalist safeguards, the justiciability 
doctrine of article III cannot apply mutatis mutandis to state courts)  
184  See Case 33/76 Rewe v v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 
and Case 45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043 
185 See Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] 
ECR I-1029, para 66; Köbler, supra note 20, para 57 
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Therefore, important restrictions are imposed upon the Member States 
when denying access to national courts186. First, the ECJ has consistently 
held that parties, who are (or likely to be) injured by violations of 
Community law, are entitled to seek relief before national courts187. 
Secondly, third party standing may be granted where otherwise the 
effectiveness of Community law would be undermined. For instance, in 
Verholen188, the ECJ ruled that national law should confer standing to a 
plaintiff who bears the effects of a breach of Community law committed 
against a third party. Therefore, a husband seeing his pension reduced 
because of national law sexually discriminating against his wife and thus 
breaching Community law is entitled to seek judicial review against national 
authorities189. However, in Safalero190, the ECJ narrowed down third party 
standing. It held that, in so far as other equally effective remedies are 
available for the plaintiff, third party standing may be refused. Therefore, it 
is compatible with Community law to deny standing to a trader when 
challenging the seizure of goods sold to his retailer, if he is able, 
nonetheless, to bring proceedings against the fines imposed on him as the 
seller.  
 
Where the plaintiff tries to enforce Community Law against a third 
party, account should be taken to the purpose of Community legislation191. 
In Muñoz, the ECJ ruled that, though UK law was silent, an EC regulation 
imposing standards on agricultural products enables a competitor to bring 
civil proceedings against a trader violating those standards192. By relying on 
the principle of effectiveness, the ECJ held that, as a supplement to the role 
                                                 
186 T TRIDIMAS, General Principles of EU Law, (Oxford, OUP:2006) Chapter 9, pp 419-
497 
187 See Case 222/84 Johnston v RUC [1986] ECR 1651; Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens 
[1987] ECR 4097; Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357 
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Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-3757 
189 Ibid, paras 24-26  
190 Case C-13/01 Safalero Srl v Prefetto di Genova [2003] ECR I-8679, in the same vein 
see also Case C-216/02 Österreichischer Zuchtverband für Ponys, Kleinpferde und 
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191 Tridimas, Op cit, 546 
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Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd [2002] ECR I-7289 
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of national supervisory authorities, private enforcement strengthened the 
objectives protected by the regulation, namely the elimination of products of 
unsatisfactory quality from the market and fair competition. However, in 
Muñoz, the ECJ did not provide any guidance as to the scope of third party 
standing193. In addition to having exhausted other remedies, must the 
plaintiff have suffered (or likely to suffer) an injury which differentiates him 
from the rest of economic operators, as the Advocate General suggested194? 
Or should Community law impose “actio popularis” standing? Both 
extreme positions should be rejected. On the one hand, the extrapolation of 
standing rules under Article 230(4) EC to national rules of procedures is 
unacceptable. Not only because without any alternative forum, an analogue 
application of “individual concern” is clearly incompatible with the 
principle of judicial protection, but also due to the ECJ’s insistence on 
transforming the national forum into the principal venue for the vindication 
of Community rights195. On the other hand, a general and unrestricted grant 
of standing cannot be imposed on the Member States, not because of a 
parallelism with Article 230 EC196, but rather due to the fact that “actio 
popularis” is not related with the protection of individual rights. 
Accordingly, the principle of effectiveness does not require this type of 
standing either. On the contrary, it would appear as an undue intrusion into 
the Member State’s procedural autonomy. Hence, a competitor, consumer, 
trade union or environmental association should be entitled to enforce a 
Community obligation against a third party where [1] the effectiveness of 
EC regulations so demands it and [2] provided that the plaintiff’s interests 
are likely to be adversely affected. 
 
Moreover, it is worth examining whether the case-law of USSC 
regarding third party standing would comply with EC standards. As a 
general rule, standing is denied, unless it is demonstrated that [1] there is a 
close relationship between the first and third party and that [2] the first party 
encounters difficulties in asserting his own rights. However, the USSC has 
                                                 
193 A BIONDI, Case note on Muñoz, (2003) 40 CML Rev., pp 1247-49 
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195 Jégo-Quéré (appeal), para 29-32 
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tempered these requirements by granting standing where the restrictions on 
the third-party’s rights lead to adversely affecting the litigant. For instance, 
Eisenstadt v Baird, the USSC agreed to grant a contraceptive distributor 
with standing to challenge the validity of a state law which prohibited the 
sales of contraceptives to unmarried couples197. Likewise, in Craig v Boren, 
the USSC conferred standing to a beer seller who argued that a state law 
banning sales of beer with an alcohol level above 3.2% to males under 21, 
while permitting such sales to females above 18, was discriminatory198. 
Indeed, these two cases demonstrate that first and third party’s right were 
“mutually interdependent”199. Thus, if Verholen had been decided by the 
USSC, it would have reached the same outcome. Indeed, just like in Craig, 
a discriminatory law against a third party had adverse repercussions for the 
applicant. In Craig, it was the loss of customers. In Verholen, it was a 
reduction in his pension. Has the USSC adopted the approach of the ECJ in 
Safalero, by also requiring the applicant to lack other equally effective 
remedies before enforcing third party’s rights? the reply must be in the 
negative. The USSC centers its analysis in verifying that the applicant has 
suffered a relevant injury and that there is a “congruence of interests” 
between him and third party, so that the former effectively advocates for the 
rights of the latter. In so far as these conditions are fulfilled, it is irrelevant 
whether the applicant could have availed himself of other remedies. 
Accordingly, the USSC would have conferred standing to Mr. Safalero.  
 
Thus, it follows that, not only do third party standing rules under Article 
III US Constitution seem to comply with the requirements imposed by 
Community law, but they are more generous. While the USSC would agree 
with the findings of the in Verholen, it has not adopted the additional 
requirement laid down in Safalero.  
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claims should be understood as  first party standing cases) 
 76 
IV.-   Conclusion 
 
The most salient differences between standing rules under the EC 
and federal legal order are twofold. On the one hand, Article III US 
Constitution does not distinguish between private and public applicants, 
while Article 230 EC does. On the other hand, private applicants 
approaching federal courts have easier access than they would before the 
Community judiciary. The reason is that the US Constitution and the EC 
treaty entrust standing with a different mission.  
 
In the US, standing operates as an implement of the principle of 
separation of powers, that is, federal courts should be cautious not to 
intervene in the political process to the detriment of the Executive and 
Congress. At the same time, the political branches should not approach 
federal courts with a view to protecting their political power. That explains 
why the core of the standing doctrine is immune from congressional 
considerations. That is also why, ever since Marbury, all applicants, either 
private or public, are required to have suffered (or likely to) a harm. This 
enables the federal courts to draw the line between the realm of politics and 
law. In addition, the injury must be “concrete”, “real” and “impeding” as 
opposed to “hypothetical” and “generalized grievance”. Otherwise, the line 
would become blurred.  
 
In the same way, concerns for federalism also oppose to States, 
acting as parens patriae, which question the validity of a federal statute. 
This type of action is seen as an undue interference between individuals and 
the United States. However, whereas States may not challenge a federal 
statute, they may rely on it in order to protect their citizens from illegal 
federal agency action. In allowing so, the USSC favours a second level of 
enforcement by the States. This is a welcomed development. By acting as 
“congressional allies”, States are brought on board of federal policy making. 
They also contribute to enhancing the control mechanisms for delegating 
congressional powers, rendering agency action more transparent and 
accountable. Lastly, this “special solicitude” protects individuals from 
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generalized grievances that they could not themselves remedy in court for 
lack of standing. Yet, although this new development brings American 
States closer to their European counterparts, they are still far from being 
“privileged applicants”. 
 
In Europe, locus standi has been relied upon by the ECJ with a view 
to allocating judicial power between the Community and the national courts. 
Put simply, Article 230 EC favours constitutional debates among the 
Member States and the Community Institutions, while shifting the “normal 
judicial business”, understood as remedying individual injuries, to the 
national courts. View from this perspective, the Plaumann formula does 
make sense. This also explains why the ECJ did not think twice before 
rejecting the AG’s proposal in UPA. What is less clear, though, is why it 
reversed the unpretentious reform of the CFI in Jego-Quere. Perhaps, it is 
because the ECJ is overconfident in the capacity of national courts to step 
up. AG Jacobs is right in suggesting that the preliminary reference 
procedure cannot operate as a judicial remedy, but it should be treated 
exclusively as a tool of judicial cooperation. If the “jurisdictional shifting” 
strategy is flawed, it would be best for the ECJ to emulate the USSC in 
adopting standing rules without looking at other jurisdictions. Indeed, since 
it enjoys a monopoly to declare Community acts void, the ECJ would not 
even face the practical difficulties of its American counterpart. 
 
Further, by looking at both legal systems, it appears that private 
applicants have easier access to federal courts than to Community Courts. 
This is not surprising if one looks at the purpose of standing in each system. 
The notion of “individual concern” has no equivalent under Article III. For 
federal courts, it suffices for an injury to be “concrete”, regardless of 
whether it is widely shared. However, the USSC imposes additional 
causation requirements than the ECJ does. Yet, this difference should not be 
attributed to stricter standing rules, but rather to the different nature of 
available remedies. When seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, one may 
examine “traceability” and “redressability” separately. Often, both involve 
an identical inquiry. If the injury is caused by the defendant, it suffices to 
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enjoin its conduct to stop the injury. But Allen suggests that the USSC may 
disagree when applicants attack the legality of public action in order to 
change certain private behaviour. On the contrary, for annulment actions, 
the two prongs of causation are indissoluble united. It suffices to prove one 
to meet the other. In spite of additional causation requirements, the fact that 
standing under Article III is significant more liberal should not be contested. 
First, the impact of Allen should not be overstated. In most cases, both 
elements of causation converge. Secondly, as opposed to “direct concern”, 
the insurmountable obstacle for private applicants largely remains the 
Plaumann formula. Last but not least, cases relating to third-party standing 
demonstrate that Article III goes beyond the standards of judicial protection 
required by the ECJ for national courts. 
  
Finally, one more comparison deserves a few lines. Cases like 
Laidlaw, Massachusetts v EPA and Akins evince the willingness of the 
USSC to cope with changing times, while not abandoning the prominent 
features of the Marbury paradigm. Conversely, it appears that few 
jurisprudential shifts will occur under Article 230 EC. This is a pity since a 
moderate reform, such as the one introduced by Article 263 TFEU, would 
allow the ECJ to embrace continuity and change. 
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Chapter II 
The Political Question Doctrine in the US and in the EU 
 
Having established that standing does not operate as an implement of 
the principle of separation-of-powers in the EU; our comparative study now 
turns onto examining substantive questions that are deemed too political for 
judicial resolution. To this effect, this chapter aims to determine whether the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has implicitly embraced a political 
question doctrine along the lines of the US Supreme Court (USSC). It is 
divided as follows. Section I is an in-depth analysis of the conceptual 
foundations, normative justification and historical evolution of this doctrine. 
It is argued that during the last forty years, the USSC has progressively 
refused to find questions escaping judicial cognizance. The outcome of Bush 
v Gore200 provides an excellent illustration of this. Yet, in the realm of 
foreign affairs, the same conclusions cannot be drawn. In Section II, it is 
argued that the doctrine remains important in the US when allocating 
external competences between Congress and the Executive. However, 
recent cases on international terrorism demonstrate that, despite national 
security interests at stake, the USSC is not willing to abandon its role as 
guarantor of individual rights. Section III is devoted to examining whether 
analogue political questions have arisen in the EU. After examining a broad 
range of cases, three main findings are drawn. Firstly, the framers of the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) excluded some political questions 
from the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI) or 
decided that they should be governed by national law. Secondly, where 
Community Courts (the ECJ and the CFI) enjoy jurisdiction, their approach 
is analogue to the one of the USSC in Baker v Carr201. Both the USSC and 
the ECJ agree that, even if located at the heart of the political process, 
questions do not escape review where democratic values weigh against. 
Thirdly, stripping the ECJ from its jurisdiction over the Common and 
Foreign Security Policy (CFSP or second pillar) is not an adequate solution. 
                                                 
200 Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000) (Bush II)  
201 Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) 
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Instead, by examining recent cases on economic sanctions against terrorists, 
it is argued that it would be best to expand the powers of the Community 
Courts over the second pillar, while embracing a political question doctrine. 
Finally, it is maintained that it would be a mistake for the ECJ to emulate, in 
a near or distant future, the arrogant approach of the Bush Court. 
 
 
I.-   The Political Question Doctrine and the US Supreme Court 
 
A.-  Concept 
 
The political question doctrine can be understood as placing outside 
the purview of the federal judiciary certain constitutional questions, whose 
final and definitive resolution is entrusted to the political branches of 
government, that is, to Congress and the Executive. Therefore, the political 
question doctrine operates as a substantive limitation on judicial review 
(“ratio materiae”), which favours the participation of the two other branches 
of government in interpreting the Constitution, whilst preventing the 
judiciary from exercising an uncontested hegemony over all constitutional 
provisions. It follows that where a constitutional issue is qualified as a 
political question, the USSC is not the final arbiter in deciding the 
compatibility of a federal measure with the Constitution. On the contrary, an 
absolute deference to the constitutional judgment of the political branches 
takes place202.  However, even if the political question doctrine can be seen 
as an important caveat to the powers of the judiciary, its applicability is 
conditioned upon judicial self-restraint. Since neither the legislature nor the 
executive are entitled to determine when the Constitution considers a matter 
political; it is for the federal judiciary to qualify and define the boundaries 
of a political question. Hence, a question must first be qualified as political 
by the federal judiciary, and only then is its resolution entrusted to the 
legislature or to the executive (or both).   
 
                                                 
202 RE BARKOW, More Supreme than the Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, (2002) 102:2 Colum. L. Rev., pp 237-336. 
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The roots of the political question doctrine can be traced to Marbury v 
Madison, where not only did Chief Justice Marshall affirm that it is 
“empathically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is”203, but he also acknowledged that in relation to acts whose nature 
is political, they “can never be examinable by this court”204. Thus, from the 
beginning, judicial review was not unlimited. On the contrary, Marbury 
evinces that its substantive scope is defined by a “spectrum of deference”205 
which measures the degree of discretion enjoyed by the political branches. 
Indeed, the less discretion is enjoyed by the political branches, the more 
room there is for judicial intervention. Conversely, the more discretion is 
enjoyed by the political branches, the less judicially reviewable the measure 
is. At the end of the spectrum, where the political branches enjoy full 
discretion, there is no room for judicial review. The political branches have 
the last word in determining the compatibility of a measure with the 
Constitution. This is where the political question doctrine lies.  In Luther v 
Bordern206, the USSC articulated for the first time the term “political 
question doctrine”. There, the USSC was called upon to decide which of the 
two opposing governments contenting for legitimacy and possession of the 
State offices complied with the Guarantee Clause.  According to this clause, 
“the United States shall guarantee to each state of this Union a Republican 
Form of Government”. However, by interpreting the Guarantee Clause as an 
absolute deference to congressional constitutional judgment207 and by 
noticing that a ruling favourable to the applicants would lead to the chaotic 
situation of replacing the charter government and annulling all its actions208, 
the USSC refused to adjudicate on the merits of the case and dismiss the 
application. Therefore, Luther proved that not all constitutional issues can 
be judicially cognizable. In such case, their resolution should be left to the 
political branches. 
 
                                                 
203 Marbury, 177 
204 Ibid, 166 
205 Barkow, supra note 202, pp 241 
206 Luther v Borden, 48 US ( 7 How) 1 (1849) 
207 Ibid, 42 
208 Ibid, 39-40 
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B.-  The Normative Justification 
 
One could suggest that “la raison d’être” of the political question 
doctrine is that by virtue of the institutional characteristics of the political 
branches, some constitutional issues are better solved by the latter, rather 
than by federal courts209. Besides, by contrast to the protection of individual 
rights or the allocation of power at federal and state level, this doctrine 
engages federal courts into defining the contours of their interests and 
strengths vis-à-vis the political branches. Accordingly, if there was no 
political question doctrine, the USSC would not be obliged to undertake this 
“healthy exercise”. On the contrary, an absolute judicial supremacy would 
be embraced, subjugating the political branches to the mandates of overall-
reaching judicial review210. It follows that, the political question doctrine 
helps to maintain all branches of government on an equal footing. 
 
However, American scholars supporting a political question doctrine 
have disagreed over its scope and rationale. Some authors, such as 
Weschler211, argue that judicial abdication of review powers should only be 
based on an explicit or implicit interpretation of the Constitution that 
indicates an absolute deference to a branch of government. This version of 
the doctrine, known as the “classical” political question doctrine, relies on 
the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v Virginia, pursuant to 
which federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given”212. In 
other words, political questions are a residual concept, which only comes 
into play where interpreting the Constitution shows that federal courts lack 
jurisdiction213.  Others have affirmed, in particular Bickel214, that the 
                                                 
209 JS CHOPER, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, (2005) 54 Duke L.J., 
pp.1457-1523 (holding that this is the case where a constitutional issue raises questions of 
policy or it is conditioned upon factual findings) 
210 Barkow, Op cit, pp 330-336 
211 H WESCHLER, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, (1959) 73:1 Harv. 
L. Rev., pp 1-35. See also Barkow, Op cit, pp 330-336 
212 Cohens v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 403 (1821) 
213 However, since the Constitution does not expressly provides for judicial review, how 
can a literal interpretation of the former exclude the exercise of latter? Hence, from the 
express grant of power to a political branch it cannot be inferred that judicial review is 
precluded. Likewise, if a constitutional provision provides no judicial enforceable 
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political question doctrine should be based not only on an interpretation of 
the Constitution, but rather on “prudential” considerations. In this sense, the 
federal judiciary should decline to exercise its jurisdiction over cases whose 
resolution entails [1] a fear of disregard by the political branches, [2] the 
impossibility of solving the case following judicial standards215 or [3] the 
inability of the judiciary to foresee the practical impact of its rulings216. In 
addition, one can affirm that whereas a classical construction of the political 
question doctrine tends to limit its application; the prudential version grants 
more flexibility to the Judiciary. Indeed, a classical approach would be 
followed by an activist court, whereas the prudential version is a suitable 
tool for judicial restraint217.  
 
Finally, some US commentators favour the abandonment of the political 
question doctrine, holding that the judiciary should be the final interpreter of 
all constitutional provisions. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, if one 
reads the US Constitution as protecting intangible structures and values 
from majoritarian pressures, then the judiciary is the best fitted branch for 
its protection218. On the other hand, the decision making process of the 
judicial department is the most suitable for constitutional interpretation and 
                                                                                                                            
standards, it does not follow inter alia that the political branches enjoy full discretion. 
Indeed, the exercise of their authority may be reviewed under the Constitutional 
Amendments. See MH REDISH, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, (1985) 79:5 
Nw. U. L. Rev., pp 1031-1061, 1039-1042. 
214 A BICKEL, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 
(Indianapolis, Bob Merrill, 1962) pp 183-98. 
215 By invoking the cases under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause, Redish, Op 
cit, pp1046-1047 believes that if the USSC truly wants it, it can always find workable 
standards. A different question is whether the USSC should create standards in the absence 
of any constitutional hint as to how.  
216 Bickel, Op cit,  pp 184 
217 Barkow, Op cit, pp 333-334 criticizes the prudential version of the doctrine arguing that 
its application by the USSC has led to unpredictable results. Indeed, the author highlights 
the difficulty of distinguishing the cases that are avoided on prudential grounds from the 
ones decided. Furthermore, there is no need for a prudential version since other judicial 
doctrines, such as standing and equitable discretion, may lead to the same results. See also 
L HENKIN, Is There a Political Question?, (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal, pp 597, 622-623; 
Redish, Op cit, 1045-46 
218 E CHEMERINSKY, Why Should Not Be a Political Question Doctrine, in N 
MOURATADA-SABBAH and B CAIN (eds.), The Political Doctrine Question and the 
Supreme Court of the United States, (Maryland, Lexington Books: 2007), pp 181-199 
(holding that due to their life tenure and non-reducible salary, federal judges are best 
equipped to listen and respond to complaints of single persons as well as to enforce the 
Constitution in a hostile environment) 
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evolution219. However, this does not mean that deference to the political 
branches would stop, but only that there are no “constitutional safe-
heavens” for the political branches. Put simply, there is no room for judicial 
abdication under the US Constitution220. 
 
C.-  The Rise and Fall of the Political Question Doctrine  
 
The case law of USSC reveals three different stages in the evolution 
of the political question doctrine, which demonstrate its rise and fall. The 
first cases show that the USSC opted for a classical construction of the 
doctrine. As Luther elucidates, although the USSC referred to the adverse 
and undesirable effects of a ruling upholding the applicant’s claim, the core 
of its argumentation relied upon a textual interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause221.  Secondly, the USSC progressively abandoned its classical 
understanding of the doctrine in favour of a more prudential foundation. The 
political question doctrine was used as an abstention device enabling the 
USSC to avoid dealing with controversial cases. In Coleman v Miller222, 
plaintiffs contested that a State could ratify a constitutional amendment 
thirteen years after it was proposed by Congress, which had not specified a 
time limit. They argued that Article V of the Constitution compelled state 
legislatures to ratify within a reasonable time. Nevertheless, without making 
any reference to the wording of the Constitution, the USSC concluded that 
since a “satisfactory criteria for judicial determination”223 was lacking, 
whether the ratification process was still pending was a political question for 
Congress to decide. Likewise, in Colegrove v Green224, Illinois voters asked 
the USSC to put an end to the gerrymandering of Illinois congressional 
election districts. However, the USSC ruled that this was beyond its 
competence. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the Opinion of the USSC, 
                                                 
219 Ibid, 190 (opining that by contrast to the political branches, the judicial department is the 
only branch whose decision are based upon reasoning and arguments) 
220 Ibid, 197. See also Redish, Op cit, pp 1048-1049 
221 The USSC interpreted “United States” as meaning “Congress”. See Barkow, supra note 
202, pp 246-257. 
222 Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433 (1939) 
223 Ibid, 454 
224 Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549 (1946) 
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argued that even if the population was not fairly represented, it was not for 
the USSC to “enter this political thicket”225, but for state legislatures or 
Congress to solve unfair apportionments. He also relied on prudential 
grounds and affirmed that if the USSC were to render the electoral system 
invalid, Illinois would become undistricted and consequently, House 
representatives would be elected on a state-wide constituency. In his 
opinion, this situation would be much worse than the first one. The question 
that then arises is what prompted the USSC to stretch the political doctrine 
question. Perhaps, the attitude of the USSC responded to the lessons learned 
from the failed Packing-plan promoted by President Roosevelt226. Indeed, in 
the light of the pressing need of creating a national economy, the New Deal 
Court became highly deferential to congressional judgement. Accordingly, 
the political question doctrine found good soil from which to blossom227. 
 
However, in Baker v Carr228, the USSC overruled Colegrove. In this case, 
plaintiffs challenged the Tennessee Reapportionment Act on the grounds 
that it did not give city voters a fair share of seats and, consequently, it 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brennan writing for the USSC 
proceeded to a thorough review of the existing case-law on the political 
question doctrine. He began by stating that the political question doctrine 
relates to separation of powers issues. Hence, he inferred that the political 
question doctrine only alludes to the relationships among the federal 
branches of government and, hence, state legislative compliance with the 
US Constitution does not call for such judicial deference229. Subsequently, 
he went on to explain the cases in which a constitutional issue had been 
considered as political, namely, foreign relations, dates of duration of 
hostilities, validity of enactments, the status of Indian tribes and the 
Guarantee Clause230. Justice Brennan noticed that although in these cases, 
the USSC deferred to the Executive or Congress, it did not do so relying on 
                                                 
225 Ibid, 556 
226 See infra Chapter IV 
227 Barkow, Op cit, pp 258. See also R SCHAPIRO, Judicial Deference and Interpretative 
Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, (2000) 89 Cornell L. Rev, pp 656-716; 
685 
228 Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) 
229 Ibid, 210-211 
230 Ibid, 211-218 
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a “semantic cataloguing” of cases; but as a result of the “precise facts and 
posture of the particular case”. In other words, he stressed that “The 
doctrine of which we treat is one of “political questions, not of political 
cases”231. Hence, the USSC was not willing to reduce its jurisdiction in 
favour of “a blanket rule”232. On the contrary, Justice Brennan laid down six 
alternative criteria capable of defining a constitutional question as political, 
and whose application does not depend on the subject matter involved. He 
wrote:  
“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question”233.  
 
In this regard, one can affirm that by adopting this formula, the USSC 
embraced both versions of the political question doctrine. Whereas the 
“textual demonstrable constitutional commitment” requirement clearly 
alludes to the classical strand of the doctrine, the rest are based on 
prudential considerations. As Tushnet suggests, by listing the criteria under 
which a question is deemed political, the USSC narrowed down its 
application234. In his view, by giving political questions the form of law, 
Baker transformed a flexible approach advocating for judicial prudence into 
an ordinary question of constitutional interpretation. Besides, not only did 
                                                 
231 Ibid, 217 
232 Ibid, 215 
233 Ibid, 217 
234 M TUSHNET, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and 
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, in Moutarda-Sabbah and Bruce, supra 
note 218, pp 47-74 (opining that the “doctrinalization” of political questions as a set of 
rules undermined the possibility of avoiding decisions for prudential reasons) 
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this formula render more difficult alluding to prudence, but it is ultimately 
its reading by the post-Baker Court which initiated the fall of the doctrine. 
Indeed, in Baker, the USSC was not convinced by the prudential reasons 
previously defended by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove. Instead, it 
concluded that owing to the fact that “the consistency of state action with 
the Federal Constitution”235 was put into question, there was no separation 
of powers issue and thus, the political question doctrine was not applicable. 
In the same way, it added that by contrast to Luther, which involved the 
Guarantee Clause and where judicial standards were lacking, the Equal 
Protection Clause provided the USSC with enough guidance to issue a 
judgment. Consequently, the USSC concluded that apportionment 
legislation which appears to be inconsistent with a fair representation will be 
reviewed by the USSC.  
 
Why did the USSC decide to adopt a more assertive approach in 
relation to questions so central to the operation of the political process? 
Delivered eight years after Brown v Board of Education236 and only four 
after Cooper v Aaron237, Baker can be read as a coherent development in the 
USSC’s quest for judicial supremacy as a method of implementing its own 
political agenda238, which championed the protection of civil rights while 
greatly deferring to Congress for economic choices239. Indeed, Baker 
epitomises the theory of judicial review embraced by the Warren Court in 
Carolene Products, whereby judicial review cannot be foregone where 
legislation perpetuates locked-in political power structures or discriminates 
against “discrete and insular minorities”240. Thus, since the non-justiciability 
                                                 
235 Baker, 226 
236 Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state laws allowing 
school segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the XIVth Amendment, since 
they deprived black students from equal opportunities) 
237 Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that the USSC’s precedent in Brown must 
be read as the supreme law of the land and consequently, state law to the contrary must be 
disregarded. Likewise, in the light of Article VI Clause 3, every state officer must abide by 
it.) 
238 Tushnet, Op cit, pp 72 
239 R ZIETLOW, The Judicial Restrain of the Warren Court (and Why it Matters), available 
at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960144> 
240 This Theory of Judicial Review stems from Footnote Four in United States v Carolene 
Products Co. , 304 US 144, 152-53 (1938). See generally J HART ELY, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Harvard: 1980) 
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of reapportionment stood in the way of population equality between 
electoral units (1 person = 1 vote241) restricting its participation in the 
political process, the USSC decided to set it aside242. 
 
The fall of the political question doctrine continued in Powell v 
McCormack243. Powell was elected House Representative for the State of 
New York. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives did not allow him to 
take his seat. The House’s refusal was not due to Powell’s failure to meet 
the standing requirements laid down in Article I § 2 of the Constitution244, 
but to an alleged misuse of congressional funds. Powell sought injunctive, 
declaratory and monetary relief from the House Speaker, Mr. McCormack, 
affirming that he had unduly been excluded. The House argued that the case 
raised political issues which fell under its exclusive competence. Quoting 
Baker, the House considered that Article I §2 was a “textual demonstrable 
constitutional commitment”. However, the USSC disagreed. It conceded that 
the House alone was competent to determine whether the requirements 
listed in Article I §2 were met. However, whether the House could refuse an 
elected congressman to take his seat relying on different grounds was for the 
USSC to decide245. Powell can be distinguished from Baker in that whereas 
the latter showed that the USSC is cautious in applying the political 
question doctrine relying on prudential grounds, the former demonstrated 
that the USSC also follows very strict criteria in finding textual 
demonstrable constitutional commitments.  
   
Since Baker v Carr, the USSC has held only in few occasions that the issues 
presented political questions246. Besides, in these cases, the USSC primarily 
                                                 
241 Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964) 
242 B JACEWICZ, The Relationship of Judicial Politics and Constitutional History in the 
Warren Court’s Apportionment Revolution, (1993) 9 J.L.& Pol., 436-459 
243 Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969)  
244 See Annex 
245 Powell, supra note 243, 517-549  
246 In Gilligan v Morgan, 413 US 1 (1973), Kent University students requested the USSC to 
issue a remedial decree which would supervise and regulate the activities of the Ohio 
National Guard, whose intervention on campus in May 1970 had injured and even caused 
death to some students. Nevertheless, the USSC dismissed the application alleging that 
“establish[ing] standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of order to 
control the actions of the National Guard” raised a political question. Additionally, it held 
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followed a classical approach of the doctrine. Notwithstanding foreign 
policy and to some extent the Guarantee Clause247 and partisan 
gerrymandering248, this situation has led many scholars to confirm that 
Baker entailed the beginning of the end for the political question doctrine or, 
even more, the complete embracement of Judicial Supremacy. A good 
example fostering this statement is provided by Bush v Gore249, where the 
political question doctrine was not even mentioned by the USSC250. The 
facts of the case can be summarised as follows. During the 2000 presidential 
elections, the votes of the electors from the State of Florida became 
decisive. Owing to the fact that Bush led Gore with a margin inferior to 
0.5% of the votes cast, state law required a machine recount, which proved 
to narrow further the differences between the two candidates. Gore 
requested then a manual recount in several counties which Bush opposed. 
The case reached the Supreme Court of Florida, which upheld Gore’s claim 
                                                                                                                            
that pursuant to Article I Section 8 Clause 16, it is for Congress to organize the Militia 
(now the National Guard). On the other, it pointed out that the applicant’s request involved 
“[..] complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, 
and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject 
always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate 
responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government 
which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.”  
Likewise, in Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993), a federal judge who was being 
subjected to impeachment proceedings argued that the Senate’s conclusions could not be 
based on the report of the fact-finding committee. He sustained that Article I Section 3 
Clause 6, and in particular the “trial of impeachment”, alludes to the participation of the 
plenary in all its stages of impeachment proceedings. Thus, he affirmed that the 
Constitution precluded the Senate from delegating its impeachment powers to the 
committees. However, the USSC rejected his arguments and held that a textual, historical 
and systematical interpretation of the Constitution demonstrates that it is for the Senate 
alone to interpret the meaning of “trial of impeachment”. Therefore, it concluded that the 
Senate enjoyed full discretion in conducting impeachment proceedings. Besides, the USSC 
stressed that the impeachment could be seen as a check on the judiciary and hence, 
compliance with the Principle of Separation of Powers precluded the judiciary from 
intervening.  
Recently, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), in a 5-4 decision, the USSC declared 
partisan gerrymandering non justiciable. The USSC justified its decision alluding to the 
absence of judicially manageable standards. However, the constitutional impact of this 
ruling needs to be nuanced. The USSC did not expressly overrule Davis v Bandermer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986), where it had examined whether an Indiana apportionment statute 
discriminated against Democrat candidates. In Vieth, judicially manageable standards could 
not be found. However, as “swing” Justice Kennedy acknowledged, nothing prevents the 
USSC from finding them in future cases. To the same effect, see also League of United 
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and ordered a manual recount. Bush filed a writ of certiorari to the USSC, 
urging the latter to stop it. He argued that, since the Supreme Court of 
Florida did not comply with Florida’s electoral legislation, its ruling was in 
breach of the 3 USC § 5, Article II § 1 Clause 2 and the XIVth Amendment. 
Despite the fact that this case seemed to involve matters of state law 
alone251, the USSC granted certiorari. The USSC first acknowledged that 
state legislatures have been vested with plenary powers in choosing how 
electors for presidential elections are appointed, that is, state legislatures can 
opt between appointing electors directly or call for elections252. However, 
the USSC pointed out that if a State decides to confer on citizens the right to 
vote, it must do so avoiding “arbitrary and disparate treatment of the 
members of its electorate”253. Hence, it deduced that an unequal treatment of 
ballots would be in breach of the Equal Protection Clause. As for the case at 
issue, the USSC noticed that the Supreme Court of Florida had failed to 
indicate adequate standards capable of ensuring that a manual recount 
would not entail disparities among the different counties in accepting or 
rejecting contested ballots. In accordance with the USSC’s opinion, 
identifying “voters’ intent” does not prove to be sufficient to make sure that 
all the contested ballots would be equally treated. As a result, the USSC 
quashed the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida , ordering the manual 
recount to stop254.  
 
Whereas it is difficult to argue that the equal protection claim 
presented a political question255, concurring Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and 
Thomas also based their decision on Article II. They maintained that the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Florida was so peculiar that clearly 
departed from Florida statutes regulating elections256.  
However, Article II § 1 Clause 2 read in conjunction with the Twelfth 
Amendment appears as vesting Congress with a prominent role in the 
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election of the President. Indeed, in pursuance with these Articles, it is for 
the President of the Senate, “in the presence of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, to open all the certificates and the votes shall be counted”. 
The Twelfth Amendment also states that if no majority can be found, it is 
for the House of Representatives to choose among the first three candidates. 
There appears thus to be a solid textual argument demonstrating that the 
Constitution leaves to Congress the resolution of presidential elections 
disputes257. In the same way, prudential considerations also point in the 
same direction. First, the USSC knew that its ruling would determine the 
outcome of the 2000 presidential elections. As Calabresi indicates, it is 
difficult to think of any other highly political question than the election of 
the US President258. Secondly, in relation to Article II, it is difficult to see 
which judicial standards were followed by the USSC. There is no 
constitutional provision, nor precedent giving guidance as to whether a state 
court had unduly interfered with state legislation directing the appointment 
of presidential electors. Lastly, the USSC intervention in this case certainly 
undermined its legitimacy vis-à-vis a large part of the electorate. Since the 
five Justices nominated by Republican Presidents voted in favour of Bush, a 
popular perception of partisanship could arise259.  Indeed, as dissenting 
Justice Stevens emphatically concluded, “[a]lthough we may never know 
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential 
election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s 
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law”260.  
 
As the Warren Court did in Baker, was the Rehnquist Court also 
trying to promote larger political principles and ideological goals in Bush v 
Gore? The reply must be in the negative261. Bush v Gore is at odds with the 
Rehnquist Court’s conservative agenda, whereby state rights are enhanced 
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and justiciability is restrictively interpreted262. Besides, since its 
“considerations [were] limited to the present circumstances”263, the Bush 
Court was not pursuing a substantive change in the law of Equal Protection. 
What was the Bush Court aiming at then? Some authors suggest that the 
USSC pursued the perpetuation of its ideology by abusing the political 
process. By ruling in favour of the republican candidate, the USSC made 
sure that nominations of future Justices would better fit the predilections of 
the conservative majority264. Most importantly, while in Baker, the Warren 
Court intervened in order to solve the entrenchment of political power and 
to protect minorities, in Bush v Gore those interests were not at stake. 
Instead, the USSC intervened as the “protector of majority preferences”265, 
which are better represented by Congress266. Hence, by lacking any spirit of 
reluctance to decide cases close to the political process, Bush v Gore can be 
read a step away from the political question doctrine. As Tushnet indicates, 
it also reflects the consolidation of judicial supremacy in the American legal 
culture. Nowadays, the only fear of the American people is that “the nation 
will not comply with the Court’s decisions”267, no matter how political 
charged those are. In a similar vein, drawing on the Rehnquist’s federalist 
revolution, Barkow argues that the decline of the doctrine is “part and 
parcel” of a larger trend refusing to defer to the political branches in cases 
where the USSC has plainly jurisdiction. Since the USSC seems to pay little 
homage to congressional findings, intent and policy assessments when 
examining respectively the Commerce Clause268, substantive cannons of 
statutory interpretation and §5 XIVth Amendment269, it has just extrapolated 
its overconfidence on its institutional capacities when exploring political 
questions270. 
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To sum-up, the political question doctrine is a substantive limit to 
judicial review. It is based on both constitutional and prudential 
considerations. Nevertheless, since Baker, one can argue that the doctrine 
has been declining in favour of a more activist and far-reaching judicial 
review. Indeed, Bush v Gore suggests that the political question doctrine is 
at its nadir.  
II.-   The Political Question Doctrine and Foreign Policy 
 
By contrast to its general decline in domestic affairs, in realm of 
foreign policy, the political question doctrine remains good-law. 
Traditionally, foreign affairs have been considered as “the core of political 
question cases” and, in particular war powers, “the nub of the core”. 271 For 
example, the constitutionality of the Vietnamese War was never decided272. 
Recently, the First Circuit refused to adjudicate over the validity of the War 
in Iraq alluding to the political question doctrine273.  
 
Often, applicants contest the validity of the Executive’s foreign 
action on the ground that it has encroached upon the competences of 
Congress. In Goldwater v Carter274, US Senators urged the USSC to declare 
that President Carter’s decision to unilaterally withdraw the Unites States 
from the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was unconstitutional. They 
argued that since senatorial approval was necessary for its ratification, the 
same applied for its withdrawal. Likewise, relying on the absence of 
congressional declaration of war, applicants contended the 
unconstitutionality of the Vietnam War275. However, the USSC and lower 
courts disagreed, putting forward two grounds. Firstly, judicial abstinence 
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was justified in “dispute[s] between coequal branches of our Government, 
each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests”276. 
Indeed, under the US Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief 
of all armed forces and, thus, he has constitutional authority to direct 
external relations277. Secondly, it is exclusively for Congress to allocate 
funds to finance foreign operations278. Thus, if the President decides to carry 
out operations abroad without congressional approval, Congress may in turn 
decide to reduce financing these operations, forcing the Executive to request 
it279. Further, the USSC has indicated that, in foreign policy, courts lack 
capacity to coin discoverable and manageable standards. Besides, as 
Goldwater demonstrates280, it is common for the Constitution not to give an 
answer (or to give more than one) to a legal issue. Consequently, the 
resolution of questions relating to foreign policy should fall within the 
competences of the political branches. 
 
Another line of cases stresses the paramount importance for the US 
of “speaking with one single voice” in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Accordingly, the federal judiciary should abstain from putting at risk the 
consistency and coherence of the US President’s action. That is why the 
duration of hostilities281, the recognition of foreign nations282, the diplomatic 
status of foreigners claiming immunity283 and the interpretation of treaties 
have been qualified as political questions284. In the same vein, if courts were 
to get too involved, this would undermine their legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
general public285. 
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In Johnson v Eisentrager286, where German war criminals argued that the 
American military commission had violated several constitutional 
provisions and the Geneva War Conventions, the USSC held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain this claim and pointed out that “Such trials would 
hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. […] It would 
be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to 
allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to 
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the 
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely 
that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between 
judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United 
States.”287  
 
Moreover, the realm of foreign policy may be distinguished from the 
rest of political question cases in that this doctrine is relied upon in order to 
prevent the US Government from being caught in double loyalty, namely, 
compliance with judicial process and international responsibility288. Indeed, 
if the courts were to annul a treaty, a declaration of war or military 
operations, foreign governments would not be amenable to the American 
judicial process, and the consequences of such ruling would be 
overwhelming for the US Government. Besides, since the federal judiciary 
is precluded from rendering advisory opinions, it has chosen to defer to the 
Executive where a declaration of unconstitutionality would adversely affect 
American interests or undermine the American capacities in the 
international scene.     
 
It follows from the foregoing that the USSC is reluctant to allocate 
competences in the field of foreign policy. A “political clash” or a dialogue 
should draw the division of foreign affairs powers. The same reluctance to 
judicial action applies when it would impinge on the unity of the US foreign 
policy. However, as Brennan advanced in Baker, “it is error to suppose that 
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every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance”289. Indeed, recent developments in the case law of the 
USSC demonstrate that where, by affecting civil liberties, foreign affairs 
have domestic implications, the judiciary is less favorable to abdicate its 
review powers290. In this regard, the war on terror has come to demonstrate 
that the federal judiciary has an important role in deciding the proper 
balance between the general interest of preventing further terrorist attacks 
and an adequate level of protection of constitutional rights, while refusing 
an absolute deference to the Executive. Two cases evince this new pro-
active attitude of the USSC, namely Hamdi v Rumsfeld291 and Hamdan v 
Rumsfeld292. 
 
In Hamdi, the USSC was asked whether the status of “enemy combatant”293 
imposed on an American citizen and Guantanamo detainee could be 
judicially second-guessed or whether absolute judicial deference would take 
place. Thus, by contrast to Goldwater, this case was not about whether the 
President had gone beyond his constitutional powers to the detriment of 
Congress294. The petitioner argued that a detention based on a statement of 
an official of the Justice Department (“The Mobbs Declaration”) as the sole 
evidentiary piece submitted by the Government to the courts was contrary to 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. Conversely, 
in the light of its war powers, the US Government pointed out that the 
Mobbs Declaration provided the constitutionally required factual 
background and urged the USSC to dismiss any further inquiry since it 
would be both unworkable and undesirable. The US Government stressed 
that it was undisputed that Hamdi had been captured in a combat zone. 
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Additionally, further factual exploration would put national security 
interests at stake. Justice O’Connor, who delivered the Opinion of the 
USSC, sided with the petitioner. She stated that from the fact that Hamdi 
had been captured in a country where military operations were taking place, 
it did not follow that the petitioner was supporting hostile forces to or 
engaging in a conflict against the US. As for the second argument, the 
USSC recognised the “tension […] between the autonomy that the 
Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular 
goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived 
of a constitutional right”295, but it was not willing to abdicate its role as the 
guarantor of  individual rights. Unless Congress suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus, the USSC ruled that precluding a petitioner from the 
possibility to rebutthe Executive’s factual assertion of his detention before a 
neutral decision maker “would turn our system of checks and balances on its 
head”296. In this sense, the USSC rejected an absolute deference, preferring 
instead to strike a balance between the national security interests and the 
petitioner’s civil liberties297 as provided by Mathews v Eldridge.  There, the 
USSC held that the process due in any given instance is determined by [1] 
“the private interest affected by official action, [2] the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of that interest through the current procedures used, including 
the probable value of additional safeguards and [3] the government’s 
interests, including the additional administrative burdens the Government 
would face in providing greater process”298. Firstly, Hamdi’s physical 
indefinite detention as “enemy combatant” evinced a private interest which 
was jeopardised by governmental action. Secondly, the USSC held that an 
“unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for 
oppression and abuse” and hence, a procedure precluding a citizen from 
challenging factual findings presented a risk of an erroneous detention. 
Thirdly, the USSC also recognised that the government interests’ in 
preventing those who have fought against the US from returning to battle 
was legitimate. However, the USSC considered that further procedural 
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requirements did not adversely affect the war-making capacities of the US 
Government. It stated that handing over summaries of the documentation 
regarding battlefield detainees was a minimal imposition. Besides, in the 
same way as the judiciary is respectful of the functions of the military, the 
latter should also facilitate the constitutionally assigned duties of the federal 
judiciary299. It insisted that striking the proper balance between these two 
compelling interests was of a paramount importance300. Therefore the USSC 
concluded that, while Due Process requires that the citizen-detainee receives 
a notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to 
rebut the government’s factual assertion before a neutral decision-maker, it 
is also constitutionally admissible to uphold a rebuttable presumption in 
favour of the Government’s evidence. As a result, the USSC vacated the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
In the same way, in Hamdan, two questions were submitted to the 
USSC, namely [1] whether the Executive had made a valid use of trial by 
Military Commission when charging Guantanamo detainee of conspiracy 
against the US and [2] whether its procedures and structures were in breach 
of federal law, in particular, 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ). In accordance with this provision, Military Commissions must 
afford detainees the same procedural guarantees as the ones applied by 
Courts-Martial (the procedural parity principle). Nevertheless, this Article 
also indicates that uniformity must be followed “insofar as practicable”. 
Regarding the first question, the USSC could not reach an agreement301. As 
for the second question, the USSC concluded that, even if the military 
commission could try Hamdan, its procedures and structures were in breach 
of “the procedural parity principle”. One could argue that determining the 
practicability of the Courts-Martial’s rules of procedure should fall within 
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the competences of the Executive and that federal courts should follow a 
self-restrained approach. However, the USSC took a different view. It 
considered that, though the uniformity principle is not an inflexible one, it 
must be “tailored to the exigency that necessitates it”302. It indicated that 
practicability of the uniform principle cannot be confused with 
“convenience or expediency”. Accordingly, it held that, since the US 
Government did not justify its departure from the uniformity principle, the 
military commission should follow the same procedure as Courts-Martial. In 
this regard, in the light of Article 21 UCMJ, the President’s authority should 
comply with “the law of war”. To this effect, regardless of whether the 
Geneva Conventions were self-executing, their congressional ratification 
signaled that they belong to that body of law. Hence, when the USSC found 
that the military commissions created to trial Hamdan did not comply with 
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention303, it had no choice but to declare 
trials by Military Commission unlawful. One can affirm that in Hamdan, the 
USSC embraced “the clear statement principle”, pursuant to which, unless 
there is an unambiguous congressional authorisation, the Executive cannot 
rely on its war powers to deprive criminals from their rights to a fair trial304. 
 
The implications that flow from Hamdi and Hamdan are twofold. First, the 
two cases dealt with the interpretation and application of concepts drafted in 
very broad terms (“enemy combatant” and “insofar as practicable”), in 
relation to which the USSC could have agreed with the interpretation 
sustained by the Executive. However, in order to defend civil liberties, the 
USSC decided to intervene. Thus, not only did the USSC assess whether the 
political branches had crossed the boundaries of their constitutional powers, 
but it also reviewed their compliance with individual rights. Secondly, the 
USSC’s intervention in the realm of foreign policy is not cost free. Its 
reluctance to fully defer to the Executive on the interpretation of statutes or 
conclusive factual findings may interfere with the political dialogue between 
Congress and the Executive, prompting their negative reaction. Indeed, not 
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only was Hamdan’s ruling overruled when Congress passed the Military 
Commission Act (MCA)305, but the latter stripped federal courts from 
“hear[ing] or consider[ing] an application for writ of habeas corpus filed 
by or on behalf of an alien detained in the United States who was been 
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant or is awaiting such determination”306. Thus, one could argue that 
the USSC should have made use of its “passives virtues”307 and abdicate in 
favour of the political branches308. On the contrary, one could defend 
Hamdam, holding that the USSC would have the chance to reply when 
evaluating the constitutionality of the MCA. As a matter of fact, this is 
precisely what happened in 2008 when the USSC delivered Boumediene v 
Bush. There, the USSC ruled that suspending the writ of habeas corpus 
without providing an equivalent remedy was in breach of the 
Constitution309. 
 
III.-   Political Questions in the EU  
 
By drawing some parallelisms with the American jurisprudence, this 
section studies whether in the EU, political questions have arisen regarding 
a republican form of government, judicial review of the electoral process, 
parliamentary self-governance and treaty amendments. A special attention is 
paid to examining foreign policy cases. When the answer is in the 
affirmative, this section also attempts to identify whether the “classical” or 
“prudential” strand of the doctrine has been applied. 
  
A.-  Article 7 TEU and the Guarantee Clause 
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Included by the Treaty of Amsterdam310, Article 7 TEU is the EU 
equivalent to the Guarantee Clause under the US Constitution311. Both 
provisions authorise the central government to monitor state compliance 
with fundamental constitutional values, and to react when these values are 
in danger. That would be the case where a dictatorship came to power or a 
civil war broke out in one of the component States. Nevertheless, neither the 
scope of these provisions nor the degree of intervention authorised to the 
central government overlap. First, it appears that the Guarantee Clause in 
the US opposes certain types of lawmaking initiatives312. By contrast, 
provided that human rights are respected, this would not be the case for 
Article 7 TEU313. Secondly, while the EU may only adopt sanctions against 
the infringing Member State314, Congress may itself put an end to the 
situation315. Finally, the Guarantee Clause can also be read as a check on the 
US Federal Government316. Since Congress must “guarantee a republican 
form of government”, federal legislation may not become a threat to the 
States’ institutional autonomy. On the contrary, though Article 6(1) TEU 
also binds the EU, Article 7 TEU is only addressed to the Member States317. 
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Next, as discussed above, in Luther, the USSC announced the non-
justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, adducing to both textual and 
prudential grounds318. Does Article 7 TEU also involve non-justiciable 
political questions? In accordance with Article 46(e) TEU, it is only the 
Member State concerned which may bring an action against measures 
adopted under Article 7 TEU. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the ECJ is 
limited to “purely procedural stipulations”319. For instance, the ECJ would 
only verify that the necessary majorities have been gathered and that the 
Member State concerned has been allowed to submit its observations. As 
the Commission indicates, judicial review is limited to guaranteeing that 
“the relevant State’s rights of defence are respected”320. Conversely, there is 
an absolute deference to the Council when determining the existence of a 
“serious and persistent breach of the principles mentioned in Article 6(1) 
TEU”. Hence, Article 7 TEU may be read, with the exception of procedural 
stipulations, as a political question. The reason lies in that the drafters of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam considered that, outside the scope of Community law, 
it was for the political process to ensure Member States’ compliance with 
the European Union’s founding principles. Due to the highly sensitive issues 
involved, the flexibility of diplomatic dialogue was preferred to the rigidity 
of the judicial process. 
 
A less straight-forward scenario takes place under Article 7(4) TEU, 
whereby in response to changes in the situation leading to the imposition of 
sanctions, the Council may revoke or modify them. After rectifying its 
behaviour, could the infringing Member State bring an action against the 
Council for failing to act? Arguably, the Council’s omission could be read 
as a procedural flaw. After all, the last paragraph of Article 7(1) TEU 
compels the Council to check on a regular basis whether the determination 
for the sanctions continues to apply. Thus, neither the wording of Article 46 
(e) TEU nor the wording of Article 7 TEU is conclusive. Unfortunately, the 
ECJ has not yet had a chance to define its jurisdiction under Article 7 TEU.  
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Perhaps, the prudential criteria listed in Baker could provide some 
inspiration for future cases. If the Council fails to act, the infringing 
Member State would not know how to amend its behaviour so that the 
sanctions are repealed. Thus, a ECJ’s ruling obliging the Council to act 
would end the legal uncertainty in which the infringing Member State is 
immersed. Besides, the ECJ would not examine the appropriateness or 
accuracy of the sanctions in question, respecting the limits on judicial 
review set by Article 46 (e) TEU. Hence, the prudential considerations 
enounced in Baker would not advise against an action for failure to act 
against the Council.  
 
B.-  Judicial Review and European Elections 
 
As mentioned above, the ruling in Baker initiated the re-drawing of 
electoral districts throughout the United States. To a large extent, the “one 
person/one vote” rule changed American politics. Locked-up majorities 
were dissolved and neglected minorities were injected into the political 
process. Even though apportionment lies at the epicentre of the political 
process, the USSC decided to intervene. Has the ECJ emulated its American 
counterpart or instead, considered that electoral questions were too political 
for judicial resolution?  
 
The first case that comes to mind is Les Verts321. Despite the original 
version of the EC Treaty only provided for judicial review of acts of the 
Commission and the Council, the ECJ declared that acts of the European 
Parliament which had effects on third parties could not escape judicial 
control322. The ECJ based its determination on the rule of law and the 
principle of inter-institutional balance. Still, the merits of the case are also 
an important contribution to the democratic development of the 
                                                 
321 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 
322 F JACOBS, Constitutional Control of European Elections: The Scope of Judicial 
Review, (2005) 28 Fordham Int'l L.J., p 1049-1061 
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Community323. For the 1984 elections, the European Parliament had 
provided funds for an “information campaign” on European elections. These 
funds were to be allocated among the parties already represented at the 
European Parliament, while only leaving a limited proportion of funds to 
parties participating for the first time. Acting as the plaintiff, the French 
environmentally-friendly party argued that the system discriminated against 
new parties and, accordingly, was contrary to Community law. In other 
words, the system could be seen as entrenching already established political 
groups. Besides, the system also blurred the distinction between the 
information campaign on the European Parliament and campaign finances, 
the first falling within the competence of the Parliament, while the latter 
within the competences of the Member States. Thus, as a way of protecting 
the electoral process, the ECJ decided to intervene. It annulled the 
Parliament’s decision, holding that it laid down a scheme for reimbursing 
election campaign expenses which, back then, was for the Member States to 
decide. As provided in footnote four of Carolene Products, this ruling also 
epitomises the link between judicial review and legitimacy324. In les Verts, 
judicial review was employed in order to enhance the democratic process in 
European elections. The ECJ was willing to surmount procedural obstacles 
in order to prevent incumbent political parties from obtaining an advantage 
in the electoral run.  
 
As for national laws regulating local and European elections, the role of 
the ECJ is confined to determining their compliance with Articles 19, 
190(4) EC as well as with the 1976 Act325. Firstly, via a preliminary 
reference procedure, the ECJ would declare incompatible with the EC 
Treaty national legislations discriminating against candidates or voters 
residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals326. Secondly, it 
would be contrary to Article 190(4) EC and to the 1976 Act for a national 
                                                 
323 K LENAERTS & T CORHAUT, Judicial Review as a Contribution to the Development 
of European Constitutionalism, (2003) 22 YEL, pp 1-44 
324 Ibid, 34 
325 Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, OJ 1976 L 278/1, as amended by Council Decision 
2002/772/EC, OJ 2002 L 283/1 
326 See Cases C145/04 Spain v United Kingdom, [2006] ECR I-7917, paragraph 66; C-
300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055, paragraph 53.  
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law to lay down a non-proportional voting system when electing Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs). Finally, the 1976 Act binds Member 
States when defining the term of office, incompatibility in relation to elected 
members, the period in which elections are to be held and the time when 
counting is to begin. Hence, once these conditions are met, the electoral 
process is largely governed by national law327. For instance, provided that 
the proportional nature of the voting system is complied with, it is for 
Member States to define the constituency for European elections. Further, 
the ECJ has held that it falls within the national legislatures’ discretion to 
extend the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections to 
non-EU citizens residing in Europe. Likewise, it is up to the Member States 
to decide whether nationals residing outside the EU may participate in the 
European elections. Can this deference to the national legislature when 
defining the electorate be understood as a political question? I would 
suggest a reply in the negative. The ECJ’s limited role is due to a division of 
competence between the EU and the Member States rather than to 
prudential considerations. “In the current state of Community law”328 
resulting from the Council’s failure to adopt a uniform procedure, many of 
the electoral questions are decided by the national parliaments. In any event, 
the ECJ still exercises an important, albeit limited, control by applying the 
principle of equal treatment. In Eman and Sevinger, the ECJ indicated that 
Member States enjoy discretion in conditioning the right to vote upon the 
criterion of residence. However, it also pointed out that in exercising such 
discretion, the Member States may not discriminate329. Hence, the ECJ ruled 
that a Dutch law precluding Dutch nationals residing in Aruba from voting 
in the European elections, while allowing Dutch nationals residing in a non-
member country to do so, violated the principle of equal treatment.  
 
 
 
                                                 
327 Jacobs, Op cit, 1053 
328 Spain v UK, paragraph  78; Eman & Sevinger, paragraph 45 
329 Eman & Sevinger, paragraph 55 
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C.-  Self-governance of the European Parliament 
 
In Powell v McCormack, the USSC denied the application of the 
political question doctrine in relation to internal congressional decisions, in 
so far as there is no textually demonstrable constitutional commitment330.  
For instance, Congress would enjoy absolute discretion to determine if a 
member met the qualifications stated in Article I § 2 US Constitution, to 
expel a congressman331 or to conduce impeachment proceedings332. 
However, as Powell indicates, if Congress refuses to seat a representative on 
different grounds, it is for the federal judiciary to verify that such refusal 
complies with the Constitution. The USSC is thus rejecting a prudential 
approach according to which simply because Congress sustained a variant 
interpretation of Article I §2, “the courts’ [should] avoid[…] their 
constitutional responsibility of interpreting the constitution”333. Besides, the 
USSC justified its review in the light of protecting the “fundamental 
principle of our representative democracy […] that the people should 
choose whom they please to govern them”334. In the same way, since 
congressional internal mechanisms failed to protect Mr. Powell’s and his 
constituents’ interests, the USSC opined it had sound reasons to 
intervene335. Thus, all seems to indicate that in the absence of textually 
constitutional commitment or of sufficient internal remedies336, all 
congressional self-governing acts may not be regarded as political 
questions337.   
 
                                                 
330 Powell, supra note 243. In the same vein, United States v Munoz Flores, 495 US 385 
(1990); United States Term Limited v Thornton, 514 US 779 (1995) 
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332 See Nixon v United States, supra note 246 
333 Powell, Op cit, 549 
334 Ibid, 548 
335 E CHEMERINSKY & C FISK, The Filibuster, (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev., pp 181-254 
336 However, Chemerinsky & Fisk, Op cit, pp 230-231 argue that the presence of Article I 
textually demonstrable commitment does not exclude Congress from complying with other 
constitutional provisions, in particular, basic constitutional values as the one enshrined in 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
337 Still, as indicated in the previous Chapter, the justiciability of these claims would also 
have to surmount standing requirements. Notably, applicants arguing they have suffered an 
injury resulting from the “dilution of the political power” will not have standing. 
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Would the ECJ intervene in an analogue situation to one suffered by 
Mr. Powell? Before answering this question, it must be pointed out that the 
powers of Congress and the European Parliament differ in relation the 
exclusion and expulsion of its members. In pursuance with the 1976 Act and 
its rules of procedure, the European Parliament may verify the credentials of 
representatives and take note when a vacancy arises. However, by contrast 
to US Congress, the European Parliament may not expel a MEP. It may only 
impose sanctions on him or her as a result of non-compliance with standards 
of conduct338. Furthermore, in the absence of a uniform electoral procedure, 
it is largely for Member States to design the winner of the European 
elections, as well as rule on the disqualification of a MEP. Accordingly, just 
as it occurs in the previous section, the ECJ has a minor role in adjudicating 
over these two matters, being for the national courts and the ECtHR to 
verify that national procedures comply with human rights. The case of Le 
Pen v Parliament339 is particularly illustrative. There, a criminal conviction 
was imposed on Mr. Le Pen, a French MEP. By way of further sentence, the 
French court withdrew for a year his right to be eligible for public office. 
The French Government notified this sentence to the President of European 
Parliament who, in accordance with Article 12(2) of the 1976 Act, 
disqualified Mr. Le Pen from holding office. Reluctant to abandon his seat, 
the latter brought proceedings against this decision. However, first the CFI 
and later the ECJ on appeal dismissed the application, declaring that the 
decision of the President of the European Parliament did not produce any 
legal binding effects. Indeed, they ruled that the European Parliament did 
not enjoy any discretion to review the decision of the French authorities, but 
it merely took notice of a “pre-existing legal situation”340. Said differently, 
the challenged act was merely confirmatory. Although the ECJ has not ruled 
on the powers of the Parliament to verify the credential of MEPs, it can be 
maintained that the same holds true341. It follows that the Community 
judiciary would not review the validity of these two acts. However, it is not 
                                                 
338 Rules 146-148 
339 Case T-353/00 Le Pen v Parliament [2003] ECR III-1729 confirmed by C-208/03P 
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due to a “political question”, since the ECJ notes that it is a competence to 
be exercised by national courts and the ECtHR342. Instead, absence of 
judicial review by the Community Courts is due to the lack of EU 
competences. Hence, a case like Powell v McCormack would not be 
reviewed by the ECJ, but by the national judiciary. 
 
However, where the European Parliament does enjoy competences, 
is the ECJ willing to review the validity of their acts? As a starting point, the 
ECJ has consistently held that, unless an internal act of the European 
Parliament has effects vis-à-vis third parties, the Community Judiciary will 
not intervene343. As Professor Hartley suggests, the reason of its reluctance 
to extend judicial review to internal acts of the European Parliament may be 
explained by the fact that the ECJ pays homage to the traditionally 
established organisational sovereignty or autonomy of legislative 
assemblies344. In the same way, the non-reviewability of internal acts is due 
to the ECJ’s efforts to preserve the inter-institutional balance345. Indeed, if 
the ECJ dictated how the European Parliament must organise itself, the 
former would be clearly impinging upon the latter’s prerogatives, violating 
the principle of inter-institutional balance. But, when a measure affects third 
parties and involves parliamentary self-governance alike, would it not be for 
the ECJ to defer to the EU Parliament’s political judgement, and only later 
decide over the third party’s rights? Martinez & Others v European 
Parliament346 provides helpful insights to this question. There, in order to 
enjoy the benefits of forming a political group, the applicants, right-wing 
MEPs, had decided to create “Le Groupe Technique des Deputes 
Independents” (TDI). By contrast to traditional groups, the members of the 
TDI publicly stated they shared no political affiliation with each other. In 
accordance with Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, the plenum of the 
                                                 
342 T-353/00, Op cit, paragraph 91 
343 Orders in Case 78/85 Group of the European Right v Parliament [1986] ECR 1753, 
paragraph 11, and Case C-68/90 Blot and Front national v Parliament [1990] ECR I-2101, 
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Parliament opined that “political affiliation” is a condicio sine qua non for 
the creation of a parliamentary group. Accordingly, it considered the TDI to 
be non-existent ex tunc, reducing its members to being non-attached MEPs. 
Before the CFI, the Parliament raised the inadmissibility of the application 
brought by some members of the TDI, alleging that the challenged act did 
not produce any legal effects. However, the CFI shared a different view, 
holding that the challenged decision adversely affected the parliamentary 
functions of the applicants. It proceeded then to thoroughly examine the 
notion of “political affinity”. The CFI noted that this requirement was not 
optional, but all groups had to be of a political nature. It also indicated that 
MEPs creating a group were presumed to share political affinities, however 
minimal. Hence, only in so far as there is a patent, open and deliberate 
denial of political affinities by the members of a group, may the European 
Parliament order its dissolution347. On the contrary, the Parliament would 
exceed its discretion, if it applied Rule 29(1) when members of a group 
retain their voting freedom or declare their political independence from each 
other. Therefore, the CFI agreed with the Parliament, indicating that the TDI 
itself had rebutted the presumption of political affinity by issuing such a 
public statement. Some scholars have qualified this point as disturbing. 
Simon maintains that it would have been better for the CFI to defer to the 
“sovereign” judgment of the Parliament, when interpreting the concept of 
“political affinity”348, given that the CFI itself highlighted the “subjective 
nature of the concept”349.  Following Baker, Simons seems correct, since the 
interpretation of this concept entails “the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion”350. However, as in the Powell case, the CFI’s intervention may 
be underpinned by democratic reasons, in particular, the principle of 
independent mandate. The ruling of the CFI reflects a balance between the 
principle of institutional self-governance and the principle of democratic 
functioning. Had the CFI abdicated in favour of the Parliament, the latter 
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would have been free to dictate what constitutes a political group. 
Accordingly, the voting freedom of MEPs could have been undermined. 
Political majorities could have impinged on the rights of individual MEPs to 
create “non-majoritarian” political groups.  
 
D.-  Treaty Amendments 
 
In Coleman v Miller, the USSC ruled that determining whether the 
period for ratifying a constitutional amendment had elapsed was a political 
question for Congress to decide. However, Coleman pre-dates Baker. 
Accordingly, as the doctrine stands today, the USSC would be very likely 
intervene. Yet, since the USSC has not given a definitive answer351, 
American scholars remain divided. On the one hand, the USSC’s 
impartiality would be put at stake if it intercedes when a constitutional 
amendment seeks substantial overruling352. On the other hand, the 
normative force of Article V US Constitution would be weakened without 
checks on its procedural requirements353.  
 
Is the ECJ in an analogue position? In accordance with Article 46 TEU, 
the ECJ has jurisdiction over provisions regulating the amendment of the 
TEU and EC Treaty. For instance, the ECJ could annul the opinion of the 
Council calling for an intergovernmental conference if it fails to consult the 
European Parliament. However, by contrast to Coleman, it is not for the 
Community judiciary to assess the validity of each national ratifying 
process. Article 48 TEU clearly defers to the national constitutions. Hence, 
it is for national courts to check that the ratification process complies with 
“their respective constitutional requirements”. As a result, amending the 
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TEU and the EC Treaty is not a political question, but a vertical division of 
competences between the Community and national judiciary354. 
 
E.-   Foreign Policy 
 
In the EU foreign affairs, not only does the allocation of powers have a 
horizontal dimension, but also a vertical one. Horizontally, external 
relations may be undertaken either by the Community or fall within the 
scope of the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)355. Vertically, it 
is important to draw the line between foreign affairs whose competence has 
been assumed by the Community and foreign affairs retained by national 
sovereignty. The EU “external” complexity is further intensified by Article 
3 TEU according to which, despite this vertical and horizontal distribution 
of powers, the EU’s action must be coherent so that third parties may rely 
upon the fact that their counterpart speaks with one single voice356. 
 
As for comparing the political question doctrine, this double dimension 
renders the EU constitutional framework substantially different from the 
American one. Horizontally, one could draw some analogies between the 
US inter-branch and the EU inter-pillar and inter-institutional conflicts. 
However, whereas Community Courts are called upon to determine the level 
of judicial scrutiny allowed when Member States derogate from Community 
law invoking national security or foreign policy considerations, the same 
cannot be said for the American States. Said differently, US foreign affairs 
take place at federal level, not vertically357. Bearing in mind this structural 
difference, this section is divided into three parts. The first sub-section is 
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devoted to studying whether there is a “political question doctrine” when 
inter-institutional and inter-pillars conflicts arise in the realm of foreign 
affairs. The second sub-section advocates the expansion of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction over the CFSP, while adopting a political question doctrine. The 
third sub-section looks at the degree of discretion enjoyed by the Member 
States when invoking foreign policy or national security derogations. 
 
1.-  Horizontal dimension 
 
As Goldwater v Carter evinces, the USSC has consistently refused to 
adjudicate over the allocation of foreign affairs competences between 
Congress and the US President. It justified its finding by stating that the 
equality of arms between the political branches rendered judicial 
intervention unnecessary. It also added that there were no manageable 
judicial standards for such determinations. In the EU, it is precisely the 
opposite. Not only is the Community judiciary empowered to annul a 
Community measure impinging on the prerogatives of one of the political 
institutions358, but the ECJ also has jurisdiction to prevent the CFSP from 
encroaching upon Community competences359.  
 
However, within the Community pillar, the “foreign affairs” factor is 
not decisive. Community Courts adjudicate over inter-institutional disputes 
involving external measures just like they do when they examine internal 
measures adopted in the same area of law. In effect, the ECJ has held that 
the degree of judicial scrutiny is not conditioned upon determining whether 
a competence is being internally or externally exercised, but upon 
ascertaining whether the substantive area of law, in which the measure was 
adopted, vests Community Institutions with broad discretionary powers360. 
Hence, the question that must be answered is not why inter-institutional 
conflicts fall within the province of the Community judicial department in 
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the realm of foreign affairs, but why they generally do so in the first place. 
As opposed to the US political branches, Community Institutions did not 
possess equal arms when they were first created. Originally, there were no 
checks and balances preventing the Council (allied with the Commission) 
from encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Parliament. The case of 
Chernobyl provides a clear example361. There, the ECJ concluded that, in 
order to preserve the inter-institutional balance, disputes among Community 
Institutions had to be submitted to judicial review362. Besides, today an 
additional explanation may be that, whereas the USSC is reluctant to confer 
standing in inter and intra-branch disputes which are deferred to the political 
process, in the EU, Community Institutions and Member States are seen as 
guardians of rule-of-law363. Since a Community Institution may bring 
proceedings solely alleging the violation of the law by another Institution, a 
fortiori they may as well act to defend their prerogatives. 
 
The situation changes radically in the CFSP. In accordance with 
Articles 46 and 47 TEU, the jurisdiction of ECJ is limited to “policing the 
boundaries”364 between the first and the other two pillars365. Traditionally, 
there have been two reasons for excluding the CFSP from the purview of the 
Community judiciary366. Not only did Member States fear that conferring 
jurisdiction to the ECJ would amount to eroding highly sensitive areas of 
national sovereignty, but also owing to their scope and nature, CFSP 
measures were deemed unfitted for judicial review. In the field of foreign 
policy, no permanent legal framework between the Member States is 
created. On the contrary, it is suggested that international conflicts often 
require a prompt and non-permanent reaction free from “rampant” 
interventions of the judiciary. However, some European scholars have 
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contested these two settled assumptions. For instance, after examining wide 
range of CFSP measures, Eeckhout argues that CFSP involves more than 
“foreign-policy positions and the making of diplomatic demarches”. In his 
view, albeit creating rights for and imposing obligations of citizens, “the ill-
defined nature of joint actions and common positions therefore appears to 
permit virtually any type of governmental action”, going from measures 
involving financial expenditure to setting up military missions367. Why 
should some of CFSP measures, being no substantively different from 
Community measures, be excluded from judicial control? Besides, he posits 
that where there is a democratic deficit, courts should step forward to ensure 
the Executive is confined by the rule of law368. 
 
To sum-up, cases such as Goldwater v Carter would be examined by 
the Community judiciary. The ECJ does not hesitate to solve inter-
institutional disputes. On the one hand, the original institutional design did 
not possess sufficient political checks and balances ensuring that one 
Community Institution did not encroach upon the competences of the other. 
On the other hand, the EU legal system has evolved so as to grant the 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament with general 
standing. The ECJ also has jurisdiction to police the boundaries between the 
Community and the CFSP pillars.  
 
2.-  US Flexibility vs. EU Rigidity: Expanding judicial control over the 
CFSP 
 
To some extent, the “natural” exclusion of CFSP from the purview 
of the ECJ mirrors the pre-Baker conservative case-law of the USSC. For 
instance, when asked as to review the President’s opposition to an 
application to engage in air carrier transportation overseas, the USSC 
replied “the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial Such decisions […] are delicate, complex, and involve 
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large elements of prophecy […] They are decisions of a kind for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility”369. Still, cases 
such as Hamdi and Hamdan demonstrate that the USSC may subsequently 
shifts its views by embracing an assertive approach in defence of civil 
liberties. As opposed to the legal EU system, the USSC is not confined by 
constitutional walls insulating foreign policy from judicial checks370. As 
Justice O’Connor indicated, the USSC may opt for a balanced approach.  
.    
By contrast to the American flexibility, the rigidity of the EU legal 
system prevents applicants from challenging the validity of a CFSP measure 
no matter how serious violations of EU law may be. This situation is not so 
alarming when CFSP measures are implemented by the Community. OMPI 
v Council provides a good illustration371. There, the applicant challenged 
both a CFSP Common Position listing the name of the persons whose assets 
had to be frozen by the European Community and the Council Decision 
implementing it. The CFI did not spend much time declaring the 
inadmissibility of the action against the Common Position, by 
acknowledging that no encroachment upon Community competences had 
taken place. It then rejected the claim alleging that the non-justiciability of 
the CFSP measure would amount to “a denial of justice”. It held that, since 
it enjoyed jurisdiction to assess the validity of the Community implementing 
measure372, its judicial review entailed an indirect review of the Common 
Position. Notwithstanding that the ruling of the CFI diminishes the 
consistency in the EU external action, OMPI evinces that whenever a CFSP 
measure is implemented by Community legislation, expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Community Courts does not appear to be so urgent. 
Nonetheless, serious human rights concerns arise when CFSP measures 
need no further implementation. Cases such as Segi and Gestora Pro-
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Amnistia373 provide a good example. Although the measures challenged 
pertained to the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC 
or third pillar), the underlying legal problem was the same, namely the 
absence of judicial review. In these cases, applicants brought proceedings 
claiming damages against the Council. They argued that including their 
names on a terrorist blacklist for the purposes of judicial and police 
cooperation caused them serious harm. The CFI ruled that it would declare 
admissible an action for damages against a PJCC Common Position, 
provided that it had encroached upon Community competences as provided 
by Articles 46 and 47 TEU. Noticing that there was no encroachment, the 
CFI had no choice but dismiss the application, admitting nevertheless that, 
since no further implementation was required, no remedy was available to 
applicants. However, it held that “the absence of a judicial remedy cannot in 
itself give rise to Community jurisdiction in a legal system based on the 
principle of conferred powers, as follows from Article 5 TEU”374. On 
appeal, AG Mengozzi largely agreed with this last statement of CFI, 
suggesting that national courts should review the validity of PJCC Common 
Positions, where the EU legal order failed to do so375. However, the ECJ 
rejected these last observations. Forcing the adaptation of its UPA and Jégo-
Quére case-law376, it ruled that [1] ascertaining the true nature of a PJCC 
Common Position, [2] annulment actions brought by the Member States and 
the Commission, and [3] the preliminary reference procedure did ensure “a 
complete system of remedies”377. The decision of the ECJ in Segi has been 
largely criticised elsewhere378. Suffice to say that the preliminary reference 
procedure is not, properly speaking, a remedy. Nor does it give rise to 
compensation. As a result, since there were no implementing measures, 
applicants were deprived of all remedies. 
                                                 
373 Case T-333/02 Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council, not published in the ECR; 
Case T-338/02 Segi and Others v Council [2004] ECR II-1647 
374 Segi, Op cit, paragraphs 38 
375 Opinion of AG Mengozzi in C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council [2007] ECR I-1657, 
paragraphs 130-132  
376 Case C-50/00P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; Case C-
263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA [2004] ECR I-3425 
377 Segi (appeal), Op cit, paragraphs 50-54 
378 S PEERS, Salvation Outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar After 
Pupino and Segi Judgments, (2007) 44 CML Rev, pp 883-929 
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With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the remedial gap 
will be partially solved. Article 275 TFEU will enable natural and legal 
persons adversely affected by a CFSP measure to initiate annulment 
proceedings before the Union (now Community) Judiciary. Still, this grant 
of jurisdiction must be read as an exception to the general non-justiciability 
of the CFSP measures. Therefore, applicants may not seek damages against 
the EU. Nor may they indirectly challenge a CFSP measure via the 
preliminary reference procedure. Article 275 TFEU provides for a direct, 
prospective and non-monetary remedy. 
  
The rigidity of the EU legal system can be contrasted with the 
flexibility the political question doctrine provides to the USSC. By 
comparing cases like Hamdi with Segi, both dealing with terrorism, one may 
wonder whether a policy of self-restraint would be preferable to 
constitutional walls impossible for the judiciary to climb. Arguably, it could 
be sustained that a political question doctrine would fail both ways, either 
by over-deferring to or excessively mistrusting the political branches. 
However, where they enjoy jurisdiction, the rulings of the CFI and the ECJ 
on the fight against terrorism suggest otherwise. For instance, in OMPI, the 
CFI ruled that because of the Council’s broad discretion in adopting 
economic sanctions implementing a CFSP common position, “the 
Community Courts may not, in particular, substitute their assessment of 
evidence, facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures 
for that of the Council”379. The prudential rationale underpinning Baker 
seems to appear. Both the USSC and the CFI will not adjudicate over 
matters involving “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non 
judicial discretion”. Said differently, the CFI is not willing to replace the 
Council’s political judgment by its own. However, it does not follow that 
economic sanctions become a “blank cheque” in favour of the Council. In 
particular, just as in Hamdi where the USSC did not abdicate its role as 
                                                 
379 OMPI, supra note 371, paragraph 159. In the same vein, see also: T-47/04, Sison v 
Council, judgment of 11 July 2007, n.y.p and T-327/03, Al-Aqsa v Council, judgment of 11 
July 2007, n.y.r; T-253/04 Kongra-Gel and Others v Council, judgment of 3 April 2008, 
n.y.r. ; T-229/02 PKK v Council, judgment of 3 April 2008, n.y.r. 
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guarantor of fundamental rights, so too have the Community Courts taken 
the same stand. It suffices to read at the Opinion of AG Maduro in Kadi, 
later endorsed by the ECJ on appeal380. There, after rejecting the primacy of 
UN law over EU law381, Maduro urged the ECJ to annul the EC Regulation 
for breach of fundamental procedural rights. Before examining the 
Community Regulation, he evaluated the level of judicial involvement that 
was required. AG Maduro disagreed with respondents who had argued that 
the fight against terrorism was a “political question” unfitted for judicial 
determination. In their view, unlike the Security Council, not only did the 
Community judiciary lack the expertise to evaluate which measures are 
appropriate to prevent international terrorism, but judicial intervention 
might also disrupt a “globally coordinated effort to combat” this threat . 
Although AG Maduro conceded that the ECJ should not ignore that it 
operates in an increasingly interdependent world where the authority of 
other International bodies must be, as far as possible, recognised, he stressed 
that the Community Courts could “turn its back on the fundamental values” 
which they are bound to protect. Measures intended to suppress 
international terrorism could not be seen as a political question excluding 
any type of judicial second-guessing. The reason lies in that “the political 
process is liable to become overly responsive to immediate popular 
concerns, leading the authorities to allay the anxieties of the many at the 
expense of the rights of a few”382. Hence, in embracing a classical 
conception of the judicial function echoing a Post-Baker rationale, the 
Advocate General posited that compliance with the rule of law commands 
Community Courts to follow judicial review. Even if it is true that the 
prevention of international terrorism may be read as a novel question, it is 
not the standard of judicial scrutiny that needs to be accommodated, but the 
balance resulting from weighing new threats to the general interest against 
fundamental rights.   
                                                 
380 Opinion of AG Maduro 16 of January 2008, in Case C-402/05 Kadi v Council, 3 
September 2008, n.y.r.  ; Cases T-306/01 Yusuf v Council [2005] ECR II-3533 and T-
315/01 Kadi v Council [2005] ECR II-3649 reversed by Case C-402/05P 
381 See generally T TRIDIMAS & J GUTIERREZ-FONS, EU Law, International Law and 
Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? (2008) Fordham Int'l 
L.J.l (forthcoming). 
382 Para. 45 
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Therefore, OMPI and Kadi reveal that the Community Courts are 
aware of their institutional limitations when second-guessing the adequacy 
of measures adopted to fight terrorism, while still not giving away judicial 
protection of human rights. Since the Community judiciary has proved 
capable of striking the right balance between “liberty and security”, nothing 
suggests that they could not do so in other areas of foreign affairs. 
Traditional fears no longer justify the exclusion of the ECJ from the CFSP. 
  
3.-  Vertical Dimension 
 
In the realm of foreign affairs, the degree of centralisation attained under 
the US Constitution is greater than the one laid down by the EU legal 
system. Article I § 10 US Constitution precludes States from entering into 
any treaties, declaring wars or levying duties on exports without 
congressional approval. In the same way, the USSC has built its case-law 
favouring the exclusivity of the federal government in the realm of foreign 
affairs383. American States may not invoke external policy considerations in 
order to derogate from federal law, nor may they adopt discriminatory 
measures alluding to their own security. It is precisely the opposite. States 
must ensure that their domestic policies do not hinder the Executive when 
conducting the foreign or security affairs of the Nation384. In Crosby, the 
USSC ruled that a Massachusetts law banning state entities from buying 
goods or services from companies doing business in Burma was pre-empted 
by federal law setting up a less restrictive regime. In addition to declaring 
state law pre-eempted by congressional legislation, the USSC has also 
struck down state measures which adversely affects the capacity of the 
federal government to deal with foreign affairs. In Japan Lines, the USSC 
ruled that, in addition to the restrictions stemming from the Dormant 
Interstate Commerce Clause, foreign commerce impose additional 
                                                 
383 Zschernig v Miller, 389 US 429 (1968); Japan Line Ltd. v City of Los Angeles, 441 US 
434 (1979); Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000); American 
Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).  
384 B DENNING & M RAMSEY, American Insurance Association v Garamendi and 
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, (2004) 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev., pp 825-950 
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restrictions on state regulatory powers, namely state law would be displaced 
if it interferes with the US Government’s capacity to “speak with one 
voice”. More recently in Garamendi, the USSC held that a Californian law 
requiring insurance companies doing business in California to provide 
information about the insurance policies they sold in Europe during the Nazi 
regime, was pre-empted by an executive agreement concluded with 
Germany.  
 
Conversely, defence and foreign policy largely remain within the 
sovereignty of the EU Member States. Does it mean that all measures 
touching upon these domains fall outside the scope of Community law? In 
the light of Centro-Com385, the reply must be in the negative. The ECJ has 
expressed that, though Member States remain sovereign over foreign affairs 
and national security, “the powers retained by [them] must be exercised in a 
manner consistent with Community law”. Thus, even if the UK had a 
legitimate interest in complying with its international obligations under UN 
law, it was precluded from adopting measures pursuing objectives already 
protected by the Community legislator. Hence, simply because a national 
measure has a foreign or national security dimension, it does not fall outside 
the scope of Community law. Nor does it escape judicial scrutiny386. 
However, it does not follow that Member States’ concerns in these sensitive 
areas are not taken into account by the ECJ. As Trybus indicates, the case-
law of the ECJ reveals that “the weaker the commercial link and the 
stronger the security link of a provision, the lower the degree of intensity” in 
applying the proportionality test387. In other words, there is a “spectrum of 
deference” going from Article 30 EC to Article 297 EC. First, national 
measures adopted under Article 30 EC388  must be [1] suitable to promote 
the objectives of public security, [2] the least restrictive alternative on free 
                                                 
385 Case C-124/95, the Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v HM Treasury and Bank of England, 
[1997] ECR I-81. In the same vein, Cases C-273/97, Sirdar v The Army Board and 
Secretary of State for Defence [1999] ECR I-7403; C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [2000] ECR I-69 
386 P KOUTRAKOS, Is Article 297 EC a “Reserve of Sovereignty”?, (2000) 37 CML Rev., 
pp1339-1362. 
387 M TRYBUS, The EC Treaty as an Instrument of European Defence Integration : 
Judicial Scrutiny of Defence and Security Exception, (2002) 39 CML Rev, pp 1347-372 
388 See Article 36 TFEU 
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movement capable of attaining the same objective, and [3] the public 
security reasons must outweigh free movement interests. Cases such as 
Campus Oil, Commission v Greece or Albore provide a good illustration389. 
In an intermediate position lies Article 296 EC.  There, the allusion to the 
concept of “necessity” implies that only clearly unsuitable, arbitrary or 
manifestly inappropriate measures will be set aside390. Finally at the end of 
the spectrum, Article 297 EC provides the widest margin of appreciation to 
the Member States391, but is there room for a political question?  
 
It is difficult to answer this question, since the ECJ has been reluctant to 
deal with this provision392. The FYROM case393 is perhaps the only case 
shedding light on its meaning. By invoking this provision, Greece sought to 
unilaterally interrupt trade with FYROM alleging that the use of the name 
“Macedonia” threatened its territorial integrity. However, the Commission 
disagreed and brought an enforcement action under Article 298 EC on the 
ground that Greece had unjustifiably violated EC trade law. For some 
scholars, Article 297 is an “un-interpretable” provision securing a “reserve 
of national sovereignty”394. Accordingly, in order to protect their national 
security, not only does Article 297 entitle Member States to adopt measures 
which would run against the proper functioning of the common market, but 
it also prevents both national and Community judiciaries from reviewing the 
validity of state measures adopted thereunder. Although the case became 
moot for review before the ECJ could issue a ruling, the Opinion of AG 
Jacobs is an important contribution. He acknowledged that the ECJ, or any 
other court, lacks judicial standards to ascertain “whether serious 
international tension existed and whether such tension constituted a threat 
                                                 
389 See Cases C-72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727; C-398/98 Commission v Greece 
[2001] ECR I-07915 ; Case C-423/98 Alfredo Albore [2000] ECR I-5965 
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391 Trybus, Op cit, pp 1368 
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of war”395. This matter is left to the subjective considerations of the Member 
State concerned, which is in the best position to assess the adverse impact 
that the conduct of a third State would have on its national security. As the 
USSC previously held396, determining the existence of belligerent 
confrontation was for the Member State’s executive to determine. Indeed, 
the parallelisms with Baker are clear. Both AG Jacobs and the USSC are 
willing to defer to the political branches in the absence of “workable judicial 
standards”. Arguably, courts may always find or even create judicial 
enforceable parameters397. However, a different question is whether they 
should. Clearly, due to the exceptional character of Article 297 EC, the 
reply must be in the negative.  
 
Nevertheless, since this provision has been qualified by the ECJ as 
“wholly exceptional”398, the paucity of judicial criteria regarding the 
substantive conditions provided in Article 297 EC does not imply that 
Member States are granted “carte blanche”399. Firstly, the case-law reveals 
that the ECJ will not apply Article 297 as way of circumventing other treaty 
provision, in particular Article 30 EC400. Secondly, national and Community 
Courts will focus on verifying that this Article is not used to protect the 
economy of the Member State concerned, thus, ensuring that a misuse of 
powers does not take place401. Thirdly, AG Jacobs stated that invoking this 
provision does not preclude compliance with either the principle of 
proportionality or the principle of equal treatment402. Although 
proportionality would not be used to determine whether the challenged 
national measure is adequate to put an end to the risk or threat invoked by 
the Member State, Community and national courts are entitled to assess 
                                                 
395 Opinion AG Jacobs in FYROM case, supra note 393, 50. In the same vein, Opinion of 
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whether the impact of the state measure on the common market is 
proportional403. Finally, Article 297 EC also imposes certain procedural 
requirements on the invoking Member State, e.g., it is required to consult 
other Member States prior to adopting measures deviating from the common 
market404. If Article 297 EC were a provision calling for absolute judicial 
deference, Article 298 EC which introduces an expedite procedure for 
enforcement actions would be devoid of purpose. Thus, the whole of Article 
297 EC cannot be read as precluding judicial control. It is only in relation to 
the internal consistency of the measure that the Community judiciary will 
not intervene. However, its impact upon the common market will be 
examined. 
 
IV.-   Concluding Remarks 
 
Either because some textual provisions are clearly committed to the 
political branches or because “prudential considerations” advise against 
judicial intervention, the political question doctrine recognises that the 
province of the judicial department does not cover the entire constitutional 
landscape. Some constitutional questions escape judicial cognizance. Yet, 
accepting that the institution of judicial review is not constitutionally all-
embracing does not imply a devalued role for the judiciary. On the contrary, 
it reveals that the judiciary undertakes the “healthy exercise” of defining the 
contours of its interests and strengths vis-à-vis the political branches. 
Accordingly, the viability of this doctrine presupposes that the federal 
judiciary trusts the institutional capacity of the legislature and executive, 
when dealing with questions unfit for judicial resolution. However, even 
after accepting the institutional superiority of the legislature and the 
executive, it does not follow that the judiciary will abdicate its role when 
fundamental constitutional values are at risk. Ever since Baker, the USSC 
has pointed out that, even if questions lie at the epicentre of the political 
process or fall within their field of expertise, the political branches will 
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break the judiciary’s trust, if they fail to protect or causes themselves the 
violation of basic constitutional tenets (e.g. Due Process Clause or Equal 
Protection Clause). In such cases, the judicial department is ready to assume 
leadership monopolising the interpretation of the Constitution. Still, the fact 
that the vow of confidence may be withdrawn does not entail per se a 
constant mistrust of the political branches. As demonstrated by Bush v Gore, 
embracing absolute judicial supremacy without pursuing larger 
constitutional principles and goals may severely damage the USSC’s 
legitimacy and reputation vis-à-vis the nation. It follows that the success of 
this doctrine is conditioned upon constantly adopting a “balanced 
approach”. First, when applying the doctrine, federal courts must not refer 
to an abstract catalogue of cases, but proceed to outweigh political 
considerations on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, the federal judiciary must 
be guided by openness to deference. The federal judiciary must not be 
overconfident of its own institutional capacities, but must recognise that 
some areas of law are better fitted to political discussion. Nevertheless, if, 
on the merits, the courts are always reluctant to defer to political branches 
when exploring factual findings, intent or policy assessments, they are less 
inclined to do so when applying jurisdictional limits. As shown in the 
following chapters, there appears to be a symmetrical momentum in the 
USSC’s attitude when examining jurisdictional and federal boundaries. 
Finally, the added value of the doctrine lies in its prudential foundation 
rather than on its classical construction. While the latter can be recast as an 
ordinary question of constitutional interpretation, the notion of “prudence” 
brings flexibility and dynamism into the doctrine. It is true that this strand of 
the doctrine renders outcomes more difficult to predict, reducing legal 
certainty. However, this flaw results from its virtue. By contrast to the 
classical approach creating immutable “safe-heavens” for the political 
branches, prudential considerations favour constitutional innovation, by 
adapting the doctrine to changing times. Most importantly, they are the only 
ones capable of striking the proper balance between “reckless confidence” 
and “excessive distrust” on the political branches.  
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In the EU, the ECJ has not formally coined a doctrine excluding 
political questions from its purview. The reason is twofold. On the one 
hand, the drafters of the Treaty have already subtracted political questions 
from the jurisdiction of the Community Courts. Article 7 TEU and the CFSP 
are paradigmatic examples. On the other hand, the EU has not assumed 
competences in matters located close to the operation of the political 
process, which largely remain for the national parliaments to decide. For 
instance, the European electoral process, the disqualification and seating of 
MEPs and the ratification process of treaty amendments are largely 
governed by national law. Indeed, cases such as Powell v McCormack or 
Coleman v Miller would fall outside the scope of the EU legal order. 
However, it does not follow inter alia that these questions are seen as 
political. The ECJ has suggested that it is a matter for the national courts 
and, where appropriate, for the ECtHR to decide. Said differently, it is not 
an automatic deference to the political process, but a vertical distribution of 
jurisdictional competences between the Community Courts and the national 
courts. Of course, national courts may, in turn, consider whether these 
questions raise political questions. Nevertheless, their ruling will be based 
on their national constitution and not the TEU or EC Treaty, just like when, 
in exercising their jurisdiction, state courts in the US are not bound by 
Article III of the US Constitution. Still, in areas where the Community 
Courts enjoy jurisdiction, have they applied a political question doctrine? I 
would suggest that the Community Courts have followed an approach 
relatively close to the post-Baker era, that is, judicial intervention was 
underpinned by democratic principles. In Les Verts, the ECJ surmounted 
jurisdictional limitations in order to prevent already represented political 
parties from taking an advantage in the electoral run, eventually leading to 
the locking-up of settled majorities. In the same way, in Martinez v 
European Parliament, the CFI did not hesitate to thoroughly examine the 
concept of “political affinity”. In its view, an absolute deference to the 
benefit of the European Parliament would have become an obstacle to the 
democratic principle of an independent mandate. Hence, in both cases the 
Community Courts emerged as guarantors of the democratic process, even if 
it resulted detrimental to parliamentary self-governance. Additionally, just 
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as in Baker, in Eman v Sevinger, the ECJ also alluded to the principle of 
non-discrimination to curtail the discretion of national legislatures when 
adopting electoral laws.  
 
 
In the realm of foreign affairs, the political question doctrine remains 
good law. The USSC is reluctant to solve inter-branch disputes regarding 
the allocation of foreign affairs powers, by holding that both political 
branches stand on an equal footing to defend themselves and that there are 
insufficient judicial tools to solve these disputes. To a large extend, the 
USSC’s refusal mirrors its doctrine on representational standing.  Likewise, 
the USSC is also keen on deferring to the US President in order to enhance 
the consistency and unity of foreign policy. However, in the light of Hamdi 
and Hamdan, it does not follow that the whole of foreign policy is non-
justiciable. As a flexible judicially-created instrument, the political doctrine 
question allows a balanced intervention when civil liberties are at stake.  
 
In the EU, in addition to the horizontal allocation of powers, foreign 
policy presents a vertical dimension absent in America where States have 
almost no say. Horizontally, the ECJ has not refused to adjudicate over 
inter-institutional disputes. Without “the foreign affairs factor” being 
decisive, the reason explaining why the ECJ has adopted an approach 
different from Goldwater v Carter is twofold. Firstly, the original version of 
the Treaty did not provide for co-equal branches, but a weaker European 
Parliament. Secondly, the EC Treaty has evolved so as to grant Community 
Institutions with a general standing. As for the CFSP, with the exception of 
the limited role of “policing the boundaries”, judicial review is precluded. 
This judicial exclusion rests on traditional assumptions over protecting 
national sovereignty and the non-justiciable nature of foreign affairs, which 
arguably no longer hold true. Besides, the rigidity of the EU legal system 
falls short of providing a satisfactory level of human rights protection. As 
Segi and Gestoras demonstrate, this situation is particularly alarming when 
a CFSP measure requires no further implementation. Although the Treaty of 
Lisbon will provide for a direct, prospective and non-monetary remedy, it is 
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only a partial solution. Constitutional walls insulating the CFSP from 
judicial review should be torn down. A policy of self-restraint along the 
lines of the political question doctrine should then be embraced. But is the 
ECJ ready or are traditional fears still valid? OMPI demonstrates that where 
the Community Courts enjoy jurisdiction, they have proved able to strike a 
proper balance between the need to combat terrorism and human rights, 
while paying due account to the Council’s findings. Accordingly, the 
Community Judiciary appears to be mature enough to assume the greater 
responsibility in defining its institutional position vis-à-vis the Community 
political institutions. Vertically, when called upon to determine the level of 
discretion allowed to Member States invoking national security or foreign 
policy considerations, the same applies. Community Courts have designed a 
“spectrum of deference”, whereby the weaker the commercial link is, the 
softer the proportionality test becomes. Located at the end of the spectrum, 
Article 297 EC raises a political question namely “whether serious 
international tension existed and whether such tension constituted a threat 
of war”. As Baker indicates, judicial deference takes place because of the 
lack of judicially workable standards. Nevertheless, this provision cannot be 
considered as “blanket rule” or “a reserve of national sovereignty”. The 
Community Courts will still examine compliance with the principle of 
proportionality and equal treatment, as well as the procedural requirements 
laid down in Article 298 EC. As in OMPI, it appears that the ECJ also 
strikes a right balance between national fundamental interests and the proper 
function of the common carket. 
 
Finally, with an expanded jurisdiction, there is always the risk that 
the Community judiciary might lean towards an approach close to Bush v 
Gore, that is, a judicial supremacy which not only protects minorities from 
political abuses, but directly injects federal courts into the heart of the 
political process. Should the Treaty of Lisbon enter into force, the 
Community judiciary will have then completed its transformation “from a 
trade and tax law into a human rights court”405. Accordingly, cleavages 
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with the political branches might become more common. The adoption of a 
political question doctrine, along the lines described above, appears to be a 
good solution.  Otherwise, a total lack of deference to the political branches 
would lead to Community Courts committing the same mistakes as its 
American counterpart. 
 129 
Chapter III 
 
Negative Integration: The Dormant Commerce Clause And 
Article 28 EC 
 
One of the primary objectives of the founding fathers of the US 
Constitution and of the drafters of the EC Treaty was to integrate different 
national markets into a single one. Accurately, they believed that a single 
market would enhance economics of scale, maximise efficiency and 
competition and thus, it would increase the general welfare while ending 
commercial balkanisation among sister States. Accordingly, when drafting 
the US Constitution, “no other federal power was so universally assumed to 
be necessary, no other state power was so readily relinquished”406, Justice 
Jackson wrote. Likewise, Article 2 EC understands the establishment of the 
common market as the mean to bring prosperity to the Peoples of Europe. 
The constitutional legitimacy of this objective being indisputable, how can 
it be achieved? The EC Treaty and the US Constitution point out two 
different, albeit complementary, ways of tearing down barriers to interstate 
trade. On the one hand, when a supranational legislative body adopts 
common standards pre-empting contradictory national regulatory laws, 
“Positive integration” takes then place. On the other hand, the judiciary 
may also be entrusted with enforcing constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
free movement of the factors of production. This institution is known as 
“Negative integration”. It follows that, while the first type of integration 
relies on the supranational legislature, the latter considers that, in order to 
establish a common market, the judicial protection of commercial rights is 
vital. These two types of market-building devices can be found in America 
and in Europe. The Commerce Clause and Article 95 EC empower 
Congress and the Community legislature to enact commercial legislation 
that will facilitate interstate commerce, while Article 28 EC and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) compel the judiciary to strike down 
national measures unduly impinging upon interstate transactions. 
 
                                                 
406 Hood & Sons, Inc v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 534 (1949) 
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However, in the United States and in the European Union, the 
powers of the Federal Government or the Community are not infinite, but 
limited to the ones vested upon them by the US Constitution and the 
Founding Treaty respectively. The principle of “Enumerated Powers” under 
American law is enshrined in Article I § 8 US Constitution, which lays 
down an exhaustive list of subject matters upon which Congress has the 
power to legislate407. Additionally, the Xth Amendment also provides that 
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people”. In the same way, though the Treaty does not contain a 
catalogue of Community competences408, Article 5 EC lays down the 
principle of “Attribution”, pursuant to which “[t]he Community shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the 
objectives assigned to it therein”. Therefore, one may affirm that, in both 
constitutional orders, the legislative powers of the Federal Government or 
the Community are valid in so far as they take, explicit or implicitly, as their 
legal basis a constitutional or treaty provision. In the light of these 
principles, the creation and functioning of the internal market cannot 
amount to eroding all legislative competences of the States. It is true that, in 
order to free interstate trade from illegitimate and protectionist 
interventions, States agreed to transfer power to the US Government and the 
Community respectively. However, under any circumstance, they 
acquiesced to giving away all aspects of market regulation. The “Market” 
not only involves economic operators, but also other interests, such as 
environment, consumer protection, social policy and so on. The question 
that then arises is how national markets can be coordinated without 
depriving States from all their regulatory competences affecting it. Put 
simply, it is for the US Supreme Court (USSC) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) “to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress (and the 
                                                 
407 Indeed, as Professor Tribe indicates, Article I§1 does not state that Congress is vested 
with “all legislative power”, but with the legislative power “herein granted”. See LH 
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Community Legislature) to regulate more than nothing [...] and less than 
everything [...]”409. 
 
Nevertheless, both the federal and the Community judiciary have 
struggled to allocate legislative powers to regulate the commerce between 
these two levels of governance.  The reason is that, not only is the regulation 
of commercial activity the key stone of an integrationist process, but it is 
also a very complex matter. The regulation of commerce among the 
different component States is subject to constant changes. What could be 
considered as a non commercial activity in the past may be considered as 
commerce in the future. In the same way, progress in communications, 
transports and technologies has rendered more difficult to ascertain what is 
purely local from what may affect interstate trade. Thus, the definition of 
commerce and determining when interstate elements are involved, are a 
constant challenge to constitutional adjudication. Indeed, important shifts in 
the case-law of both Courts have been undertaken in the realm of the 
internal market law. Both Courts have introduced different tests aiming at 
fostering legal certainty and coherence, against an increasing body of law 
which threatened to erode all state commercial legislation. Either based on 
structural or substantial principles, these tests encapsulate a judicial effort to 
find the appropriate “constitutional equilibrium” between what ought to be 
regulated by supranational bodies and what is better kept in the hands of 
local authorities.  
 
The purpose of the following two chapters is thus to examine and 
compare the “mode of analysis” coined by both Courts. While the next 
chapter will look at “Positive integration”, the following paragraphs are 
devoted to studying constitutional provisions limiting States’ regulatory 
powers. The first section examines the place of the DCC and Article 28 EC 
in their respective constitutional text. Section II outlines the constitutional 
foundation and the normative evolution of these provisions. Section III 
looks at judicial review of discriminatory state measures, while Section IV 
                                                 
409 Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1,  (2005) (O’Connor dissenting) 
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examines cases beyond discrimination. In Section V, it is determined 
whether, when assessing the validity of state legislation, the ECJ takes into 
account its extraterritorial effects. Section VI underlines and explains the 
convergences and divergences of both the USSC and the ECJ when limiting 
state regulatory powers. Finally, the chapter concludes by briefly 
examining the application of a “process-oriented” review to overcome the 
shortcomings of Keck.  
 
I.-   Constitutional Limits on State Regulatory Powers 
 
The DCC is not the only provision which limits state regulatory and 
taxing powers. Firstly, “Economic Substantive Due Process”410 protects the 
ability to enter into and enforce contracts, to pursue a trade or profession 
and to acquire, posses or convey property. However, since 1937 when the 
Lochner era came to an end, the USSC has not declared void either state or 
federal regulations on the ground that they unduly hinder economic 
liberties411. Secondly, the “Equal Protection Clause”412 embodies a general 
prohibition of discrimination. Nonetheless, by contrast to the DCC, it does 
not prohibit the discriminatory effects of facially neutral laws, unless there 
is a discriminatory purpose behind413. Thirdly, the USSC has recognised 
that there is a fundamental right to travel and to interstate migration within 
the United States414. Finally, the “Privileges and Immunities Clause”415 bans 
state discriminatory measures against citizens of other States. The USSC has 
recognised that the DCC and Article VI§2 substantially overlap. They are in 
a “mutually reinforcing relationship”416. However, the scope of Article 
VI§2 is narrower than the one of the DCC. Firstly, it does not apply to 
corporate entities417. Secondly, it only protects constitutional rights and 
                                                 
410 XIVth Amendment US Constitution 
411 E CHEMERINSKY, Constitutional Law, (New York, Ed. Aspen: 2006), pp 625-629 
412 XIVth Amendment US Constitution 
413 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976); see JL LARSEN, Discrimination in the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, (2004) 49 S.D.L.Rev., 845-866. (arguing that the notion of 
discrimination applied in the realm of the Commerce Clause is broader than in other areas 
of constitutional law, particularly with regards to the Equal Protection doctrine) 
414 United States v Guest, 383 US 745 (1966) 
415 Article VI§2 US Constitution 
416 Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518, 531 (1978) 
417 Paul v Virginia, 75 US (8 Wall) 168 (1868) 
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important economic activities. For instance, access to recreational facilities 
is not included418. Finally, it only targets discrimination against out-of-state 
citizens. Thus, there is no equivalent to the Pike test under Article VI. 
Nonetheless, by contrast to the DCC, Article VI cannot be superseded by 
federal statute. Nor does it recognise the market participant exception419.  
   
Established in order to create a common market, it is not surprising that 
the EC Treaty contains specific provisions prohibiting States from erecting 
custom420, fiscal421 and technical barriers422 to interstate trade. Respectively 
and with the exception of custom duties423, the Treaty also lays down a list 
of derogations for each type of barrier.  The free movement provisions are 
“lex specialis” of Article 12 EC, which enshrines the General Principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. Indeed, when laying down the 
foundations of an incipient common market, integration unavoidably 
requires compliance with the principle of non-discrimination. However, 
notwithstanding Keck, the law of the free movement has moved beyond the 
“non-discrimination paradigm”, by adopting a further-reaching “access to 
market test”. It follows that law of free movement has developed so as to 
surpass the scope Article 12 EC. Additionally, since each of the free 
movement provisions covers a specific aspect of the European internal 
market, the ECJ has ruled that they are, albeit exceptional cases424, 
“mutually exclusive”425. In effect, the piecemeal categorisation of state 
measures has enabled the ECJ to follow a different approach distinguishing 
between the free movement of goods and the free movement of persons426. 
                                                 
418 Baldwin v Montana Fish and Game Commission, 436 US 371 (1978) 
419 United Building and Construction Trades Council v Mayor of Camden, 465 US 208 
(1984); B DENNING, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause Cannot Replace the 
DCC, (2004) 88 Minn.L.Rev., pp 384 – 415.  
420 See Articles 23 EC. 
421  See Articles 90 and 91 EC. 
422 See Articles 28; 29; 30 EC. See also for the free movement of persons: Article 39 to 42 
EC (workers), 43 to 48 EC (establishment) and 49-55 EC (services).  For a comprehensive 
and detailed overview, see C BARNARD, The Substantive Law of the EU, (OUP, 2004)  
423 Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423. 
424 This would be the case for advertising bans: e.g. Case C-405/98, Gourmet [2001] 
ECR I-1795. 
425 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165; Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-
1039, paragraph 22; and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, 
paragraph 31 
426 C BARNARD, “Fitting the remaining pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw”,  (2001) 
26 E. L. Rev., pp 35 - 54 
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Finally, not only are economic operators protected by Community law, but 
since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the concept of 
“European citizenship” also allows non-economically active EU citizens “to 
move and reside freely” within the territory of the Member States427. 
 
Article 28 EC applies to quantitative restrictions on trade of goods and 
measures having equivalent effects (MEE). Its substantive scope is thus 
narrower than the DCC, which in addition covers custom duties, taxation as 
well as the three other freedoms. In spite of this difference, this chapter will 
focus on Article 28 EC and the DCC for two reasons. Firstly, in both the US 
and the EU, trade in goods has been pivotal in developing free movement 
law. Secondly, it has been the area of the internal market where the case-law 
has encountered major “revirements”. 
  
II.-   Constitutional Foundation and Normative Evolution 
 
Created via judicial interpretation, the DCC can be defined as the 
negative implications flowing from Congress’ powers to regulate interstate 
commerce. However, despite being enforced for almost 150 years, its 
constitutional foundations are still unclear. For instance, Redish and Dugent 
reckon that neither the history nor structure nor a literalist interpretation of 
the Constitution supports the DCC428. Even inside of the USSC, criticism 
has arisen.  Justices Scalia and Thomas have urged the USSC to abandon 
the DCC429, alleging that, in the absence of any constitutional provision 
                                                 
427 For a comparative study of citizenship and free movement see: F STRUMIA, 
Citizenship and Free Movement: European and American Features of a Judicial Formula 
for Increased Comity, (2005) 12 Colum.J.Eur.L., 713-79 
428 MH REDISH & SV DUGENT, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional 
Balance of Federalism, (1987) Duke L.J.pp 569-.617 
429 See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc v Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 US 232, 
260-62 (1987) (Scalia J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc v Healy, 512 US 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia J, concurring in the judgment), 
arguing that the Commerce Clause should only be interpreted as an authorisation for 
Congress to regulate commerce and nothing else. In any case, the DCC should only be 
invoked in two rather exceptional cases, namely (1) against facially discriminatory state 
statutes and (2) against statutes which are indistinguishable from a type of law previously 
found unconstitutional by the USSC. See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc v Town of 
Harrison, 520 US 564, 612-14. (1997) (Thomas J, dissenting) More recently, see United 
Haulers Assoc., Inc v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 
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precluding states from impinging on interstate commerce, constitutional 
silence cannot be interpreted as a unionist device, but just as silence430. 
 
Partially, the fact that the USSC has time and again revisited the test 
applied when limiting state regulatory powers may explain its unstable 
constitutional foundations. At first, in Gibbons v Odgen431, the USSC 
maintained that the DCC rested on Congress’ exclusive powers to regulate 
interstate commerce. A priori, this approach would suggest that Congress’ 
regulatory silence amounted to its desire to leave certain areas of the market 
totally unregulated. Nevertheless, Marshall indicated that States could still 
rely on their “police powers” to pass legislation having a “considerable 
influence on commerce”432. Thus, the validity of state law was conditioned 
upon distinguishing between commercial regulation and decisions based on 
public policy. However, not only did this approach fail to acknowledge that 
these two categories are intertwined, but police powers could also seriously 
burden interstate trade433. Next, aware of these shortcomings, the USSC 
took a new approach. Although it also categorised state measures according 
to subject matter, the USSC sought to clarify its doctrine by distinguishing 
between “local” and “national activities”434. The former were for the States 
to regulate, the latter for Congress. However, the progressive integration of 
the American economy rendered more and more difficult to draw clear-cut 
lines between these two types of activities. Besides, this test rested on 
arbitrary criteria435. The USSC limited itself to imposing labels on state 
activity without following any accurate formula giving rise to judicial 
predictability. Subsequently, the USSC decided to abandon any tests based 
on a subject matter classification, and opted for observing the effects of 
                                                                                                                            
(2007), where Justice Thomas argued that not only has the DCC no support in the US 
Constitution, but he also stressed that its practice has proved to be unworkable. He also 
maintained that it is for Congress, and not for the USSC, to choose between free trade and 
economic protectionism. 
430 Tyler Pipe, Op cit  
431 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
432 Ibid, 203 
433 This could be the case for measures guised as “inspections laws, quarantine laws [and] 
health laws of every description” with protectionist intent. 
434 See also Cooley v Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel.Soc. for Relief of 
Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 320 (1852) 
435 Tribe, supra note 407, p. 1049 
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state measures. Direct effects on commerce were for Congress to regulate, 
whereas States could only adopt measures whose effects were indirect. 
Nonetheless, once again, not only did this test not fit with the New Deal 
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, but it also was “too 
mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from 
actualities, to be of value”436. 
 
Convinced that its attempt to draw rigid categories of measures 
would lead to a new doctrinal failure, the USSC finally embraced the DCC 
as a safeguard against state economic protectionism437. Currently, the 
USSC reads the DCC as preventing States from transferring costs to out-of-
state traders in order to benefit local industries. As Justice Cardozo 
famously stated when striking down New York discriminatory regulations, 
the Commerce Clause “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the 
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run 
prosperity and salvation are in union and not in division”438. At least 
formally, the USSC has not limited itself to embracing “the principle of 
“non-discrimination”. In addition, even if applied even-handedly, state 
measures excessively burdening interstate commerce are also deemed 
incompatible with the DCC. This second prone of the DCC, known as 
“balancing”, does not rest on barring protectionism, since it clearly goes 
beyond. Instead, its normative foundation is enshrined in a “virtual 
representation” or “inner political check” argument439, according to which, 
while in-state citizens may rely on the political process to defend their 
interests, out-of-state parties cannot. Therefore, it is for the courts to ensure 
that foreign interests are well represented in domestic political processes440. 
                                                 
436 DiSanto v Pennsylvania, 273 US 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, dissenting) 
437 New Energy Co. of Ind. V Limbach, 486 US 269, 273 (1988). See also Oregon Waste 
System, Inc. v Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 US 93, 98 (1994) and 
American Trucking Assns, Inc. v Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 US 429, 433 (2005) 
438 Baldwin v GAF Seelig, Inc, 294 US 511, 22-23 (1935); DH REGAN, The Supreme 
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, (1986) 84 
Mich. L. Rev., pp 1091-1287 
439 R ROTUNDA, The Doctrine of the Inner Political Check, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, and Federal Pre-emption, (1986) 53 Transp. Pract. J. pp 265. 
440 For a critical view of this doctrine, see DH REGAN, Judicial Review of Member-State 
Regulation of Trade within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and 
Balancing, Da Capo, (2001) 99 Mich. L. Rev., pp 1853-1902.   
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In the same way, this “political” reading of the DCC is consistent with the 
theory of judicial review expounded in footnote 4 of Carolene Products. 
Indeed, not only does the DCC operate as a “representation-reinforcing” 
mechanism by contributing to solving defaults in the state political process, 
but it also helps to minorities deprived of political means to defend 
themselves (foreign traders)441.  
 
By contrast to the DCC, determining whether the EC Treaties provided 
for the judicial enforcement of provisions guaranteeing free movement has 
never been in an issue; instead the debate has exclusively focussed on 
defining their underlying principles and scope. In this regard, it has been 
suggested that when reviewing the validity of state measures, perhaps 
inspired by the US experience, the ECJ took short-cuts discarding a “police 
powers”, “local/ national”, and “direct/indirect burdens” test442. Indeed, the 
test applied by the ECJ has always taken the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality as a minimum threshold. This is not surprising 
since this principle is omnipresent throughout all free movement provisions. 
Having a constitutional nature and being intrinsically linked to the very 
existence of Community law, it is thus a basic tenet in the building-up of 
market integration443. However, the question that has constantly puzzled the 
ECJ and scholars is whether free movement law, in particular Article 28 EC, 
extends beyond the prohibition of discrimination.   
 
Admittedly, the difficulty in defining the contours of Article 28 EC is 
partially due to the breadth of the Dassonville444 formula by which the ECJ 
defined the concept of MEE. There, the ECJ stated that “all trade measures 
or trading rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, into community 
trade are to be considered as measures having and effect equivalent to 
                                                 
441 See e.g. J O’FALLON, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, (1982) 61 Or. 
L. Rev., pp 395-420 
442 DP KOMMERS & M WAELBROECK, Legal Integration and the Free Movement of 
Goods: The American and European Experience, in M CAPELLETTI, M SECCOMBE and 
J WEILER (eds.), Integration Trough Law, Vol 1, Book 3 (1986), 224. 
443 S ENCHELMAIER, A Traditionalist Interpretation of Keck, (2003) 22 YEL, pp 273- 
281. 
444 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837. 
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quantitative restrictions”445. As Barnard suggests, the scope of the 
Dassonville Formula is striking446, including state measures which, for 
example, may only indistinctly and potentially affect intra-community trade. 
Additionally, not only is this formula drafted in broad terms, but it has also 
been interpreted by the ECJ extensively. For instance, under the notion of 
“measures or trading rules enacted by the Member States”, the ECJ has 
followed a substantive, instead of a formal, approach, so that even measures 
adopted by private bodies enjoying state support or recognition are 
considered as MEE447.  In the same way, “community trade” has been 
understood as to also include cases where both parties were located and 
their trade took place in one single Member State448. Moreover, the 
Dassonville formula does not provide for a de minimis rule, nor is its 
application conditioned upon substantial repercussions on inter-state 
trade449. Further, in stating that both “distinctly and indistinctly applicable” 
measures may be considered as MEE, the ECJ seemed to have expanded the 
scope of Article 28 beyond the non-discrimination principle450. Indeed, the 
facts of the case suggest that what really mattered was access to the market. 
There, Belgian authorities prohibited the importation of whisky without a 
certificate of origin issued by the authorities of the origin State. 
Consequently, the state measure did not discriminate between imports and 
domestic products. It simply was issued to render more difficult parallel 
imports. (As a matter of fact, traders who had imported Scotch from France 
alleged that they would have more difficulties in obtaining a certificate of 
origin than traders importing whiskey directly from the UK to Belgium). 
Hence, one could argue that, in Dassonville, the ECJ declared a non-
                                                 
445 Ibid, 5 
446 Barnard, supra note 426, pp. 87 
447 Case 249/81, Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish), [1982] ECR 4005. See also Case 
222/82, Apple and Pear Development Council v Lewis, [1983] ECR 4083. More recently, 
C-325/00, Commission v Germany, [2002] ECR I-9977 
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discriminatory state measure incompatible with Article 28 EC451. As 
discussed below, in Cassis the ECJ confirmed this reading of Dassonville 
holding that non-discriminatory measures fell within the scope of Article 28 
EC. However, in Keck, the ECJ reconsidered its approach and ruled that 
non-discriminatory “selling arrangements” cannot be defined as MEE. Thus, 
without entailing a total overruling of the previous case-law, Keck 
introduced a significant reform in the free movement of goods. 
III.-   Discriminatory State Measures 
 
A.-  Facial and Material Discrimination 
 
Both the DCC and Article 28 EC prohibit discriminatory state 
measures. Besides, for both Courts, the notion of discrimination includes 
statutes which facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, as well 
as those being facially neutral, but whose effects are discriminatory. 
 
As for facially discriminatory measures, a comparison between 
Great A & P. Tea Co v Cottrell452 and Commission v UK (UHT Milk 
Case)453 provides a good illustration. In the American case, Mississippi law 
conditioned the importation of milk from other States to [1] a public health 
certificate and [2] to a reciprocal acceptance of Mississippi milk exported 
to other States. In the same way, the European case involved British law 
which banned the importation of milk upon wihtout an import licence. In 
both cases, the Courts consider local measures to be discriminatory.  
 
As for material discrimination, both Courts agree that it takes place 
where a state measure is formally applied to domestic and import products 
alike, but in reality import products suffer a competitive disadvantage. Put 
differently, discrimination does not arise from the wording of the regulatory 
                                                 
451  Conversely, one could counter-argue that unequal treatment among different channels 
of trade (in the case at issue, between direct and indirect imports) is also a form of 
discrimination. Be as it may, perhaps the ECJ did not reply to this question in Dassonville, 
but it surely did not foreclose this possibility either. In any case, Cassis de Dijon (see 
below) confirmed a broad reading of MEE. 
452 Great A & P. Tea Co v Cottrell, 424 US 366 (1976) 
453 Case 124/81 , Commission v United Kingdom (UHT Milk), [1983] ECR 203 
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measure, but from the factual context where its effects develop. For 
instance, in Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission454, the 
USSC declared invalid a North Carolina statute on the ground that its 
effects were discriminatory. The statute required all apples sold or shipped 
into its territory to be identified by no other grade than the applicable by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) or to bear no 
classification at all. Washington’s apples producers claimed that the statute 
adversely affected them, since re-labelling would increase their costs. 
Additionally, by prohibiting the marketing of apples displaying 
Washington’s grade, applicants argued that they would suffer a competitive 
disadvantage, due to the fact that their products were submitted to higher 
standards than the ones imposed by the USDA. Conversely, North Carolina 
replied that its statute aimed at protecting consumers by avoiding confusion 
created by a multitude of state grades. Besides, it sustained that the statute 
applied even-handedly. However, the USSC rejected these arguments. 
Firstly, while compliance with the statute did no require local producers to 
alter their market practices, Washington’s apple producers saw their costs 
increase. Secondly, the USSC held that “[…] downgrading (Washington’s 
apples to inferior standards) offers the North Carolina apple industry the 
very sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that the 
Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit”455. Thirdly, the USSC opined 
that, by allowing the marketing of apples with no grades at all, not only did 
the contested statute fail to prevent consumers from being confused, but it 
magnified the evil it intended to eliminate. In effect, consumers would not 
be able to identify the origin and the producer of the apples bearing no 
classification. Lastly, the USSC gave some examples of non-discriminatory 
alternatives which would protect consumers’ interests, while being 
compatible with the Commerce Clause, namely a joint use of the federal 
and state labels or banning all products whose quality was inferior to the 
one mandated by the USDA. Thus, despite the statute’s facial neutrality, the 
USSC revealed its underlining discriminatory effects. Likewise, in 
                                                 
454 Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333 (1997) 
455 Ibid, 352 
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Commission v UK (Origin Marking)456, the ECJ followed a similar 
approach. There, British authorities required an indication of origin for 
goods to be sold in the retail market. The UK argued that the contested 
measure was non-discriminatory, since it was equally applicable to import 
and domestic products. The ECJ rejected this argument. It found that the 
contested measure was applicable without distinction “only in form”, since 
“by its very nature” requiring goods to bear an indication of origin would 
enable consumers to distinguish between domestic and import products, 
giving rise to prejudices against the latter. As a result, importations would 
become more difficult, “slowing down the economic interpenetration in the 
Community”457. The Origin Marking case clearly resemblances to Hunt v 
Washington State Apple Advertising. In both cases, the facial neutrality of 
the challenged statute did not stop both Courts from reviewing its 
underlying discriminatory effects.  
 
 Moreover, for both the USSC and the ECJ, in so far as a state or 
local measure is found to discriminate against interstate commerce, whether 
the state legislature acted in good faith458, whether the number of parties 
affected is minimal459 or, whether in-state citizens are also adversely 
affected,460 is completely irrelevant461. It follows that the notion of 
discrimination embraced by both Courts is a very broad one, comprising any 
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the latter and burdens the former”462. 
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B.-  The American “Virtually per se rule of invalidity” and Article 30 EC 
  
Although the approach of both Courts converges in defining the 
notion of “discrimination”, they adopt diverging views when examining the 
validity of state discriminatory measures. While the USSC has only once 
ruled that a discriminatory state measure was compatible with the DCC, the 
EU Member States may recourse to Article 30 EC in order to justify a 
discriminatory measure. Thus, the USSC’s intolerance towards 
discrimination is greater than the one of its European counterpart. As the 
USSC recently articulated, “state laws that discriminate against interstate 
commerce face a virtually per se rule of invalidity”463 
 
The only case where a state discriminatory measure survived the 
DCC is Maine v Taylor464.  There, criminal proceedings were brought 
against a bait-dealer who had imported live baitfish into Maine, in breach 
of a Maine statute prohibiting it so. The USSC accepted that this statute 
sought to protect the wild fish in Maine, by preventing its exposure to 
parasites prevalent in out-of-state species, which would also disturb 
Maine’s fragile ecological balance in competing for habitat and food. The 
USSC also recognised that Maine could not avail itself of non-
discriminatory means. Firstly, inspections and sampling techniques were 
physically impossible, since they would amount to the destruction of the 
imported fish. Secondly, no standardised examination of the imported fish 
had been developed465. Lastly, even if the risks prove to be negligible, the 
USSC sustained the Commerce Clause did not compel Maine to affront a 
“potentially irreversible environmental damage”466. Thus, the USSC 
concluded that, though the measure “restricted trade in the most direct 
manner possible”467; Maine legitimately relied on its police powers. The 
question that then arises is how Maine v Taylor can be differentiated from 
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other cases. As Tribes suggests, discrimination was allowed because “out-
of-state products pose unique harms to the State”468. 
 
Taylor is almost identical to Bluhme, where the ECJ ruled that a Danish 
law prohibiting the importation of any bees onto the Island of Laeso other 
than the Laeso brown bee was a MEE469. Nevertheless, as the USSC 
recognised in Maine v Taylor, the ECJ considered that, under Article 30 EC, 
the maintenance of biodiversity justified the ban.  However, Bluhme is not 
an isolated case. Although the conditions of Article 30 EC are difficult to 
meet, States have occasionally managed. For instance, in Campus Oil, the 
ECJ ruled that an Irish law obliging oil traders to purchase a proportion of 
their imports from a state-own refinery was justified on public security 
grounds, namely the importance of ensuring that energy supply was not 
interrupted470. Likewise, when examining national laws prohibiting the 
importation of pornographic material, the ECJ held that “it is for each 
Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and 
in the form selected by it the requirement of public morality within its 
territory”471.  
 
Article 30 EC is only applicable in the absence of Community 
harmonization. It must be interpreted restrictively and cannot serve any state 
economic interests. In addition, states measures relying on Article 30 EC 
must, on the one hand, comply with the principle of proportionality and, on 
the other hand, not be means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade. By contrast to judicial review of Community measures, 
the proportionality test applied by the ECJ when reviewing the compatibility 
of national measures with Article 28 EC is a very strict one. A state measure 
is deemed proportional, when (1) it is necessary to achieve the declared 
objective, which (2) cannot be attained by “less restrictive means”. For 
instance, in Campus Oil, the Irish measure was proportionate, provided that 
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the purchase obligation was strictly limited to ensuring national security. By 
contrast, in the UHT milk case, British authorities justified their scheme 
alleging that it would allow them to trace contaminated consignments, and 
to prevent these consignments from entering the market immediately after 
being alerted by the exporting State. However, the ECJ rejected these 
arguments, holding that less onerous restrictions on interstate trade were 
available, namely a system of signed declaration or, where appropriate, 
certification472. Moreover, reliance on Article 30 EC as a mean of arbitrary 
discrimination occurs where state measures lack external consistency, that 
is, the reasons supporting restrictions on interstate trade are not taken into 
consideration when it comes to regulating domestic products473.  
 
Finally, the ECJ is not always consistent when qualifying a measure as 
discriminatory and limiting its justification to the grounds listed in Article 
30 EC474. A clear example is provided by the Wallonia Waste case475. There, 
the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Belguim, arguing 
that a Wallonia regulation prohibiting the disposal of waste generated 
outside the region of Wallonia was contrary to Article 28 EC. Belgium 
defended the Wallonia measure holding that it complied with the 
environmental principle of disposing the waste as close as possible to the 
place where it is produced. Clearly, this measure is discriminatory. Waste 
generated outside Wallonia (consequently, originated in other Member 
States) cannot be disposed therein, by contrast waste generated inside of 
Wallonia had access to its disposal sites. As a matter of fact, this was the 
approach followed by the USSC in Philadelphia v New Jersey476, where it 
struck down New Jersey regulations prohibiting the importation of out-of-
state waste. After declaring that the measures were facially discriminatory, 
the USSC held that the defendant’s “attempt to isolate itself from a problem 
common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate 
                                                 
472 Commission v United Kingdom (UHT Milk), supra note  453 
473 Case 40/82, Commission v United Kingdom, [1984] ECR 2793 
474 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099. See also 
Bluhme, Op. cit, paragraph19 and Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 
475 Case C-2/90, Commission v Belgium, [1992] ECR I-4431 
476 Philadelphia v New Jersey, Op cit 
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trade” was clearly contrary to the Commerce Clause477. Consequently, since 
environmental protection is not laid down in Article 30 EC, the contested 
measure could not be justified on this ground and hence, it was in breach of 
Article 28 EC. However, the ECJ took a different view.  In referring to the 
“particular nature of waste”, it ruled that Belgium could rely on an 
environmental protection justification. In this regard, this inconsistency has 
led some authors to unsuccessfully argue that limiting the grounds of 
justification pursuant to the discriminatory (or not) nature of the measure is 
an artificial distinction which should be abolished478. 
C.-  Special Provisions  
 
Even if the US Constitution vests on the States the power to limit (or 
even prohibit) the commerce of certain goods within their territory, it does 
not follow that they may do so in a discriminatory fashion. In this sense, the 
XXIst Amendment in its Section § 2 states that: “The transportation or 
importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States for 
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws 
thereof, is hereby prohibited”. The question that then arises is whether 
States may rely thereon to enact discriminatory legislation, where the 
commercial product at issue is liquor.  In Granholm v Heald479, the USSC 
answered in the negative. It maintained that, though States could ban the 
sales of all liquors, allowing discriminatory treatment in their marketing 
could spill over other areas of law, depriving the Commerce Clause from its 
purpose. In addition, the USSC relied on the history preceding and 
postdating the ratification of the XXIst Amendment, to stress that a 
discriminatory treatment had never been allowed.  
 
Just like the XXIst Amendment US Constitution, Article 296 (1) (b) EC also 
lays down a special regime authorising Member States to restrict the 
production and trade in arm munitions or war materials intended for 
specifically military purposes, in order to protect essential security interests. 
                                                 
477 Ibid, 628. 
478 P OLIVER, Some Further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30 (ex 30-36), (1996) 
36 CML Rev., pp 783-806; 804 
479 Granholm v Heald, 544 US 460 (2005). 
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Can the Member States adopt any measures on the basis of this treaty 
provision or has the ECJ adopted an approach similar to Granholm? In 
Commission v Spain480, a Spanish law exempted imports and intra-
Community transfers of arm materials from VAT. Spain argued that the 
exemptions were “necessary” in order to ensure the effectiveness of its 
armed forces. However, the ECJ rejected this argument, holding that, since 
most of the income from payments of VAT would flow into the State’s 
treasury, the exemption was not necessary in order to achieve this objective. 
It is true that, by contrast to Granholm, the ECJ did not review whether the 
Spanish measure was discriminatory, but limited itself to applying the 
principle of proportionality. Still, the ultimate rationale underpinning these 
two cases is the same, namely in spite of enjoying a large margin of 
manoeuvre in regulating the trade of certain goods, States may not adopt 
measures disturbing or affecting significantly the proper functioning of 
interstate commerce.   
D.-  Discrimination to the benefit of one single operator 
 
Perhaps, the case where the USSC pushed the boundaries of 
discrimination to the outmost was in C&A Carbone, Inc v Town of 
Clarkstown, New York481. There, it held that a “flow control” ordinance, 
requiring all solid waste produced within the city of Clarkstown to be 
processed by a private facility before being shipped away, was contrary to 
the Commerce Clause. Whereas the majority concluded that the regulation 
was discriminatory on the ground that it compelled haulers to undertake 
part of their market activities within the State482, concurring Justice 
O’Connor considered that granting a waste processing monopoly to a 
private operator was not483. Since “all waste originated” within the city was 
required to be treated at the designed transfer facility, she argued that the 
contested ordinance was not discriminatory. In particular, she opined that 
the ordinance did not discriminate on a geographical basis, nor did it give 
local businesses a competitive advantage. It only benefited a chosen 
                                                 
480 Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] ECR I- 5585 
481 C&A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown, supra note 460 
482 Ibid, 391-392 
483 Ibid, 403.  
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operator, while putting on an equal footing the rest of in and out-of-state 
competitors484. However, for the majority in Carbone, a state statute is 
discriminatory where it benefits one chosen local operator.  
 
Subsequently, in United Haulers Assoc., Inc v Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Management Authority485, the USSC was invited to revisit its 
ruling in Carbone. The facts of the case were similar, but this time the 
beneficiary of the processing waste monopoly was a public entity. As 
dissenting judges sustained, it appears that this new feature is not sufficient 
for the USSC to depart from Carbone.  Just as it occurred in Carbone, in 
this case, haulers were also obliged to use the services of the chosen 
operator before shipping away the waste. Nevertheless, the USSC took a 
different view. In holding that “the Dormant Commerce Clause is not a 
roving license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate 
for state and local government to undertake, and what activities must be the 
province of private market competition”486, the USSC concluded that the 
Counties’ flow ordinances were not discriminatory. It follows that States 
can discriminate in their own benefit, whereas they cannot do so to benefit 
a private party. Even if this distinction seems to be artificial and illusory 
(even more so if one bears in mind that in Carbone, the operator was 
subject to strict and detailed contractual obligations), it may however 
indicate the USSC’s efforts to prevent the devastating consequences of 
declaring a statute discriminatory. Indeed, expanding the notion of 
discrimination may amount to “an unbounded [judicial] interference with 
state and local government”487, since, almost certainly, state or local 
legislation would be struck down. Conversely, introducing caveats into the 
notion of discrimination allows more room for the States and their 
subdivisions to operate. Thus, the ruling of the USSC in United Haulers 
Assoc., Inc v OHSWMA may illustrate the USSC’s intention to reverse (or 
                                                 
484 After affirming that the contested ordinance was not discriminatory, Concurring Justice 
O’Connor applied the Pike balancing test (see infra on page 3), concluding that the 
contested measure excessively burdened interstate commerce and thus, was 
unconstitutional. Ibid, 405-407 
485 United Haulers Assoc., Inc v Oneida-Herkimer, supra note 429 
486 Ibid, 1796 
487 Ibid, 1789 
 148 
to put an end to) the expansionist trend in applying the notion of 
discrimination. 
 
These two American cases involved respectively the grant of 
exclusive rights to third parties and the creation of public commercial 
monopolies. While in the first case, the DCC opposed to its creation, in the 
latter it did not. In a similar scenario, would the ECJ follow its American 
counterpart’s approach in Carbone or OHSWMA? The answer is actually 
neither of them. The case-law of the ECJ is more nuanced and elaborated.  
 
The ECJ distinguishes between rules related to the “existence and 
operation” of commercial monopolies and rules “directly bearing upon” 
their operation488. The first set of rules falls within the scope of Article 31 
EC, while the latter within 28 EC. By contrast to the American case-law, 
Article 31 EC does not distinguish between monopolies and the conferral of 
exclusive rights to private parties remaining under state supervision489. 
Article 31 EC does not oppose either to state monopolies as such, but it only 
requires their reconciliation with free movement law490. Said differently, the 
existence and operation of monopolies must not give rise to discrimination 
between Member States as regards conditions of supply and demand. For 
instance, in Hanner, the ECJ declared incompatible with Community law 
the Swedish monopoly on the retail sale of medical preparations. Given the 
lack of transparent criteria when selecting medical preparations to be sold in 
the retail market, the ECJ held that the monopoly could put at disadvantage 
foreign goods vis-à-vis Swedish products491. As for rules having a direct 
bearing upon monopolies, Rosengren is very illustrative492. There, the ECJ 
was asked to determine whether the Swedish ban on direct alcohol imports 
from other Member States was contrary to the EC Treaty. Firstly, the ECJ 
acknowledged that the ban did not pertain to rules related to the existence 
                                                 
488 Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909. 
489 Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraph 26 
490 Case 59/75 Pubblico Ministero v Manghera [1976] ECR 91, paragraph 5 
491 Case C-438/02 Hanner [2005] ECR I-04551 
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and operation of the Swedish retail monopoly of alcoholic beverages493. 
Secondly, the ECJ ruled that preventing the importation of alcoholic 
beverages by individuals without imposing a counter-balancing obligation 
to import them on the holder of the monopoly, was a quantitative restriction 
prohibited under Article 28 EC.  Finally, though the ECJ agreed with 
Sweden in so far as the ban could be justified on the ground that it protected 
younger persons from the harmful effects of alcohol consumption, it 
considered the ban to be disproportionate since it applied to everyone 
regardless of age.  
As a result, had the ECJ ruled in a case like Carbone or OHSWMA, it would 
not have held that the waste processing monopoly gave rise as such to 
discrimination. Nor would it have reached a different outcome depending on 
whether the monopoly is directly exercised by public authorities or 
delegated to a private contractor. Instead, the ECJ would have first focussed 
on whether the creation of a monopoly ensured equal access to out-of-state 
haulers transporting local waste to the processing facility. Secondly, the ECJ 
would have proceeded to examine whether the local ordinance preventing 
haulers from using other waste processing facilities was in breach of free 
movement provisions494.  
 
E.-  The Market-Participant Exception and Congressional Superseding 
Powers. 
 
There are only two exceptions where the USSC has ruled that a 
discriminatory state statute may be compatible with the DCC, namely 
where a State operates as a private market actor495, and where Congress 
enacts federal legislation validating otherwise unconstitutional state 
activity496.When a State invokes the private market-participant exception, 
                                                 
493 Indeed, neither the system for selection of goods by the monopoly nor its sales network 
nor the organisation of the marketing nor advertising of goods distributed by that monopoly 
was involved. Consequently, article 31 EC was not applicable. Ibid, paragraph 24 
494 The ECJ would have examined the ban under article 29 EC for the haulers, and under 
article 49 EC for out-of-state waste processing facilities. 
495 Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US 794, 810 (1976) 
496 Hillside Diary Inc, v Lyons, 539 US 59,66 (2003); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 US 
564, 572 (1997), Maine v Taylor, supra note 464, 138, South-Central Timber Development, 
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the USSC will focus on ascertaining whether the State participated in the 
market or instead intervened as a regulator. For instance, in Alexandria 
Scrap Corp497, with a view to eliminating derelict cars, Maryland 
introduced a state-purchase scheme of crushed automobile hulks, granting 
in-state scrap processors with a premium price. Out-of-state scrap 
processors challenged the validity of the scheme on the ground that 
Maryland refused to conduct businesses with them. However, the USSC 
rejected their claim, holding that the respondent was merely participating in 
the scrap-car market as a purchaser and thus, could choose from whom to 
buy. Likewise, Reeves Inc, v Stake498, the USSC held that a cement plant 
owned by South Dakota could give a preferential sales treatment to its 
residents during periods of shortage. The USSC concluded that there was 
no constitutional ground precluding the States from engaging freely in the 
market. However, in South-Central Timber Development, Inc v 
Wunnicke499, the USSC refused to apply the market-participant exception to 
an Alaskan statute requiring all timber taken from its forests to be 
processed before being exported. Indeed, according to the contested statute, 
after purchasing timber from Alaska, buyers could not do with it as they 
pleased. By contrast to Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, the USSC held that 
Alaska had laid down rules which went beyond its own dealings as a 
market operator and hence, had intervened as a regulator in the market. It 
follows that, in order to rely on the market-participant exception, “[t]he 
State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or 
contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular 
market.”500  
 
Does the ECJ distinguish between States acting as regulator and 
States acting as a market participant? The reply must be in the negative. 
Cases like Alexandria Scrap and Reeves would not have been decided in 
the same way by the ECJ. Indeed, a brief look at public procurement cases 
                                                                                                                            
Inc. v. Wunnicke , 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984), New England Power Co., supra note 437, 
339-340. 
497 Supra note 495 
498 Reeves Inc, v Stake, 447 US 429 (1980) 
499 Wunnicke , supra note 496. 
500 Ibid, 97-98. 
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demonstrates that Member States engaged into market activities are still 
bound by the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and 
objectivity501. In Dundalk Waters, the ECJ ruled that “grandfather” clauses 
imposing national standards for the construction of water pipes were 
contrary to Article 28 EC502. In the same way, in Dupont de Nemours, the 
ECJ ruled that, unless justified under Article 30 EC, preference purchasing 
schemes to the benefit of local companies are incompatible with Article 28 
EC503.  It follows that the principle of non-discrimination applies even 
when Member States engage in market activities. 
 
Moreover, Congress may validate state statutes previously declared 
incompatible with the Commerce Clause by the judiciary504. In this regard, 
in Prudential Insurance Co v Benjamin505, the USSC held that a South 
Carolinian statute discriminating against out-of-state insurance companies 
by imposing a 3% tax on all insurance premiums collected, while having 
beforehand exempted in-states companies, did not violate the Commerce 
Clause. The justification given by the USSC was that, by enacting the 
McCarran-Fergusson Act506, Congress had rendered valid discriminatory 
insurance taxes. Thus, these cases demonstrate that Congress may 
supersede the case-law of the USSC under the DCC, no matter how 
flagrantly discriminatory state law is.  
 
Although fundamental freedoms address the Member States, the ECJ 
has consistently held that they also bound the Community legislature507. 
Neither the Council nor the Parliament may validate state action which 
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would otherwise be in breach of the Treaty. Fundamental freedoms have a 
constitutional ranking binding both the Community and national legislature. 
 
IV.-   Non-Discriminatory State Measures  
 
A.-  The Pike Balancing Test 
 
In the US, where a state measure is found to be non-discriminatory, 
then a less stringent test applies. A state measure applied “even-handedly” 
will be upheld, provided that it pursues [1] a “legitimate local public 
interest” and, [2] it is demonstrated that its burdens on interstate commerce 
are not “clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits”508.  By 
contrast to discriminatory measures, the presumption of validity favours 
States. It is for the interested party to prove that the measure unduly 
burdens interstate commerce. Hence, the question of whether a state 
measure is declared unconstitutional “becomes one of degree”509. The more 
important local interests are, the heavier the burden on interstate commerce 
may be. The “undue burden standard” was firstly articulated by the USSC 
in Pike v Bruce Church Inc. In this case, Bruce Church Inc, a producer of 
cantaloupes in Arizona, filed an injunction against an Arizonan order 
banning its products from being shipped out of the State, unless they were 
previously packaged and stored in compliance with the conditions laid 
down in the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act. As a result, 
Bruce Church was deprived from using its packing shed facilities located in 
the neighbouring California. Arizona justified its decision on the ground 
that it sought to enhance the reputation of its products, by incorporating 
high quality crops, such as the one of Bruce Church, into its agricultural 
reputation. Although the USSC acknowledged that Arizona intentions were 
legitimate, it maintained that Arizona could not impose on Bruce Church “a 
straitjacket with respect to the allocation of its interstate resources”510. It 
held that, in comparison with the burdens suffered by the affected 
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company, state interests were “tenuous” and could have been protected 
trough less onerous means. For instance, Arizona could have required a 
second packaging notice certifying the cantaloupes were “grown” in 
Arizona, or alternatively it could have granted Bruce Church with a 
construction subsidy.  Thus, the USSC concluded the order was 
unconstitutional. Curiously enough, albeit an allusion to non-discriminatory 
taxation, the USSC did not make any reference to the concept of 
discrimination, nor did it explain why the contested order was not 
discriminatory. It simply assumed it was applied “even-handedly”. 
However, it seems that the contested decision favoured in-state packing 
facilities to the detriment of out-of-state ones. Indeed, as the USSC itself 
acknowledged511, from the moment States require certain market activities 
to be undertaken within its borders, discrimination arises. Hence, though in 
Pike the theoretical framework of balancing test was clearly expounded, its 
application to the facts seems somewhat puzzling.  
 
Possibly, Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamy provides a better 
illustration512. With a view to promoting resource conservation, Minnesota 
enacted a statute whereby the sale of milk in non-refillable, non-returnable 
plastic containers was prohibited. However, the sale of milk in non-
refillable, non-returnable containers made of materials other than plastic 
was permitted (e.g. paperboard cartons). The USSC found that the statute 
was not discriminatory, since it applied regardless of the origin of the milk, 
seller or container. In applying the Pike balancing test, the USSC found that 
the “inconvenience of having to conform to different packaging 
requirements in Minnesota and in the surrounding State should be 
slight”513. Additionally, even if the out-of-state plastic industry was more 
adversely affected than the Minnesota pulpwood industry, the USSC 
maintained that, in the light of the objectives pursued, such burdens were 
not “clearly excessive”. Finally, the USSC found that alternative solutions 
(such as prohibiting all non-returnable containers) would not have a “lesser 
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impact on interstate activities”. As a result, the Minnesota scheme was 
upheld. 
 
In most cases, the balancing test tends to favoured state regulations. In 
effect, since 1990, only in one case has the USSC annulled a non-
discriminatory state measure514. This circumstance has led some authors to 
suggest that the balancing tier of the doctrine has been abandoned by the 
USSC515.  At the same time, this also indicates that the USSC prefers to 
construe the DCC as doctrine forged upon the notion of economic 
protectionism, rather than upon a model based on the judicial defence of 
economic liberties threatened by public intervention. As Scalia sustains516, 
the USSC’s cautionary approach towards “balancing” may evince that it 
feels more institutionally confident when reacting against discriminatory 
legislation than in waging the value of trade against other policies, which is 
better left to the legislature. Further, Regan also welcomes this 
development, holding that, given the doctrinal flaw of the “inner political 
check”, balancing should be abandoned altogether. In his view, if the state 
legislator takes into account all local interests without incurring into 
protectionism, then all global interests will be protected too, resulting in a 
general gain of efficiency (the so-called “local/global equivalence”). Indeed, 
there is no need to adopt measures with a view to protecting foreign 
producers’ interests. Given their direct or indirect market relationship with 
local actors, their interests have already been represented by the latter. Thus, 
courts must only intervene when not all local interests are accounted for. 
Yet, this often occurs when regulation is not efficient, but aims at fulfilling 
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the special interests of a commercial group, that is, when legislation is 
protectionist517.     
 
B.-  The Principle of Mutual Recognition and Mandatory Requirements 
 
In the landmark case Cassis de Dijon518, the ECJ broadened up the 
scope of Article 28 EC to its outmost. There, a French company was 
precluded from selling “Cassis de Dijon” in Germany, since  the alcohol 
content of this product did not attain the minimum of 25% required by 
German Law for marketing fruity liqueurs. The German authorities justified 
their decision on two grounds. Firstly, they sustained that, by precluding the 
sale of spirits with a low alcohol content, consumer tolerance towards 
alcohol was rendered more difficult. Secondly, the ban protected consumers 
from unfair commercial practices. Due to the fact that producers of 
beverages with low alcohol content would pay fewer taxes than producers 
selling spirits with high levels of alcohol, the former would enjoy a 
competitive advantage at the expense of uninformed consumers. When the 
ECJ was questioned on the compatibility of this measure with Article 28 
EC, the ECJ replied that “(o)bstacles to movement within the Community 
resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the 
marketing of products in question must be accepted in so far as those 
provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.”519 It follows that, even in the 
absence of discrimination between import and domestic products, the 
imposition of national standards to importers must be justified. By virtue of 
the principle of mutual recognition, disparities among legislations are 
accepted, unless state legitimate interests are put at risk. Indeed, by stating 
that non-discriminatory state measures may violate free movement 
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provisions, the application of Article 28 EC was no longer conditioned upon 
determining whether there was an unequal treatment between imports and 
domestic products. Instead, the ECJ decided to undertake a balancing 
exercise between, on the one hand, freedom to pursue an economic activity 
and, on the other hand, state intervention to protect legitimate public 
interests. Put differently, the Cassis ruling supposes that not only must 
Member States regulate the market in a non-discriminatory fashion, but 
Article 28 EC also draws the line between lawful and excessive regulation 
of the market. As Maduro suggests, one possible reading of Cassis would 
award traders an “Economic Due Process” right520, that is, the right to 
pursue trade in the individual Member States free from excessive public 
regulation.   
 
Regarding the facts of the case, in order to qualify a state measure 
requiring a minimum alcohol content for fruity liqueurs as a MEE, the ECJ 
did no longer need to undertake a comparative assessment between national 
and import products. The balancing exercise would be carried out between, 
on the one hand, the general interests protected by the challenged measure 
and, on the other hand, the commercial burden imposed on the importer. As 
a result, Cassis entailed a serious setback in state powers to regulate the 
market. Perhaps aware that this new approach would not be accepted by the 
Member States unless the justifications contained in Article 30 EC were 
expanded, the ECJ opted for compensating the States by advancing the 
notion of “mandatory requirements”. In effect, the lawfulness of non-
discriminatory state measures can be based not only on Article 30 EC, but 
also by relying on an open-ended list of general interests, such as “the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the 
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer”521, 
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environmental protection522, working conditions523, the protection of 
cultural expression524, press diversity525 or fundamental rights526. 
 
Moreover, whereas the number of justifications for non-discriminatory 
state measures is larger than the grounds justifying discriminatory treatment, 
the principle of proportionality applies on an equal fashion527. For instance, 
in Cassis, the ECJ held that the public health consideration put forward by 
the German authorities was not sustainable. It ruled that a broad range of 
low alcohol beverages was available to German consumers. Furthermore, 
beverages with a high alcohol content were often consumed in a diluted 
form. Thus, the measure did not protect consumers from becoming tolerant 
towards alcohol. In the same way, unfair commercial practices could be 
deterred by less burdensome alternatives on interstate trade, e.g. informing 
consumers through displaying an indication of the alcohol content on the 
packaging products. 
 
 Both the Pike test and the principle of mutual recognition examine 
the effects of non-discriminatory measures upon interstate trade. Suffice it 
to compare Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamy with Commission v Denmark 
(Recycle Bottles). Concurring with the previous ruling of its American 
counterpart, the ECJ ruled that a Danish system of deposit-and-return, 
which required containers for beer and soft drinks to be reusable, was in 
breach of Article 28 EC. However, after recognising that environmental 
protection was a legitimate concern, the ECJ ruled that the system of 
deposit-and-return was an indispensable element to ensure that containers 
were re-used. Hence, the Danish law was proportionate. However, Cassis 
supposes a greater intrusion upon state regulatory powers than Pike. On the 
one hand, while American applicants must prove that a non-discriminatory 
state measure unduly burdens interstate commerce, it is for the host Member 
State to justify why goods complying with the standards of the Member 
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State of origin cannot be marketed within its territory. On the other hand, 
while the ECJ demands non-discriminatory  state measures to be the “least 
restrictive alternative”, the same cannot be said in the US. It is true that 
Pike and Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamy seemed to follow this criterion. 
However, the USSC has never invalidated non-discriminatory state law 
because there were less burdensome means. Chemerinsky suggests that the 
“least restrictive alternative” test involves the most intensive type of 
judicial scrutiny. This type of review has been used by the USSC when 
evaluating discrimination based on race, origin or gender, or when 
examining fundamental rights. Nevertheless, he questions its reliance when 
reviewing non-discriminatory commercial state laws528. 
 
C.-  Keck:  non-discriminatory selling arrangements fall outside Article 
28 EC. 
 
By following a broad reading of the Dassonville formula, and by 
embracing the principle of mutual recognition, the ECJ encouraged 
commercial litigation. Indeed, traders started conceiving Article 28 EC as 
compelling national legislators to justify all commercial regulatory 
measures. Put simply, in their opinion, Article 28 EC was equated to 
freedom to trade. Even if the impact on interstate trade was incidental, 
traders were confident that the validity of state regulation would be 
scrutinised under a strict proportionality test. This situation was stressed by 
some commentators who invited the ECJ to revisit its case-law, in particular 
regarding rules on market circumstances529. Indeed, in relation to this type 
of measures, the ECJ proved to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some 
cases, it followed a narrow reading530 of Article 28 EC, whereas in others, it 
applied Cassis automatically531.  These contradictions were acknowledged 
                                                 
528 Chemerinsky, supra note 411, pp 439-440 
529 E WHITE, In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, (1989) 26 CML 
Rev., pp 235; K MORTELMANS, Article 30 EC Treaty and Legislation Related to Market 
Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition, (1991) 28 CML Rev, pp 115.  
530 Holding that article 28 EC was not applicable: Oebel, Op cit; Case 75/81, Joseph Henri 
Thomas Blesgen v Belgian State, [1982] ECR 1211 ; Case C-23/89, Quietlynn Limited and 
Brian James Richards v Southend Borough Council, [1990] ECR I-3059.  
531 Case 286/81 Oosthoek, [1982] ECR 4575; Case 382/87 Buet [1989] ECR 1235; 
Aragonesa de Publicidad, supra note 461 
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by AG Tesauro in Hünermund532, who urged the ECJ to reply to the 
following question: “Is Article (28) of the Treaty a provision intended to 
liberalize intra-Community trade or is it intended more generally to 
encourage the unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member 
States?”  
 
In Keck533, the ECJ took this step and, in a clear departure from precedent, it 
held that non-discriminatory selling arrangements escape the definition of 
MEE. In this case, criminal proceedings were brought against two French 
nationals who were selling goods at loss. Before the criminal court, the 
defendants argued that French Law was contrary to Article 28 EC, holding 
that it deprived them from a method of promoting their goods and restricted 
the volume of imports. However, the ECJ rejected these arguments. It held 
that: “By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided the 
application to products from other Member States of national provisions 
restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not [a MEE], so 
long as so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating 
within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, 
in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from 
other Member States”534. Accordingly, the ECJ concluded that French 
legislation prohibiting the resale at loss fell outside the scope of Article 28 
EC.  
 
The immediate implications flowing from the Keck ruling are fourfold. 
Firstly, the ECJ curtailed the scope of the Dansonville Formula. Selling 
arrangements which do not discriminate against imports fall outside the 
scope of Article 28 EC. However, in relation to “rules that lay down 
requirements to be met by goods”535 Cassis remains good law. Thus, Keck 
must not been seen as a revolution overruling all previous case-law, but as a 
                                                 
532 Case C-292/92, Hünermund, [1993] ECR I-6787. 
533 Joined Cases C- 267 and 268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and 
Daniel Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097. 
534 Ibid, paragraph 16. 
535 Ibid, paragraph 15. 
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substantial reform536. In addition, though one of the big flaws of the 
judgment is that the ECJ failed to provide a definition of “selling 
arrangements”, subsequent cases indicate that they are measures which 
restrict when537, where538, or by whom539 goods can be sold, as well as 
advertising restrictitions540 and price controls541. Secondly, the ECJ justifies 
the departure from its case-law on the need to curve down the flood of cases 
invoking Article 28 EC. However, this reason does not appear to be entirely 
convincing. The interpretation of core substantive provisions of the Treaty, 
such as Article 28 EC, cannot be conditioned upon administrative costs 
incurred by the Community judiciary. Thirdly, in replacing a judicially 
manageable standard with a formal rule, Keck enhances legal certainty. 
Indeed, by contrast to Cassis, when assessing the validity of selling 
arrangements, balancing is delayed at a later stage. Before, the interested 
party must demonstrate that the challenged measure is a discriminatory 
selling arrangement and only then, the national court (or, where appropriate, 
the ECJ) will embark upon a balancing exercise. In other words, by delaying 
the application of the principle of proportionality to the benefit of a 
discrimination-based test, the ECJ embraces a formalistic approach 
reinforcing judicial predictability. Thus, Keck restricts the creative role of 
the ECJ in determining the legitimate degree of public intervention in the 
market. Finally, as for state regulatory powers, Keck reinsures the Member 
States that, provided there is no discrimination, the latter are free to regulate 
any circumstance governing the market. Thus, Keck devolves power to the 
Member States.  Keck is a prove of judicial restraint and a hold-back in the 
integration process. 
 
                                                 
536 Maduro, supra note 520, pp 78-79 
537 Case C-69/93, Punto Casa [1994] ECR I-2355 
538 Case C-319/92, Commission v Greece (Baby Milk), [1996] ECR I-1621 
539 Banchero, supra note 489; Franzén, supra note 488  
540 Cases C-292/92, Hünermund, [1993] ECR I-6787; Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec, 
[1995] ECR I-179, Joined Cases C-34 to 36/95, De Agostini, [1997] ECR I-3843, Gourmet, 
supra note 424 
541 Case C-63/94, Belgapom v ITM Belgium, [1995] ECR I-2467. 
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Moreover, the ECJ did not have to wait long before the first criticisms 
arose542, among which the most famous one is the Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Leclerc-Siplec543. There, he argued that applying different tests according to 
whether the contested measure is a product requirement or a selling 
arrangement is inappropriate, since both categories may impose serious 
obstacles to trade. In addition, he maintained that the objective of the free 
movement provisions is to eliminate unjustified obstacles to trade, 
regardless of whether these obstacles also adversely affect domestic 
products. To this effect, he affirmed that the adoption of a “discrimination 
test would lead to the fragmentation of the internal market”, owing to the 
fact that importers would have to accommodate to the market circumstances 
defined in each Member State. Instead, he proposed an alternative test 
declaring invalid all state measures which substantially restrict access to 
market. He acknowledged that a de minimis rule would be required in order 
to determine the validity of measures which, while not being discriminatory, 
substantially restrict access to market. More recently, other Advocate 
Generals have also invited the ECJ to abandon (or modify) the Keck 
solution, suggesting alternative tests544. For instance, in Alfa-Vita545, AG 
Maduro argued that not only is it sometimes difficult to draw the distinction 
between product requirements and selling arrangements 546, but also some 
                                                 
542 See for example: I HIGGINS, The Free and not so Free Movement of Goods, (1997) 7 
I.J.E.L., pp 166; L GORMLEY, Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable judgment in Keck 
and Mithouard (1994) EBL Rev., pp 63; MATTERA, De l’arrêt Dassonville à l’arrêt Keck: 
l’obscure clarté d’une jurisprudence riche en principes novateurs et en contradictions, 
(1994) RMUE ; Barnard, supra note 426, pp 35. 
543 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, supra note 540 
544  Opinion of AG Greenhold in Case C-239/02, Douwe Egberts, [2004] ECR I-7007 
(urging the ECJ to follow a different approach in relation to advertising restrictions), 
Opinion of AG Maduro in Joined Cases C-158 and 159/04, Alfa-Vita, [2006] ECR I-8135 
(see below) and Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-142/05 (pending), Mickelsson and Roos, 
14 December 2006, n.y.r.(by contrast to the previous Opinions, she proposes expanding 
Keck so that, by analogy to selling arrangements, non-discriminatory “arrangements for 
use” or national measures prohibiting a “marginal use of a good” should fall outside the 
scope of article 28 EC. For instance, the lawfulness of a non-discriminatory measure 
prohibiting driving cross-country vehicles off the roads should not be tested under article 
28 EC) 
545 See supra note  
546 Paragraphs 27-29, where he draws a comparison between the ruling of the ECJ in Case 
C-470/93, Mars, [1995] ECR I-1923 and in Case C-416/00, Morellato [2003] ECR I-9343.   
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measures do not fit in either of the two categories547. These complexities are 
worsened by the fact that the ECJ often refers back to the national courts 
“the responsibility of ascertaining the character and scope of the rule in 
question”. In addition, the Keck ruling appears to be inconsistent with the 
approach followed by the ECJ in realm of other freedoms, where “all 
measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of 
that freedom” need to be justified. This inconsistency seems even more 
alarming where a case can be examined under the scope of different 
freedoms548. To this end, by linking the free movement of goods to the 
concept of European citizenship, AG Maduro argues in favour of expanding 
Article 28 EC beyond the notion of discrimination. Influenced by the “inner 
political check” doctrine549, he posits that this Article should be applicable 
where “cross-border situations are treated less favourably than purely 
internal situations”, that is, his proposed test would prohibit: (1) 
discriminatory measures, (2) measures imposing supplementary costs on 
imports wihout taking into account their particular situation and (3) 
measures constituing a barrier to market access550. However, these 
alternatives to Keck also present some weak points. The indroduction of a de 
minimis test would entail an economic assessment of the relevant market, 
which the ECJ is not willing to undertake551. Further, as for the test 
proposed by AG Maduro, it appears to raise more questions than answers, 
since it does not specify the circumstances to take into account when 
imports are submitted to additional costs552.  
 
Despite these detracting voices, it appears that, since Keck was 
delivered, the case-law in the area of free movement of goods has  been 
                                                 
547 Ibid, paragraph 31. This assertion is correct, for instance public procurement cases or 
cases involving state commercial monopolies seem to belong to a different category of 
measures. 
548 Ibid, paragraph 33. 
549 M MADURO, Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European 
Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights, (1997) 3 Eur. L J, pp 55-82 
550 Ibid, paragraphs 40-46. 
551 Perhaps, the reason lies in that, by contrast to competition cases where the Commission 
takes the leading role in examining complex economic issues involving the application of a 
di minimis test, when parties invoke article 28 EC, the ECJ has no assistance. 
552 P OLIVER & S ENCHELMAIER, Free Movement of Goods: Recent Developments in 
the Case Law, (2007) 44 CML Rev., pp 649-704, 677. 
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rather stable553. As a matter of fact, in replacing the dichotomy between 
product requirements and selling arrangements by distinguishing between 
selling arrangements and other type of measures, the ECJ appears to 
overcome one of Keck’s major defaults554. As a result, it seems that, for the 
sake of its credibility, it is very unlikely that, in the near future, the ECJ will 
overrule Keck. 
 
What is the approach of the USSC towards non-discriminatory 
selling arrangements? A good American example answering this question is 
provided by Exxon Corp. Governor of Maryland555. During the 1973 
petroleum shortage, Maryland state authorities noticed that producers and 
refiners gave a preferential treatment to their own gasoline stations. Taking 
the view that this market practice put at risk sound competition, Maryland 
passed a statute precluding producers and refiners of petroleum products 
from operating any retail service station within its territory. Additionally, it 
also banned producers and refiners from entering into discriminatory 
supply and price practices. Shortly after, Exxon and six other interstate oil 
companies, which not only supplied to independent dealers in Maryland but 
also sold directly to the consuming public, challenged the constitutionality 
of the statute, arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause. To this end, 
applicants put forward three arguments. Firstly, they claimed that the 
statute was discriminatory, since the contested measure aimed to protect 
local independent dealers. However, the USSC took a different view. It 
held that, since there were no local producer or refiners in Maryland, but all 
petroleum was supplied from out-of-state sources, the contested measure 
could not be discriminatory. The USSC also denied the statute benefited 
local independent dealers, since it did not created any barriers against 
interstate independent dealers. (Neither did it prohibit the flow of interstate 
goods nor impose additional cost upon them nor favour an unequal 
treatment between in-sate and out-of-state companies). Thus, the USSC 
                                                 
553 Ibid, pp 704. 
554 Canal Satélite Digital, supra note 425, paragraph 35; Alfa-Vita, Op cit, paragraph 19 
Case C-434/04, Ahokainen and Leppik, [2006] ECR I-9171 paragraphs 20-21. Case C-
170/04, Rosegren & Others, 5 June 2007, n.y.r. paragraph 33 
555 Exxon Corp. v Governor of Maryland, 437 US 117 (1978) 
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concluded that “the fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some 
interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination 
against interstate commerce”556. Secondly, even if the statute is non-
discriminatory, applicants pointed out that at least three refiners would 
withdraw from the Maryland market and hence, it would deprive 
consumers from certain special services. Nonetheless, the USSC held that 
injuries on the consuming public cannot be identified with burdens on 
interstate commerce, but relate to the wisdom of the statute557.  Lastly, they 
maintained that owing to the nation-wide nature of the petroleum products 
market, States lacked the power to adopt regulatory measures.  
Nevertheless, the USSC replied that only where a lack of uniformity 
impedes the flow of interstate goods, would States be deprived from their 
regulatory powers. To this effect, the USSC found that the contested 
measures did not adversely affect the flow of interstate goods but only “a 
particular structure or method of operation in a retail market” and hence, 
the lack of regulatory uniformity was not precluded by the Commerce 
Clause. As a result, one may conclude that Exxon is a valuable contribution 
to the case-law of the USSC. It demonstrates that, in so far as there is no 
discrimination, the Commerce Clause does not prevent states from opting 
for a particular market structure or methods of operations to the detriment 
of others. As Justice Stevens wrote, “the Clause protects the interstate 
market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome 
regulations”558.  
 
It is very likely that in a case similar to Exxon the ECJ would have 
reached the same outcome. However, its rationale would have differed. The 
ECJ would have ruled that, since the challenged statute involved non-
discriminatory selling arrangements, the latter fall outside of the scope of 
Article 28 EC. By contrast, the Exxon Court followed a soft balanced 
approach. It was not after discarding that the effects of the Maryland statute 
upon interstate commerce were benign, that the USSC sided with the State. 
                                                 
556 Ibid, 127 
557 Ibid, 128. 
558 Ibid, 127-129. Quoting Alexandria Scarp, supra note 495, 806 
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Said differently, the approach of the USSC in Exxon is just the application 
of the Pike test to certain market techniques. 
 
 
 
V.-   Extraterritorial and inconsistent state regulations: An example, 
the Internet 
 
From the findings of the USSC in Exxon, it seems that States retain 
regulatory powers to limit (or even ban) certain market techniques, while 
favouring others. Indeed, in the light of Exxon, one could suggest that, for 
example, in the absence of federal legislation, non-discriminatory state 
legislation forbidding the sale of certain goods over the Internet complies 
with the DCC. However, recent rulings of lower courts demonstrate that the 
judiciary has struggled to define the negative limits of the DCC in the 
cyberspace. On the one hand, some courts have ruled that, when States 
regulate the Internet, they may impinge on wholly external conducts, 
incurring into regulatory “extraterritoriality”, prohibited under the DCC559. 
To this effect, it has also been maintained that state intervention would 
amount to “adversely affect[ing] interstate commerce by subjecting 
[Internet] activities to inconsistent regulations”560. On the other hand, other 
courts have followed the Exxon rationale, holding that States may regulate 
the way in which operators pursue their market activities. Two cases 
illustrate these opposite views.  
 
In American Libraries Associations v Pataki561, a US District Court 
annulled a New York law which criminalised the intentional use of the 
Internet to disseminate pornographic materials to minors. The District 
Court judge noticed that it was extremely difficult for content providers to 
place age and geographical restrictions when accessing their websites. 
Hence, in his opinion, the contested measure would chill the commercial 
                                                 
559 In Healy v Beer Institute, 491 US 324, 339 (1989); Brown-Forman Distiller Corp. v NY 
State Liquor Authority, 476 US 573 (1986) and Edgar v MITE Corp., supra note 514 
560 CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69, 88 (1987)  
561 American Libraries Associations v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
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activities of content providers located in other States with more permissible 
legislations. Additionally, though protecting minors from exposure to 
pornographic materials was legitimate, these local benefits did not out-
weigh the burdens on interstate commerce. Since the statute did not 
regulate either textual information or communications originated overseas, 
it did not attain the objectives it sought to pursue. Further, the District 
Court judge considered that, with regards to the legislative disparity among 
States, “a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated and 
even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended 
to reach and possible was unaware were being accessed”562. Lastly, in 
holding that the Internet was a nation-wide market, the District Court judge 
concluded that state regulation was precluded and consequently, he urged 
Congress to take action563. However, the reasons given by the District 
Court judge do not appear to be entirely convincing. In their influential 
article, Goldsmith and Sykes argue that the extraterritorial and inconsistent 
effects of state regulations cannot lead inter alia to their annulment564. On 
the contrary, as it occurs in other communication sectors, courts should 
undertake a balancing exercise between the protection of local interests and 
interstate commerce565. In this regard, they maintained that American 
Libraries Assoc could be based on flawed factual premises. For example, 
                                                 
562 Ibid, 168-169 
563 Ibid, 181. The ruling in Pataki has been subsequently followed by other courts when 
annulling state law criminalising the diffusion of pornographic material. See ACLU v 
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); PSINet, Inc v Chapman, 108 F Supp 2d 611 (WD 
Va 2000); Cyberspace Communications, Inc v Engler, 55 F Supp. 2d 737 (ED Mich. 1999) 
In the same way, anti-spam statutes have been struck down. See State v. Heckel, 143 Wash. 
2d 824, 24 P.3d 404 (2001). 
564 Goldsmith and Sykes, supra note 515, pp 785-828.  
565 Basing their analysis on the economics of regulation, they maintained that, in adopting 
anti-pornography and anti-spam statues, States aim to redress the harm caused by “non-
pecuniary externalities” (which affect third parties not involved in the transaction 
originating the harm). In their opinion, the main characteristic of the Internet lies in that 
these externalities are located outside of the regulating jurisdiction. However, this 
distinctive feature should not prevent courts from undertaking a balancing exercise. On the 
one hand, they considered that state legislation redressing the harm, while not exceeding the 
losses incurred by those participating in interstate commerce, should be allowed. Since the 
in-state benefits outweigh out-of-state burdens, state legislation contributes to the general 
economic welfare. Conversely, when state legislation impinges on interstate commerce 
beyond what is necessary to amend the harm, it should then be annulled. Indeed, in these 
cases, the economic welfare will decline below the situation with no corrective measures. 
Thus, they criticise courts which quash state regulation solely on the ground that it 
produces external and inconsistent effects, without taking into account the benefits it 
produces.  
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contrary to the opinion of the District Court judge, geographical and age 
identification technologies could enable content providers to avoid criminal 
liability at non-excessive cost. Moreover, they stress that regulatory 
uniformity should only take place when inconsistent state regulations 
render impracticable the exercise of commercial activities by multi-
jurisdictional firms. Thus, with a view to departing from American 
Libraries Assoc, they invite courts to strike a balance between, on the one 
hand, the extraterritorial and inconsistent effects of state regulation and, on 
the other, the benefits it produces. 
 
In this sense, in Ford Motor Company v Texas Department of 
Transportation566, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a different 
view. This case involved the validity of § 5.02 (c) of the Texas Motor 
Vehicle Commission Code (the Texas Code), which precluded car 
manufacturers and distributors from owning a dealership. Since the Texas 
Code required a dealer’s licence in order to sell vehicles to consumers 
residing in Texas, the applicant was precluded from retailing cars over the 
Internet. Texas heavily relied on Exxon, maintaining that there was no 
significant legal or factual difference between the case at issue and the 
latter. Conversely, Ford put into question the dicta of the USSC in Exxon, 
claiming that it was an anomaly which should be read in the context of the 
1973 petroleum crisis. It instead urged the Court of Appeals to follow Hunt 
v Washington Advertising Commission567 and Lewis v BT Invest. Managers 
Inc.568, where the USSC found the challenged provisions to be 
discriminatory.  However, the Court of Appeals rejected this claim. It 
considered that, by contrast to Hunt and Lewis, there was no discrimination 
between in-state and out-of-state manufacturers569. Indeed, the applicant 
                                                 
566 Ford Motor Company v Texas Department of Transportation, 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 
2001) 
567 Hunt, supra note 454 
568 Lewis v BT Invest. Managers Inc, 477 US 27 (1980) 
569 In accordance with the Court of Appeals, whereas in Hunt, North Carolinian regulations 
favoured in-state apple producers to the detriment of Washington’s apple producers (see pp 
3) and in Lewis, a Florida statute prohibited out-of-state financial entities from operating 
branches or giving investment advise but not extending the ban to in-state entities; the 
Texas Code only precluded all car manufacturers from using their superior market position 
against dealers in the retail car market. 
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was adversely affected not because he was an out-of-state manufacturer, 
but just because he was a manufacturer. The contested statute only 
protected in-state dealers from manufacturers’ competition, but not from 
out-of-state independent dealers.  Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that forbidding vertical integration of car manufacturers was not 
discriminatory. Likewise, in applying the Pike balancing test, the Court of 
Appeals recalled Exxon and held that injuries to consumer’s welfare 
resulting from the statute was not relevant for the Commerce Clause, but it 
related to its “economic efficacy” . Finally, in relying on American Assoc. v 
Pataki, the applicant argued that e-commerce “demand[ed] consistent 
treatment and [is] therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national 
level”. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals opined differently. Were the 
argument of the applicant upheld, parties could circumvent valid state 
regulations by simply connecting their activities to the Internet. Indeed, 
since the Texas Code banned manufacturers from all retailing activities, its 
effects on the Internet were only incidental. Consequently, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that the Texas Code complied with the Commerce Clause570. 
 
The different outcome in these two cases may be explained by the nature of 
the goods involved. Whereas in American Libraries Assoc., the diffusion of 
pornographic images has a “digital” nature, in Ford Motor Comp v Texas 
Dept. of Transp., Texas regulated the sale and transmission of “real-space” 
goods, namely cars. Likewise, while in American Libraries Assoc state 
regulation focussed on regulating the content of the services provided, in 
Ford Motor Comp v Texas Dept of Transp the Court of Appeal centred its 
analysis on the Texan retail car market. Put differently, whereas the first 
case involved the regulation of a service, the latter dealt with regulating the 
sales of goods. It follows that this distinction appears to be important owing 
to the fact that, where a digital good, that is, regulating an online service is 
                                                 
570 The ruling of the Court of Appeals has also been followed in other cases: Santa Fe 
Natural Tobacco Co. v Spitzer, No. 00 Civ. 7274, 2000 WL 1694307 (SDNY Nov. 13, 
2000).  See also L VANDERSTAPPEN, Internet Pharmacies and the Specter of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, (2006) 22 J.L.& Pol'y, 619-644, (who supports the holding in 
Ford Motor Company. She rejects the blanket invalidation of all state regulations of the 
Internet).  
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primarily involved, it is more costly for content providers to “identify and 
filter their communications and deliveries by geography” 571.  
 
Has the ECJ opted for an approach similar to American Libraries Assoc., or 
instead adopted Ford Motor Comp v Texas Dept. of Transp? First of all, the 
legislation at issue in American Libraries Assoc. would not have been 
reviewed by the ECJ under 28 EC, but rather under Article 49 EC. The 
reason is that the New York law targeted cross-border services rather than 
the market techniques for the sale of goods. In the light of cases like Alpine 
Investements, Schindler and Gambelli572, the ECJ would have ruled that 
criminalising the intentional diffusion of pornographic material to minors 
hindered access to market to contain providers based in other Member 
States. The ECJ would have also recognised the legitimate interest at stake. 
However, if the objections of Goldsmith and Sykes were upheld, the ECJ 
would have ruled that the challenged regulation did not comply with the 
principle of proportionality, since there were less restrictive alternatives 
available. Still, though attaining the same outcome, the rationale of both 
Courts would differ. The ECJ does not pay attention to the extraterritorial 
effects of legislation. This is largely because these effects are already 
prohibited by Article 49 EC.  
 
As for Ford Motor Comp v Texas Dept. of Transp, the ECJ replied to 
a similar question in DocMorris573. There, the German Association of 
Pharmacists (GAP) sought to prevent DocMorris, a pharmacy based in the 
Netherlands, from offering non-prescription and prescription-only 
medicines for sale over the Internet. The GAP invoked German legislation 
banning the sale by mail order of medical products. Conversely, the 
DocMorris claimed that German legislation was in breach of Article 28 EC. 
The ECJ began by noting that German legislation involved selling 
arrangements. Accordingly, it proceeded to examine whether German 
legislation failed to [1] apply to all relevant traders operating in Germany 
                                                 
571 Goldsmith and Sykes, supra note 564,pp 824-825 
572 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141; Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] 
ECR I-1039; Case C-243/01 Gambelli and Others [2003] ECR I-13031 
573 Case C-322/01 DocMorris [2003] ECR I-14887 
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and [2] to affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, domestic and import 
products. Whereas the first condition was met, the ECJ held that German 
legislation had a greater impact on pharmacies established outside of 
Germany. Indeed, German pharmacies could still sell their products over the 
counter. On the contrary, Internet was the only significant way to gain 
access to the German market. Since German legislation involved 
discriminatory selling arrangements, a justification was required. Given the 
risks attached to prescription-only medicines, the need to verify the 
authenticity of the prescription and the identity of the customer, the ECJ 
accepted that the ban was justified under Article 30 EC. However, it ruled 
that it was not the case for non-prescription medicines. Following cases like 
Gourmet and De Agostini574, DocMorris demonstrates that a selling 
arrangement is deemed discriminatory when it bans the only significant way 
for import products to penetrate the market. Accordingly, it will need to be 
justified. As result, had the ECJ examined a case like Ford Motor, it would 
have evaluated whether prohibiting the retail sale of cars over the Internet 
by manufacturers was a discriminatory selling arrangement, particularly 
whether this was the only significant way for out-of-state manufacturers to 
penetrate the market.  I would suggest a reply in the negative. Since neither 
in-state nor out-of-state manufacturers could access the retail market, the 
ECJ would have found that the Texan law was not discriminatory. In 
addition, both out-of-state and in-state manufacturers could access the Texas 
market by recurring to independent dealers. 
   
VI.-   A Comparison: Beyond discrimination? 
 
The case-law of both Courts evinces that the shadow of invalidity 
surrounds discriminatory state measures. The prohibition of discrimination 
is seen by USSC as “a rule essential to the foundation of the Union”, from 
which, in “all but in the narrowest of the circumstances”, states may not 
derogate575. Likewise, the principle of non-discrimination is the keystone of 
                                                 
574 Gourmet, supra note 424 ; De Agostini, supra note 540  
575 Granholm, supra note 463, 472  
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all free movement provisions and hence, derogations therefrom are 
submitted to very strict conditions. Additionally, the notion of 
discrimination embraced by both Courts is a very broad one, including 
facial (formal) discrimination, as well as effective (material) discrimination. 
Further, both Courts would not be deterred from qualifying a state measure 
as discriminatory where the number of parties affected is minimal, 
domestic interests are also affected, or a protectionist intend is missing. 
However, there a three major differences when evaluating discriminatory 
measures. Firstly, contrary to the holdings of the USSC in Carbone, the 
ECJ does not consider that granting exclusive rights to a commercial 
operator violates inter alia free movement law. Nor would the ECJ concur 
with OHSWMA in accepting that state monopolies are not barriers to 
interstate trade. Instead of giving a “yes-or-no” reply, the ECJ carefully 
applies a two-tier-balanced examination. At first stage, it evaluates whether 
the creation and operation of a monopoly produces discriminatory effects. 
It then reviews whether rules having a direct bearing upon monopolies give 
rise to discrimination. Secondly, in the case-law of the ECJ, there is no 
equivalent either to the market-participant exemption or congressional 
superseding legislation. Last but not least, whereas only once has the USSC 
upheld a discriminatory state measure, implying their virtually per se 
invalidity, under Article 30 EC, Member States still have an opportunity to 
justify their adoption.  
 
Moreover, both Courts have tried to expand the scope of the DCC 
and Article 28 EC beyond the principle of non-discrimination. As Cassis 
and Pike show, the ECJ and the USSC were ready to strike down state 
measures which, while awarding an equal treatment to in-state and out-of-
state interests, constituted an undue burden on interstate trade. 
Nevertheless, the balance undertaken by both Courts differs. Even if one 
assumes that the Pike test has not been entirely abandoned by the USSC, 
the balancing exercise thereof clearly favours States. Only where burdens 
upon interstate commerce are “clearly excessive” to the protection of 
putative local benefits, a state regulation will be struck down. In addition, it 
is for applicants to prove that non-discriminatory measures unduly burden 
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interstate trade. On the contrary, Cassis submitted all types of commercial 
regulation to a strict scrutiny. It is true that, in introducing the notion of 
mandatory requirements, the ECJ enlarged the number of derogations 
available to the Member States. However, the fact that it is for the host 
Member State to justify why goods complying with standards of the 
Member State of origin cannot be marketed in its territory, and the fact that 
the principle of proportionality applies in the same manner to all state 
measures, regardless of the presence of discrimination; operated in favour 
of Community integration. Thus, Cassis entailed a substantial erosion of 
state regulatory powers. Indeed, since both discriminatory and non-
discriminatory measures would be subjected to the same “rule of reason”, 
ascertaining this distinction was pushed to the background. Thus, Cassis 
supposes a bigger intrusion on state powers to regulate the market than Pike 
does (or ever did).  
 
Why is balancing stricter under Article 28 EC than under the DCC? 
Firstly, the adoption of a high level of judicial scrutiny when examining 
economic state regulations would resurrect the ghosts of Lochner. As 
Tushnet indicates, both balancing and economic due process examine 
whether economic regulation imposes unreasonable burdens on private 
traders. Accordingly, in order not to repeat past mistakes, the constitutional 
viability of Pike calls for a soft review576. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the 
federal judiciary would be seriously undermined, by being accused of 
incurring into policy making. Secondly, as Maduro suggests, the EU and 
the US markets had reached different levels of integration that required 
different degrees of judicial activism. In the EU, the institutional impasse of 
the time, the incapacity of national markets for self-integration, the need to 
break the path-dependence of actors from national systems left the ECJ no 
choice but to embrace a more assertive approach in favour of market 
integration. Thus, Cassis was relied upon by the ECJ in order to set the 
foundations of an incipient market, that is, as a “market-building” device. 
Conversely, in the US, the market had reached a “point of no return”. 
                                                 
576 M TUSHNET, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, (1979) Wis. L. Rev., 125-165 
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Political and economic integration diminished the risks of obstacles to the 
free movement. The barriers that may appear are more the result of 
innovation and experimentation than protectionism. To this effect, the 
USSC has focussed on coining rules that bring certainty and clarity to 
market operators (the principle of “non-discrimination”), rather than on the 
elimination of all conflicting standards. Put simply, the USSC reads the 
DCC as a “market-maintenance” device577. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that, when applying the DCC doctrine, 
the validity of a state measure is examined under a dualistic approach: 
Either a measure is deemed discriminatory and hence, it is annulled; or it is 
qualified as non-discriminatory and, due to the low risk represented by 
Pike, it is certainly upheld. These two binomials (discrimination = 
invalidity) and (non-discrimination = validity) have compelled the USSC to 
revisit the notion of “discriminatory treatment”. As OHSWMA evinces, the 
narrower discrimination is defined, the more room there is for state 
regulatory intervention. Conversely, a broad notion of discrimination would 
be a “an unbounded [judicial] interference with state and local 
government”578. Thus, in America, the cannon of validity for state measures 
is that they do no discriminate between in-state and out-of-state interests. 
 
 Until Keck was delivered, Cassis prevented the extrapolation of this 
approach to the other side of the Atlantic. Discrimination or not, all 
commercial measures were submitted to the principle of mutual 
recognition. Thus, Keck also brings, albeit in a limited fashion, a 
“clarifying” dualist approach into the realm of the free movement of goods, 
epitomising maturity in market integration. It is a step towards “market 
maintenance”. However, as Exxon demonstrates, it is only regarding non-
discriminatory selling arrangements that the outcome of both Courts 
converged. However, Exxon did not reform the foundations of the DCC. It 
was one more step away from “balancing” and towards a “discrimination 
only rule”.  
                                                 
577 Maduro, supra note 520, pp- 88-102 
578
 OHSWMA, supra note 485, 1789 
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VII.-   Conclusions 
 
The “discrimination-only” approach followed by the USSC shows 
that access to market is not a priority in the US. Instead, the USSC has 
focused on ensuring stability for an already-sufficiently-integrated 
market579. At the same time, the approach of the USSC also enshrines a 
high degree of deference to the political institutions, both state legislatures 
and Congress. The principle of non-discrimination calls for a lesser degree 
of judicial activism than “balancing”. Given their wide resources and 
expertises, States are better equipped to wage the interests of interstate 
trade against state regulatory autonomy. In addition, in so far as Congress 
may intervene to correct state determinations, interstate commerce is 
always secured. Therefore, the DCC gives room for “States (to act as) 
laboratories”580. 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Keck brought the case-law of 
Article 28 EC closer to the US experience. Yet, since Cassis remains 
largely good law, Keck had only a limited impact in the law of free 
movement. With the exception of selling arrangements, this treaty 
provisions goes beyond discrimination. Can Keck be read as a deferential 
gesture to the political institutions?  Not without reservations. While Keck 
could be interpreted as admitting that state political actors are better 
qualified than the ECJ and national courts to examine the impact of non-
discriminatory selling arrangements upon intra-Community trade; I do not 
believe this was the ultimate intention of the ECJ. By drawing a catalogue 
of measures falling within and outside the scope of Article 28 EC, the ECJ 
imposed its own cost/benefit analysis of market integration. As opposed to 
the DCC, it is not “balancing” which is deemed unfitted for judicial review. 
Keck simply narrowed down the scope of Article 28 EC. Thus, this ruling 
does not enshrine strong believes in the institutional capacities of national 
                                                 
579 Maduro, supra note 520, 96 
580 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310- 311, 386 (1932) (Brandeis 
dissenting). 
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political actors when balancing the virtues and vices of market uniformity 
and diversity.  
 
In view of the achievements made, I do not believe that Keck should 
be overruled. Its formalistic character has brought clarity into the realm of 
free movement of goods. Besides, as explained above, alternative tests 
seem to fall either into the over-breadth of Cassis or the under-
inclusiveness of Keck. Thus, how can Keck be improved without destroying 
it? In my view, the ECJ should stop focussing on “outcomes” and start 
examining national political processes. The approach advanced by AG 
Maduro in Alfa-Vita points in this direction. Nevertheless, in expounding 
his model, the AG still reviews the adequacy of national processes by 
evaluating outcomes, raising the same old questions but reformulated in 
new terms. In my view, the Advocate General is right in trying to 
extrapolate the “inner political check” or “virtual representation” argument 
into the EU. However, the ECJ should not second-guess the outcome 
reached by national legislators when regulating selling arrangements in a 
non-discriminatory fashion. Instead, I would advocate for a “process-
oriented” review, whereby courts should evaluate whether the measure 
adopted is the result of sound legislative deliberations on the costs and 
benefits to the European internal market. Thus, national courts should 
check that national legislators took the internal market seriously. Discussed 
at more length in the general conclusion, the advantage of this “process-
oriented” review is twofold. Firstly, it would not undermine the results 
achieved by Keck, in so far as “process-oriented” review would be limited 
to non-discriminatory selling arrangements. Secondly, not only would it 
epitomise that the ECJ is willing to trust the Member States, but, in the long 
run, the latter would internalise the adoption of a European perspective 
when passing national law. It would compel national legislatures to think 
“federal”. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Positive Integration: The Commerce Clause and Article 95 
EC 
 
 
This chapter is divided as follows. In Section I, the USSC’s 
application of the principle of “enumerated powers” to the Commerce 
Clause is examined. In the same vein, Section II outlines how the ECJ has 
applied the principle of attribution to Community measures adopted under 
Article 95 EC. After drawing some comparisons between the recent case-
law of both Courts, Section III argues that the judicial enforcement of the 
principle of enumerated powers (attribution) has not contained the 
competence creep of the central government. Accordingly, Section IV 
looks at three alternatives capable of striking a proper balance between the 
Union’s interests in an integrated market and respecting States’ autonomy 
namely, reliance on the political process, the principle of proportionality 
and the principle of subsidiarity. Finally, it is concluded that courts ought to 
focus on controlling that, in the vast field of concurrent powers, Congress 
and the EC legislator pay due homage to “the values of federalism”. 
Although protecting enclaves of state sovereignty remains important when 
reminding Congress and the EC legislator of the limited nature of their 
powers, it appears that an adequate balance would only be reached if courts 
duly examine “what lies within”.  This may be achieved by relying on 
“process federalism”, that is, judicial review that solves failures in federal 
or Community legislative deliberations that improperly impinge upon state 
autonomy. 
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I.-   The Principle of Enumerated Powers applied to the Commerce 
Clause 
 
A.-  The History of the Commerce Clause until Lopez 
 
US scholars tend to divide the “pre-Lopez” history of the Commerce 
Clause into three periods. While the first two are dominated by “Dual 
Federalism”, that is, the existence of two separate and independent spheres 
of competences, one belonging to Congress, the other reserved to the States, 
with the New Deal not only did the USSC accept the possibility of 
competence overlapping, but it also exercised a rubber-stamped review of 
congressional legislation.  
 
From 1826 to 1887, the Commerce Clause was interpreted both 
intensively and extensively. In Gibbons v Ogden581, Marshall supported a 
broad reading of “commerce”, understood in general terms as “describ(ing) 
the commercial intercourse […]”582.  Likewise, the term “among” suggested 
that, notwithstanding transactions being completely internal, “commerce” 
“cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be 
introduced into the interior”583. In addition, he ruled that, even in the 
absence of federal legislation, States had no powers to regulate transactions 
with sister States584. However, Marshall also acknowledged that the 
Commerce Clause should not deprive States from adopting health and safety 
legislation as part of their police powers. Thus, federal courts were entrusted 
with drawing bright lines between activities falling within “commerce” and 
activities pertaining to the police powers of States. However, once Congress 
started legislating, the Court realised that Marshall’s approach eroded state 
regulatory powers excessively, thus it decided to revisit its doctrine.  
 
From 1887 until 1937, the USSC also adopted a substantive test 
drawing a catalogue of activities falling “in” and “outside” of commerce. 
                                                 
581 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
582 Ibid, 190-91 
583 Ibid, 194 
584 Ibid, 197 
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Although this test was originally construed under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, it was soon applied to control congressional powers. First, the 
USSC embraced a test which allowed Congress to regulated activities 
having “direct” impact upon interstate commerce, while excluding those 
whose effects were only “indirect”. Subsequently, the USSC decided to 
construe the notion of “commerce” narrowly, by excluding activities such as 
“manufacturing”585 or “mining”586 from the realm of federal power. For 
instance, in Hammer v Dagenhart587, the USSC found that Congress lacked 
the power to exclude the products of child labour from interstate commerce. 
It based its ruling on the ground that rules relating to manufacturing were 
for States to adopt. Nevertheless, since the USSC failed to justify why 
certain economic activities were excluded from the Commerce Clause, 
whereas others were not, it was progressively accused of introducing 
arbitrary criteria. In addition, not only did these tests not respond to the 
needs of an interdependent and interconnected American economy, but it 
also pushed the USSC into a political cleavage with the Executive. In 
annulling several pieces of federal legislation adopted under the Commerce 
Clause588, the USSC became the main obstacle to the implementation of the 
New Deal program, which sought to recover the American economy from 
the 1929 Big Depression. Thus, with a view to avoiding the “Court-packing 
plan” promoted by President Roosevelt589, the USSC opted for 
reformulating its interpretation of the Commerce Clause, granting more 
leeway to congressional action. 
 
From 1937 until 1995, Congress saw, therefore, its powers increase. It 
was no longer relevant to determine which activities were “in or out” of 
“Commerce”. Hence, “Dual Federalism” was abandoned. Apart from 
                                                 
585 United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 US 1 (1895) 
586 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v Lord, 262 US 172 (1923) 
587 Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) 
588 Scherchter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 US 495 (1935); United States v Butler, 
297 US 1 (1936), Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238 (1936); Ashton v Cameron County 
Dist., 298 US 513 (1936); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v Radford, 295 US 555 (1935). 
589 WE LEUCHTENBURG, The Origins of Franklin D Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing”, 
(1966) Sup. Ct. Rev., pp. 347- 400. 
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including the channels of interstate commerce590 and the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce or things and persons therein591  within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, the USSC ruled that Congress could also regulate 
activities having “substantial” effects592 upon interstate commerce593. In 
United States v Darby594, the USSC was called upon to rule on the validity 
of two provisions of the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA)595, namely 
whether [1] Congress could prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of 
goods manufactured by employees whose wages and working hours did not 
comply with the FLSA and whether [2] it could also ban the employment of 
these workers in the production of goods for interstate commerce. First, the 
USSC held that the powers of Congress to exclude goods from the interstate 
commerce were plenary.  In so doing, the USSC expressly rejected Hammer 
v Dagenhart, adding that the distinction in which it rested had long been 
abandoned596. As for the second question, the USSC justified the 
constitutionality of the FLSA under the Necessary and Proper Clause. After 
recognising the “property” of suppressing nationwide competition from 
goods produced under substandard labour conditions, the USSC ruled that 
Congress “may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of 
the permitted end even though they involve control of intrastate 
activities”597.  Thus, Congress was right in excluding employees hired under 
sub-labour conditions, since the prohibition contributed to the objectives of 
the statute. As a result, the USSC concluded that intrastate activities, which 
                                                 
590 See LH TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, (NY: West Group, 1999),  pp 827, who 
suggests that channels of interstate commerce alludes to congressional control “over […] 
the river of commerce to exclude whatever cargo Congress deems unfit” See Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v United States, 379 US 241 (1964). 
591 In Lopez, Rehnquist gave three cases to illustrate this concept. First, in Shreveport Rate 
Cases, 234 US 342 (1914), the USSC held that Congress had the authority to regulate 
intrastate travel fares by carriers, which also travel outside the State. As instruments of 
commerce, the fact that carriers were also used for intrastate travelling did not deprive 
Congress from having a complete authority over them. Secondly, in Southern Railway Co. 
v United States, 222 US 20 (1911), the Court upheld the validity of the Safety Appliance 
Act, which penalised the intrastate use of defective carriers operating in a railroad which 
also served for interstate traffic. Finally, in Perez v United States, 402 US 146 (1971), the 
Court held that Congress could protect the instrumentalities of commerce. For instance, 
Congress could validly impose penalties for the unauthorised destruction of aircrafts.  
592 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 US 1 (1937) 
593 Perez v US, Op cit, 150  
594 United State v Darby, 312 US 100 (1941) 
595 29 U.S.C. 201 (1938)  
596 Darby, Op. cit, 116-117 
597 Ibid, 121 
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were substantially related to interstate commerce, fell within the scope of 
congressional powers.  
 
Furthermore, in Wickard v Filburn598, the USSC held that, in regulating 
intrastate activities, not only should effects on interstate commerce be 
considered on an individual basis, but also in the aggregate. In order to 
obtain price stability in the wheat market, Congress passed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act in 1938599 (AAA), introducing a system of annual quotas. 
Where farmers exceeded their assigned allotments, the AAA provided for 
the imposition of fines. The appellee, a farmer from Ohio who had been 
fined for exceeding his quota, challenged the constitutionality of the Act as 
applied to him. He argued that the regulation of home-consumption of 
wheat was beyond Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Put 
differently, wheat not marketed but consumed by farmers themselves could 
not account as a part of their quota. Writing for the USSC, Justice Jackson 
began by restating that the USSC had abandoned any formalistic 
approach600. He stressed that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate 
activities, where “[they] exert […] a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce”601. It is very unlikely, Justice Jackson conceded, that 
the excess of wheat sown by the appellee would have an effect by itself on 
the interstate commerce. However, “his contribution, taken together with 
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial”602. Since, in 
controlling the supply of wheat, Congress had sought to increase its price, 
an eventual flow into the market of home-consumed wheat could put at risk 
this objective. Likewise, owing to the fact that farmers consuming their own 
wheat would otherwise purchase it on the market, home-grown wheat was 
in competition with wheat in commerce. It follows that, though home-
consumed wheat was outside the regulatory scheme, its disturbing 
“substantial effects” on interstate commerce allowed congressional 
                                                 
598 Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942) 
599 7 U.S.C. 1281 (1938) as amended by 7 U.S.C. 1340 (1941) 
600 Wickard, Op. cit, 120 
601 Ibid, 125 
602 Ibid, 127-129 
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intervention. Thus, Justice Jackson concluded that the AAA was 
constitutional. 
 
Along with the “substantial effect” doctrine and the “aggregation 
principle”, the scope of the Commerce Clause was further expanded by 
significantly deferring to congressional fact-findings. In so far as Congress 
demonstrated a “rational basis” for its conclusions, the USSC would agree 
in qualifying the effects of local incidents upon interstate commerce as 
“substantial”. A good illustration of this argument is provided by 
Katzenbach v McClung603. There, the owner of a restaurant, which refused 
to serve blacks, sought the annulment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act604, 
according to which no restaurant could discriminate on grounds of sex, 
colour, national origin or religion, "if […] it serves or offers to serve 
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves […] 
has moved in commerce." Particularly, the defendant contested that 
Congress could impose a non-discriminatory treatment on the ground that 
the food it served had moved in the interstate commerce. However, by 
relying on congressional hearings, the USSC took an opposite view. It 
recalled congressional findings, holding that black people will not attend 
racial discriminatory restaurants. These restaurants would have fewer 
customers and consequently, “(t)he fewer customers a restaurant enjoys, the 
less food it sells, and consequently the less it buys (from the interstate 
commerce).”605 Likewise, the USSC agreed with Congress in that racially 
discriminatory restaurants would render more difficult the interstate travel 
of black people, owing to the fact that “one can hardly travel without 
eating”606. Thus, the USSC ruled that “this testimony afforded an ample 
basis” to conclude that discriminatory treatment undertaken by restaurants 
impaired interstate commerce.  Lastly, in recalling Filburn v Wickard, the 
USSC ruled that in determining whether the Civil Rights Act was 
constitutional, one should not assess the impact of the appellee’s activities 
upon interstate commerce alone. On the contrary, it was necessary to bear in 
                                                 
603 Katzenbach v McClung,  379 US 294 (1964) 
604 42 U.S.C. 1971 
605 Katzenbach, 299 
606 Ibid, 300 
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mind that the appellee’s conduct was “representative of many others 
throughout the country”607. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that the breadth of the Commerce Clause 
rendered applications seeking to limit the reach of federal commercial 
legislation almost nugatory. In fact, during more than fifty years, only in 
National League of Cities v Usery608 did the USSC annul an act of 
Congress. There, it held that by extending the minimum hours and wages 
provisions of the FLSA to state and municipal employees, Congress had 
gone beyond the powers conferred to it. However, the ruling of the USSC 
relied on the Xth Amendment, leaving untouched the line of cases favouring 
broad congressional powers to regulate interstate commerce. In any case, 
the impact of National League lasted less than a decade, since it was 
subsequently overruled by Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority609. These circumstances were welcomed by some scholars, who 
opined that the USSC was right to follow judicial restraint610. 
Simultaneously, others urged the USSC to modify its case-law, which had 
excessively eroded the federal model and, did not comply with the principle 
of enumerated powers611. In this regard, the then Justice Rehnquist criticised 
the USSC thoroughly, calling for a more tempered interpretation of 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause612.  
 
 
 
                                                 
607 Ibid, 302. 
608 National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976) 
609 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985) 
610 J.H. CHOPER, The Scope of National Power vis-à-vis the State: the Dispensability of 
Judicial Review, (1977) 86 Yale L. J., pp 1552-1621; See also Maryland v Wirtz, 392 US 
183, 204 (1968) (Douglas dissenting)  
611 R. A. EPSTEIN, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, (1987) 73 Va. L. Rev., pp 
1387-1455. (The author maintains that the pre-New Deal interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause facilitated integration of national markets by preventing state balkanisation, while 
avoiding excessive uniformity. He also suggests that the scope of the Commerce Clause 
should be construed along the lines of its dormant version). 
612 Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 US 264, 310 (1981) 
(Rehnquist Concurring) 
 183 
B.-  The Lopez-Morrison-Raich Trilogy: The beginning and the end of 
“the federalist revolution” 
 
1.-  United States v Lopez: The beginning. 
 
In Lopez613, Rehnquist managed to mobilise the USSC and in a 5- 4 
decision, the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA)614 was annulled. Adopted 
under the Commerce Clause, this act criminalised the possession of fire 
arms in a school zone. The US Government supported the validity of the 
GFSZA by maintaining that there was a close connection between the 
possession of firearms in a school zone and violent crime. In turn, violent 
crime adversely affected the national economy in two ways, namely the 
“cost of crime” and the “cost of productivity”. Firstly, through the 
mechanism of insurance, the financial effects of violent crime are suffered 
by the entire population. Likewise, violent crime also refrains people from 
travelling to areas perceived as unsafe. Secondly, violent crime is also an 
obstacle to the educational process. A poorly educated population is less 
productive and consequently, the national economy is weakened. Thus, the 
US Government inferred that the GFSZA regulated an activity having a 
substantial adverse effect upon commerce and, urged the USSC to uphold 
the statute. 
 
“We start first with principles”615, Rehnquist wrote for the USSC. He 
stated that the Congress was bound by the principle of enumerated powers. 
Although plenary and submitted to no limitations but the ones prescribed by 
the Constitution, the very wording of the Commerce Clause imposes 
intrinsic limitations to congressional powers. Likewise, the USSC had never 
conceived the Commerce Clause as an unbounded source of federal power. 
He proceeded then to enounce the three categories of activities that 
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, namely [1] channels of 
interstate commerce, [2] the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or 
things and persons therein and, [3] activities having a “substantial effect” 
                                                 
613 United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) 
614 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) 
615 Lopez, 552 
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upon interstate commerce. Owing to the fact that the GFSZA did not fall 
within the two first categories, Rehnquist decided to examine whether the 
possession of firearms in school zones had a “substantial” impact upon 
interstate commerce.  
 
In this regard, he drew a distinction between local economic and local 
non-economic activities. On the one hand, “where economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
will be sustained”616. Indeed, even in Filburn v Wickard, “[…] the most far 
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity”, 
the federal statute in question regulated an economic activity. A sensu 
contrario, where Congress sought to regulate non-economic areas 
traditionally reserved to state sovereignty, such as criminal law, federal 
legislation will be almost certainly struck down. Consequently, Rehnquist 
declared the unconstitutionality of the GFSZA, affirming that it had 
“nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise”617.   
 
Moreover, he indicated that the GFZSA did not form part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, requiring for its effectiveness the inclusion 
of intrastate non-economic matters. Neither was there a “jurisdictional 
hook” conditioning the application of the GFZSA to a case-by-case inquiry 
into the effects of gun possession on interstate commerce618. Nor were there 
specific legislative findings indicating the effects of gun possession in 
school zones on interstate commerce. As for the arguments pushed forward 
by the US Government, Rehnquist did not spend much time dismissing 
them. They were no more than “inferences upon inferences”. If the USSC 
had followed the appellant’s arguments, it would have been very “difficult 
to perceive any limitation of the federal power, even in areas such as 
                                                 
616 Lopez, 560. 
617 Ibid, 561 
618 This was precisely what Congress did after Lopez was rendered. It limited the scope of 
the GFSZA to “a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce”. 18 USC § 922 (q) (2) (A) (2000). Besides, the constitutionality of this statute 
was subsequently affirmed in United States v Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 10398 (9th Cir. 2005)  
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criminal law enforcement and education where States historically have been 
sovereign”619. As a result, the GFZSA was declared unconstitutional. 
 
Dissenting Justices accused the USSC of creating three major legal 
problems. Firstly, the USSC had already upheld federal statutes regulating 
intrastate activities having lesser connection with interstate commerce than 
violent crime. Particularly, they found impossible to reconcile Lopez with 
the racial discrimination cases. Secondly, the distinction between regulating 
local “non-commercial” and local “commercial” activities was difficult to 
bring together with previous case-law. Indeed, they criticised Rehnquist for 
having reintroduced a formalistic approach, long abandoned since the New 
Deal. Finally, they stated that this new test would introduce legal 
uncertainty into the realm of the Commerce Clause. Specially, they foresaw 
the end of congressional power to impose criminal penalties. Conversely, 
dissenting Justices argued in favour of following judicial restraint. The task 
of judges should be confined to determining whether there was a “rational 
basis” for finding a significant link between the regulated activity and 
interstate commerce. The reason behind judicial deference lies in that 
determining this rational connection requires an “empirical judgment”620, 
which is better performed by the legislature rather than the judiciary. 
Accordingly, by extensively invoking “reports, hearings, and other readily 
available literature”621, dissenting Justices agreed with the appellant. 
 
The direct implications flowing from Lopez are fourfold. Firstly, Lopez 
canvasses the USSC’s intention to enforce the principle of enumerated 
powers622. It is a clear statement directed to Congress, encapsulating that its 
powers under the Commerce Clause are not unlimited623. Secondly, 
although the USSC conceives Lopez as a clear depart from precedent, it 
does not state which cases it pretended to overrule. This circumstance may 
                                                 
619 Lopez, 564 
620 Ibid,  617 (Breyer dissenting) 
621 Ibid,  619 (Breyer dissenting) 
622 SG CALABRESI, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of 
United States v Lopez, (1996) 94 Mich. L. Rev., pp 752-831 (who welcomes the ruling of 
the Court)  
623 The Court seems to reject the opinion of some scholars arguing for a limited role of the 
judiciary in federalism cases. See Choper, supra note 610. 
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mislead lower courts, which may struggle to ascertain what precedent is still 
valid624. Thirdly, the USSC appears to introduce a formal test which focuses 
on the type of regulated activity rather than in the effects it produces625. 
Indeed, the USSC seems willing to recognise congressional powers to 
regulate local economic activities, while local non-commercial activities fall 
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause.  However, the Lopez Court 
failed to provide a definition to this effect. Consequently, lower courts may 
opt for interpreting “commercial activity” broadly, refusing to follow the 
USSC in its federalist revival626.  Alternatively, they may interpret this 
concept restrictively, so that the constitutionality of entire areas of federal 
law, such as environmental legislation, would be put into question627. 
Finally, though the USSC appears to reject federal regulation of local non-
commercial activities, it leaves many doors open through which Congress 
may circumvent this limitation628. Perhaps, the most important loophole in 
Lopez is that Congress may include local non-commercial matters in a larger 
regulatory scheme of an economic activity. To the extreme, Lopez could 
become counterproductive for limiting the powers of Congress, given that 
the exercise of judicial review is hindered when Congress drafts legislation 
                                                 
624 W ROBERT, United States v Lopez: The Continued Ambiguity of Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence, (1996) 69 Temp. L. Rev., pp 275-302. (holding that Lopez rendered the case-
law of the Court under the Commerce Clause even more confusing) 
625 T STACY, What’s Wrong with Lopez, (1996) U. Kan. L. Rev., 243 (accusing the Court 
of being too formalistic); E YOUNG, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, (2004) 83 
Tex. L Rev, pp 1-166 (holding that Lopez focuses on substance)   
626 GH REYNOLDS & BP DENNING, Lower Courts Reading of Lopez or What if the 
Supreme Court held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came, (2000) Wis. L. Rev., pp 
369. From the same authors, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause 
encounter the Lower Courts, (2003) 55 Ark. L. Rev., pp 1253-1312. (holding that the 
uncertainty surrounding the concept of “economic activity” has driven lower courts to 
uphold federal legislation) 
627 JC NAGLE, The Commerce Clause meets the Delhi Sands-Flower Loving Fly, (1998) 
97 Mich. L. Rev., pp. 174-215.  (casting serious doubts on the validity of the Endangered 
Species Act, in the light of Lopez) 
628 LA GRAGLIA, United States v Lopez: Judicial Review under the Commerce Clause, 
(1996) 74 Tex. L. Rev., pp 719- 771 (affirming that the GFSZA could have been saved, had 
Congress alluded to commercial transactions). JA KLEIN, Commerce Clause Questions 
After Morrison: Some Observations on the New Formalism and the New Realism, (2003) 
55 Stan. L. Rev., pp 571-606 (holding that, since the Court follows a broad approach when 
defining the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the repercussions of 
Lopez must be nuanced). 
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in broad terms629. Accordingly, it appears that Lopez was only a “minor 
constitutional revolution”630.   
2.-  United States v Morrison:  The Confirmation. 
 
One aspect left unresolved in Lopez was whether by relying on a 
specific factual inquiry demonstrating that local non-economic activities 
have an adverse impact on interstate commerce, Congress could invoke the 
Commerce Clause to pass legislation. Indeed, in Lopez, the USSC did not 
expressly foreclose this possibility. Besides, the absence of congressional 
fact-findings had led the Court of Appeals to annul the GFZSA. However, 
in United States v Morrison631, the USSC answered in the negative. There, 
the appellee challenged the constitutionality of Section 13981 of the 
Violence against Woman Act632 (VAWA), providing a federal civil remedy 
for the victims of gender motivated violence. The appellee argued that, in 
adopting Section 13981, Congress had gone beyond its powers under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the XIVth Amendment. By contrast to 
Lopez, in Morrison Congress had done an exhaustive background research 
proving that gendered motivated violence impinged upon interstate 
commerce633. However, the USSC was categorical, “simply because 
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so”634. The USSC recalled 
its ruling in Lopez. It insisted that the US Constitution did not confer on 
Congress the power to regulate intrastate non-economic activities. To this 
                                                 
629 A KREIT, Why is Congress still Regulating Non-Commercial Activity?, (2005) 28 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, pp 169-204  (affirming that most of lower courts have not 
followed Lopez. Instead, lower courts have upheld the regulation of local non-economic 
activities. By deferring to congressional purposes, lower courts have concluded that the 
effectiveness of a larger regulatory scheme of economic activities is conditioned upon the 
inclusion of local non economic activities therein) Additionally, this possibility was later 
acknowledged by Justice O’Connor when writing her dissenting opinion in Gonzales v 
Raich, infra 3. 
630 DJ MERRITT, Commerce !, (1996) 94 Mich. L. Rev., pp 674-751 (qualifying Lopez as 
“limited attempt” to lay down judicial enforceable standards under the Commerce Clause)  
631 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
632 42 U.S.C §13981 
633 Congress found that gender motivated violence deprived potential victims from 
travelling interstate and from engaging in interstate business. It also discovered that this 
violence diminished national productivity by increasing medical costs and diminishing the 
supply and demand for interstate products. 
634 Morrison, 614 (quoting Hodel, supra note 612, 311.) 
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effect, since gendered motivated violence was a local activity which did not 
have an economic nature, the USSC ruled that the Commerce Clause could 
not operate as the constitutional basis for Section 13981 of the VAWA635. 
 
By contrast to National League of the Cities v Usery, the ruling of the 
USSC in Morrison confirms that Lopez was not an isolated event. On the 
contrary, it illustrates the USSC’s serious purpose to revitalise the federalist 
debate. Additionally, in holding that congressional fact findings are not 
decisive when drawing the limits of the Commerce Clause, the USSC erects 
itself as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution636. However, albeit this 
assertion, Morrison did not help to clarify many of the questions Lopez left 
unanswered. It repeated the USSC’s intention to police the powers of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause, but did not provide further guidance 
how to do it637. Indeed, there was no definition of “economic activity”. Nor 
did it explain how local non-commercial activity may be included in a 
broader economic scheme. Thus, maybe due to the fact that both Opinions 
were authored by Rehnquist, Morrison confirmed Lopez in the true sense of 
the word. Not only did it reproduce its outcome, but also its shortcomings. 
 
3.-  Gonzales v Raich: The end? 
 
Lopez and Morrison made clear that the outer limits of the 
Commerce Clause would depend on how broad the USSC conceives the 
notion of “economic activity”. From these two cases, it appears that 
regulating intrastate non-economic activities is beyond congressional power. 
On the contrary, regarding economic activities taking place within a single 
State, Congress has a broad leeway to invoke its commercial powers. To 
this effect, Congress may rely on the aggregation principle enounced in 
                                                 
635 Ibid, 627  
636 CA MacKINNON, Disputing Male Sovereignty in United States v Morrison, (2000) 114 
Harv. L. Rev., pp 135-177 (qualifying Morrison as the “high-water mark to date” on the 
Court’s notion of federalism. However, the author criticised the Court for qualifying 
gendered-motivated violence as non-economic, since it cost billions of dollars to the 
American economy.)  
637 JH CHOPER & JC YOO, the Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, (2000) 25 
Okla. City U. L. Rev., pp 843-868. (alleging that both Lopez and Morrison left many 
questions unanswered) 
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Wickard to sustain that there is a connection between the local economic 
activity and interstate commerce.  
 
Accordingly, a broad construction of “economic activity” would 
render the ruling in Lopez “little more than a drafting guide”638 for 
Congress. Ten years after Lopez, this was the approach followed by the 
USSC639. In Gonzales v Raich640, with a view to preventing seriously ill 
patients from suffering excruciating pains, California passed the 
Compassionated Use Act of 1996641 (CUA), which provided an exemption 
from criminal prosecution for physicians, patients and caregivers who 
possess or cultivate marijuana for medical purposes. Respondents, two 
Californian residents, had relied on the CUA to possess and cultivate 
marijuana; when, in enforcing the Controlled Substance Act642 (CSA), 
federal agents of the DEA seized and destroyed their cannabis plants. 
Respondents filed then an injunction against the US Attorney General, 
alleging that, in relation the cultivation, distribution and possession of 
marijuana for medicinal use, the CSA violated the Commerce Clause. On 
appeal, the CSA was declared unconstitutional, by heavily relying on Lopez 
and Morrison.  
 
However, in a 6-3 decision, the USSC took a different view. Writing 
for the USSC, Justice Stevens stated that the similarities between this case 
and Filburn v Wickard were striking. In both cases, the cultivation of a 
home grown commodity could put at risk the objectives Congress aimed to 
achieve. Just as home-grown wheat could threaten the federal interests in 
stabilising the interstate wheat market, the diversion of home-cultivated 
marijuana could put in peril the congressional intent of eliminating this 
substance from the interstate commerce. “Be in wheat or marijuana”, 
                                                 
638 Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1,  (2005)  (O’Connor dissenting) 
639 Before Raich was delivered, the Court avoided pronouncing itself on the 
constitutionality of two federal statutes; instead the Court based its ruling on statutory 
interpretation. See Jones v United States, 529 US 848 (2000) and Solid Waste Agency  of 
North Cook County v United States Army Corps of Engineers,  531 US 159 (2001) 
640 Supra note 638. 
641 California Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (b) (West Supp. 2005) 
642 21 U.S.C § 801 et seq.  In accordance with the CSA, the distribution, manufacture or 
possession of marijuana is a criminal offence. 
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Justice Stevens wrote, “home consumption has […] a substantial effect on 
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity”643. However, 
respondents argued that Wickard could not be invoked, since by contrast to 
Mr. Wickard, they did not cultivate marijuana with a view to selling it. 
Justice Stevens rejected this argument, holding that the fact that Mr. 
Wickard was a commercial farmer never played a role in the USSC’s ruling.  
 
Furthermore, respondents contented that Congress had not embarked 
itself on an extensive factual inquiry determining the effects of home-
cultivated marijuana upon interstate commerce. In recalling Lopez, Justice 
Stevens briefly replied that congressional findings had never been a decisive 
factor when determining the validity of federal legislation644.  Justice 
Stevens proceeded then to stress that, in examining the constitutionality of 
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause, the role of the judiciary was 
a “modest one”. Judicial review was limited to ascertaining the existence of 
a “rational basis” demonstrating that the federally regulated activity 
produced substantial effects upon interstate commerce, without being 
necessary to verify if “in fact” that was the case. To this effect, Justice 
Stevens concluded that, given the “enforcement difficulties between 
marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere”645, Congress 
had acted rationally. 
 
Finally, respondents alleged that the possession and cultivation of 
home-grown marijuana did not have an economic nature and consequently, 
in pursuance with Lopez and Morrison, the CSA was in breach of the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, by alluding to the broad definition of 
“Economics” contained in Webster’s Dictionary, Justice Stevens replied that 
“the activities regulated by the CSA [were] quintessentially economic”646. 
Accordingly, since economic activity alludes to “the production, 
distribution and consumption of commodities”, banning the possession and 
manufacture of certain commodities fell within this definition. Therefore, by 
                                                 
643 Gonzales v Raich, 16 
644 Ibid, 18 
645 Ibid, 19 
646 Ibid, 23. 
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eliminating marijuana from the market, the CSA regulated activities having 
an economic nature. Further, the fact that respondents used marijuana for 
medical purposes was not a sufficient factor for distinguishing this class of 
activities from the general scheme of the CSA.  On the contrary, Congress 
had rational basis to believe that their inclusion was necessary to render the 
federal general regulatory scheme effective.  
 
4.-  The Lopez and Morrison Legacy after Raich. 
 
In Raich, the USSC overruled neither Lopez nor Morrison. Both 
cases remain good law. Unless Congress introduces a jurisdictional hook or 
demonstrates that its inclusion in a larger regulation of economic activity is 
necessary, a local activity not having an economic nature lies beyond the 
scope of the Commerce Clause. In addition, the presence or absence of 
congressional fact findings does not appear to alter this statement.  
 
Moreover, how extensively the definition of “economic activity” is 
coined remains decisive in defining the outer limits of congressional 
powers. However, since the majority in Lopez and Morrison failed to define 
this concept, Justices favouring Congress’ broad commercial powers 
subsequently profited from this shortcoming. Arguably, the definition 
provided in Raich appears to be sufficiently generous, so that it includes 
mere “possession”647. 
 
As for the regulation of local non-economic activities, it is not clear 
whether the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook is sufficient in itself to 
guarantee the constitutionality of a federal statute648. The rationale behind 
jurisdictional hooks is to confine the application of federal statutes to cases 
                                                 
647 By contrast dissenting Justices stated that this definition of economic activity “threatens 
to sweep all of the productive human activity into the federal regulatory reach”. Instead, 
economic activity should be identified with commercial activity. Thus, since Lopez 
recognised the non-commercial character of “possession”, they concluded that the CSA 
does not regulate an economic activity. 
648 TR STUCKEY, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting 
Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, (2006) 81 Notre Dame L. Rev., pp 2101-2144 
(indicating that, before Raich, many lower courts had held that the inclusion of a 
jurisdictional hook does not ensure the constitutionality of federal legislation).  
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where there is an important nexus with interstate commerce. Accordingly, 
jurisdictional hooks failing to constrain congressional powers may not be 
sufficient to safe a federal statute. For instance, lower courts were divided as 
to the constitutionality of Child Pornography Statutes649 criminalising the 
intentional possession of child pornography that had travelled “in the 
interstate or foreign commerce”. In United States v Maxwell, the 11th Circuit 
argued that the inclusion of this “in-commerce” hook did not guarantee that 
the regulated activities substantially affected interstate commerce650. 
However, the USSC remanded and vacated Maxwell, ordering its re-
examination in the light of Raich. Subsequently, the 11th Circuit reversed, 
holding that the regulated activity could be included in a larger regulation of 
an economic activity. Thus, there was not need to adjudicate on the 
sufficiency of the jurisdictional hook651.  
 
Indeed, why should Congress rely on jurisdictional hooks to 
guarantee the validity of federal legislation, when it can do so by catching 
local non-economic activities in a regulatory net?652 In this regard, Raich 
seems to welcome this strategy. The only requirement seems to be the 
presence of a “rational basis” demonstrating that the regulation of these 
activities is vital for the larger scheme. It follows that, when examining the 
connections between local non-economic activities and the larger scheme, 
the ruling in Raich supports a high level of deference to Congress. Further, 
this holding may encourage Congress to legislate without precision. As 
dissenting Justice O’Connor affirmed653, “[t]oday’s decision suggests that 
the federal regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce Clause 
challenge because Congress chose to act with an ambitious, all-
encompassing statute, rather than a piecemeal”. 
 
As Tushnet reckons, the federalist vision promoted by Rehnquist 
limited itself to describing the objective of having a Federal Government 
                                                 
649 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) 
650 United States v Maxwell, 386 F. 3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005) 
651 United States v Maxwell, 446 F. 3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2006) 
652 Stuckey, supra note 648, pp 2126-2127. 
653 Raich,  
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with limited powers, but he missed the opportunity to provide judicial 
enforceable standards654. This absence prevented the federal judiciary from 
erecting substantial limitations655 on the Commerce Clause, while giving 
room for manipulative use of precedent. Put differently, the ruling in Lopez 
can be read as a programmatic manifesto, which did not provide enough 
guidance for judicial obedience.  
 
C.-  The Necessary and Proper Clause: An alternative approach. 
 
Even if Congress lacks the power to regulate local non-economic 
activities under the Commerce Clause, it may still invoke the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as a valid constitutional authority. As a matter of fact, the 
USSC had already recognised this alternative in United States v Darby.  
 
As Marshall suggested in McCulloch v Maryland656, it would suffice 
for Congress to demonstrate that a federal statute contributes to making 
effective interstate commerce (“necessary”) and that it is consistent with the 
Constitution (“proper”). However, this clause cannot be interpreted as 
sweeping all state regulatory powers. For instance, Marshall himself 
declared that, under the pretext of executing its powers, Congress could not 
invoke this clause to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not 
instructed to (it)” 657. In the same way, he also posited that there must be an 
“obvious relation” between legislative means and constitutional ends658. 
Thus, the Necessary and Proper Clause covers neither pretextual legislation 
nor remoteness in the chain of cause659.  
 
                                                 
654 M TUSHNET, William Rehnquist’s Federalism, in BRADLEY (Eds), The Rehnquist 
Legacy, (Cambridge, CUP 2005), pp 187-204. 
655 RJ PUSHAW Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-
Revolution?, (2005) 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev., pp 879-941. (holding that the 
Lopez/Morrison revolution was quite modest, since the Court failed to identify judicial 
enforceable standards capable of introducing a coherent doctrine under the Commerce 
Clause) 
656 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
657 Ibid, 423 
658 Ibid, 409 
659 J BECK, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2002) Ill. L. 
Rev., pp 581-650 
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Bearing in mind that neither in Lopez nor in Morrison the USSC 
discussed the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause, could the 
latter have saved the GFSZA and the VAWA?  Concurring in Lopez, Justice 
Thomas replied in the negative, arguing that such a broad reading of this 
Clause would make various enumerated powers redundant660. 
Commentators also agree661. By rejecting the “costs of productivity and 
crime” arguments defended by the US Government, the Lopez Court 
rejected the federal regulation of activities bearing only remotely on the 
interstate commerce. The same applies to Morrison, where the USSC 
qualified the relationship between interstate commerce and combating 
gender motivated violence as “attenuated”662. Therefore, the GFSZA and 
the VAWA were just a pretext for Congress to regulate matters falling 
within the police powers of States.  
 
Moreover, while siding with the States in Lopez and Morrison, 
Justice Scalia supported the constitutionality of the CSA in Raich. However, 
by contrast to the majority, Scalia opined that the Commerce Clause is not 
in itself sufficient to regulate activities which, while having substantial 
effects upon interstate commerce, are not part of it. Instead, congressional 
powers derive from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thereunder, Congress 
may regulate all intrastate activities, whether economic or not, which are 
necessary to render the regulation of interstate commerce effective. It 
follows that, concerning non-economic activities (local possession of home-
grown marijuana), the question that arises is whether its regulation (its 
prohibition) is necessary to achieve the objectives (eradicating marijuana 
from the interstate commerce) Congress legitimately sought to attain. Scalia 
replied in the affirmative, noting that it was very difficult for the enforcing 
authorities to distinguish between home grown marijuana and marijuana 
purchased in the interstate market.  
 
                                                 
660 Lopez, Op cit, 587-89 (Thomas concurring) 
661 D CROWELL, Gonzales v Raich and the Development of Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence: Is the Necessary and Proper Clause the Perfect Drug?, (2006) 38 Rutgers L. 
Rev., 251-320 
662 Morrison, 612 
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However, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been “internalised” 
in the Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the USSC indicated that, in order to 
preserve the effectiveness of a federal general regulatory scheme, Congress 
may also incorporate local non-economic activities. The same was posited 
in Raich.. So, what is the added value of Scalia’s concurring vote? It is 
suggested that it provides an accurate solution to the federalist debate. 
Instead of navigating through the conundrums of Lopez, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause clearly flags up that Congress is approximating the outer 
boundaries of its powers. First, it escapes the formal dichotomy “economic / 
non-economic” activities. Secondly, the “necessity strand” of the doctrine 
introduces a “means-end” test, which allows a sufficient degree of 
congressional manoeuvre. Lastly, it would prevent Congress from relying 
on its enumerated powers as a pretext to enact unconstitutional legislation. 
To this effect, Gardbaum argues that “property” requires the means 
deployed to comply with the “Spirit of the Constitution”, part of which are 
federalism concerns663.  
 
II.-   The Principle of Attribution applied to Article 95 EC 
 
A.-  Article 95 EC (ex 100a EEC) and Titanium Dioxide 
 
Article 95 EC (ex 100a EEC) was introduced by the Single European 
Act 1986, with a view to ensuring the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market as define in Article 14 EC. By contrast to Article 94 EC, 
which was the original provision of the Treaty governing harmonization, 
Article 95 EC does not require unanimity, but qualify majority voting 
(QVM). Albeit fiscal matters, the free movement of persons and the 
protection of workers, Article 95 EC meant that positive integration would 
take place, even if some Member States raised dissenting voices. Fearing a 
substantial loss of their sovereignty, Member States introduced two 
safeguards when drafting Article 95 EC. Firstly, this provision may be relied 
                                                 
663 S GARDBAUM, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, (1995) 74 Tex. L. Rev., pp 795-
838. 
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upon “save where otherwise provided for in [the] Treaty”, that is, it has a 
residual character. Secondly, it introduces a derogation procedure for those 
Member States wishing to maintain in force their own national provisions, 
or adopt new measures in the light of new scientific evidence. However, 
despite these two safeguards, the Community legislature started a centripetal 
trend, leading to a proliferation of Community measures664.  
 
Additionally, in the light of Titanium Dioxide665, the ECJ allied itself 
with an expansive use of Article 95 EC, by embracing a wide interpretation 
of the concept of “internal market”. In this case, the Commission challenged 
Directive 89/428/EEC666 on the harmonization of programmes for reduction 
of pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide industry, alleging 
that it had wrongly been adopted under Article 130s EEC (now 175(4) EC). 
Instead, the applicant contended it should have been adopted under Article 
95 EC. Whereas Article 130s required unanimity and thus, protected 
Member States to the maximum, the Commission sought to push forward 
the integrationist momentum.. The ECJ found that, since the Directive 
required titanium dioxide industries to adopt programmes concerning the 
treatment of waste, production costs were rendered largely uniform and 
thus, conditions of competition too. Hence, the Directive equally aimed to 
eliminate pollution and to improve the conditions of competition in that 
industry. Accordingly, the ECJ held that the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market would not be achieved by solely removing obstacles 
to trade, but also by eliminating distortions of competition. Thus, reliance 
on Article 130s as well as on 95 EC was correctly founded. However, taking 
the view that recourse to dual legal basis was not possible, the ECJ opted for 
Article 95 EC, holding that this provision already compelled institutions to 
adopt a high level of environmental protection. Therefore, the Directive was 
annulled.  
 
                                                 
664 250 out of 282 Proposals put forward by the Commission were approved by 1992, most 
of which had as their legal basis Article 100a (now 95 EC). See COM (92) 383 
665 Case 300/89, Commission v Council, (Titanium Dioxide), [1991] ECR I-2867. 
666 OJ L 201, 14.7.1989, p. 56–60 
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Titanium Dioxide expanded the scope of Article 95 EC in two ways. 
Substantially, the ECJ held that the elimination of distortions of competition 
is necessary for the establishment or functioning of the internal market. 
Even in the absence of obstacles to trade, recourse to harmonization remains 
possible.667 Systematically, on an equal footing, the ECJ seemed to prefer 
Article 95 EC to other horizontal treaty provisions, such as Article 130s.  
 
Further, the ECJ expanded again the interpretation of this treaty 
provision, by holding that recourse to Article 95 was not conditioned upon 
“approximating national laws”. On the contrary, where necessary, it can 
“lay down measures relating to a specific product or class of products”668. 
 
As a result, though the ECJ dismissed several applications 
supporting Article 95 EC as legal basis to the detriment of other treaty 
provisions669, until 2000, no challenge succeeded in sticking down 
Community legislation adopted under this treaty provisions670. Arguably, 
for the sake of achieving the internal market programme launched by the 
Commission, the ECJ had decided to follow a pro-integrationist judicial 
restraint. Article 95 EC was conceived as an unstoppable vacuum of 
national power. Had the ECJ continued this line of reasoning, it would have 
been very difficult to argue that Community powers were governed by the 
principle of attribution671. In fact, all seemed to indicate that Article 95 EC 
had to be read as a general source of power to regulate the market672.  
 
Reacting against this “judicial-accomplice” erosion of national 
sovereignty, the drafters of the Treaty of the European Union introduced 
                                                 
667 Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-350/92, Spain v Council, [1995] ECR I- 1985. Para. 45 
668 Case C-359/92, Germany v Council, [1994] ECR I-3685. 
669 C-155/91, Commission v Council ('Waste 1) [1993] ECR I-940; Case C-187/93, 
Parliament v Council, (Waste 2) [1994] ECR I-2857 (favouring recourse to Article 130s 
EEC) , Case C-209/97, Commission v Council, [1994] ECR I-3681 (holding that the 
Council was right in having chosen Article 308 EC), Case C-269/97, Commission v 
Council, (Beef Labelling) [2000] ECR I-2257 (upholding recourse to Article 37 EC) 
670 Cases C-359/92, Op. cit. and C-350/92, Op. cit. 
671 J WEILER and J. LOCKHART, "Taking Rights Seriously': the European Court and its 
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence", (1995) 32 CML Rev., pp 51 
672 R BARENTS, The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of 
Community Legislation, (1993) 30 CML Rev., pp 85-109. (alleging that the principle of 
attribution was in decline after Titanium Dioxide) 
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Article 5 EC, according to which, when exercising its legislative powers, the 
Community is bound by three constitutional principles, namely the 
principles of attribution, subsidiarity and proportionality. In the same way, 
national courts also showed their concern about the competences of the 
Community being unlimited673. Perhaps taking note of these warnings, in 
Tobacco Advertising I674, the ECJ changed the dynamics of integration and, 
for the first time, quashed a Community measure adopted under Article 95 
EC. The subsection that follows tries to explain this case and its progeny, to 
conclude that, though taking the issue of competence seriously, the ECJ 
commits errors similar to the ones of USSC. 
 
B.-  The Tobacco Saga in three acts 
 
1.-  Act I. – Tobacco Advertising I 
 
With a view to eliminating obstacles to the free movement of 
advertising media (other than television) and distortions of competition 
among advertisers, those benefiting from sponsorship of tobacco products 
and tobacco manufacturers; the Council and Parliament relied on Articles 
47(2), 55 and 95 EC, as legal basis, to adopt Directive 98/43/EC675. In 
principle, this Directive prohibited all forms of advertising and sponsorship 
of tobacco products in the Community. Nevertheless, its Article 3 allowed 
the advertising of brand names already used in good faith for both tobacco 
products and other types of goods or services. In the same way, the 
Directive excluded from its scope communications between professionals in 
the tobacco trade, advertising in sales outlets or in publications published 
and printed in third countries but not principally intended for the 
Community market. Moreover, Article 5 of the Directive did not preclude 
                                                 
673 See the ruling of the German Constitutional Court in Brunner v European Union Treaty, 
[1994] 1 CMLR 57. (where it subtly warned the ECJ that if it persisted in failing to police 
the boundaries of Community competences, national courts will have legitimate grounds to 
take over) 
674 Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I ), [2000] 
ECR I-8419 
675 OJ L 213, 30.7.1998, p. 9–12 
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Member States from issuing stricter measures in relation to the advertising 
and sponsorship of tobacco products, that is, the Directive only laid down 
minimal harmonization.  
 
Germany, which had voted against the adoption of the Directive, put 
forward several pleas contesting its validity. On the one hand, the applicant 
argued that the Community institutions had circumvented the prohibition 
laid down in Article 152 EC, according to which the Community lacks 
legislative powers in the realm of public health. On the other hand, the 
Directive did not contribute to the establishment or improvement of the 
internal market. Firstly, advertising of tobacco products had only an 
insignificant impact on intra-Community trade. Secondly, the applicant 
argued that, instead of promoting the advertising of tobacco products, the 
Directive negated the exercise of this economic freedom. Finally, the 
applicant objected the transposition of the case-law of Article 28, in so far 
as it prohibited minimal obstacles to trade.  
 
As the USSC did in Lopez, the ECJ began by stating that, in 
pursuance with Article 5 EC, Article 95 EC cannot be read as vesting upon 
the Community legislature “a general power to regulate the internal 
market”. Neither mere disparities between national rules nor abstract 
obstacles to the free movement can lead to the adoption of Community 
legislation under Article 95 EC676. Next, the ECJ rejected that Article 152 
EC precluded all Community measures from having an impact on the 
protection of public health. Provided that the contested Directive fulfilled 
the conditions laid down in Articles 47(2), 55 and 95 EC, the fact that the 
Community legislature had opted for highly protecting human health was 
welcomed. Indeed, the ECJ pointed out that it was Article 95 EC itself 
which compels Community Institutions to take into account human health 
when enacting harmonizing measures thereunder. Thus, the validity of the 
Directive could not be questioned under public health considerations alone, 
but as to whether it was permissible to rely on the aforementioned treaty 
                                                 
676 Tobacco Advertising I, 83-84 
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provisions as legal basis677. In this regard, the ECJ verified whether the 
contested Directive contributed to eliminating [a] obstacles to free 
movement or [b] distortions of competition. 
 
As for the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods 
and freedom to provide services, the ECJ drew a distinction between static 
and dynamic advertising media. While recognising that the choice of Article 
95 EC was legitimate with a view to ensuring the free movement of 
dynamic advertising media (e.g. news papers or magazines), the ECJ 
concluded that this was not the case for advertising media located in hotels, 
restaurants, cafes or cinemas (e.g. posters, parasols, ashtrays)678. It is true 
that not all provisions contained in the Directive had to contribute to 
eliminating obstacles to free movement, as long as they were “necessary to 
ensure that certain prohibitions imposed in pursuit of that purpose are not 
circumvented”, the ECJ wrote679. However, it briefly indicated that this was 
not the case. Anyhow, as AG Fennelly observed, traders complying with the 
Directive were not exempted from stricter rules laid down by the Member 
States under Article 5. Thus, even if obstacles to the free movement of 
dynamic advertising media were real or at least potential, the absence of a 
“free movement clause” did not guarantee their removal. As a result, the 
ECJ concluded that the Directive did not eliminate obstacle to free 
movement. 
 
Regarding the elimination of distortions of competition, quoting 
Titanium Dioxide, the ECJ held that distortions had to be “appreciable”. 
The ECJ conceded that advertising agencies and producers of advertising 
products would be economically favoured by States imposing fewer 
restrictions on the advertising of tobacco products. Consequently, these 
disparities would distort sound competition. However, by contrast to 
differences in the production cost as it was the case in Titanium Dioxide, 
these distortions were “remote and indirect”, that is, not appreciable. 
                                                 
677 Ibid,  88 
678 Ibid, 98-99 
679 Ibid, 100 
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Although the relocation of sports events, resulting from national disparities 
concerning their sponsorship by tobacco products, could give rise to 
appreciable distortions of competition, this finding did not justify an 
“outright prohibition of advertising of the kind imposed by the Directive”.  
 
To sum up, the ECJ conceded that the Community had competences 
to regulate certain forms of advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. 
Nonetheless, in the light of the general nature of the prohibition, the ECJ 
opted for annulling the Directive in its entirety.  
 
From Tobacco Advertising I, it seems that the ECJ tries to enforce 
the principle of attribution (or enumerated powers). As the USSC held for 
the Commerce Clause, the ECJ ruled that Article 95 EC cannot be read as a 
“carte blanche”680. It is not an unlimited source of Community power, but it 
is constrained to constitutional internal and external limits.  
 
Internally, in order to recourse to Article 95 EC, the Community 
measure must contribute to eliminating “real or potential obstacle to free 
movement” or alternatively, “appreciable distortions of competition”. In 
accordance with the ECJ, static advertising media cannot be considered as 
an obstacle to free movement. In this regard, if one considers that 
advertising is a selling arrangement681 and that prohibiting the advertising of 
tobacco products in public places does not discriminate against imports682, it 
seems that “non-discriminatory selling arrangements” fall outside the scope 
of Article 95 EC. It seems logical to believe that what is not considered an 
obstacle to Community trade under Article 28 EC cannot justify the choice 
of Article 95 EC. Arguably, Tobacco Advertising I introduces a parallelism 
between Article 28 EC and 95 EC683. The Community Institutions may not 
                                                 
680 Opinion AG Fennelly, Para. 89 
681 Cases C-292/92, Hünermund, [1993] ECR I-6787, C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] 
ECR I-179 
682 Hünermund (holding that German rule prohibiting pharmacies from advertising para-
pharmaceutical products outside their premises was not discriminatory, consequently  
falling outside Article 28 EC) 
683 J USHER, note on Case C-376/98, (2001) 38 CML Rev., pp 1531-1539 See also A 
DASHWOOD, The Limits of European Community Powers, (1996) 21 E. L. Rev., pp 113-
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expand the scope of the free movement of goods beyond the limits set-out in 
Keck. Therefore, harmonization would focus on national measures which, 
while falling within the scope of Article 28 EC, can be justified under 
Article 30 EC or under mandatory requirements, but nonetheless, hinder the 
completion of the internal market684. As recognised by the case-law of the 
ECJ685, Community legislation would then focus on construing the degree of 
discretion enjoyed by the Member States when invoking the protection of 
general interests. However, following this approach, several pieces of 
Community legislation in the field of consumer protection or contract law 
would be “ultra vires”686. Still, the ECJ simultaneously introduced an 
exemption from the overlapping interpretation of Articles 28 and 95 EC. 
Activities not considered obstacles to the free movement can be harmonized 
in so far as they are necessary to avoid the circumvention of the aim the 
Community legislature seeks to achieve. This exemption echoes the USSC 
in Lopez when holding that local non-economic state activities may be 
federally regulated in order for the general economic scheme not to be 
undercut. Unfortunately, the ECJ did not develop this point further, living 
the door open for different interpretations.  
 
As for “appreciable” distortion of competition, the ECJ seems 
willing to introduce a de minimis test, along the lines of the one accepted 
under competition law. This would seem at odds with the case-law 
pertaining to the free movement, where the ECJ has consistently refused to 
endorse a de minimis rule687. Distortions on the production costs are 
                                                                                                                            
128 (suggesting that the proposal of the Commission on the Tobacco Directive was 
misconceived in the light of Keck) 
684 This is precisely how the Commission intended to use Article 28 EC. See The 
Commission White Paper Completing the Single Market, COM (85) 310. 
685 Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, [1995] ECR I-2553, paragraph 18, Case C-1/96 
Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251, paragraph 47. 
686 SLOT, Harmonisation, (1996) 21 E. L. Rev., pp 378; K MORTELMANS, The 
relationship between the Treaty Rules and Community Measures for the Establishment and 
Functioning of the Internal Market- Towards a Concordance Rule” (2002) 39 CML Rev., pp 
1326 (casting doubts as to whether there is room for harmonization outside the limits set by 
Keck). W Van GERVEN, Harmonization of Private Law: Do we Need it?, (2004) 41 CML 
Rev., pp 505. 
687 For a critical opinion, see L GORMLEY, Competition and Free Movement: Is the 
internal market the same as the Common Market?, (2002) 13 EBL Rev., pp 517-522 
(arguing that the notion of “internal market” of Article 95 EC only aims at eliminating 
obstacles to free movement. Conversely, the notion of “common market” laid down in 
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sufficiently important to trigger harmonization, so are disparities in 
sponsoring sports events. On the contrary, divergent national regulatory 
frameworks on the advertising of tobacco products are not. But why is that? 
The ECJ did not provide an exact answer; it only briefly highlighted the 
differences with Titanium Dioxide. 
 
Externally, in relation to activities complying with the internal limits 
of Article 95 EC, the ECJ examined the validity of the contested Directive 
under the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 5 EC. Firstly, 
since potential contradictions among national advertising rules of tobacco 
products constituted obstacles to the free movement of dynamic media, the 
ECJ went on to assess whether the Directive was suitable for eliminating 
this obstacle. It replied in the negative. Owing to the lack of a free 
movement clause, the Directive was manifestly inappropriate to ensure the 
free movement of dynamic media. Secondly, as for appreciable distortions 
of competition arising from disparities in sport sponsorship rules, the 
Community had gone beyond what it was required to counter this obstacle. 
An outright ban on all types of sponsorship by tobacco products excessively 
eroded the competence of the Member States. Thus, the ECJ applied the two 
limbs of the principle of proportionality, stressing its decisive importance in 
balancing Community and Member State legislative powers. 
 
As a result, Tobacco Advertising I encapsulates the ECJ’s efforts to 
enforce constitutional limits upon the Community legislature. Thus, as 
Tridimas suggests, it is an activist judgement because it empowers the ECJ 
vis-à-vis the Community political institutions, but decelerates the process of 
integration688. However, by leaving important questions unresolved, the ECJ 
                                                                                                                            
Article 94 EC also includes distortions of competition. He also observes that “competition 
analysis does not assist the removal of national barriers to trade within the Community 
trough negative integration”. In any case, the author indicates that when seeking to 
eliminate distortions to competition, in the light of Tobacco Advertising I, the Community 
legislature will be required to include an assessment demonstrating their appreciable 
effects). 
688 G and T TRIDIMAS, The European Court of Justice and the Annulment of the Tobacco 
Advertisement Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public Health?, (2002) 
14:2  Eur J Law Econ, pp 171-183. (supporting the ruling of the Court from a economic 
efficiency point of view) 
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repeated analytical mistakes similar to the ones of the USSC in Lopez. It did 
not indicate to what extent the scope of Article 28 and 95 EC overlap in 
relation to “the notion of obstacles to trade” and, failed to provide a precise 
definition of “appreciable” distortions of competition. Nor did it not 
elucidate whether, once the existence of an obstacle to trade was proved, the 
insertion of a “free movement clause” would render Community legislation 
compatible with the principle of proportionality. 
 
2.-  Act II. – BAT, Arnold André and Swedish Match.  
 
In BAT689, two producers of tobacco products instituted proceedings against 
the intention of the UK Government to transpose Directive 2001/37/EC690 
into national law. Adopted under Articles 95 and 133 EC, the Directive 
introduced maximum tar, nicotine and carbon dioxide yields of cigarettes. It 
also imposed labelling requirements regarding warnings for health as well 
as indications of yields, while banning descriptions suggesting that a 
particular tobacco product is less harmful to health (e.g. mild, light). Article 
3 extended the aforementioned maximum yield to cigarettes produced in the 
Community, but intended for export. Finally, Article 13 of the Directive 
precluded Member States from adopting additional requirements against 
traders complying with its provisions. On the merits, the ECJ first examined 
whether the Directive was compatible with Articles 95 and 133 EC. In 
recalling Tobacco Advertising I, the ECJ held that reliance on Article 95 EC 
was conditioned upon finding that the contested measure contributed to 
eliminating obstacles to trade or distortions of competition. To this effect, in 
quoting Keck, the ECJ held that disparities in the national legislations 
concerning the composition or labelling of tobacco products “are in 
themselves liable […] to constitute obstacles to the free movement of 
goods”691. In addition, taking the view that Member States were 
increasingly conscious of the danger to health caused by tobacco products 
                                                 
689 Case C-491/01, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American 
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [2002] ECR I-11453 
690 OJ L 194, 18.7.2001, p. 26–35 
691 Ibid, 64 
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and that the already existing Community legislation harmonizing maximum 
yield tars and presentation of tobacco products only lay down minimal 
requirements, in the absence of the contested Directive, nothing prevented 
state legislatures from adopting stricter measures. Thus, the ECJ concluded 
that the Directive tackled obstacles to free movement. Besides, by contrast 
to the directive annulled in Tobacco Advertising I, in inserting a “free 
movement clause”, Directive 2001/37/EC guaranteed that tobacco products 
produced in conformity with its provisions would move freely throughout 
the Community.  
 
Furthermore, claimants put forward two arguments contesting the validity of 
the Directive in the light of the principle of proportionality. On the one 
hand, in banning the use of certain descriptors, the Community legislator 
had excessively interfered with their rights. In their view, requiring the 
display of tar, nicotine and carbon dioxide levels in the packaging sufficed 
to ensure that consumers were objectively informed. In the same way, it 
would have been preferable the adoption of provisions governing the use of 
descriptors or at least, safeguarding established denominations protected by 
trade marks. On the other hand, they alleged that prohibiting the 
manufacture of cigarettes for export not complying with the Directive was 
inadequate to prevent the illegal re-importation into the Community, owing 
to the fact that most of the illegal cigarettes are produced in third countries. 
This risk would be better addressed by reinforcing import controls. 
However, the ECJ rejected both arguments. Firstly, it stated that the 
Community enjoys broad discretion when adopting policy measures, which 
entail complex assessments. Accordingly, the role of the judiciary is limited 
to examining that the Community has acted within those bounds, that is, that 
the measures adopted are not “manifestly inappropriate having regard to the 
objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue”692. Secondly, 
the ECJ stated that the Community was right in considering that the 
descriptors laid down in Article 7 could be misleading and consequently, it 
decided to forbid them in order to ensure that consumers were well aware of 
                                                 
692 Ibid, 123 
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the toxicity of tobacco products. Finally, though Article 3 of the Directive 
did not in itself ensure that the importation of illegal cigarettes into the 
Community would be prevented, the ECJ stated that it contributed to this 
objective. Consequently, the ECJ replied to the referring court that there 
were no factors for annulling the Directive. 
 
 Two years later, in Arnold André693, a German company was banned 
from importing tobacco for oral use called “Snus” from Sweden. Likewise, 
in Swedish Match694, the Swedish producer of “Snus” challenged the 
validity of the decision of British authorities denying the marketing of this 
product in the UK. Both decisions were taken on the basis of the national 
law implementing Article 8 Directive 2001/37/EC which, prohibited the 
market of tobacco for oral use in the Community. Article 8 also indicated 
that, in pursuance with Article 151 of its Act of Accession, Sweden was 
excluded from this prohibition. The German and the Swedish Company 
challenged this decision before the Administrative Court of Minden and the 
High Court of England and Wales respectively. The latter decided then to 
suspend proceedings, while asking to the ECJ whether Article 8 complied 
with Articles 95 EC, 28 EC and the principle of proportionality. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, when deciding on the compatibility of Article 8 of 
Directive 2001/37/EC with Article 95 EC, the ECJ limited itself to recalling 
Tobacco Advertising I and, especially BAT. It simply repeated that, since 
some Member States had prohibited the selling of tobacco products for oral 
use, “those prohibitions […] contributed to the heterogeneous development 
of that market and were therefore such as to constitute obstacles to the free 
movement of goods”695. As for the principle of proportionality, the German 
company claimed that Article 8 did not take into account recent scientific 
information. The ECJ disagreed, holding that no scientific information 
proved that tobacco for oral use presented no danger for human health. In 
particular, the ECJ considered that there were no alternative measures 
                                                 
693 Case C-434/02, Arnold André, [2004] ECR I-11825 
694 Case C-210/03, Swedish Match, [2004] ECR I-11893 
695 Arnold André, Op cit., Para. 39;  Swedish Match, Op. Cit. , Para. 38 
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capable of being as effective as a complete ban, since they would allow 
these products to gain a place in the market. Further, the German company 
argued that Article 8 of the Directive was in breach of Article 28 EC. The 
ECJ concurred in this point with the applicant. It, nevertheless, held that 
Article 8 was justified on the ground that it protected the health and life of 
humans, as provided by Article 30 EC. Finally, after holding that the 
Community legislature had complied with its obligation to state reasons, the 
ECJ ruled that Article 8 of the Directive complied with the EC Treaty. 
 
Although the outcome in BAT, Arnold André and Swedish Match 
favours the Community, one must stress that the ECJ applied the rationale it 
defended in Tobacco Advertising I. Reliance on Article 95 EC is 
conditioned upon [1] finding obstacles to free movement or appreciable 
distortions of competition and at the same time, [2] complying with the 
principle of proportionality. Furthermore, BAT seems to partially clarify 
Tobacco Advertising I. It reinforces the argument supporting a parallelism 
between Article 28 EC and 95 EC. In fact, the ECJ referred to Keck in order 
to qualify national disparities concerning composition and presentation of 
tobacco products as obstacles to trade. Therefore, product requirements can 
be harmonized under Article 95 EC. Likewise, the ruling in Arnold André 
suggests that positive harmonization must comply with Article 28 EC or be 
justified under Article 30 EC. A total ban of a product, that is, a quantitative 
restriction imposed by the Community is an obstacle to trade and 
consequently, it can only be upheld in so far as it is justified under Article 
30 EC.  Accordingly, in relation to the notion of “obstacles to trade”, the 
scope of Article 28 and 95 EC overlap. To this effect, the Dansonville 
Formula and Keck case-law may apply mutatis mutandis to positive 
integration. However, one can rebut this reading of BAT, Arnold André and 
Swedish Match. Simply because the ECJ clearly stated that product 
requirements fall within the scope of Article 95 EC, it does not follow inter 
alia that non-discriminatory selling arrangements are out. Put differently, an 
“inverse a fortiori” argument is not entirely convincing. From BAT, it can 
only be inferred that Article 28 EC and 95 EC converge at eliminating 
national measures, which unless justified, are incompatible with the internal 
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market. Moreover, it appears that introducing “free movement clauses” 
brings Community legislation in line with the principle of proportionality. 
This raises questions as to whether Article 95 EC leaves room for minimum 
harmonization696.  
 
3.-  Act III. - Tobacco advertising II 697 
 
As a result of the annulment of Directive 98/43/EC, the Community adopted 
Directive 2003/33/EC698, on the basis again of Articles 47(2), 55 and 95 EC. 
The new Directive also regulated advertising and sponsorship in respect of 
tobacco products in media other than television. Article 3 of the Directive 
prohibited the advertising of tobacco products in the press and other printed 
publications, with the exception of publications exclusively intended for 
professionals in the tobacco trade, or printed and published in third 
countries and not principally intended for the Community market. It also 
extended this prohibition to the information society services (e.g. Internet). 
Further, Article 4 prohibited the advertising of tobacco products in radio 
programs, as well as their sponsorship by tobacco manufacturers or 
distributors. Article 5 banned the sponsorship of events or activities taking 
place in several Member States or having cross-border implications by 
tobacco products. The free distribution of tobacco products in these events 
or activities was also prohibited. Finally, Article 8 of the Directive laid 
down a “free movement clause”. In trying to repeat the previous success 
obtained, Germany challenged the validity of Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Directive. Firstly, the applicant contented that these Articles neither 
removed obstacles to the free movement nor appreciable distortions of 
competition. Germany alleged that 99.9% of press and other publications 
were marketed only regional or locally. Thus, the obstacles to their free 
                                                 
696 P ROTT, Minimum Harmonization For the Completion of the Internal Market? The 
Example of Consumer Sales Law, (2003) 40 CML Rev., pp 1107-1135 (affirming that a 
“too low degree of harmonization” would not contribute to the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market”. To this effect, in the realm of private law, e.g. 
consumer protection, he suggests that minimum harmonization can only take place outside 
the core provisions of Directives adopted under Article 95 EC)  
697 Case C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council, [2006] ECR I-11573 
698 OJ L 152, 20.6.2003, p. 16–19 
 209 
movement that the Community legislature was seeking to eliminate were 
only marginal. In the same way, “other publication” could allude to a wide 
range of publications targeted only to local people. (e.g. posters, telephone 
directories, leaflets…). Additionally, there was no distortion of competition, 
owing to the fact that there was no competitive relationship between local 
publications in one Member State and those in other Member States. 
Germany also put into question that, in extending the advertising ban to 
information societies, prohibiting the advertising in “paper” media would 
not be circumvented. In fact, since Internet operates worldwide, websites of 
third countries could advertise tobacco products. Moreover, as for radio 
advertising, Germany argued that radio programs take place locally. Finally, 
as it did previously, Germany insisted that the Directive did not seek to 
contribute to the functioning or establishment of the internal market, but to 
protect public health. Consequently, it was contrary to Article 152(4) (2) 
EC. However, the ECJ immediately disagreed. In recalling its previous case-
law, it repeated that, in so far as the Directive eliminated obstacles to trade 
or removed distortions of competition, the Community legislation was not 
prevented from protecting public health. On the contrary, Article 152 and 95 
required the Community institutions to take into account the protection of 
public health.  
 
The ECJ went on to acknowledge the existence of disparities 
between the Member States in relation to the advertising and sponsorship of 
tobacco products. Indeed, whereas several Member States allowed the 
advertising of tobacco products under certain conditions, others envisaged 
even greater restrictions. Besides, these disparities were not only real, but 
also increasing. In this sense, the ECJ observed that these disparities 
impeded the free movement of press and other publications, and freedom to 
provide advertising services thereof in three ways. Firstly, they impeded 
market access to imports more than they did so to domestic products. 
Imported publications would have to comply with the rules laid down by the 
home and the host State, imposing a double burden. Secondly, they also 
prevented services providers from offering space in their publications to 
advertisers located in different Member States. Finally, the ECJ rejected the 
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de minimis rule advanced by Germany. “Even if only by way of exception or 
in small quantities”, the previous findings remained valid regarding 
publications primarily distributed locally. Thus, after noting that the same 
conclusions applied to advertising of tobacco products in radio programs 
and information societies, it held that disparities in the national laws 
constituted obstacle to trade, as required by Article 95 EC.  
 
The ECJ proceeded then to examine whether Article 3 and 4 of the 
contested Directive actually contributed to eliminating these obstacles. As it 
could be foreseen from its ruling in Tobacco Advertising I, the ECJ held that 
a ban on advertising of tobacco products facilitated the free movement of 
printed media and the provision of radio and information society services. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a free movement clause guaranteed that once 
publications or radio programs complied with the Directive, they are free to 
move or broadcast in the Community. Additionally, the ECJ held that 
reliance on Article 95 EC was not conditioned upon the existence of an 
interstate element for every situation covered by the Community measure 
adopted thereunder, in so far as it generally contributed to the functioning 
and establishment of the internal market. 
 
As for the principle of proportionality, Germany argued that the 
prohibition broadly drafted in Articles 3 and 4 was contrary to the freedom 
of press, in so far as it restricted the revenue of press products. Moreover, it 
alleged that an exemption should have been granted for press media locally 
distributed. Nevertheless, the ECJ took a different view. It held that, though 
freedom of press was recognised as a general principle of EC law, this 
fundamental right could be proportionally and rationally limited by public 
interests. Since the Directive facilitated the free movement of press media, 
while ensuring a high protection of human health, the ECJ stated that the 
solution adopted by the Community legislature was not manifestly 
inappropriate. Further, in relation to publications targeting a regional or 
local market, the ECJ ruled that there were not less restrictive options 
available. Indeed, granting an exemption would have rendered extremely 
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difficult to distinguish between the exempted publications and the ones 
violating the Directive. As a result, the ECJ dismissed the application. 
 
A priori and as all sequels, Tobacco Advertising II leaves the reader 
with a “déjà-vu” impression. In Tobacco Advertising I, the ECJ hinted that it 
would not oppose the harmonization of “dynamic advertising media”, such 
as new papers, journals and magazines699. As the ECJ pointed out in both 
cases, disparities among national laws could obstruct the free movement of 
these goods. This was precisely what the Community legislator did, when 
adopting Directive 2003/33/EC. Indeed, having learned from the mistakes of 
the past, the Community legislator included a free movement clause, and 
limited the ban on sponsorship by tobacco products to events having cross-
border implications. Moreover, extending the prohibition to radio programs 
and information societies not only seems reasonable, but it could be 
considered as completing the legislative framework initiated by Directive 
89/552/EEC700 prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products in order to 
promote the free broadcasting of television programs. In the same way, the 
ECJ seems to embrace a parallelism between Articles 28 and 95 EC 
regarding the concept of “obstacles to trade”. The Opinion of AG Leger 
develops this point further. He posited that, even if qualified as selling 
arrangements; the ban on advertising would discriminate against imports, 
consequently falling within the scope of Article 28 EC. Thus, AG Leger 
appears to support that what are considers obstacles to trade under Article 
28 EC, are also obstacles under Article 95 EC. Thus, Directive 2003/33/EC 
can be read as the codification of Tobacco Advertising I.  
 
However, in examining the existence of obstacles to the freedom to 
provide radio and Internet services, the ECJ limited itself to indicating that, 
in the view of the “increasing public awareness”, it was likely for future 
barriers to emerge. Consequently, the ECJ set the probability of new 
obstacles at such a low level that it thwarted the accepted internal limits of 
                                                 
699 Tobacco Advertising I, Para 98  
700 OJ L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23–30 
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Article 95 EC701. Indeed, it appears that the ECJ incurred into an oxymoron. 
How can mere disparities among national rules not be enough to invoke 
Article 95 EC, while “potential” obstacles are? Therefore, as the Raich did 
when defining “economic activities”, the ECJ also appears to follow a broad 
definition of activities to be regulated at a central level. Obstacles to trade 
include not only “actual”, but also “prospective” barriers. 
 
C.-  Article 308 EC: a “Scalia-like” alternative?  
 
One may wonder whether the Directive annulled in Tobacco 
Advertising I could have been adopted under Article 308 EC. This treaty 
provision enables the Community to adopt measures necessary for attaining 
objectives of the treaty where no other specific provision can be used. 
However, as the US experience demonstrates, Article 308 cannot be read as 
circumventing the principle of attribution. In its Opinion 2/94, the ECJ ruled 
that Article 308 may not modify the “general framework of the treaty”, that 
is, it cannot amount to a treaty amendment702. In the same way, it is also 
suggested that this provision is framed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality as provided by Article 5 EC703.  
Coming back to the question, I would suggest a negative reply. 
Firstly, the unanimity rule would render politically impossible the use of 
this treaty provision where a Member States votes against the Directive. 
Secondly, one could argue that Article 308 could still be invoked to purse 
treaty objectives outside the realm of the internal market704. For example, 
the Directive could contribute “to the attainment of a high level of health 
protection”705. Nevertheless, this argument is difficult to reconcile with 
Article 152 EC which expressly excludes “any harmonization of the laws” 
                                                 
701 M LUDWIGS, Note on Case C-380/03, (2007) 44 CML Rev., pp1159-1176 
702 Advisory Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759. 
703 R SCHUTZE, Organized Change towards an “Even Closer Union”: Article 308 EC and 
the Limits to the Community’s Legislative Competence, (2003) 22 YEL, pp 79-116 
704 This would nevertheless appear to run counter the wording of Article 308 EC, which 
limits its application to situations “in the course of the operation of the common market”. 
However, this contextual limitation played no role in the case-law of the ECJ. See Schutze, 
op cit, 88-89. Besides, the new Article 352 TFEU finally abandons it.  
705 Article 3 (1) (p) EC 
 213 
designed to protect and improve human health706. Thirdly, due to its residual 
character, Article 308 EC can only be relied upon if it harmonizes beyond 
the bounds of Article 95 EC. Accordingly, this provision could be invoked 
in order to cover activities being neither obstacle to the free movement nor 
causing distortions of competition but if left-unregulated, they would render 
harmonization ineffective. Nevertheless, just like in the US Commerce 
Clause, Article 95 EC has also “internalised” the regulation of these 
activities707. Finally, admitting that Article 28 EC defines the outer-limits of 
Article 95 EC; could Article 308 EC be invoked to harmonize non-
discriminatory selling arrangements not causing appreciable distortions of 
competition? This would involve two opposite understandings of the 
internal market, namely one limited to removing obstacles to trade, the other 
exercising a general regulatory power over economic matters. Nevertheless, 
since the Community is not vested with a plenary power to regulate the 
market, Article 308 cannot be relied upon. 
III.-   Enumerated Powers Compared 
 
A.-  Can the Community criminalise the possession of cannabis under 
Article 95 EC? 
 
It appears that the width of the Commerce Clause is broader than the one 
of Article 95 EC. Selling arrangements involve local economic activities 
and consequently, they can be subjected to the aggregation principle laid 
down in Wickard. Thus, Congress would have no problems in regulating 
tobacco advertising even for static media.  As a matter of fact, Congress has 
done so, by approving the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act708. On the contrary, it is difficulty to see how either prohibiting gun 
possession near schools or creating civil actions against gendered motivated 
violence could contribute to eliminating “obstacles to trade” or “appreciable 
distortions of competition”.  
 
                                                 
706 Article 352 (3) TFEU excludes the “flexibility clause” from areas where the Treaty 
prohibits harmonization.  
707 Tobacco Advertising I, para 100; BAT, op cit, para 82 
708 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 
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Raich is somehow different. The USSC believed that imposing criminal 
penalties for possession of home-grown marijuana for therapeutic use would 
smooth the eradication of this commodity from the interstate market. Could 
the EC legislator adopt an analogue measure to the CSA? In my view, the 
EC legislator could prohibit the marketing of marijuana. Indeed, in the light 
of Swedish Match and Arnold Andre, for the ECJ to reach this outcome it 
would suffice to swap the ban on “oral tobacco” for a ban on “cannabis”. 
The ban on marketing cannabis could be regarded as eliminating the 
opposite national views towards its legalisation709, which lead to 
“heterogeneous development of that market such as to constitute an obstacle 
to free movement”710.  
 
However, prohibiting the possession of home-grown commodities raises 
some questions. It would be difficult to see how home-grown commodities 
for self-consumption could be an “obstacle to free movement”, since they 
never entered the market in the first place. Perhaps, the answer lies in the 
alternative argument posited by Justice Stevens in Raich, whereby 
regulating local non-economic activities is justified in order to prevent the 
general scheme of the CSA from being undercut. This line of reasoning has 
been recognised by the ECJ in Paragraph 100 of Tobacco Advertising I. The 
ECJ held that activities not being obstacles to trade can be nevertheless 
harmonized, provided that they are necessary to “ensure that certain 
prohibitions in pursuit of that purpose are not circumvented”. Would that 
imply that the Community legislator is entitled to include activities not 
being obstacles to trade (home-grown marijuana for self-consumption) with 
a view to ensuring the effectiveness of a broad regulatory scheme (its 
eradication)? Although in Tobacco Advertising I the ECJ did not elaborate 
further on this point, a close reading of BAT would suggest an affirmative 
reply711. There, the extension of labelling and packaging requirements to 
cigarettes intended solely for exportation to third countries was not 
                                                 
709 Take the extreme examples of Sweden and the Netherlands. See C CHATWIN, Drug 
Policy Developments within the European Union. The Destabilizing Effects of Dutch and 
Swedish Drug Policies, (2003) 43 Brit. J. Criminol., pp 567 - 582. 
710 Arnold Andre, op cit, para 39 
711 BAT, Op cit, Para. 82. 
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considered as an obstacle to trade. However, the ECJ recognised that its 
inclusion was necessary in order for the whole scheme introduced by the 
Directive not to be undermined. Likewise, in Tobacco Advertising II, the 
ECJ acknowledged that it was very complex for the Community legislator to 
preserve the effectiveness of the Directive, while distinguishing between 
intra-Community and local publications712. This clearly echoes Raich, 
where the USSC recognised the difficulty for the DEA in distinguishing 
between medical and drug-trafficking marijuana.  Therefore, it seems 
possible for the Community legislature to rely on “Raich’s regulatory net”.  
 
Another alternative would be for the Community legislature to include 
“jurisdictional hooks”, with a view to preserving the validity of its 
legislation. As matter of fact, the Community legislator has adopted this 
technique. It suffices to look at Article 5 Directive 2003/33/EC. There, the 
ban on sponsorship by tobacco products was limited to sports events 
“having cross-border effects”. However, as previously mentioned, this 
legislative technique cannot validate ipso facto Community legislation, 
when it intends to expand, rather than constrain, Community powers. For 
instance, the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook would not render the 
regulation of activities “not-being” obstacles to trade lawful. Therefore, 
though this legislative technique illustrates the commitment of the 
Community institutions to be more cautious when relying on Article 95 EC, 
it does not solve by itself the issue of competences. 
 
Finally, until recently it was not certain whether the Community 
legislator had the power to enact criminal statutes. If the reply had been in 
the negative, this would have been a major difference between the scope of 
federal and Community commercial powers. Nonetheless, two recent 
cases713 suggest that the ECJ will not annul Community legislation just 
because it imposes criminal penalties. In order to make the prohibition 
effective, the Community legislator could require Member States to impose 
                                                 
712 Tobacco Advertising II, supra note 697, Para 149. 
713 Cases C-176/03, Commission v Council , [2005] ECR I-7879 and C-440/05, Commission 
v Council, n.y.r. 23 October 2007.  
 216 
“effective, dissuasive and proportionate” penalties for the marketing and 
possession of cannabis. Certainly, due to their informative proximity, it is 
for the Member States to assess the appropriateness of a punitive response. 
However, where criminal sanctions are so “essential” for Community 
legislation to be effective that the appraisal becomes manifest, the 
Community legislator itself may require their adoption714. Whereas criminal 
penalties seem adequate to combat drug trafficking, the same cannot be said 
in relation to the possession of cannabis. In the light of different possible 
strategies towards drug-users, it is not self-evident whether criminalising 
possession would actually contribute to the effectiveness of the general ban. 
Thus, the ECJ would defer to the Member States when designing the policy 
to combat the possession of cannabis. 
 
As a result, the Community could ban home-grown marijuana intended 
for self-consumption in so far as it was necessary not to circumvent the 
prohibition to market it. However, the Community is not entitled to impose 
criminal penalties for its possession.   
 
B.-  Appreciable distortions of competition 
 
The notion of “distortions of competition” does not find an equivalent 
under the Commerce Clause. It is true that in United States v Darby, when 
enacting the FLSA, the motive and purpose of Congress was to “make 
effective (its) conception of public policy that interstate commerce should 
not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods 
produced under substandard labor conditions”715. Nevertheless, the USSC 
stated that congressional intent lay outside its purview. In fact, the rationale 
of the USSC follows an inverse “iter” to the one of the ECJ. Since Congress 
has the power to control all objects inside the “river” of commerce, it may 
exclude all the ones it considers injurious. Accordingly, Congress is 
empowered to exclude from the interstate commerce objects which, for 
                                                 
714 See Opinion of AG Colomer in C-176/03, paras 48-50 
715 United States v Darby, supra note 715, 115. 
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example, distort competition. Inversely, the Community legislature may 
only rule out from intra-Community trade Articles qualified as “obstacles to 
trade” or which “distort competition”. As Arnold André and Swedish Match 
reveal, this legislative exclusion must also comply with Article 30 EC. 
Accordingly, if one extrapolates the facts of United States v Darby to a 
European scenario, the ECJ would uphold a Directive regulating minimum 
wages and maximum working hours adopted under Article 95 EC, on the 
grounds that it removes distortions of competition arising from disparities in 
national labour laws; that it pursues the general interest of ensuring the 
wellbeing of workers and; that it is proportionate716. 
 
By contrast, it seems that the rationale of United States v Darby would 
follow the argumentative line of the ECJ in relation to harmonizing 
measures having an impact in the public health. Once it is demonstrated that 
a federal or Community measure complies with a constitutional source of 
authority, what lies “under the guise of regulating the interstate commerce” 
escapes judicial control. Let it be improving labour standards, tackling 
discrimination in public places, prohibiting marijuana for medical purposes 
or improving the health of citizens by reducing tobacco advertising and 
sponsorship, both Courts will not oppose to these policies, provided that 
they are consistent with the constitutional requirements to regulate 
commerce. Hence, in the US and in Europe, the judiciary accepts the 
“indirect or incidental” regulation of social matters at federal level through 
the medium of commercial regulation. 
 
C.-  Concluding Remarks 
 
Three conclusions may be drawn when comparing the Lopez-Morrison-
Raich Trilogy with the Tobacco Saga. Firstly, both the USSC and the ECJ 
have stressed that the commercial powers of the central government are not 
                                                 
716 However, this cannot be the case since the EC Treaty provides a specific legal basis to 
adopt legislation protecting workers, namely Article 137(2) EC. See in this regard, Council 
Directive 1993/104/EC, OJ L 307, 13.12.1993, p. 18–24 amended by Directive 
2000/34/EC, OJ L 195, 1.8.2000, p. 41–45. 
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infinite, but they must comply with the principle of enumerated powers. To 
this effect, both Courts sought to identify activities falling outside the scope 
of the Commerce Clause and Article 95 respectively. The Lopez Court 
indicated that local non-economic activities do not have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, while Tobacco Advertising I suggests that non-
discriminatory selling arrangements are not obstacles to trade. However, 
both Courts failed to provide clear guidance as to the activities remaining 
“within”. Lopez did not provide a definition of “economic activities”. 
Likewise, the ECJ did not clarify either to what extent the scope of Articles 
28 and 95 overlap or when distortions of competition are appreciable. 
Secondly, in subsequent developments, these analytical flaws benefited the 
federal and Community legislature. In Raich, Justice Stevens provided the 
broadest possible definition of economic activities. In Tobacco Advertising 
II, the ECJ opened the door to “potential” obstacles. Finally, Tobacco 
Advertising I and Lopez introduced an important exception to the regulation 
of activities falling outside the scope of the Commerce Clause and Article 
95 EC respectively. Where the inclusion of these activities prevents the 
general regulatory scheme from being circumvented, Congress and the 
Community legislature may expand its “regulatory net”. Besides, in 
determining whether this is the case, both Courts apply a soft standard of 
review.  
 
Therefore, the foregoing raises questions as to whether the principle of 
enumerated powers (or attribution) may suffice by itself to counter 
“centripetal forces”. Perhaps, it would best to look at other additional or 
alternative solutions, which would better allocate powers between the center 
and the periphery. 
IV.-    Other Solutions to Counterbalance the Centripetal Trend 
 
A.-  Reliance on the Political Process 
 
Some American scholars maintained that political safeguards are enough 
to protect States’ autonomy. For example, Weschler maintained that the 
Senate -representing the will of States, the important role of state 
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legislatures in congressional districting and presidential rapports with 
Congress- ensures that state rights are taken into account in the federal-
decision-making process717. Garcia echoed this theory, when the majority 
ruled that “the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to 
insulate the interests of the States”.718  However, not only did Lopez 
suppose a revival of judicial enforcement of federalism, but this approach 
also fails to capture the modern political environment. Firstly, state 
governments’ interests do not necessarily coincide with the protection of 
States as “political institutions”719. For instance, obtaining federal funding 
may reduce the incentives of state governments to oppose to an ultra vires 
federalisation of extensive areas of law. Secondly, since Senators are no 
longer chosen by state legislatures but directly elected720, a Senator will 
support interests geographically concentrated in his State, but not its 
regulatory prerogatives. federal and ftate elected officials are “rivals and not 
allies”, competing for providing the electorate with beneficial regulation. 
Thirdly, it is very unlikely for the US President to veto popular bills 
alluding to federalism. For instance, though President Bush raised 
federalism concerns, he finally did not veto the GFSZA721. Fourthly, 
political safeguards do not prevent “horizontal aggrandisements”, that is, a 
coalition of States imposing their preference on a dissenting minority. Last 
but not least, since federalism is not a tangible policy objective, Congress 
may forego it to benefit more pressing substantive policies722.  
 
Most recently, Kramer has tried to rescue this doctrine, claiming that 
organised national parties protect federalism. They link the fortunes of 
federal politicians to state and local party organisations, encouraging them 
                                                 
717 H WESCHLER, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of The States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, (1954) 54 Colum.L.Rev., p 543-
560; Choper, supra note 610, pp 1561-67  
718 Garcia, supra note 609, 551 
719 L KARMER, Putting the Politics Back into the Safeguards of Federalism, (2000) 100 
Colum.L.Rev., p 215-292 
720 XVII Amendment US Constitution 
721 Perhaps, he was not willing to suffer the political harm of opposing to the “omnibus” 
Crime Control Act, a variety of legislative provisions combating crime, which were 
positively welcomed by the public opinion, and of which the GFSZA was part. 
722 Editorial Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Federalism’s Political 
Safeguards, (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev., p 609 
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to work together towards common goals723. However, Kramer’s theory main 
flaw is that it entrusts non-constitutional actors with protecting core 
constitutional values. Thus, political parties are not permanently committed 
to defending federalism724. Indeed, just like state governments’ interests not 
always coincide with state institutional integrity, the fact that political 
parties are organised at state level does not imply that they protect the State. 
Local politicians would be more than happy to transfer expensive and 
troublesome policies to the federal government725.  
 
Drawing on the US experience, Young maintains that, in the EU, the 
political safeguards have also failed to protect state autonomy726. Firstly, 
though States are best represented at the Council than in Congress, success 
in obtaining substantive policy commitments may overwhelm concerns over 
institutional interests. Admittedly, the Council prevents radical intrusions 
into state autonomy, but it leaves the door open to gradual erosions. Indeed, 
with a view to obtaining short term objectives, Bermann suggests that 
European States have obviated long term considerations on regulatory 
competences727. In the same way, incentives to protect federalism become 
less attractive when state executives rely on the Council to circumvent 
political obstacles at national level. Thus, “communitarization” was seen by 
state executives as a way of escaping from parliamentary control. Likewise, 
the shift from unanimity to QMV has facilitated “horizontal 
aggrandisements”. Secondly, it is difficult to see how the Commission will 
protect state autonomy when the Treaty itself prohibits its members from 
acting in the interests of the Member States728. Besides, its formal promises 
to respect subsidiarity have not been followed in practice. Finally, empirical 
evidence reveals that the overwhelming voting pattern of the European 
Parliament (EP) is explained by “left-right” politics, while national interests, 
                                                 
723 Kramer, 273 
724 Young, supra note 625, p 75 
725 For an extensive critic, see S PRAKASH & J YOO, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Federalism Theories, (2001) 79 Tex. L. Rev., 1459-1523. 
726 E YOUNG, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some 
Cautionary Tales From American Federalism, (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L Rev, p 1612-1737   
727 G BERMANN, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community 
and the US, (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev., pp 331 - 456 
728 Article 213 EC. 
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independent of national party positions, have a marginal influence on 
voting729. Arguably, Kramer’s theory could still be applicable to the EP. 
Indeed, not only are candidates elected from national parties, but European 
transnational parties need the support of their national counterparts. At the 
same time, reducing informative costs and improving voting efficiency 
force national parties to forge alliances at EU level. Yet, the same criticisms 
can also be repeated here. Notwithstanding Euro-sceptics, parties are subject 
to other concerns that not always address federalism.  
 
Therefore, since all EU political institutions have failed to check the 
vertical powers of the Community, their “prevailing institutional 
incestuousness” has been denounced, urging for a better competence 
monitoring730. Perhaps, the failure of political safeguards to protect 
federalism is due to the absence of the national parliaments in the EU 
legislative process. As the most affected party by a vacuum of competences, 
the Treaty of Lisbon provides for their active involvement in monitoring 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It introduces an “early-
warning” mechanism. National parliaments may manifest their opposition to 
the presidents of the EU political institutions, by issuing a reasoned opinion 
against proposals not complying with the principle of subsidiarity. If at least 
one third of the votes allocated to the national parliaments favour the 
withdrawal of the proposal, the Commission must review it. If a simple 
majority of negative votes is reached, but the Commission decides to 
maintain the proposal, before concluding the first reading, the EU legislator 
must express its opinion by voting731. Moreover, national parliaments may 
also recourse to the same monitoring system when the outer limits of Article 
352 TFEU (current 308 EC) are overstepped. 
 
                                                 
729 S. HIX, A. NOURY & G. ROLAND, Dimensions of Politics in the European 
Parliament, (2006) 50 AJPS, pp. 494-511  
730 S. WEATHERILL, Better competence monitoring, (2005) E.L. Rev, pp 23-41 
731 See Article 7 Protocol (No2) Treaty of Lisbon. It is interesting to note that these new 
reforms go beyond the measures provided in the failed EU Constitution, which only 
compelled the Commission to review its proposal, but no vote of the EU legislator was 
required. 
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This is a welcome development since its breaks the vicious cycle of the 
EU institutions732. However, this reform has not been introduced as an 
alternative to judicial review. On the contrary, in accordance with their own 
constitutional arrangements, Member States may lodge direct actions on 
behalf of their national parliaments733. Thus, the ECJ would still exercise a 
key “ex-post” control. 
B.-  Controlling the Exercise of Commercial Power 
 
By contrast to the EU, in the US there is no equivalent to the principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity. Indeed, as Justice Marshall wrote, once 
an activity falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause, congressional 
power becomes “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, 
and acknowledges no limitation other than are prescribed in the 
Constitution”734. Thus, in the US, there is no second layer of competence 
control735. The next subsections try to explain why this absence.   
 
1.-  The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The Community legislator must remove obstacles or eliminate 
distortions of competition. If the ECJ considers that the measure adopted is 
inadequate or excessive, in the light of the principle of proportionality, the 
measure will be struck down. Conversely, congressional commercial 
legislation does not have to take into account whether the federal policy is 
suitable for the objectives it aims to achieve or, whether it does not go 
beyond what it is necessary. The Commerce Clause does not have the 
“remedial” justification Article 95 must comply with. Time and again, the 
USSC has stated that these issues pertain to the wisdom of the statute, and 
                                                 
732 Weatherill, Op cit, pp 39-40 (generally welcoming this reform, but raising two 
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733 See Article 8 Protocol (No2) 
734 Gibbons v Odgen, supra note 581, 196. 
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defer to the political process736. For instance in Wickard, Justice Jackson 
stated that whether the AAA was unfair in forcing farmers to buy what they 
could provide for themselves was not a matter for the USSC to decide, but 
to be discussed and resolved through the legislative process. In the same 
way, in Raich, Stevens expressly excluded from his evaluation whether it 
was wise for the CSA to apply the ban to therapeutic marijuana. On the 
contrary, if the ECJ decided a case similar to Raich, it would certainly 
examine whether the principle of proportionality advise against banning its 
therapeutic use.  Applicants could argue that it is an oxymoron to harmonize 
cannabis trying to achieve a high level of health protection, while denying 
its use to alleviate patients suffering excruciating pain. Although judicial 
review is limited to verifying that the challenged measure is not “manifestly 
inappropriate”, the EC legislator would still have to demonstrate that 
available scientific evidence is not conclusive over the positive use of 
cannabis; that its healing effects do not outweigh its toxicity and addiction; 
or that other relieving substances less dangerous for public health were 
available. Nonetheless, failure to do so would force the ECJ to recall 
Tobacco Advertissing I and to side with the applicants. 
 
Functionally, Article 95 EC is closer to the XIVth Amendment than to 
the Commerce Clause. In this regard, the USSC has stressed that this 
amendment is not a substantive grant of legislative power, but it must 
“remedy” unconstitutional behaviour arising from state action or inaction. 
To this effect, federal legislation adopted under the XIVth Amendment must 
bear “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
and the means adapted to that end”737. By contrast, this test is absent under 
the Commerce Clause. This different approach is clearly illustrated in 
Morrison. After rejecting that § 13981 could be adopted under the 
Commerce Clause, the USSC went on to examine whether reliance on §5 of 
the XIVth Amendment was constitutionally possible. Congress contended 
that the civil remedy created under the VAWA responded to the 
documented pervasive bias of state justice systems against victims of gender 
                                                 
736 Gibbons v Ogden, Op. Cit , 197  
737 City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 520 (1997) (see also Chapter V) 
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motivated violence and thus, tried to counter sexual discrimination, ensuring 
the “equal protection under laws” as stipulated by § 5. However, the USSC 
disagreed. It began by stressing that recourse to §5 could correct state action 
only. Consequently, it held that, since the federal remedy targeted private 
conducts rather than sexually discriminatory conducts sponsored by certain 
States, Congress could not rely on this constitutional provision. In any case, 
even if admitting this were the case, §13981 of the WAVA did not meet the 
“congruence and proportionality test”. On the one hand, the federal remedy 
did not aim at “proscribing discrimination by officials”, instead it was 
directed to perpetrators of gender motivated crimes. On the other hand, it 
went beyond what was necessary, owing to the fact that it failed to limit its 
scope to the infringing States738. Further, this test has proved to be stricter 
than the principle of proportionality as applied to Community measures. 
While the ECJ limits itself to verifying that there is no manifest error 
between the means deployed and the aims to be achieved, the USSC 
scrutinizes in depth federal legislation. For instance, it would be very 
unlikely for the ECJ to reject that a civil remedy for victims of gender 
motivated violence could contribute to tackling a long history of sexual 
discrimination in state justice systems.    
 
Thus, in the light of Morrison, one can affirm that by contrast to 
Article 95 EC or the XIVth Amendment, the Commerce Clause is not 
subjected to a proportionality test. Why is that? In my view, under the 
Commerce Clause, Congress is not confined to harmonizing or remedying 
unconstitutional behaviour of States. Its authority is broader. It is entrusted 
with defining policies regulating the interstate commerce. The policy can be 
directed towards establishing common standards, but also favouring 
diversification and even discrimination. The Constitution does not prescribe 
an objective to be attained by Congress. Accordingly, it would be very 
difficult for the USSC to start second guessing congressional policy choices. 
Provided that there is no breach of other constitutional provisions, Congress 
is free to regulate interstate commerce as it pleases739. Besides, if the USSC 
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were to evaluate whether federal economic regulation is excessive, it would 
wake up the ghosts of Lochner. As explained in the previous chapter, the 
Lochner Court, which sought to guarantee private autonomy at the outmost, 
was accused of imposing its own ideology on a neutral Constitution. 
Accordingly, applying the proportionality principle would be seen as an 
illegitimate intrusion into the political process. Indeed, the open-texture of 
the Commerce Clause renders very difficult for the judiciary to look for 
benchmarks facilitating scrutiny of manifest errors.     
 
However, a different answer could be given, had the USSC examined 
the congressional regulation of local activities under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. The two limbs of this constitutional provision would provide 
the constitutional authority to apply a soft version of the proportionality 
principle. As discussed above, the “necessity prong” would evaluate that 
there are no manifest errors in the chain of causation, where “property” 
would determine whether the incursion into States’ autonomy is excessive. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how Scalia himself would promote 
applying a “standard-oriented” review, given that he opposes to do so in 
other areas of constitutional law740. 
2.-  The principle of Subsidiarity  
 
If proportionality controls the intensity and suitability of Community 
legislation, subsidiarity operates at an earlier stage. Whit the exception of 
exclusive competences, it limits the exercise of Community competences to 
objectives which cannot be sufficiently achieved at state level.  
 
However, while the ECJ applies a mild version of proportionality under 
Article 95 EC, subsidiarity appears to be non-justifiable at all. Indeed, the 
ECJ has never annulled a Community measure on this ground. BAT may 
provide some insights as to why. There, the ECJ briefly stated that, since the 
Directive eliminated obstacles to trade arising from the multifarious 
developments of national laws, this objective could not be sufficiently 
                                                 
740  Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509, (2004) (Scalia Dissenting) 
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attained by the Member States741. Put simply, once an objective falls within 
the scope of Article 95 EC, subsidiarity “vas de soi”. Nevertheless, this 
reasoning is misleading, in so far as it does not explain why obstacles to 
trade may not be tackled at national level.742 
 
Perhaps, the non-justiciability of subsidiarity lies in that is very difficult 
for the ECJ to ascertain at which level of governance a policy is more 
efficiently adopted. In this regard, “as being par excellence a political 
principle seeking to influence the legislative process ex ante”, Tridimas 
suggests that this principle is hardly susceptible of judicial determination743. 
Likewise, Bermann posit that “the uncertainty about how much localism 
really matters on a given issue, the heavy reliance on prediction and the 
probability of competing scenarios, the possibility of discretion and 
tradeoffs between and the sheer exercise of political judgment” render 
virtually impossible crafting judicially enforceable standards744. Indeed, 
liaising with the Chapter II, subsidiarity would raise political questions 
reserved to the legislator.  
 
While judicially abdicating subsidiarity on “substantive grounds” may 
be tolerated, the same does not follow when invoked as a “procedural 
principle”, pursuant to which the EC legislator would be obliged to 
seriously deliberate and explicitly provide sufficient reasons satisfying a test 
of comparative efficiency. By “enhancing process federalism”, the ECJ 
would not replace legislative choices for its own preferences. On the 
contrary, it would limit itself to verifying that, in its decision-making 
process, the EC legislator has reflected upon the interests of the States in 
preserving their autonomy. Therefore, the judiciary would undertake a soft 
review, requiring nonetheless more than an abstract reference to objectives 
calling for harmonisation. The Community judicature would press the 
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legislator for supporting quantitative and qualitative information showing 
that joined or individual action at national level is inadequate745. 
Unfortunately, as BAT reveals, the ECJ has not adopted an approach that 
would examine subsidiarity as an independent procedural principle. Instead, 
it has been subsumed into the more general enquiry on competence and 
proportionality746 
 
In the US, the validity of congressional commercial powers is not 
conditioned upon compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The reason 
is that, when delimitating federal powers, the USSC is still influenced by the 
notion of “dual-federalism”747. Although the existence of federal and state 
concurrent powers has long been accepted, no circumstances and conditions 
constrain Congress when deciding to invoke the Commerce Clause. Lopez 
provides a clear example: local “economic” activities are in, while “non-
economic” are out. Thus, the USSC has focussed on preserving “state 
sovereign enclaves”, rather than on evaluating whether efficiency advise in 
favour of leaving the regulation of local economic activities to the States748. 
This has not discouraged US scholars from thinking beyond “borderline 
federalism”. For instance, when regulating local activities, Gardbaum argues 
that the vertical balance of powers is altered and consequently, Congress is 
required to “seriously deliberate on the needs and merits of (its actions)”749. 
Even admitting the existence of reserves of state sovereignty, he concludes 
that this test would still operate as a supplementary guarantee on federalism. 
Moreover, Young reckons that, though drawing substantive borderlines is 
necessary in order to preserve a significant regulatory area where States 
compete for the People’s loyalty, it is not sufficient to alt the centripetal 
trend. He advocates for soft substantives limits to federal power, while 
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imposing non-derogable “clear statement” rules when Congress displaces 
state regulations. In his view, this process-oriented review corrects failures 
in the political process that threaten federalism, while avoiding direct 
confrontations with Congress. Not only do “clear statement” rules facilitate 
the task of States in monitoring congressional activity impinging on their 
autonomy, but they also slow down the federal legislative process by 
imposing additional drafting costs750. 
 
V.-   Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the difficulties that the 
USSC and the ECJ have encountered when applying the principle of 
enumerated powers to Community and federal commercial measures. To 
some extent, the adoption of formal tests does not appear to absolutely 
counter the competence creep. Lopez was weakened by the broad notion of 
“economic activity” defined in Raich, whereas opening the door to 
“potential obstacles” may reduce the impact of Tobacco Advertising I. 
Likewise, both Courts introduced an important caveat, namely Congress and 
the EU legislator may regulate activities that, while falling outside of the 
Commerce Clause and Article 95 EC respectively, are necessary for the 
effectiveness of a larger regulatory scheme. This does not mean that formal 
boundaries are not necessary. On the contrary, despite their shortcomings, 
Lopez and Tobacco Advertising I canvass the judiciary’s willingness to 
police the outer limits of federal commercial powers. Congress and the 
Community legislator now bear in mind that their powers are not unlimited. 
 
However, in order to counterbalance the vertical vacuum of power, it 
seems that other solutions are also necessary. Although it has been defended 
that federalism may not rest on political safeguards alone, courts may 
nonetheless restore failures in the federal legislative process where they 
excessively impinged upon state autonomy. Courts should not limit 
themselves to protecting enclaves of state sovereignty. Instead, in the vast 
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area of concurrent competences, they should also control that the federal 
legislator provides enough justifications as to why state regulation is 
displaced.  “Process Federalism” would contribute to this end. In the EU, 
the ECJ should check that the EC legislator provides enough informative 
input justifying compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Indeed, the 
Protocol on Subsidiarity of the Treaty of Lisbon points in this direction. Not 
only does it enhance political debate by incorporating national parliaments, 
but the latter would have access to the ECJ. Accordingly, it is not expected 
from the ECJ to give the final word on whether a policy may be sufficiently 
achieved at national level, but just to verify that the dissenting voices of 
national legislators have been taken into account and that an adequate 
rebuttal was provided. In the US, clear statement rules when Congress 
regulates local activities would also protect the values of federalism. 
Finally, at first stage, “process federalism” would entail a higher judicial 
involvement in scrutinizing legislative deliberations. However, step by step, 
when judicial rulings become internalised in the political culture, the role of 
courts would diminish. Along with reminding from time to time that federal 
powers are limited, this is how courts should also protect federalism: As 
neutral enhancers of legitimately-adopted policy decisions. 
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Chapter V 
 
The Principles of Sovereign Immunity of States and Non-
Contractual State Liability Compared 
 
As a constitutional principle, supremacy instructs the judicial 
department to uphold federal law and ignore conflicting state law. This 
principle is embodied in Article VI of the US Constitution751. In particular, 
the “Judges Clause” commands every judge throughout the nation to 
disregard state law violating federal law. Likewise, though primacy of 
Community Law is not expressly recognised in the EC Treaty752, this 
circumstance did not prevent the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from 
introducing this principle into the newly created Community legal order. 
Not only has primacy been interpreted, along with direct effect, as the 
foundational constitutional principle753, but also as a legal basis bestowing 
national courts with all necessary powers to set aside conflicting national 
laws754. It follows from the foregoing that both the EC and the US legal 
orders mandate the judicial department to ensure that infringing States do 
not contest that federal law is “the supreme law of the land”. Accordingly, 
there is an essential linkage between this principle and the constitutional law 
of remedies755. The perspective adopted to characterise this linkage will 
determine how much remedial power must be granted to the judiciary for it 
to accomplish its constitutionally assigned mission756. On the one hand, one 
may argue that supremacy is only ensured where for every violation of a 
federal right, there is a judicial remedy. Thus, compliance with the maxim 
“ubi jus, ibi remedium” conditions the supremacy of federal law. Said 
differently, failure to provide an adequate remedy erodes the supremacy of 
federal law. On the other hand, one may consider that, even if there is not 
always an available remedy for every violation of a federal right, the 
                                                 
751 See Annex 
752 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. Although, Article I-6 CT embedded this 
principle, the Treaty of Lisbon is again silent.  
753 K ALTER, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 
754 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR I-2433.   
755 M CLAES, The National’s Court Mandate in the European Constitution, (Oregon, Hart 
Publishing: 2006), pp 97-119 
756 R. FALLON, Jr. and D. MELTZER, New Law, Non-retroactivity and Constitutional 
Remedies, (1991) 104:8 Harv. L. Rev., 1731-1833.  
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supremacy of federal law is ensured in so far as States remain bound by the 
rule of federal law. Allowing a certain degree of infringement does not 
deprive federal law from its supremacy. On the contrary, it just gives equal 
importance to other constitutionally protected interests, such as the role 
played by States in the federal design, which may advise against granting 
judicial relief. Put simply, supremacy of federal law cannot be construed as 
an absolute remedial grant, but its supreme character is apprehended by 
weighing it against other constitutional principles.  
 
By determining the availability of monetary relief against States for 
violation of federal or Community law, this chapter aims at determining 
which of the two aforementioned perspectives has been followed by the US 
Supreme Court (USSC) and the ECJ. By contrast to declaratory or 
injunction relief, monetary relief is more intrusive into state sovereignty. 
While a declaratory judgment or enjoining state action may seem sufficient 
measures in themselves to restore the legality of a federal system, awarding 
damages goes to the heart of States’ financial dignity. Hence, monetary 
relief is the optimal example to compare the reach of the principle of 
supremacy in the United States and of primacy in the European Community. 
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section I is devoted to studying the 
principle of state sovereign immunity under the US Constitution, in 
particular, its increasing constitutional importance. Once limited by the 
wording of the Eleventh Amendment, the USSC now derives this principle 
from “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design”757. As a 
result, state sovereign immunity has become an important limitation on 
Congress which may only rely on its limited XIVth Amendment Powers and 
the Bankruptcy Clause to award damages. As a result, monetary relief has 
been almost precluded.  However, the USSC considers that alternative 
remedies are sufficient to secure the supremacy of federal law, namely, suits 
brought by the Federal Government, the Ex-Parte Young Doctrine and 
monetary relief against state officials. In Section II, the principle of state 
liability for damages under EC law is explored. In describing its harmonious 
                                                 
757 Alden v Maine, 527 US 709, 729 (1999) 
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evolution from Francovich to Köbler, it will be asserted that state liability 
for damages has developed into a General Principle by which the ECJ 
merged the concepts of primacy and judicial protection. Section III argues 
that structural differences and a different attitude towards state financial 
implications explain why both Courts give a different answer to the same 
question. While in the US, the federal legislature may not commander either 
the state executive or legislature, liability for damages was born in the EU 
as a reply to the non-implementation of Directives. Additionally, in 
extending the principle of state liability, the ECJ pays little attention to the 
possible financial implications upon the Member States. On the contrary, 
the USSC only accepts monetary implications on the state treasuries when 
prospective relief is seen as necessary to ensure the supremacy of federal 
law. Finally, it is concluded that whereas primacy of community law is seen 
through the lens of judicial protection, the USSC considers that for the 
federal law to be supreme, it is not always necessary to have an effective 
remedy. 
 
I.-   The Principle of Sovereign Immunity of States under US Law 
 
A.-  Concept 
 
In the American federal system, each State is a sovereign entity. Since it 
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to suit without 
consent758,the principle of sovereign immunity of States implies that both 
federal and state courts lack jurisdiction in cases where an individual files a 
suit against a non-consenting State759. Thus, this principle operates as a limit 
to the judicial enforcement of individual rights.   
                                                 
758 Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 13 (1890) 
759 This principle originates from old English that “the King can do no wrong”.  See Hans v 
Louisiana, 12-13 quoting Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No 18,: “It is 
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without 
its consent”. 
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States’ consent is a relevant factor in determining the scope of the sovereign 
immunity of States. The more States’ consent is deemed given, the less 
immune from suits States will be. Besides, since this principle is “a 
personal privilege (of States) which may be waived at pleasure”760, the 
number of cases in which it is applicable varies from one State to the other. 
However, the USSC has introduced some uniformity in its application. 
Firstly, regarding suits brought by the United States or by a sister State, the 
USSC has understood that such consent was given when States joined the 
Union. Hence, federal courts have jurisdiction to rule in these cases761. 
Secondly, the USSC has rejected the doctrine of “constructive waiver” 
whereby a State engaged in a federally regulated commercial activity 
authorising private suits, has implicitly waived its immunity762. Instead, an 
unequivocal statement is now required763. As a result, notwithstanding the 
cases in which the United States or other States are the plaintiff, States’ 
waiver cannot be presumed. Even if a State interacts in the market with 
private undertakings, state immunity is preserved. Therefore the USSC has 
interpreted the principle of sovereign immunity in very broad terms764: Not 
only are States immune while carrying out acts of government (“jus 
imperii”), but also where they operate in the market (“jus gestionis”)765. 
                                                 
760 Clark v Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-448 (1883). 
761 US v Texas, 143 US 621 (1982) 
762 Parden v Terminal R. CO., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) 
763 College Savings Banks v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education, 527 US 666 (1999) 
764 Against, K. KINPORTS, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, (1998) 82 Minn. L. Rev, 
pp 793-832 (The author holds that the USSC has hopelessly confused the doctrine of 
implied waiver and the doctrine of abrogation. Accordingly, by rescuing this distinction, 
she supports the constitutionality of federal statutes passed under the Spending Clause that 
condition obtaining federal funds to States’ waiver of their immunity, as well as federal 
regulated activities passed under Article I in which States voluntarily engage.)  
765 The scope of States’ immunity under American Constitutional law is even wider than 
the one normally accepted under Public International Law pursuant to which, whilst a 
Foreign State is pursuing a commercial activity, the latter cannot invoke its immunity. See 
e.g. Resolution of the UN General Assembly 59/38, “United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property”.  16 December 2004.  See Also L 
GARDNER, State employers are not Sovereign: Transfer the Market Participant Exception 
to the Dormant Commerce Clause to States as Employers, (2004) 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev, pp 
725-54 (arguing that the market-participant exception to Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges should be extrapolated to cases under the Eleventh Amendment where States act 
as employers) 
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B.-  Legal Basis of State Sovereign Immunity 
The principle of sovereign immunity of States and the enactment of 
Eleventh Amendment have been closely related. The Eleventh amendment 
is the result of a political dissent against the USSC ruling in Chisholm v 
Georgia766. There, a South Carolina citizen sought to recover from Georgia 
the payments overdue for the goods supplied during the American 
Revolution. Nevertheless, Georgia argued that it was sovereign and thus, not 
liable to such action. The USSC rejected Georgia’s arguments and held that 
Article III US Constitution767 empowered the federal judiciary to rule on 
proceedings brought by individuals against States. 
 Owing to the fact that in the aftermath of the Revolution, States were 
heavily indebted, Chisholm ruling filled States with consternation768. The 
fear of insolvency prompted the States to seek for constitutional reform 
which led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, according to which:  
 
“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state”. 
 
If one relies on the literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment, it 
could be argued that the latter only bars diversity jurisdiction, that is, suits 
brought against out-of- state citizens. Accordingly, citizens could still be 
entitled to suit their own State769. Nevertheless, following Hans v 
Louisiana770, the current opinion of the USSC is precisely the opposite. 
Proceedings brought by a citizen against its own State are also barred by the 
                                                 
766 Chisholm v State of Georgia, 2 US. 419 (1793) 
767 See Annex 
768 Alden , Op cit, 720 
769 See AR AMAR, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, (1987) 96 Yale L. J., pp 1429-37. The 
author argues that the principle of sovereign immunity should be limited to diversity cases. 
Thus, when exercising federal question jurisdiction, States may not rely on their immunity. 
However the problem with this theory is that the Eleventh Amendment refers to “any suit”. 
See to this effect, L MARSHALL, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, (1989) 
102 Harv. L. Rev., pp 1342 -1371 .   
770 Hans v Louisiana, Op. cit., 13 
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Eleventh Amendment. The reason is that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
modify the original understanding of the US Constitution, but it simply 
overrules the USSC’s ruling in Chisholm. In this sense, in Alden v Maine, 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the USSC, held that the doctrine that a 
sovereign State could not be sued without its consent was universal in the 
States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified771. He also added that 
this principle has been embraced by the US Constitution since its 
creation772. Lastly, he stressed that had the US Constitution provided that 
States could be suit in their own courts and by their own citizens, it would 
not have been ratified773. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not define on 
itself the principle of sovereign immunity of States. On the contrary, it 
simply emphasises the importance of such principle in the American 
constitutional design. In other words, as the USSC held in Seminole Tribe v 
Florida774, ”we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms”. 
Therefore, the principle of sovereign immunity of States, as a constitutional 
principle, is not framed by the wording of the Eleventh Amendment. As a 
result, one may infer four direct implications. 
 
Firstly, the principle can be extended beyond the wording of the 
Eleventh Amendment. As a matter of fact, the USSC has done so. In 
particular, in Hans v Louisiana, in Smith v Reeves775, Principality of 
Monaco776 and Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak777 the USSC 
respectively held that States’ immunity was applicable to proceedings 
brought by citizens against their own States, federal corporations, foreign 
nations and Indian tribes. However, the principle of Sovereign immunity is 
not applicable to political subdivisions of the State (e.g. cities, counties, 
towns …), which can be sued at federal courts778. The reason is that for 
                                                 
771 Alden,  Op cit, 715-716 
772 Ibid,  720 
773 Ibid,  727 
774 Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 (1996) 
775 Smith v. Reeves , 178 U.S. 436 (1900) 
776 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi , 292 U.S. 313 (1934) 
777 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak , 501 U.S. 775 (1991) 
778 Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118 (1869), more recently Mt Healthy City Board of 
ED v Doyle, 429 US 274 (1977 
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diversity purposes779, unless they are the “arm or alter ego of the State”, 
local corporations are considered “citizens” of the State where they are 
formed780.   
 
The second implication is that the principle of sovereign immunity 
stands on an equal footing with other constitutional principles, such as 
supremacy of federal law. In order to determine the current position 
occupied by the principle of immunity in the American constitutional 
landscape, two cases must be examined namely, Pennsylvania v Union 
Gas781 and its subsequent overruling in Seminole v Florida782. In Union 
Gas, the Federal Government, which had partially covered the expenses for 
the cleaning-up at Brodhead Creek, sued Union Gas claiming that it was 
responsible for the environmental disaster. The latter filed a third party 
claim against Pennsylvania arguing that in accordance with federal law, 
Pennsylvania should share responsibility. By relying on the Eleventh 
Amendment, Pennsylvania replied that Congress did not have power under 
Article I to abrogate States’ immunity. However, the USSC disagreed. 
While acting within the scope of its plenary powers under Article I (in the 
case at issue, it was the Commerce Clause), Congress could fashion statutes 
enabling individuals to claim damages against States for breach of federal 
law. In accordance with the USSC’s opinion, “the States surrendered a 
portion of their sovereignty when they granted the Congress the power to 
regulate commerce, and that by empowering Congress to regulate 
commerce, the States surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that 
would stand in the way of such regulation”783. Consequently, “the power to 
regulate interstate commerce would be incomplete without the authority to 
render States liable in damages”784.  
 
However, in Seminole Tribe v Florida, the USSC felt “bound to conclude 
that Union Gas was wrongly decided, and that it should be, and now is, 
                                                 
779 28 U.S.C. §1332  
780 See Cowles, supra note 778, 120.  
781 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. , 491 U.S. 1 (1989) 
782 Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44 (1996) 
783  Union Gas Co., Op cit,  14 (1989). 
784 Ibid, 19-20.  
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overruled”785. In Seminole Tribe v Florida, Congress had passed the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) by which States were required to negotiate 
with Indian tribes the formation of a compact. The IGRA also granted 
Indian tribes the right to start proceedings against States which failed to 
perform this duty. The same conflicting arguments as the ones exposed in 
Union Gas were repeated by the parties. The Seminole Tribe recalled Union 
Gas, arguing that under Article I (the Indian Commerce Clause) Congress is 
empowered to abrogate state immunity from suits by individuals, whereas 
Florida argued that Congress lacked such power. However, this time the 
USSC sided with Florida, holding that “Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction”786. In 
accordance with the USSC, where in a subject matter, States have 
surrendered their competences to the federal legislature, this does not imply 
per se that the federal judiciary has jurisdiction over claims brought by 
individuals against States. Thus, the USSC draws a distinction between 
transfers of competence to the federal legislature and transfers of 
jurisdiction to federal judiciary. The former does not imply inter alia the 
latter. In fact, it is only the US Constitution, and not Congress by enacting 
federal statutes, which is capable of empowering the federal judiciary with 
jurisdiction over claims brought by individuals against the State. It clearly 
appears from the rationale of the case that the principle of States’ immunity 
has a constitutional character.  Likewise, in Alden v Maine, state employees 
sought compensation from Maine before its own state court, alleging that it 
had breached the Fair Labor Standard Act (adopted under the Commerce 
Clause). While petitioners argued that the principle of supremacy of federal 
law, embodied in Article VI of the Constitution, by necessity overrides the 
sovereign immunity of the States, Maine relied on its immunity. The USSC 
agreed with Maine and held that “when a States asserts its immunity to suit, 
the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the 
law in a manner consistent with the sovereign immunity of the States”787.  It 
seems therefore that in accordance with the USSC’s opinion, state liability 
                                                 
785 Seminole Tribe,  Op cit., 66 
786 Ibid, 72-73 
787 Alden, 732 
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is outside the scope of supremacy of federal law. In other words, in order to 
preserve federal law as the “supreme law of the land”, it is not necessary to 
render infringing States liable for damages caused to individuals.  
 
 The third implication is that since the principle of sovereign 
immunity of States has a constitutional ranking, exemptions from the said 
principle are only possible if the US Constitution allows it. So far, the USSC 
understands that Section §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment788 and the 
Bankruptcy Clause789 under Article I are the only constitutional provisions 
empowering Congress to fashion statutes capable of removing immunity 
from States.  
 
In City of Boerne v Flores790, the USSC ruled that §5 cannot be defined as 
general powers to legislate, but as corrective legislation. Firstly, it may be 
invoked to provide remedies against state laws or actions which (or are 
likely to) infringe the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause. Secondly, 
in order to discern between substantive measures and enforcing measures, 
only the latter being allowed under §5, the USSC will apply a 
proportionality and congruence test by which a connection “between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” is 
necessary791. In this sense, the USSC pointed out that sunset clauses, 
geographic restrictions or egregious predicates are not required, but these or 
similar limitations would tend to ensure that Congress legislation is 
proportionate.792 Lastly, in accordance with the USSC’s opinion, the 
proportionality and congruence tests are not applicable in abstracto, on the 
contrary, “the appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in 
light of the evil presented […] Strong measures appropriate to address one 
harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.[..]793. For 
instance, in Florida Prepaid794, a private company, College Savings Bank, 
                                                 
788 Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
789 Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 548 US 356 (2006) 
790 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)  
791 Ibid, 519-520 
792 Ibid, 533 
793 Ibid, 530 
794 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary , 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
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brought a patent infringement claim against Florida Prepaid, a company 
belonging to Florida. The plaintiff based its claim on the Patent Remedy Act 
(PRA), which had been passed by Congress to put an end to constant 
infringements committed by state related companies. Florida argued that the 
PRA was unconstitutional because it infringed States’ immunity, whereas 
College Savings Bank contented that under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the PRA complied with the Constitution and thus, could 
abrogate States’ immunity. The USSC upheld Florida’s arguments. It stated 
that the Due Process Clause does not protect the deprivation of property 
alone, but the deprivation of property without due process of law795. Since 
Congress had failed both to prove that state remedies for patent 
infringement were questionable and to limit federal claims to such cases, its 
reliance on §5 did not comply with the Constitution796. From these and 
similar cases, it seems that the proportionality test under §5 is a very strict 
one797. Indeed, reliance on §5 is conditioned, on the one hand, to remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional behaviour and, on the other, to the absence of state 
remedies. Hence, the USSC has added a subsidiarity test to the 
proportionality and congruence ones798. 
 
In Central Virginia Community College v Katz799, the USSC held 
that under the Bankruptcy Clause, States could not rely on their immunity to 
avoid complying with transfer recovery proceedings. The USSC based the 
“Bankruptcy Clause” exception on two grounds. Firstly, historical evidence 
shows that the Framers wanted to put an end to the problems caused by 
disparities of state legislation, which prevented debtors from being finally 
discharged800. Thus, the USSC considered that during the constitutional 
                                                 
795 Ibid, 643 
796 Ibid, 639-648 
797 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000); University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001). Yet, it does not follow that it is an insurmountable obstacle when 
fundamental rights are involved, see Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 
538 US 721 (2003) and in Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509 (2004) 
798 Compare with the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See Chapter IV 
799 Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 548 US 356 (2006) 
800 Justice Stevens who delivered the Opinion of the USSC referred to two pre-
constitutional cases, namely, James v Allen, 1 Dall 188 (CP Phila. City 1786) and Millar v 
Hall, 1 Dall 229 (Pa.1788); showing that even if a debtor was discharged in one State and 
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ratification process, States were aware of the importance of harmonizing 
bankruptcy law, even if it entailed subordinating their immunity to this 
“pressing goal”. Secondly, since bankruptcy jurisdiction is “in rem”801, the 
impact on States’ immunity is only ancillary. The USSC took the view that 
under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress was granted with the power to 
regulate the entire “subject to Bankruptcies”. Bankruptcy courts are 
therefore entitled to issue ancillary order necessary to enforce their in rem 
adjudication, that is, they have the power to avoid preferential transfers and 
to recover the transferred property, regardless of the third-party withholding 
it.  Thus, if the “res” is being held by a State, the latter must return it to the 
bankruptcy trustee.  
  
 
The question that then arises is what differentiates the Bankruptcy Clause 
from other Article I legislative powers? Unfortunately, the USSC did not 
provide a clear answer. Some scholars argue that no persuasive argument 
can support such distinction802. Conversely, it is also maintained that 
congressional powers under the Bankruptcy Clause are greater than under 
other clauses of Article I. The term “uniform” is only present in this 
provision, indicating a greater grant of power. Indeed, it is suggested that 
Congress enjoys exclusive competence in the field of bankruptcies and 
consequently, sovereign immunity has been surrendered803. Likewise, by 
contrast to Seminole, Alden, and Florida Prepaid, in Katz Congress did not 
rely on its legislative powers to create an action in personae against the 
States, but in rem. Arguably, the unique nature of the bankruptcy power 
may be sufficient to award a different treatment. In any case, the USSC did 
                                                                                                                            
had debts in other States, he could be arrested for non-payment in the latter.  See also 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) 
801 Jurisdiction “in rem” means that bankruptcy trustees are empowered to recovery the 
property of the insolvent debtor resulting from preferential transfers. 
802 MH REDISH & DM GREENFIELD, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and the 
Dilemma of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia 
Community College v Katz, (2007) Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., pp 13- 57 (affirming that the 
historical arguments advanced by the USSC are not convincing enough to distinguish the 
Bankruptcy Clause from the Commerce Clause). 
803 RJ HAINES, the Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy is Different, (2003) 77 Am. 
Bankr. L.J., pp 129-157. 
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not overrule Seminole Tribe. It just seems willing to accept an incidental 
limitation on States’ immunity. 
 
Lastly, the USSC has applied the principle of sovereign immunity 
not only in proceedings before federal courts, but also before state courts. In 
Alden v Maine, after recalling its previous decision in Seminole Tribe, the 
USSC justified its expansion to state fora by stressing that “a congressional 
power to authorize private suits against non consenting States in their own 
court would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a power to the 
suits in a federal forum”804. The principle of sovereign immunity of States is 
therefore applicable irrespectively of the forum where the suit is filed. 
 
 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity of States is a 
constitutional principle which denies state liability to private claims. States 
are only liable for infringing federal law when they have unequivocally 
consented to be sued or where federal legislation is passed under §5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Bankruptcy Clause. 
 
C.-  Why has the USSC endorsed States’ immunity? 
 
The reasons leading the USSC to consider state immunity as one of 
the key principles in the American constitutional design are of a double 
nature. On the one hand, according to the USSC, the quest for the 
interpretation of the founding Fathers leads to the endorsement of sovereign 
immunity of States805. On the other hand, in Alden v Maine, the USSC 
added four substantive arguments demonstrating that its interpretation is 
consistent with the essential principles of federalism laid down by the US 
                                                 
804 Ibid, 749 
805The USSC has based its historical interpretation on four pieces of evidence, namely, [1] 
the principle of sovereign immunity as understood at the time of the American Revolution, 
[2] Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm v Georgia, [3] the opinion of the Hans v Louisiana 
Court, and [4] States’ indebtness during the constitutional ratification. See Hans v 
Louisiana, Op cit, 12-16 and Alden, 715-716.  
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Constitution. Since historical evidence does not appear to be entirely 
conclusive806, it is best to focus on these substantive arguments 
 
The first substantive reason announced by the USSC in Alden is that, 
since the United States enjoys immunity from suit807, either in federal or 
state courts, States should be entitled to the same privilege. In other words, 
when it comes to sovereign immunity, there is a constitutional parity 
between the two levels of governance. In this regard, it appears that this 
legal parallelism is justified, provided that two conditions are met, namely 
that federal and state immunity have the same constitutional sources and 
that they produce the same constitutional effects. Nevertheless, none of the 
two conditions is fulfilled.  
 
First of all, the USSC itself has recognised that the sources of federal and 
state immunity differ. In this sense, in Lapides v Board of Regents808, 
Georgia, which had waived its immunity before its own courts, decided to 
remove the case to the US District Court in order to rely on its sovereign 
immunity. Georgia relied on an analogical application of the USSC’s case-
law on cross-claims against the United States whereby, even if the United 
States files a suit against a private party, it does not follow that it is 
subjected to the full jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Consequently, a 
private party can only counter-claim in so far as Congress has agreed809. 
However, by recalling its previous case-law810 the USSC held that a 
voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of state 
immunity811. To this effect, the USSC drew a distinction between state and 
federal immunity, holding that cases where the United States is a plaintiff, 
                                                 
806 For critical view on historical arguments see, J V. ORTH, “History and the Eleventh 
Amendment”, (2000) 75:3 Notre Dame L. Rev., 1147-1159 
807 In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US 264, 411-12 (1821), for the first time the USSC clearly 
recognized that the United States were immune to suit. 
808 Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 535 US 613 (2002)  
809 See Unites States v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 US 506 (1940), United 
States v Shaw, 309 US 495 (1940) and Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v Citizen Band, Potawatomi 
Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 US 505 (1991).    
810 Ibid, 620-622 quoting Gunter v Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 US 273 (1906), Gardner 
v New Jersey, 329 US 565 (1947) and Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436 (1883) (holding that 
the invocation of federal jurisdiction by States cannot lead to inconsistency and unfairness).   
811 Ibid, 624 
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“[...] do not involve the Eleventh Amendment – a specific text with a history 
that focuses upon the State’s sovereignty vis-à-vis the Federal 
Government”. In the light of Lapides v Board of Regents, federal immunity 
and state immunity are not “two sides of the same coin”. State immunity 
arises as a limit to the federal power, whereas federal immunity is not 
explained as a limit to States’ powers, but within a wider constitutional 
context. Furthermore, although it is not expressly mentioned in the wording 
of the Constitution, Articles I §8, §9812 and III§1813 not only create a solid 
basis in favour of federal immunity, but they also enshrine two special 
characteristics which evince the differences between federal and state 
immunity. Firstly, Articles I§8 and §9 US Constitution state that control of 
appropriation and the power to pay debts of the United States is allocated to 
Congress. Therefore, Congress must enact a statute authorising awards of 
monetary relief against the federal treasury before judicial relief can be 
granted. Secondly, according to Articles I and III US Constitution, Congress 
has substantial discretion over the jurisdiction of federal courts and thus, it 
could simply shape the federal jurisdiction so as to refuse suits against the 
Federal Government814. Hence, it seems that, whereas the United States can 
bring proceedings against States in federal courts (because their consent is 
deemed given in the Constitution815), States cannot suit the United States 
unless Congress has previously agreed816 to grant jurisdiction to the federal 
judiciary and to authorise money relief against the federal treasury. Finally, 
vis-à-vis private individuals, state and federal immunity have taken different 
paths. On the one hand, in the absence of a waiver, the USSC has relied on 
suits against States’ officials as a way to compensate for state immunity817. 
On the other hand, by enacting the Federal Torts Claims Act818 (FTCA), 
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814 V. JACKSON, “Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial 
Independence”, (2003) 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev., p. 546-552 
815 USA v Texas, Op cit. See also Alden Op. cit., 755 (1999) referring to Principality of 
Monaco, Op cit, 328-329 (1924)    
816 Kansas v United States, 204 US 331, 342 (1907)  
817 M. VÁZQUEZ, “Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia”, (2000) 75:3 Notre Dame L. 
Rev., 859-918 
818 See also Jackson, supra note 814, 563-567. See also H. M GOLDBERG, “Tort Liability 
for Federal Government Actions in the United States: An Overview”, in D FAIRGRIEVE, 
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Congress has decided that suits against the United States as such are the 
normal way to claim liability against the Federal Government and thus, 
claims against federal officials are almost barred819.    
 
Furthermore, the USSC held that state liability could threaten the financial 
integrity of the State and adversely affect its process of government, that is, 
States’ decision-making power would be weaken by the possibility of being 
sued. Nevertheless, one could counter argue that States could enact statutes 
which would lay down a limited liability. In other words, a limited liability 
would provide a balance between federal rights of private individuals and 
state legislative independence. In the same way, although the threat to state 
financial integrity might be partially satisfactory in cases where States act 
relying on their “imperium” to attain general interests, it is not acceptable 
when they carry out commercial activities in competitive markets. Indeed, 
in cases such as Florida Prepaid820, where States are competing on an equal 
footing with private undertakings, it is difficult to see how their financial 
integrity is affected while pursuing an economic activity intended to 
increase the state treasuries. 
 
Lastly, the USSC held that state liability not only would blur federal-state 
accountability, but it would also be contrary to the principle of separation of 
powers. The USSC believes that if as a result of breaching federal law, 
Congress could create remedies which seek monetary relief from the state 
treasuries, then States would be forced to align their policies with federal 
mandates and consequently, they would not be able to comply with their 
electorate’s wishes. It follows that not only would States’ political 
independence be undermined, but it would also be impossible to identify 
which government is the actual responsible for the positive or negative 
                                                                                                                            
M ANDENAS and J.BELL(eds.), Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative 
Perspective, London, BIIC, 2002, p. 521-539.   
819 Jackson, supra note 814, p. 565-567. Although it is true that under Bivens v Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Narcotic Agency, 403 US 388 (1971) suits against 
federal officials for constitutional violations are permitted, the USSC currently interprets 
Bivens in its terms. It is reluctant to expand suits against federal officials to other scenarios. 
In this sense, see Scweiker v Chilicky, 487 US 412(1994) or FDCI v Meyer, 510 US 471 
(1994).   
820 Florida Prepaid,  627 
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impact of such policies. Accordingly, political accountability would be 
blurred. In the same way, the USSC considers that it is for the state 
legislature and not for the (federal or state) judiciary to determine how state 
resources should be spent. In fact, empowering courts with the possibility of 
awarding damages would transform the judiciary into a decision-making 
institution on budgetary matters and thus, this would violate the principle of 
separation of powers. 
 
As a result, the USSC believes that actions for damages against 
States have both vertical and horizontal repercussions which are 
incompatible with the US Constitution. However, even if these substantive 
reasons are well founded, it seems that they do not safeguard the supremacy 
of federal law. The USSC’s reply to this objection is that the Constitution 
provides alternative remedies which render suits for damages against the 
States unnecessary. 
  
D.-  Alternative Remedies 
 
In addition to the aforementioned substantive reasons, the USSC has 
held that state liability is not a necessary instrument to secure the supremacy 
of federal law. In the USSC’s opinion, the Constitution has provided 
alternative remedies which sufficiently secure States’ compliance with 
federal law, while respecting state immunity. Therefore, it appears that the 
USSC is proud of having found a balance between States’ sovereignty and 
supremacy of federal law. These alternative remedies are, on the one hand, 
suits brought by the Federal Government and, on the other, suits for 
prospective and retrospective relief against state officials. 
 
1.-  United States as a Plaintiff 
 
States may not rely on their immunity against actions for prospective 
relief, to recover a fine or to claim damages brought by the Federal 
Government. The latter does not have to prove any interest in the case. The 
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basis of its claim may be the enforcement of a federal statute821. The USSC 
only requires that the Federal Government retains full discretion to start, 
suspend or put an end to proceedings against infringing States and 
consequently, private individuals whose rights have been infringed cannot 
compel the Federal Government to act in their defence. Nor can the Federal 
Government delegate to private individuals its privilege applicant status. 
The reason is that the USSC draws a distinction between private suits and 
suits brought by the United States, which is “entrusted with the 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed”. Indeed, 
in its opinion, unlike suits brought by private individuals, “suits brought by 
the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for 
each suit prosecuted against a State”822.  
 
However, two objections can be raised against the suitability of this remedy. 
Firstly, whereas the Federal Government would most certainly start 
proceedings against States whose breach of federal law adversely affects the 
population at large, it is doubtful that it would do the same in cases where 
violations only affect a few private individuals823. Secondly, “political 
responsibility” is a concept not necessarily related to States’ compliance 
with federal law. Indeed, the Federal Government might not be interested in 
filing a suit against an infringing State because it might have adverse 
repercussions in the political arena. Thus, the aim of this remedy is not as 
much to protect the rights of individuals as to protect the interests of the 
Federal Government. As long as there is an overlap between the two of 
them, judicial protection of private rights is ensured. Nonetheless, if there is 
a conflict of interests, “political responsibility” might prevail over 
effectiveness of federal rights. 
 
                                                 
821 See Chapter I in relation to standing. This is not the case for States. In the light of New 
Hamsphire v Louisiana, 108 US 76, 91 (1883), a State cannot enforce a private right 
against another State. 
822 See Alden, 756 
823 Vazquez, supra note 817, p. 871 
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From private individuals’ standpoint, suits for prospective or 
retrospective relief against state officials appear to be the only available way 
to enforce their federal rights. 
 
2.-  Suits for Prospective relief: Ex parte Young 
 
Federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate in cases where private 
individuals or entities seek injunctions against state officials who breach 
federal law. In Ex parte Young824, the attorney general of Minnesota sought 
to rely on the Eleventh Amendment to avoid complying with a Circuit Court 
order, pursuant to which Minnesota’s railroad rates scheme was 
unconstitutional and thus, had to be eliminated. However, the USSC upheld 
the Circuit Court mandamus. It ruled that unconstitutional acts cannot be 
attributed to the States of the Union and consequently, whenever a state 
official violates federal law, he is “stripped of his official or representative 
character and is subjected to the consequences of his individuals 
conduct”825. Thus, although sovereign immunity prevents individuals from 
suing States, the so-called “Ex parte Young” doctrine allows them to seek an 
injunction against their state officials.  
However, since States can only act through their officials, a suit for 
prospective relief against the latter is indeed a suit for prospective relief 
against the former. As a result, since the distinction between the addressees 
of the injunction is purely formalistic, the USSC has finally accepted that Ex 
parte Young doctrine is in fact a derogation from the Eleventh 
Amendment826. 
 
In order to rely on this remedy, the application must fulfil two 
conditions. Firstly, there must be an alleged violation of federal law. 
Secondly, the application must address an ongoing violation, that is, 
applicants cannot seek compensation or retrospective relief for past 
violations.  
                                                 
824 Ex parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908) 
825 Ibid, 160 
826 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Haldermann, 465 US 89, 105 (1984). 
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Nevertheless, following the same trend as it did in relation to 
congressional powers under Article I and under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the USSC has also narrowed down the Ex parte Young Doctrine in favour of 
States’ sovereign interests. In this sense, in Seminole Tribe827 the applicant 
based its application on two pleas, namely, they suited Florida claiming that 
it had breached the IRGA and sought prospective relief against the 
Governor (who, in spite of being obliged by this federal statute to enter into 
the formation of a compact, did not do so). As mentioned above, the USSC 
declared the IRGA unconstitutional on the ground that Congress lacked 
power under Article I US Constitution to abrogate States’ immunity. As for 
the second plea, the USSC refused to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine, 
holding that, since the IRGA laid down suits against the States, it also 
implicitly pre-empted suits against state officials. As a result, the application 
was dismissed in its integrity.   
 
In the same way, in Coeur d’Alene828, the USSC dealt with an 
entitlement dispute between Idaho officials and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
over the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene. The Tribe filed 
an Ex parte Young injunction aiming at prohibiting state officials from 
taking any further regulatory action in violation of its federal rights in lands. 
However, the USSC refused to grant an injunction. In the USSC’s opinion, 
where special sovereignty interests of States are at stake or where a 
prospective relief becomes as intrusive as an award of damages against the 
State, Ex-parte Young is not applicable. Otherwise, the principle of state 
sovereign immunity would be reduced to “an empty formalism”829. 
  
Whereas the limitation of the Ex parte Young doctrine in Seminole 
Tribe only shifted the burden of proof to Congress, which is now required to 
expressly mention that federal action against States does not prevent private 
individuals from relying on prospective relief against state officials; Coeur 
d’Alene is an important curtail to this remedy. Indeed, the exercise of 
                                                 
827 Seminole Tribe,  44  
828 Idaho v Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 US 261 (1996) 
829 Ibid, 270 
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federal jurisdiction is not conditioned upon protecting the US Constitution 
and federal law alone, but it must also take into account state sovereign 
interests. In other words, this remedy which, in the USSC’s opinion, would 
secure the supremacy of federal law is also submitted to the Eleventh 
Amendment. In so far as suits for prospective relief do not adversely affect 
the States’ most valuable interests, this remedy would be available to private 
individuals and entities. Nevertheless, even if federal law has been 
manifestly breached by a state official, the latter would be protected by the 
Eleventh Amendment if Ex parte Young would turn out to be “too 
intrusive”.  
 
However, as dissenting Justices pointed out in Coeur d’Alene830, it is 
difficult to distinguish this case from others where federal rights have been 
granted to private individuals. It seems that an injunction against an 
economic regulatory activity (as it was in Ex parte Young) is as intrusive as 
one against the regulation of the use of land. Besides, Ex parte Young is per 
se “intrusive” since “state officials [...] are almost always doing what their 
States’ legislative and administrative authorities intend them to do”. Thus, 
this evisceration of Ex parte Young is depriving individuals from an 
effective prospective relief, not only because the USSC did not specify what 
“special sovereign interests” means, but also because the USSC seems to 
justify state officials’ impunity for unlawful breaches of valid federal law, 
leading to a clear infringement of the principle of supremacy of federal law, 
and most importantly, of the rule of law.  However, in defence of the 
USSC’s reasoning, one could object that, since Idaho had waived its 
sovereign immunity in its own courts, federal rights could still be protected. 
The Coeur d’Alene Tribe could consequently rely on state courts to apply 
federal law831. Therefore, the USSC is eager to reinforce the principle of 
subsidiary: As it did in Florida Prepaid, before granting federal courts with 
jurisdiction which would undermine States’ immunity, due account has to 
be taken of the remedies available at state courts. 
 
                                                 
830 Ibid,  311 
831 Ibid, 274-276 
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3.-  Suits for retrospective relief: state official’s liability 
 
Furthermore, prospective relief in itself is not sufficient to ensure 
that state officials will comply with federal law. As a matter of fact, this 
remedy is only suitable to put an end to current or prospective violations of 
federal law. It is not however an appropriate mean to render States liable for 
infringements already committed. In other words, had the Constitution only 
allowed individuals to seek prospective relief, there would be many, albeit 
temporary, violations of federal law. Thus, in order to secure the supremacy 
of federal law, violations of federal law not only have to be stopped, but 
also deterred. In the USSC’s opinion, suits claiming damages against state 
officials acting in their individual capacity are the deterrent element by 
which violations of federal law would be prevented. 
 
State official’s liability for breach of Constitutional and federal rights is laid 
down in § 1983832 and it is also completed by the USSC case-law. Private 
individuals can indistinctly start proceedings either before federal or state 
courts. In the latter case, since the claim for damages is based on federal 
law, state statutes limiting the liability of sate officials are inapplicable833. 
 
 
Moreover, pursuant to the USSC, this remedy is subjected to two 
limitations. Firstly, state officials enjoy “qualified immunity”834 which 
“reflects an attempt to balance competing values: not only the importance of 
a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizen […], but also the need to 
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority”835. Thus, the USSC has set up a threshold of liability which 
deters state officials from breaching federal law, while ensuring that they 
                                                 
832 For 42 USC § 1983, see Annex.  
833 Howlett v Rose, 496 US 356 (1990). See F.L. MORRISON, “The Liability of 
Governments for Legislative Acts in the United States of America”, (1998) 46 
Am.J.Comp.L.531-547. 
834 Nevertheless, judges [Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 232 (1978)], prosecutors [Butz v 
Economou, 438 US 478 (1978)] and legislators [Eastland v Unite States Servicemen’ Fund, 
421 US 491 (1975)] are entitled to “absolute immunity”.  
835 Butz v Economou, Op cit, 504-506  
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will carry out their tasks with normality, that is, over-deterrence must also 
be avoided. Ensuring the supremacy of federal law must not simultaneously 
entail that valid state law is not applied by fearful state officials. 
 
In this sense, the USSC has held that state officials are liable for breach of 
federal law in so far as the law violated was “clearly established”836. In 
other words, the USSC applies a test “which focuses on the objective legal 
reasonableness of an official’s acts”837 and thus, his subjective good faith is 
irrelevant838. Where the state official is “expected to know” that his conduct 
was in breach of statutory or constitutional rights, then injured parties can 
bring an action for damages against the state official. 
As a result, a mere breach of federal law is not sufficient to render the state 
official liable, it is necessary that “a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right”839. 
 
Secondly, they can only be sued in their individual capacity, that is, 
applications must seek compensation from state official’s personnel 
resources, but not from the state treasury. This distinction was drawn by the 
USSC in Edelman v Jordan840. There, the applicant brought a class action 
against a state official seeking to recover the money which Illinois had 
withheld in breach of a federal statute.  The USSC dismissed the 
application, holding that “a suit by private parties seeking to impose a 
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment”. However, the USSC did not indicate the 
reasons for dismissing the application. What was the distinguishing element 
in Edelman that precluded officials’ liability? Mr. Eldeman did not seek 
damages for Illinois’ wrongfully withholding of aid. Instead, his application 
was limited to recovering the money. Said differently, Edelman’s claim was 
not an action in tort but in restitution. Likewise, as the principle of agency 
                                                 
836 Harlow v Fitzgerald,  457 US 800, 801 (1982). 
837 Ibid, 818 
838 J. JEFFRIES Jr. “In praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983”, (1998) 84 
Va. L. Rev. 47-82. In accordance with Jeffries, some constitutional violations require more 
than “negligence”, they require a particular intention or purpose, e.g. racial discrimination.  
839 Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635 (1987) 
840 Eldelman v Jordan,  415 US 651 (1974) 
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states, “a servant is liable for torts committed in the master’s business, but 
the servant is not responsible for master’s contract”841. Hence, it seems that 
the USSC distinguishes between actions in torts and actions in contract, the 
former are admissible under § 1983, whereas the latter are barred by the 
Eleventh amendment842. 
 
However, the difference between obtaining compensation from the state 
official’s own resources and from the state treasury is blurred by a 
widespread system of indemnification, pursuant to which damage judgments 
rendered against state officials are usually, directly or indirectly, paid by the 
State. As Vázquez points out843, prospective state officials will consider the 
risk of being sued for violation of federal law before accepting to work for 
the State. Thus, the State will have either to pay the judgment directly, 
indemnify the official or get a less competent employee844. Accordingly, the 
economic risk for an eventual breach of federal law is not supported, at least 
in its integrity, by the state official, but they are a burden on the state 
treasury. It follows that, since state officials do not suffer the economic 
consequences of their wrongdoing, through the system of indemnification 
States are “dampening the incentive to comply with federal law”845.  
 
Nevertheless, one could raise four arguments in favour of the 
deterring suitability of this remedy846. Firstly, States are not legally obliged 
to indemnify their officials. Secondly, States could set a maximum for 
indemnification. Thirdly, States could refuse to indemnify in cases where 
the official incurred in gross negligence or wilful misconduct. Lastly, the 
official will be called to court and would suffer the embarrassment of 
having been found responsible for violating federal law. However, these 
arguments do not appear to be entirely convincing. 
                                                 
841 Jeffries Jr, supra note 838 , p. 66 
842 Ibid, p. 67-68 
843 Vázquez, supra note 817, p. 880-888 
844 Ibid, 880 
845 Ibid, 883 
846 JH CHOPER and JC YOO, “Who’s afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The limited 
impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings”, (2006) 106:1 Colum. L. Rev., 213-261 
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Although States are not legally compelled to indemnify state officials, they 
are economically. As previously mentioned, actions for damages against 
state officials transfer the economic risk for violations of federal law to 
States and consequently, they will direct or indirectly have to suffer that 
burden. 
Moreover, denying indemnification in cases of gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct would push the threshold of deterrence to a higher level than the 
one applied by the USSC in the “clearly established” test. In the same way, 
the level of deterrence will not be established in accordance with the case-
law of the USSC, but by States’ discretion. As for capping indemnification, 
its deterrence force would depend on the amount that the State has agreed to 
cover. The lower it is, the more deterring it will be. However, by fixing a 
maximum indemnification, not only do States take into account the level of 
deterrence to ensure an appropriate compliance with federal law, but also 
other policy considerations, such as the necessary amount to attract 
competent employees or how much resources they want to spend to cover 
officials’ liability in detriment to other expenses. In other words, by fixing a 
maximum indemnification, the degree of compliance with federal law 
would depend on a series of economic factors, all of which would depend 
on each State’s budgetary policy. Finally, although it is true that a state 
official who is found responsible of having violated federal or constitutional 
rights will have to suffer the embarrassment of his misbehaviour, it does not 
appear sufficient to leave the deterring strength of this remedy and 
consequently, the supremacy of federal law in the hands of the moral values 
of the state officials.  
 
Consequently, as it currently stands, since States assume the 
economic risks for violations of federal law committed by state officials, 
suits for damages against the latter do not provide a sufficient degree of 
deterrence to ensure the supremacy of federal law. 
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II.-   The Principle of State Liability under EC Law 
 
A.-  Concept 
 
The principle of state liability implies that where a Member State has 
seriously breached Community rights, individuals are entitled to reparation 
for the damages suffered. It is thus a retrospective remedy, which has a 
financial nature. Besides, state liability can also be seen as an economic 
sanction against infringing Member States, it is for the latter to assume the 
economic repercussions of their wrongdoing, and not for the injured parties. 
It follows that as most judicial remedies in a federal system, state liability 
has a double dimension: it renders effective individual federal rights, whilst 
it keeps national governments under the rule of federal law847.   
 
The ECJ has consistently ruled that in spite of being enforced by 
national courts, the principle of state liability must be determined by 
referring to the conditions laid down by the ECJ in Francovich848 and 
Brasserie849. It is therefore an independent concept, which does not have to 
take into account additional requirements of national tort law. 
 
Moreover, the ECJ does not distinguish among the branches of the State 
liable for having violated Community law. On the contrary, it considers that 
it is the Member State as a whole which has committed the infringement850. 
Accordingly, the same conditions of liability apply irrespectively of whether 
the violation has been committed by the (regional or central) 
Government851, the legislature852, the judiciary853 or public authorities854. 
                                                 
847 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 756 
848 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich & Others, [1991] ECR I-5357 
849 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA and Factortame III, [1996] 
ECR I-1029. See also RW DAVIS, Liability in damages for a Breach of Community Law: 
Some reflections on who to sue and the concept of State, (2006) 31:1 E. L. Rev., 69-80. G. 
ANAGNOSTARAS, the allocation of responsibility in state liability actions: a modern 
Gordian knot?" (2001) 26 E. L. Rev.139 at 152-153. 
850 Brasserie, supra note 849, P 34 
851 Case C-302/97, Konle v Austria, [1999] ECR I-3099, Para 62. 
852 Brasserie, Para 35 
853 C-224/01, Köbler v Austria, [2003] I-10239. 
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Furthermore, the principle of state liability has been influenced by and 
has subsequently influenced the principle of non-contractual liability of the 
Community institutions. At first, the ECJ inferred from Article 288 EC, 
which embodies the principle of non-contractual liability of the Community, 
that there is a general principle of liability of public authorities, familiar to 
the legal systems of the Member States and recognised by the Community 
legal order855. Thus, not only Community institutions, but also Member 
States are liable when they breached Community law. Later, in 
Bergadem856, in order to determine whether the European Commission was 
liable for breach of Community law, the ECJ applied the conditions laid 
down by its case-law on state liability. Thus, there has been a mutual 
influence or crossed-fertilization857 between the two principles, which 
submits Member States and the Community to the same standard of 
liability. 
 
In addition, the principle of state liability has also influenced national 
administrative law. Indeed, nowadays the conditions of liability of public 
authorities for breach of national law are often analogue to the ones laid 
down by the ECJ for breach of Community law. Hence, there has been a 
spill-over effect which is leading, in the words of Van Gerven858, to the 
creation of a “jus commune europeus” in liability of public authorities.  
 
As a result, the characteristics of the principle state liability under EC 
law are threefold, namely, independence in its definition, uniformity and 
universality in its application, and a harmonizing aptitude. 
 
                                                                                                                            
854 Case C-424/97 Haim II [2000] E.C.R. I-5123. See also Case C-118/00, Larsy II [2001] 
E.C.R. I-5063  
855 Brasserie, Para 29 
856 C-352/98P, Bergadem v Commission, [2000] ECR I-5291. 
857 T. TRIDIMAS, The General Principles of EC Law, ( Oxford: OUP, 2 ed, 2006) 
858 W VAN GERVEN, “The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Area of Tort 
Law: the EU Contribution”, in D FAIRGRIEVE, M ANDENAS and J.BELL(eds.), Tort 
Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective, London, BIIC, 2002, p.   
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B.-  The Break-trough: Francovich 
 
Until 1991 when Francovich was decided, the ECJ had held that it was 
for the national law to decide whether individuals could claim damages 
arising from violations of EC law. In Russo v AIMA, the Court’s reply to 
this question was that the State was “liable to the injured party of the 
consequences in the context of the provisions of national law on the liability 
of the State” 859. The ECJ’s self-restraint can be explained by its ruling in 
Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel, where it held that “the treaty was not intended to 
create new remedies”860. In other words, the ECJ believed that the principle 
of procedural autonomy counterbalanced by the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness provided an adequate level of judicial protection to 
Community rights and consequently, additional remedies were not 
required861. 
 
By embracing the principle of state liability for breach of Community 
Law, the ECJ brought the missing piece in its vision of Community 
remedies. Thus, along with Simmenthal862, Johnston863and Factortame I864, 
Francovich can be considered as one of the landmark cases of the ECJ in 
providing national courts with judicial instruments aiming at enforcing the 
effectiveness of EC Law865. Due to its unquestionable importance, this case 
is discussed in detail. 
 
The facts of the case can be summarised as follows. Italy had failed to 
implement Directive 80/987/EEC866, which compelled Member States to 
provide specific guarantees of payment of unpaid wage claims.  Mr. 
Francovich and Ms. Bonifaci867 brought proceedings against their former 
                                                 
859 Case 60/75, Russo v AIMA, [1976] ECR 45 
860 Case 158/80, Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel, [1981] ECR 1805. 
861 See Cases 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989 and 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043 
862 Case 106/77, Simmenthal, [1970] ECR  629 
863 Case C-222/84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] 
ECR 1651. 
864 Case C-213/89, Factortame I, [1990] ECR I-2433 
865 Tridimas, supra note 857, Chapter 11. 
866 OJ 1980 L 283/23-27 
867 The proceedings were brought by Ms Bonifaci and 33 other employees.  
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employers seeking the payment of their wages. However, as a result of their 
employer’s insolvency and since under Italian law there were no guarantees 
to cover their unpaid wages, the applicants brought proceedings against Italy 
seeking compensation. 
In a preliminary reference procedure, two Italian courts asked the ECJ 
firstly whether  the plaintiffs could rely on the Directive to oblige Italy to 
pay the guarantee laid down therein. Secondly, if the previous question were 
answered in the negative, they asked whether the plaintiff could claim 
damages against the infringing Member State868. 
 
Firstly, the ECJ found that the provisions of the Directive concerning the 
identity of the beneficiaries and the scope of the rights were unconditional 
and sufficiently precise to give rise to direct effect. However, this was not 
the case regarding the person liable869. Indeed, in pursuance with the 
Directive, the Member States had two possibilities when choosing the 
methods of financing the guarantee institution, namely either it was financed 
by the employers or by public authorities. Hence, since the Member States 
enjoyed some discretion in the implementing process, the provisions of the 
Directive were not sufficiently unconditional and precise to give rise to 
directly enforceable rights. 
 
Secondly, as for claiming damages, the ECJ answered in the 
affirmative. The ECJ held that the EC Treaty has created its own legal 
system, whose subjects are not only the Member States, but also their 
nationals. It added that Community law can impose obligations and grant 
rights to individuals, which are to be found not only in the wording of the 
EC Treaty, but also by virtue of the obligations clearly imposed on the 
Member States, Community Institutions or other individuals. In this 
sense, it is for the national courts to give full effect to Community law 
and to protect these rights. Then, the Court went on to rule that: 
“The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the 
protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals 
                                                 
868 Francovich, 7 
869 Ibid, 25-26 
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were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of 
Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible.  
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly 
indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules 
is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in 
the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national 
courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law.  
It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and 
damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for 
which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the 
Treaty.”870  
 
Additionally, the ECJ stressed that Article 10 EC can be considered as 
a further basis for state liability. It argued that the principle of loyal 
cooperation enshrined in Article 10 EC, according to which Member 
States must take “all appropriate measures […] to ensure fulfilment of 
their obligations under Community law”, obliges the latter to “nullify the 
unlawful consequences of a breach of Community law”871 . 
 
Moreover, the ECJ enounced the three conditions which must be 
fulfilled in order to render a Member State liable for violating EC law. 
Firstly, the implementation of the Directive should result in granting 
rights to individuals. Secondly, the Directive itself should suffice to 
identify the content of those rights. Finally, there must be a casual link 
between the breach of the infringing Member State and loss or damage 
suffered by the individual872. 
 
Moreover, even though in a preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ is 
not deemed to rule on the case at issue, but it is for the national court to 
decide in the light of its ruling, the ECJ went all the way, providing the 
Italian courts with an outcome. It held that, since the aforementioned 
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conditions were fulfilled, the referring courts should uphold the rights of 
Mr Francovich and Ms Bonifaci in obtaining compensation from Italy for 
the loss or damage suffered as a result of the non-implementation of 
Directive 80/987. 
C.-  Legal Basis 
 
In Francovich, the ECJ’s rationale was based on two principles, 
namely, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of cooperation.  
1.-  Principle of Effectiveness 
 
The principle of effectiveness can be defined as the teleological 
interpretation of the constitutional principles of primacy and direct effect873, 
that is to say, the transformation of “programmatic principles” into “judicial 
instruments”.  
Since the enforcement of Community law is decentralised, national courts 
play a fundamental role in ensuring that Community rights are respected. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Community law would prevail over 
national law and be directly enforceable at national courts, did the latter 
have no power to render these postulates real. Consequently, the more 
empowered national courts are, the more respected primacy and direct effect 
will be874.  
 
Furthermore, in relation to national procedural rules, the principle of 
effectiveness can be assessed from a double perspective. On the one hand, it 
can be seen as a “negative judicial power”, that is, by virtue of the 
principles of primacy and direct effect, national courts have the authority to 
set aside any national procedural rule which undermines the effectiveness of 
Community law. On the other hand, it can also be considered as a “positive 
judicial power”, which enables national courts to create new remedies, 
                                                 
873 Tridimas, supra note 857, Chapter 9. 
874 M ACCETTO and S ZLEPTNIG, The principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking its Role in 
Community law, (2005) 11:3  EPL, pp 375-403. See Also F SNYDER, The Effectiveness 
of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, (1993) 56 
MLR , pp 19-54 
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where the existing national ones are not adequate to guarantee a sufficient 
level of protection of Community rights. In addition, whereas the first aspect 
only implies purifying national rules of procedure in the light of Community 
law, the second involves the creation of new remedies via judicial 
interpretation. Hence, it is clear that effectiveness seen as a way to cover 
remedial gaps is more intrusive, than setting aside national rules of 
procedure. 
 
In fact, this distinction can be found in the evolving case-law of the 
ECJ. At first, the ECJ held in Simmenthal875 that national courts had the 
power to set aside any provision, including of constitutional ranking, which 
“might impair the effectiveness of Community law”. However, at the same 
time, the ECJ refused to grant national courts with a “positive judicial 
power”, that is, creating new remedies was out of the question876. 
At second stage, the ECJ realised that setting aside national provisions 
inconsistent with Community law was not sufficient to ensure a suitable 
level of judicial protection, in particular, where there were remedial lacunas 
in national law. To this end, in Johnston877, the ECJ held that a certificate 
issued by the Secretary of State precluding any judicial review as to its 
compatibility with Directive 76/207878 was in breach of Community law. 
The ECJ stated that “the right to obtain an effective remedy in a competent 
court against measures which they consider to be contrary to the principle 
of equal treatment” was a General Principle of Community Law and thus, it 
was for the Member States to take all appropriate measures capable of 
securing an effective judicial control. In other words, the ECJ urged the 
Member States to create new remedies where necessary. In the same way, in 
Factortame I 879, the House of Lords asked the ECJ whether, owing to the 
fact that under English law the judiciary was unable to grant interim relief 
against an act of Parliament, such power could be derived from Community 
law. The ECJ answered in the affirmative and consequently, British courts 
                                                 
875 Simmenthal, supra note 862, Para 22 
876 Rewe, supra 860. 
877Johnston, supra 863, Para 19. 
878 OJ 1976 L 39/ 40–42. 
879 Factortame I, supra note 863, P  
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were bestowed with a new prospective remedy, which ran counter to the 
ancient principle of parliamentary supremacy. Thus, the ECJ took a step 
further: not only are Member States obliged to create effective remedies, but 
also Community law in itself can grant national courts with the necessary 
instrumental power to ensure an effective judicial protection. 
 
Lastly, as Tridimas points out, Francovich can be seen as the 
ultimate step toward the full enforcement of the principles of primacy and 
direct effect880. The facts of the case demonstrate that the applicant did not 
have other remedies, but to claim damages against Italy. Indeed, since the 
provisions of the non-implemented Directive lacked direct effect, the latter 
could not be enforced before the national courts. As a result, not only would 
the plaintiffs be deprived from any remedy, but also this remedial gap would 
put into question the binding capacities of non-implemented Directives. 
Hence, in the light of its previous case-law, Francovich seems to be a 
consistent development. Firstly, by closing a remedial gap, it enhanced the 
protection of Community rights. Secondly, the ECJ completed the range of 
remedies arising from Community law. Not only can national courts grant 
prospective, but also retrospective relief. Finally, by shifting the economic 
burden of non-implemented Directives, it reinforced their binding character 
and thus, their effectiveness. 
 
2.-  Principle of Loyal Cooperation: Article 10 EC 
 
The principle of loyal cooperation imposes two types of obligations on 
the Member States. On the one hand, they must adopt all the necessary 
measures to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty, as well as to facilitate 
the task of the Community Institutions. On the other, they must refrain from 
adopting any measure capable of putting at risk the objectives of the 
Treaty881. 
 
                                                 
880 Tridimas, supra  857,  
881 Accetto & Zleptnig, supra note 874, P 386-388 
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Therefore, Article 10 EC has been relied upon by the ECJ in order to 
impose additional obligations on the Member States. This treaty provision is 
a legal basis which favours the teleological interpretation of Community 
provisions, that is, their “effet utile”. Although Article 10 does not have 
direct effect, in conjunction with other provisions of the Treaty, it is a 
powerful instrument882. In other words, Article 10 operates as a “catalyst of 
European integration”. It does not produce any effects in itself, but in 
reaction with other principles, it causes great change. Indeed, Article 10 EC 
is not a substantive provision. It requires cooperation from the Member 
States, but it does not specify either in which subject-matters or to what 
extent Member States must cooperate. Consequently, the ECJ has relied on 
this provision in a large variety of cases883, but always with the same goal in 
mind: fostering the enforcement of European law. It follows that it is not 
surprising that the ECJ also relied on Article 10 EC to enhance the 
consistency of its ruling in Francovich.   
 
D.-  From filling in a lacuna to a General Principle: Joined Cases 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III 
 
In these cases884, Brasserie du Pêcheur, a French brewery, sought 
compensation from Germany for the loss of earning resulting from German 
legislation on Beer purity which, pursuant to a previous judgment of the 
ECJ885, was in breach of Article 28 EC (free movement of goods). Likewise, 
Factortame, a British company but whose vessels and shareholder were 
Spanish, claimed damages against the UK arising from the Merchant 
Shipping Act, whose incompatibility with Article 43 EC (freedom of 
establishment) was upheld by the ECJ in Factortame II886.  
 
                                                 
882 A. ARNULL, The European Union and its Court of Justice, (Oxford, OUP: 1999), p  
93. 
883 For a general overview of the cases in which this principle has been applied, see JT 
LANG, Developments, issues and new remedies- The duties of national authorities and 
courts under Article 10 of the EC Treaty. (2004)  27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1904-1939. 
884 See P. OLIVER, Case Note (1997) 34 CML Rev., pp 635-680  
885 Case 178/84, Commission v Germany, (“Beer Purity Case”) [1978] ECR1227.  
886 Case C-221/89 Factortame II [1991] ECR I-3905. 
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 The differences between Brasserie and Francovich are twofold. On 
the one hand, whereas in Francovich the Community measure infringed was 
not directly enforceable, both Articles 28 and 43 EC have direct effect. On 
the other hand, whereas the damage in Francovich was the result of the 
Italy’s inaction (failure to implement a Directive), in Brasserie the damage 
was the direct result of legislative activity.  
 
 Therefore, as Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands argued887, 
Francovich could have been interpreted restrictively. The principle of state 
liability should be limited to cases where individuals do not have alternative 
remedies. Hence, since Articles 28 and 43 EC are directly effective, state 
liability should be precluded. Furthermore, applying this principle to cases 
where the legislature is involved not only would be contrary to the principle 
of separation of powers (it is for the legislature to create remedies and not 
for the judiciary), but it would also threaten its independence888. 
 
  However, the ECJ rejected both arguments and decided to expand 
Francovich. It held that direct effect was a “minimum guarantee”, adding 
that it was not an adequate remedy in cases where the damage was already 
produced.  As for the principle of separation of powers, the ECJ pointed out 
that deciding whether violations of Community law committed by national 
legislatures give rise to damages was a “question of Treaty interpretation 
which falls within the competences of the Court”889. In relation to the 
independence of the legislature, owing to the fact that all domestic 
authorities are bound by Community law, the ECJ deduced that the violation 
of community law should be attributed to the Member State as a whole. The 
fact that the infringing authority was the legislature is thus irrelevant. As a 
result, the ECJ ruled that in so far as the conditions of liability are fulfilled, 
legislative activity in breach of Community law may give rise to financial 
reparation.  
 
                                                 
887 Brasserie, 18 
888 Ibid, 24 
889 Ibid, 27 
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As for the conditions of liability, the ECJ introduced the new 
concept of “serious breach”. The ECJ recognised that in implementing 
Community policies, Member States may enjoy some discretion. Therefore, 
not every violation of Community law gives rise to a right to reparation. In 
addition, the infringing Member State must have “manifestly and gravely 
disregarded the limits on its discretion”.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from Brasserie. Firstly, the ECJ 
opted for a cumulative use of remedies and upgraded state liability from a 
specific solution to a remedial gap to a General Principle of EC law890. 
Therefore, this case demonstrates that not only is the ECJ determined to 
create new remedies, but it is also willing to defend their universal 
application. Secondly, the concept of serious breach appears to be consistent 
with the principle of effectiveness of Community law, whilst avoiding over 
deterrence on Member States by the prospect of actions for damages.   
 
E.-  Conditions of State Liability 
 
Although based on the general tort principle of “neminen laedere”, state 
liability of public authorities has special features, such as the attainment of 
tasks of general interests, which may limit its scope in various ways. In fact, 
in order to preserve a fair balance between public interests and private 
rights, any breach of EC law does not lead inter alia to a right to reparation. 
Therefore, Member States’ unlawfulness is not always automatically 
translated into state liability. 
It is thus indispensable that additional requirements are met, namely [1] the 
law infringed was intended to confer rights to individuals, [2] the existence 
of a serious breach and [3] a direct causal link between the violation of EC 
law and the damage. Whereas the existence of the two first conditions can 
be determined by the ECJ trough a preliminary reference procedure, 
determining whether there is a direct causal link falls within the 
competences of the national courts. Moreover, the ECJ has pointed out that 
                                                 
890 See Opinion of AG Tesauro in Brasserie, 23-34 
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the Member States are not precluded from lowering down the threshold of 
liability under national law. It follows that by enouncing these three 
conditions, the ECJ compelled the Member States to attain a minimum 
degree of diligence while acting in the sphere of Community law.   It is to 
the study of these three cumulative conditions that I now turn. 
 
1.-  The law infringed was intended to confer rights on individuals. 
 
As Francovich shows, this first condition cannot be confused with direct 
effect. Indeed, a Community provision can be “intended to confer rights on 
individuals” and nevertheless, not be unconditional or lack sufficient 
precision to be directly effective891.  Put differently, a non-directly effective 
provision can give rise to state liability. Indeed, by contrast to direct effect, 
in order to determine whether a Community provision is intended to confer 
rights to individuals, it is sufficient that the beneficiary of that right and its 
content are ascertainable. In other words, it is not necessary for the 
Community provision to determine against whom this right may be 
enforced. It follows that for the purpose of state liability, conferring 
Community rights is a less stringent requirement than the “sufficient 
precision and unconditionality” of direct effect.   
 
Furthermore, Community provisions intending to confer rights on 
individuals must aim at protecting specific or individual interests, and not 
only merely public or general interests.  The question than then arises is 
whether the protection of individual interests must be the main objective of 
the Community provision, or whether it suffices with the inclusion of 
individual interests in its general scope of protection892. Until Peter Paul893, 
it would seem that the ECJ’s answer was rather that the protection of 
individual interests as the specific goal of the Community measure was not 
                                                 
891 S PRECHAL, Member State Liability and Direct Effect: What’s the Difference after 
all?, (2006) EBL Rev, 299-316.  
892 Ibid, 310-315 
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required894. However, in Peter Paul, the ECJ took a different approach. The 
ECJ held that from the fact that Banking Directives impose obligations on 
regulatory authorities vis-à-vis credit institutions, or that the protection of 
depositors is also included among their objectives; it does not follow that 
these Directives intended to confer rights on individuals as a result of 
defective supervision. By ensuring the mutual recognition of authorizations 
and of prudential supervision systems, the ECJ stressed that Banking 
Directives focussed on harmonizing the banking sector and consequently, 
liability for defective supervision fell outside their scope895. As a result, 
Peter Paul evinces that the protection of individual interests cannot be an 
incidental objective of the Community provision, the latter will be deemed 
to confer rights on individuals where it directly seeks to protect them. 
 
2.-  Serious breach 
 
In Brasserie, the ECJ held that a breach of Community law is 
sufficiently serious where the Member State concerned “has manifestly and 
gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion”896. In paragraph 56, the ECJ 
gave some guidelines to be taken into account by national courts when 
considering the seriousness of the breach, namely “the clarity and precision 
of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the 
national or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the 
damage caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law 
was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a 
Community institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the 
adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to 
Community law. […] On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly 
be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the 
infringement in question to be established or a preliminary ruling or settled 
                                                 
894 Joined Cases C-178, C-179, C-188 to 190/94 Dillenkofer [1996] ECR I-4845, paras 36-
39. 
895 Peter Paul, supra note 893, 40-43 
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case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct 
in question constituted an infringement.” 897  
 
Thus, it seems that the seriousness of the breach is intrinsically linked to 
the notion of discretion. The more discretion is enjoyed by the Member 
State, the less likely it is for the breach to be serious. Conversely, where 
Member States have no discretion, a mere breach of EC law would suffice 
to consider it as serious. In this sense, in Dillenkofer898 the ECJ held that, 
since Germany did not enjoy any discretion to defer the implementation of 
Directive 90/314/EEC899, its late transposition was per se a serious 
breach900.  Likewise in Hedley Lomas901, the UK had refused to issue export 
licences of live sheep to Spain on the sole ground that Spanish slaughter 
houses did not comply with Directive 74/577/EEC902. The English Court 
referred two questions to the ECJ. Firstly, it asked whether the UK could 
rely on Article 30 EC to refuse to issue exports licences. Secondly, if the 
first question was answered in the negative, whether traders, who had 
suffered loss caused by the UK’s failure to grant export licences, had a right 
to reparation. The ECJ answered that the Directive precluded Member 
States from relying on Article 30 EC and thus, the UK could not justify its 
violation of the freedom to export goods. As for the possibility of claiming 
                                                 
897 Ibid, 56 In this sense, in relation to the German law on Beer Purity, the ECJ held that 
German provisions which prohibited the marketing under the designation of “bier” of 
products manufactured in accordance with rules other than the “Biersteuergesetz”, were 
clearly a serious breach. The reason being is that under its previous ruling “Cassis de 
Dijon”, German law would be clearly incompatible and thus, it could not be seen as an 
excusable error. Conversely, since its case-law on the use of additives was not clearly 
defined, the ECJ stated that German provisions banning the use of additives could not be 
considered as a serious breach. (Ibid. 59) In the same way, concerning the Merchant 
Shipping Act, the ECJ stated that by enacting provisions which required British nationality 
as a condition for registration of vessels, UK legislation was directly discriminatory and 
hence, it had committed a serious breach. However, in relation to the requirements of 
residence and domicile, the ECJ held that, though these conditions breached prima facie 
Article 43 EC, the UK had sought to justify them under common fisheries policy (Ibid, 61-
63) 
898 Dillenkofer, supra note 894, P 26-27 By contrast, a plaintiff seeking compensation from 
a Member State which has defectively implemented a Directive before the deadline, would 
need to prove the seriousness of the infringement. See Case C-392/93, The Queen v H. M. 
Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications plc, [1996] ECR I-1631, also Case C-63/01, 
Evans [2003] ECR I-14447. 
899 OJ 1990 L 158/59 
900 G. HILSON, “Liability of Member States in damages: The place of discretion”, (1997) 
46 ICLQ, 941-946.  
901 Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553 
902 OJ 1974 L 316 L/ 10–11. 
 268 
damages, the ECJ pointed out that, since the UK did not enjoy any 
discretion, its refusal to issue export licenses was considered to be a serious 
breach.  
 
Furthermore, in Haim II903, the ECJ held that in order to determine the 
seriousness of the breach, the degree of discretion enjoyed by domestic 
authorities under national law is irrelevant. It is only by reference to 
Community law that discretion must be measured. 
 
Lastly, in Brasserie, the ECJ indicated that the concept of serious breach 
cannot be regarded as the possibility of making reparation conditional upon 
the existence of intentional fault or negligence. It clarified that additional 
requirements based on this notion, which go beyond the concept of serious 
breach, are forbidden.904 
 
Therefore, despite the fact that the concept of serious breach gives some 
flexibility to the national judiciary, the ECJ has introduced some uniformity. 
Indeed, national courts must not pay attention to the intentions of the 
infringing State, but to the general circumstances in which the breach 
occurred. As a result, it seems that “serious breach” is based on objective 
criteria. 
3.-  Direct casual link 
 
As mentioned above, it is for the national court to decide whether there 
is a direct casual link between the breach of Community law and the 
damage suffered. However, this does not mean that causation must be seen 
as a wholly national concept905. It is true that causation must be inferred 
from the facts of the case and thus, national courts are in a better position to 
determine its existence. Nonetheless, the ECJ’s guidance remains necessary 
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in order to clarify how the causality factor may affect the vertical and 
horizontal allocation of damages906.  
 
 In this regard, there are four factors which may break the chain of 
causation, namely interventions by the Community Institutions, by a 
different public authority, by a third party and by the injured party itself. 
Firstly, when national authorities are required to implement a Community 
measure leaving no room for discretion which is subsequently stroked down 
by the ECJ, the damages resulting from its unlawfulness cannot be 
attributed to the Member States907. Indeed, there is no casual link between 
national implementing measures and the damage occurred, instead the 
plaintiff should claim damages against the Community institution which 
adopted the unlawful act. Secondly, in Brinkmann908, the ECJ offered the 
possibility for Danish administrative authorities to correct the failure of the 
legislature to implement Directive 79/32/EEC909 on time. Although this 
legislative failure is a serious breach, the ECJ pointed out that the immediate 
effect given by the administrative authorities to the Directive interrupted the 
chain of causation910. Thus, in accordance with Brinkmann, even if the ECJ 
considers that a violation of Community Law is attributable to the State as a 
whole, this does not prevent different national authorities from cooperating 
among each other to ensure that Community law is observed. Thirdly, third 
parties who infringe Community law may also interrupt the chain of 
causation. A good illustration is provided by cases where third parties 
deliberately violate Community Law and a Member State fails to adopt any 
measure putting an end to such violations911. It is true that the ECJ has held 
that the passive behaviour of Member States will involve a failure to fulfil 
its obligations under the Treaty, however this does not entail that state 
liability would arise. In fact, one could argue that the behaviour from which 
the damage arose was not caused by the State, but by a third party and 
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consequently, a casual link is missing. In addition, if the Community 
provision breached has horizontal direct effect, pursuant to Courage912, the 
injured party could directly seek compensation from the infringing party. As 
a result, in order for national courts to determine the existence of a casual 
link, third parties behaviour must be taken into consideration. Finally, in 
Brasserie, the ECJ stated that there is a duty of mitigation on the injured 
party, whereby the latter must, as far as possible, do everything to avoid any 
loss or damage, or limit its extend. In particular, the injured party must 
“avail himself in time of all the legal remedies available to him” 913. Thus, if 
the latter does not fulfil his duty of mitigation, a causal link could be 
missing. However, it does not follow from the foregoing that all remedies 
must be used before claiming damages, regardless of their probability of 
success. Indeed, in Metallgesellschatf 914, the ECJ held that the duty of 
mitigation is only applicable in relation to remedies which have prospects of 
being upheld. 
 
Consequently, the third condition cannot be taken as a given and it 
may be relied upon by the national courts as an escaping mechanism to 
avoid rendering the infringing Member State liable for damages. In this 
sense, after Brasserie was delivered and sent back to Germany, owing to the 
fact that the damages were caused by multiple breaches and since the 
plaintiff did not prove the correlation between the ones deemed serious and 
the damage suffered, the German court held that element of causation was 
missing915. 
 
F.-   Liability of the national judiciary 
 
In Brasserie, by indicating that the principle of state liability is applicable to 
the Member States as a whole, regardless of whether the breach of EC Law 
has been committed by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary, the 
                                                 
912 C-453/99, Courage [2001] ECR I-6297. 
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ECJ supported its universal application916. This view was ratified in Köbler 
v Austria917, where the ECJ was called upon to decide for the first time on 
the liability of national courts of last instance918. 
 
The fact of the case can be summarised as follows. Mr. Köbler applied for a 
special length-of-service increment granted to university professors who had 
completed a 15-year service in Austrian universities. However, his 
application was dismissed on the grounds that his years of service in other 
European universities could not be taken into account. Köbler challenged 
this decision, arguing that Austrian law was in breach of the free movement 
of workers919. The case reached the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austrian 
Supreme Administrative Court) which requested a preliminary reference to 
the ECJ. Before the question was answered, the ECJ delivered Schöning-
Kougebetopolou920. There, it ruled that a collective agreement which denies 
promotion on grounds of seniority to public employees, who have 
completed comparable employment in the public service of another Member 
State, was in breach of the free movement of workers. Thus, the registrar of 
the ECJ asked the Verwaltungsgerichtshof whether in the light of this case, 
it considered necessary to maintain its request for a preliminary reference. It 
follows that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had two options, either to uphold 
Mr Köbler’s claim or to maintain its request. Nevertheless, the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof took a different approach. It withdrew the 
preliminary reference, but dismissed Mr. Köbler’s claim, holding that the 
length-of-service could be qualified as a loyalty bonus and thus, it was a 
justified derogation from the free movement of workers. As a result, Mr. 
Köbler filed an action in damages against the Austrian State before the 
Regional Civil Court of Vienna. He alleged that by infringing its obligations 
under Article 234 EC and by misinterpreting the case-law of the ECJ, the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof had infringed Community law and consequently, he 
was entitled to reparation. The Regional Civil Court of Vienna made a 
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reference to the ECJ. It asked whether the principle of state liability was 
applicable to national courts of last instance, if so, what the conditions of 
liability of the judiciary were. It also asked whether compensation could be 
awarded to Mr. Köbler921. 
 
Firstly, the ECJ held that the principle of state liability was 
applicable to violations of EC law committed by the judicial branch of the 
Member State. Owing to the fact that under international law, infringing 
States are seen as a single entity, a fortiori States must also be viewed as a 
whole under Community law. The ECJ added that pursuant to the principle 
of effectiveness, Community rights would be weaken if individuals were 
precluded from obtaining reparation where national courts of last instance 
violate Community law. Consequently, the ECJ acknowledged that, since a 
decision of a court of last instance in breach of Community law cannot be 
repealed, individuals must be provided with an alternative way to protect 
their rights. Thus, rendering national courts of last instance liable prevents 
violations of Community rights from being unsolved922. In the same sense, 
the ECJ acknowledged that liability of the judiciary had also been 
recognised by the ECtHR.  
 
In addition, the ECJ dismissed the arguments of the UK, according 
to which state liability for judicial acts not only would undermine the 
independence of the judiciary, but it would also be contrary to the principle 
of res judicata923. The ECJ replied that, since it is the State which is liable 
and not the judge in his personal capacity, there is no threat to the 
independence of the judiciary. Additionally, the ECJ rejected that the 
principle of state liability would undermine the authority of the national 
courts of last instance. On the contrary, the ECJ opined that it would 
“enhance the quality of the judiciary” and “in the long run [its] authority”.  
Likewise, there is no violation of the principle of res judciata, since an 
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action in damages has neither the same purpose nor necessarily the same 
parties924.  
 
As for the conditions of liability, the ECJ held that they remain the 
same. However, the ECJ pointed out that, in light of the special role of the 
judiciary and legal certainty, national courts of last instance should only 
incur in liability in exceptional circumstances, that is, where there is “a 
manifest infringement of the law applicable”925. Indeed, by contrast to the 
executive and the legislature, the degree of discretion is not an appropriate 
parameter to measure the seriousness of the breach committed by national 
courts of last instance926. Instead, liability will be determined by assessing, 
for instance, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, 
whether the breach was intentional, whether it was erroneous, or whether 
the national court of last instance violated its obligation to refer under 
Article 234(3) EC.  
 
Lastly, the ECJ held that its findings in Schoning-Kougetopoulou 
were applicable to the case at issue927. Consequently, the Austrian length-of-
service scheme was contrary to Community law. However, the ECJ 
considered that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had not committed a serious 
breach. Firstly, there was no previous case-law of the ECJ on whether 
loyalty bonus could be a justified derogation from free movement. 
Secondly, although by withdrawing its request for a preliminary reference, 
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof committed a procedural violation of Article 234 
EC, the ECJ considered that its seriousness was extenuated by the fact that 
the withdrawal was prompted by a misinterpretation of Schöning-
Kougebetopolou. Hence, the ECJ concluded that the 
                                                 
924 Ibid, 39-43. However, this argument does not appear to be entirely convincing. See CD 
CLASSEN, Case Note, (2004) 41 CML Rev. pp 813-834. (Holding that it is very difficult to 
see how the national court in charge of solving the claim for damages will not go into 
reviewing the lawfulness of the ruling of the national court of last instance. Moreover, it 
could be possible for the infringing court to adjudicate over a claim for damages based on 
its own infringement. The way to escape from this dilemma would be to make a new 
referral to the ECJ.) 
925 Ibid, 52-56 
926 Tridimas,  pp 524. 
927 Ibid, 81-86 
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Verwaltungsgerichtshof had not manifestly and seriously breached 
Community law928: Mr. Köbler was not entitled to reparation929. 
 
It is noteworthy pointing out that, whereas courts of last instance 
have an obligation to refer, inferior courts enjoy full discretion. In the same 
way, the ECJ indicated in Brasserie that the person who has suffered 
damage for breach of EC law has a duty of mitigation, which may include 
“all legal remedies available to him”, such as appealing judicial decisions 
inconsistent with EC Law930. It follows that under Community law, only 
national courts of last instance may generate state liability.   
 
Furthermore, not only is Köbler the logical continuation of the case-
law of the ECJ on state liability, but it also introduces significant 
constitutional changes. On the one hand, Köbler evinces that none of the 
branches of government can escape from faithfully fulfilling its duties under 
Community Law. In the same way, by ratifying the three-pronged test 
enounced in Brasserie, the ECJ resisted the assault of several Member 
States urging for the introduction of more stringent conditions of liability. 
On the other hand, its innovative feature lies in that it modifies, to a certain 
extent, the relationships between the ECJ and national courts of last 
instance. In pursuance with Article 234 (3) EC, where in order to solve the 
case, national courts of last instance are called upon to interpret Community 
law, the Treaty requires the latter to seek for guidance to the ECJ by 
requesting a preliminary reference. The rationale behind this obligation is to 
create a common understanding of the EC Treaty by “(nothing) other than 
the expression of a mechanism of judicial cooperation and mutual trusts 
between courts”931. In CILFIT, the ECJ tolerated that the obligation to refer 
imposed on national courts of last instance did not apply in cases where “the 
correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no 
scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question 
                                                 
928 Ibid, 117-124 
929 However, AG Leger was more demanding with the Austrian Court, and understood that 
Mr Köbler was entitled to reparation.  Opinion of AG Leger in Köbler, supra note 917. 
Paragraph 170 
930 Brasserie, Para. 84-85 
931 Opinion of AG Leger in Köbler, Para. 111 
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raised is to be resolved […]” and “the matter is equally obvious the courts 
of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice”. Thus, by giving up 
its place as final interpreter of the Community law to the courts of last 
instance in cases where the interpretation of Community law is obvious, the 
ECJ acknowledged their contribution to the interpretation and application of 
Community law. However, the Treaty does not provide any means to 
prevent or to sanction a misuse of the CILFIT doctrine. Since there is no 
appeal to the ECJ, before Köbler, there was no remedy against a national 
court of last instance infringing its obligations under Article 234 EC. Thus, 
Köbler can be read as a curtailment to this doctrine, which also provides a 
remedial answer to a structural need. Indeed, as Tridimas points out, 
national courts of last instance will think twice before applying CILFIT and 
would rather “play safe”932. In this regard, by upholding the liability of the 
national judiciary, the ECJ has introduced a federal element capable of 
establishing its leadership in the relationship with national courts. As 
discussed below, liability of judicial acts can be seen as a functional 
substitute to the absence of an appellate jurisdiction over national courts’ 
decisions. Consequently, state liability for judicial acts demonstrates that the 
ECJ sees itself as “the Supreme Court of the European Union”. If 
“cooperation and mutual trust” define the “ECJ-national courts” relations, 
liability of the national judiciary allocates the role played by each party in 
the Community legal order. 
 
III.-   Structural Differences and State Financial Implications 
 
The historical context in which the principles of state sovereign 
immunity and of state liability for damages arose may provide the 
explanation of a ruling. However, it is not sufficient in itself to explain 
subsequent developments in the case-law. Indeed, history may not in itself 
justify the constitutional value attributed to these two principles. While the 
enactment of the Eleventh Amendment provides the constitutional basis for 
state sovereign immunity, it is not a solid reason in itself to justify its 
                                                 
932 For critic view of Köbler, see PJ WATTEL, Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We can’t 
go on like this, (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp 177-190. 
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extensive application. In the same way, the fact that state liability firstly 
appeared as an adequate solution to the non-transposition of Directives does 
not explain its subsequent application to directly effective provisions. 
 
Accordingly, this section tries to explain why the USSC and the ECJ have 
taken different stands towards state liability for damages. It is firstly argued 
that structural differences between the federal architectural design of the 
USA and of the EU provide valuable insights as to why the USSC 
persistently refuses to render States liable for breach of federal law, whereas 
the ECJ considers state liability as remedy vital to the full effectiveness of 
Community law.  In addition, whereas the ECJ does not pay much attention 
to the adverse economic impacts of its rulings on Member States, the USSC 
considers the financial integrity of the state treasuries as a key element of its 
vision of federalism. Thus, the interplay between retrospective and 
prospective remedies and the state treasuries may shed some light on this 
issue.    
 
A.-  Structural differences: EC Directives and the Principle of “Anti-
Commandeering” 
 
1.-  Some theoretical views on Commandeering 
 
There are two ways in which “central”933 and state authorities may 
interact, namely either the central government is empowered to employ 
States as regulatory agencies or not934. 
 
Where the central government is empowered to rely on component States, it 
may do so in two ways. On the one hand, the central government may lay 
down a general framework within which States must adopt policy measures. 
                                                 
933 In order to avoid confusions, the term “central” instead of federal” is preferred in this 
section. 
934 D HALBERSTAM, Comparative Federalism and the issue of Commandeering, pp 213-
251 in NICOLAIDIS and HOWSE (eds), The Federal Vision : Legitimacy and Levels of 
Governance in the US and the EU (OUP, 2002) 
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Thus, the central government adopts “policy-making” commands which, as 
a general rule, are addressed to state legislatures. On the other hand, the 
central government may adopt policy measures in their entirety, leaving 
their execution to state authorities. Consequently, the central government 
may issue “executive-enforcing” commands, often addressed to the state 
administrative authorities935. 
 
 Furthermore, where the central government commands component States, 
the effectiveness of federal law is intrinsically linked to the effectiveness of 
central commands. The better component States perform their implementing 
duties, the more effective “central law” will be.   Conversely, where the 
central government is not empowered to command States, “central law” can 
only grant rights to or impose obligations on individuals. It follows that, 
since the central government is not empowered to rely on state legislative 
and administrative apparatus, a strong federal bureaucracy appears to be of a 
paramount importance in order to secure the proper enforcement of federal 
law.  
 
As a result, where commandeering is possible, the effectiveness of central 
law depends on the strength of central commands. On the contrary, if the 
constitutional text precludes the central government from relying on States, 
then the effectiveness of central law would depend on the enforcement 
capacities of the central government alone. 
 
 
                                                 
935  Moreover, from the standpoint of individual rights, this distinction also seems relevant. 
In relation to “policy making” commands, owing to the fact that States may enjoy some, 
albeit limited, discretion, state legislative intervention is required in order to fully 
concretise individual rights. However, where “executive-enforcement” commands are 
issued, individual rights have already been defined by the central government. State 
intervention is not necessary to define their scope. It is, only required to enforce them. 
Besides, whereas in the first case, it is almost impossible to compel the legislature to adopt 
a measure, that it, reliance on the judiciary is usually precluded, individuals can bring an 
action forcing the administration to conduce its activity in compliance with the central 
commands. Therefore, state disobedience of “policy-making” commands constitutes a 
bigger threat to individual rights, than an infringement of an “executive-enforcement” 
command.  
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2.-  The EU and the US 
 
In Europe, the Community institutions have both the power to 
legislate directly upon individuals and to compel Member States to 
implement Community policies.   
 
By adopting EC Regulations, the Community institutions may grant rights 
to and impose obligations on individuals. EC Regulations can also issue 
“executive-commands” addressed to the Member States936. However, since 
there is no need for further implementing measures, EC Regulations do not 
lay down “policy-making” commands. 
Moreover, Regulations are directly effective and thus, individuals can rely 
on them before national courts to enforce Community rights. Thus, state 
intervention is not necessary in order to give full effect to individual 
Community rights 
  
By contrast, EC Directives are not addressed to individuals but to the 
Member States. When the Community institutions adopt a Directive, 
Member States are obliged to attain a certain result, but they enjoy some 
discretion as to the means to be deployed. Therefore, Member States are 
required to enact or adapt national legislation pursuant to the “policy-
making” commands laid down in the Directive. Moreover, in order for 
Community rights embodied in a Directive to be fully directly effective, 
Member States must enact legislation. In other words, state intervention is 
required. Thus, when implementing a Directive, Member States act as 
Community Agents. 
 
On the contrary, in America, in accordance with the judicial 
principle of “anti-commandeering”937, Congress lacks powers to use States 
as implements of regulation. In the USSC’s opinion, the Framers of the US 
Constitution thought that the confederate method, according to which 
                                                 
936 See e.g. Regulation 1210/2003 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. Regulation 1/2003 
obliging National Competition Authorities to cooperate with the Commission.  
937 See Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 US 264 (1981). 
See also FERC v Mississippi, 456 US 742 (1982) 
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congressional powers targeted the States and not the individuals, was 
inappropriate in order to create a strong central government938.  As a result, 
they decided that Congress should only be vested with the power to legislate 
on individuals (e.g. power to tax, to regulate interstate commerce)939, who -
in Hamilton’s words- are “the only proper object of government”940. In 
addition, the USSC has held that where the subject matter is not pre-empted 
by the Federal Government and the latter commands States to implement its 
policies, States officials cannot act in accordance with the views of their 
electorate. Consequently, accountability between federal and state 
governments is blurred941. In other words, commandeering disturbs the 
allocation of political responsibilities between these two levels of 
governance, making impossible for the electorate to determine the 
institutional origin of any decision. 
 
Moreover, not only is the principle of anti-commandeering 
applicable to the state legislative branch, but also to the executive one. 
Therefore, the USSC understands that the US Constitution prohibits both 
“policy-making” and “executive-enforcement” commands942. 
 
However regarding states courts, the USSC has held that 
commandeering is possible. In its view, the reason for this distinction lies in 
Articles III and VI US Constitution. Article III only provides for “a 
Supreme Court”, leaving the creation of lower federal courts to 
congressional discretion. This option is known as the “Madisonian 
Compromise”943. Accordingly, Congress could have relied exclusively on 
state courts to enforce federal law. In the same way, in Article VI there is no 
constitutional provision directed to state legislatures that is similar to the 
Judge Clause944. Accordingly, whereas the US constitutional design 
precludes commandeering state executive and legislative branches, the 
                                                 
938 New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992) 
939 See FERC,  Op cit, 762-766  
940 The Federalist No 15, at 109. 
941 New York v US, Op. cit, 166-169  
942 See Printz v Unites States, 521 US 898 (1997) See EH CAMIINKER, Printz, State 
Sovereignity and the limitis of formalism, (1997) Sup. Ct. Rev.199-248 
943 See Printz v US, Op. Cit, 907. 
944 See New York v US, Op. cit., 178-179 
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supremacy Clause and the Madisonian Compromise authorise Congress to 
command state courts to enforce federal law. 
  
Furthermore, although Congress cannot oblige States to implement 
its policies, it is, nonetheless, entitled to provide some incentives. It follows 
that this principle does not prevent Congress from encouraging States to 
regulate in compliance with its policies. In New York v United States945, the 
USSC indicated that the difference between encouraging and compelling 
lies in that, whereas the former allows state officials to remain accountable 
to local preferences946, the latter does not. It is true that in order for States to 
benefit from federal incentives, they are required to follow Congress’ 
instructions. However, if a State decides to line up its legislation to 
congressional wishes and then, fails to do so, there will be no constitutional 
violation.  It will simply loose its right to federal incentives. Accordingly, 
even if States consent to follow Congress’ instructions, they cannot be 
considered as federal agents.  
 
As a result, whereas European Member States may be required by the 
Community institutions to act as their agents, this possibility is precluded in 
America. 
3.-  State Liability and Commandeering 
 
In relation to state liability, States may commit two types of 
infringements, namely [a] by omitting to give full effect to 
federal/Community rights, or [b] by actively breaching federal/Community 
legislation granting rights to individuals.  This section will focus on the first 
type of breach. 
 
In Europe, the first type of violation corresponds to Member States’ failure 
to implement a Directive. In this sense, if a Member State fails to transpose 
a Directive, it is settled case-law that individuals would not be able to 
enforce Community rights therein against other individuals (non-horizontal 
                                                 
945 See New York v US, 505 US 144 (1992) 
946 Ibid, 168.  
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direct effect of Directives)947. Consequently, Member States’ inaction 
hinders the effectiveness of Community law. 
 
Thus, in order to ensure “l’effet utile” of Directives, the ECJ was obliged to 
find ways which would deter Member States from disobeying Community 
commands. At first, by holding that after the implementation deadline, 
individuals could rely on non-implemented Directives against infringing 
States (vertical direct effect)948, the ECJ prevented Member States from 
benefiting from their own infringements. In the same way, in Foster v 
British Gas949, by widening-up the concept of State, the ECJ simultaneously 
extended the scope of vertical direct effect of Directives. Secondly, the ECJ 
held in Marleasing950 that national courts are required to interpret national 
law “in the light of the wording and purpose” of the Directive. 
Accordingly, where national law can be interpreted in different ways, 
national courts must choose the one which is consistent with the non-
implemented Directive. 
Therefore, both vertical direct effect and consistent interpretation can be 
seen as deterring mechanisms against Member States’ disobedience of 
Community commands. However, these mechanisms are limited. In fact, 
they do not provide an effective remedy in cases where national law does 
not leave any room for judicial interpretation and where an individual seeks 
to rely on Community rights contained in a non-implemented Directive 
against another individual. In such cases, the effectiveness of the non-
implemented Directive is seriously put into question. 
Finally, the principle of state liability can be seen as the ultimate 
endorsement to EC Directives’ commands. Indeed, the principle of state 
liability for breach of Community law can be examined under two 
perspectives, which are nevertheless convergent. In the light of the 
protection of individual’s rights, the principle of state liability can be seen as 
an effective remedy. Thus, although individuals cannot rely on community 
                                                 
947 See Case 152/84 Marshall I [1986] ECR 723). Also, Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori [1994] 
ECR I 3325 
948 See Cases C-9/70, Frans Grad [1971] 2 ECR 825, C-41/74, Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337 
and C-148/78, Ratti [1979] 1629. 
949 See Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR-I 3313  
950 See Case C-106/89, Marleasing [1990] ECR I- 4135 
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rights laid down on a Directive against another individual, state liability 
gives rise to compensation against the infringing Member State.  
From the point of view of the effectiveness of EC Directives, the principle 
of state liability can be seen as an economic sanction, in favour of private 
individuals. Therefore, by shifting the economic cost of the non-
transposition of a Directive from the private parties to the infringing 
Member State, the latter would be eager to comply with Community 
commands. As a matter of fact, in the light of the ECJ’s case-law, failure to 
implement a Directive is not only the scenario which opened the door to 
claims in damages for breach of Community law951, but it is also the 
paradigmatic example of a “serious breach”952.  
 
Thus, the rationale of the ECJ is simple: the combined effect of vertical 
direct effect, the Marleasing doctrine and the principle of state liability 
would deter Member States from non-implementing EC Directives. The 
principle of state liability renders more effective Community commands and 
thus, Community law.   
 
In the United States, since Congress legislates directly upon 
individuals, that is, federal rights are directly effective without the need for 
state intervention, “the failure to implement a Directive” scenario simply 
does not exist under US Constitutional law. State inaction has no adverse 
repercussion on federal rights. The States would only act pursuant to federal 
policies in so far as they freely consent to do so. However, as previously 
mentioned, if they agree to follow the commands of the Federal 
Government and subsequently, fail to do so, no constitutional obligation 
will be breached, only the right to federal incentives will be lost. Therefore, 
since States do not have a constitutional obligation to act in compliance with 
the congressional mandates, they cannot omit what they are not required to 
do. With due regard to the exception of state courts, the effectiveness of 
federal law depends on federal authorities alone. 
 
                                                 
951 Francovich , Op cit 
952  Dillenkofer, Op cit.. 
 283 
4.-  Köbler: a functional substitute for the absence of an appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
A structural difference may also explain why the ECJ has decided not to 
exclude the judiciary from incurring liability for breach of Community Law, 
whereas in the United States, not only do judges enjoy absolute immunity 
from suit, but the USSC has also a restrict view on collateral challenges to 
state court decisions953. 
 
The EC Treaty does not provide any appeal over national courts’ decisions. 
The ECJ does not have an appellate jurisdiction to review the compatibility 
of national courts rulings with Community law. Instead, the Treaty provides 
for a preliminary reference procedure through which the ECJ and national 
courts cooperate in interpreting Community law. The difference between a 
preliminary reference procedure and an appellate jurisdiction is twofold. 
Firstly, parties do not have a right to appeal. The decision to refer falls 
within the exclusive competence of the national court. Secondly, even 
though the ECJ has occasionally provided a detailed guidance indicating 
how a case should be solved, it is still for the national court to follow and 
apply the preliminary ruling. The cooperative nature of the preliminary 
reference procedure is further demonstrated by the fact that, though Article 
234 (3) EC imposes on national courts of last instance an obligation to refer 
where the interpretation of Community law is decisive for the case at issue, 
the EC Treaty does not provide any sanction or remedy against its violation.   
 
Thus, the absence of a remedy against a breach of Article 234(3) EC is an 
important weakness of the preliminary reference procedure, not only 
because parties injured by judicial action are not protected, but also because 
infringing national courts of last instance could threaten the uniform 
application and primacy of EC law954.  
                                                 
953 JE PFANDER, Köbler v Austria: Expositional Supremacy and Member State Liability, 
(2006) 17 EBL Rev., pp 275-297 
954 It is true that Article 226 EC enforcement actions could be seen as a way of enforcing 
the obligation to refer. See Case C- 129/00, Commission v Italy, [2003] ECR I-14637. 
Nonetheless, injured parties will not benefit from this type of remedy, which has rather a 
prospective character.  
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It follows that Köbler can be read as introducing a functional substitute to 
the lack of an appellate jurisdiction. In accordance with Köbler, where a 
court of last instance infringes Article 234 (3) EC and in so far as the three 
conditions enounced in Brasserie are fulfilled, the injured party is entitled to 
reparation. However, it is very unlikely that the court dealing with the claim 
for damages will adjudicate in favour of the plaintiff without making a 
reference to the ECJ. Firstly, the claim for damages will often be heard by a 
court inferior to the one which committed the breach. Consequently, it 
would not feel at ease ruling against its hierarchical authority. Secondly, a 
lack of referral may lead the infringing court to determine its own 
infringement and thus, to put into question the impartiality of the judicial 
system955. Hence, it appears that courts in charge of solving the claims for 
damages will often make a reference to the ECJ. Consequently, the ECJ will 
often decide whether the national court of last instance incurred in liability. 
Thus, Köbler fulfils an analogous function as a direct appeal to the ECJ. It 
provides a remedial solution to a structural gap. Although, the cooperative 
and trustful nature of a preliminary reference procedure remains, Köbler can 
be understood as opening the way for a “de facto” appellate jurisdiction of 
the ECJ956.  
 
On the contrary, the USSC has appellate jurisdiction to review the 
consistency of state courts decisions with the US Constitution and federal 
law. Article III US Constitution states that the USSC has appellate 
jurisdiction over all the cases to which the federal judicial power extends. 
Although it is not expressly stated in the US Constitution, in Martin v 
Hunter’s Lessee957, the USSC strongly asserted its appellate jurisdiction 
over state court decisions. Firstly, pursuant to Article III US Constitution, 
the appellate jurisdiction of the USSC is determined by the notion of “case”, 
regardless of the court it comes from. Secondly, as mentioned above, in the 
light of the Madisonian Compromise, had Congress decided not to establish 
                                                 
955 J KOMAREK, Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System, (2005) 42 CML 
Rev, pp 9-34  
956 Ibid, pp.13-16. 
957 Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (Wheat) 304 (1816) 
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federal courts, “the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would have 
nothing to act upon unless it could act upon cases pending in the States 
courts”958. Thirdly, it ensures that the US Constitution and federal law are 
uniformly applied. Furthermore, the appellate jurisdiction of the USSC has 
always been expressly endorsed by Congress in its various judiciary acts959.  
It is also noteworthy mentioning that the appellate jurisdiction of the USSC 
operates as an “ultima ratio” remedy, that is, in order to file a direct appeal 
to the USSC, it is previously required that the plaintiff concludes his 
pilgrimage at state courts960. 
 
Furthermore, Köbler can also be understood as a collateral attack to a 
decision of a national court of last instance. Although, the ECJ stated that an 
action for damages would involve neither the same purpose nor the same 
parties, the truth is that an inferior court will often be called upon to review 
the consistency of a higher court’s findings with EC law. Conversely, the 
USSC has been reluctant to allow inferior federal courts to review the 
validity of a state court decision with the US Constitution and federal law961. 
In Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co962, after their appeal was dismissed by the 
Supreme Court of Indiana, plaintiffs brought a new action before a US 
District Court alleging that the state court judgment was in breach of the US 
Constitution. Nevertheless, the USSC ruled that the US District Court 
lacked original jurisdiction and instead, plaintiffs should have sought for 
direct appeal to it. Likewise in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v 
Feldman963, two applicants challenged an admission rule to the bar of the 
District of Columbia which denied access to students not graduated from 
accredited law schools. Their actions before the courts of the District of 
Columbia were unsuccessful and as a result, they filed a new action before 
the US District Court. Again, the USSC held that it was the only court 
which could review decisions of the highest court of a state. Thus, lower 
federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions. Hence, in the 
                                                 
958 Ibid, 340 
959 28 USC §1257 (2000) 
960 See supra note 959. State courts certiorari 
961 Pfander, supra note 953, pp.284-285 
962 Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co, 263 US 413 (1923) 
963 District of Columbia Court of Appeal v Feldman, 460 US 462 (1983) 
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light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a direct appeal to the USSC is 
deemed sufficient to secure constitutional and federal rights of private 
parties, while preserving their uniform application. A collateral challenge 
will thus become too intrusive into state judicial autonomy964.  
 
As a result, Köbler can be considered as an answer to the fact that the ECJ 
does not have an appellate jurisdiction over national court decisions. Thus, 
state liability for judicial acts operates as a remedial response to a structural 
need. By contrast, since the USSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over 
state court decisions, as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine shows, it does not 
need additional means to enhance its authority.  
 
B.-  Remedies and the State Treasuries 
 
The principle of commandeering or its prohibition provides an answer to 
the constitutional consequences resulting from state inaction. Nevertheless, 
this principle is not sufficient to explain the opposite approach of both 
Courts regarding violations of federal/Community law due to state action. I 
believe that the answer to this question lies in the interplay between 
remedies and the state treasuries. 
 
1.-  America’s antagonism between past remedies and future rights 
 
One must recall that the USSC has held that one of the “raisons d’être” 
of the Eleventh Amendment is to safeguard States’ “financial integrity”965. 
The availability of alternative remedies ensuring the supremacy of federal 
law seems to be conditioned upon economic considerations. Coeur d’Alene 
demonstrates that prospective relief is only available in so far as it is not as 
intrusive as a “retroactive claim for damages”966. Likewise, actions for 
                                                 
964 The incompatibility between direct appeal to the USSC and collateral challenges is also 
demonstrated by exceptional cases where due to the fact that direct appeal to the USSC was 
precluded, a collateral challenge was allowed. See Fidelity Natural Bank & Trust Co v 
Swope, 274 US 123 (1927) 
965 Alden, 709 
966 Coeur d’Alene, 287 
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damages against state officials allow States to decide whether they 
indemnify and if so, to calculate, limit and foresee the economic risks 
generated by federal violations committed by their own officials. 
Accordingly, liability for breach of federal law is conditioned upon state 
budgetary policy. 
A priori, the USSC’ ultimate aim is to protect the state treasuries, even if 
this implies that private individuals or entities will be deprived from any 
remedy; that state officials are not deterred from breaching federal law; or 
that the supremacy of federal law is not secured. Notwithstanding cases 
where Congress has the power to abrogate state immunity, it appears that 
private individuals will have access to justice, provided that the state 
treasuries are not threatened. It can be prima facie suggested that economic 
repercussions on state budgets are the decisive factor in determining 
whether private individuals have an effective remedy to enforce their federal 
rights against infringing States. However, in the light of Milliken II967, this 
argument needs to be nuanced.  
 
In Milliken II, the USSC had to decide whether the federal courts had the 
power to order compensatory and remedial educational programs for school 
children who had suffered from de jure segregation. These programs would 
require States to spend millions of dollars. Accordingly, the USSC was 
asked to determine whether an Ex-Parte Young injunction could have 
adverse economic repercussions on the state treasuries. The USSC replied in 
the affirmative. It held that although desegregation programs were 
compensatory in nature, it “does not change the fact that they are part of a 
plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a 
unitary school system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is not 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment”968. 
Thus, prospective remedies can have “ancillary” 969 effects on the state 
treasuries. Hence, the USSC draws a distinction between the economic 
impact of prospective remedies and the one of retrospective remedies, that 
                                                 
967 Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 279 (1977) See also Hutton v Finney, 437 US 678, 691 
(1978) 
968 Ibid, 290. 
969 Hutton v Finney, supra note 967, 690 
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is, between “New and Old Property”970. Whereas retrospective relief cannot 
adversely affect the state treasury, the effectiveness of prospective relief 
could be seen as a limitation to its absolute protection. 
 
As Jeffries points out971, there is an antagonism between past remedies and 
future rights, which can be explained as follows. If constitutional innovation 
is seen as a positive value, then retroactivity must be limited. Indeed, in 
order for the judges to ease depart from precedent, the impact of their “new 
law”972 rulings should be only prospective, that is, break-through judgments 
are easier to render if judges escape from economic considerations of the 
past973. It follows that awarding damages for past claims may be a hindrance 
to constitutional innovation and consequently, it should be kept, as far as 
possible, limited. On the contrary, prospective remedies operate as a device 
which favours constitutional renewal. As a matter of fact, not only can 
injunctive remedies be relied upon in cases of ongoing violations of rights, 
but they also prevent potential breaches. Hence, they are able to go beyond 
the underlying rights, ultimately leading to a remedy-right transformation. 
Moreover, since state resources are limited and both prospective and 
retrospective remedies are capable of affecting the state treasuries, the 
judiciary is required to decide whether redressing past damages or favouring 
constitutional innovation974. In this sense, the American Constitutional 
structure of remedies is clearly biased in favour of the future. By limiting 
retrospective relief in favour of injunctive and declaratory remedies, societal 
resources are shifted from old claimants to new ones, that is, from old to 
new property975. 
 
In short, the protection of state treasuries is not absolute. The USSC 
has agreed that it can be adversely affected in cases where new property 
requires protection. Nevertheless, the state treasuries are a limit which 
                                                 
970 A WHOOLHANDLER, Old Property, New Property and Sovereign Immunity, (2000) 
75 Notre Dame L. Rev., pp 919-951.  
971 JC JEFFRIES Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, (1999) 109 Yale L.J., 
pp 87-114.  
972 Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 756 
973 Ibid. 98-99 
974 Ibid. 105-112 
975 Ibid. 113-114 
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forces retrospective and prospective remedies into a dichotomy, which in 
order to promote constitutional innovation, is settled is favour of the latter. 
 
2.-  The ECJ’s convergent view on remedies 
 
The ECJ has held that there are no antagonistic forces between 
retrospective and prospective remedies. In Brasserie du Pêcheur, the ECJ 
rejected the argument brought by the German, Irish and Dutch Governments 
pursuant to which the principle of state liability for breach of EC law should 
be limited to non-directly effective provisions, that is, to cases where 
prospective relief was not possible976. It held that direct effect was only a 
“minimum guarantee”977 and that “the right to reparation is the necessary 
corollary of the direct effect of the Community provision whose breach 
caused the damage sustained”978. Thus, the ECJ has a convergent view on 
prospective and retrospective remedies, the combine effect of both leads to a 
complete protection of Community rights. 
 
 Moreover, the ECJ’s convergent view on remedies may be explained 
by the fact that in its rationale, the protection of state treasuries has not 
taken issue. In this regard, Haim II979 clearly demonstrates that budgetary 
policy considerations do not prevent individuals from receiving full 
compensation from the Member States980.  
Mr. Haim was an Italian national who had studied dentistry in a non-
Member (Turkey), but whose title had been recognised by Belgium. In order 
to join the social security scheme as a dental practitioner, he sought to enrol 
with the German Association of Dentists (GAD). Nevertheless, the GAD 
rejected his application on the ground that he was not covered by the 
Council Directive 78/686/EEC on mutual recognition of diplomas. In Haim 
                                                 
976 Brasserie du Pêcheur, 18. 
977 Ibid, 20 
978 Ibid, 22 
979 Haim II, supra note 854 
980 More recently, see Case C-470/03 A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl [2007] ECR I-2749 (rejecting 
that national law could deny the award of loss of profit as a head of damage) 
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I981, the ECJ ruled that Mr. Haim was entitled to enrol and consequently, the 
GAD had breached his freedom of establishment.   
However, instead of adhering to the social security scheme, Mr. Haim 
brought an action before a German court asking for compensation for the 
loss of earnings against the GAD. The German court sought a preliminary 
reference from the ECJ, asking whether the principle of state liability was 
extendable to public-law bodies such as the GAD. The ECJ answered in the 
affirmative, stressing that “Member States cannot, therefore, escape that 
liability […] by claiming that the public authority responsible for the breach 
of Community law did not have the necessary powers, knowledge, means or 
resources”982. Therefore, even in cases where the infringing public 
authorities cannot financially cover the claims for damages, Member States 
would still remain liable. 
 
In the same way, though it is true that the ECJ can limit the temporal 
effects of its rulings983, it has held that the financial repercussions for the 
state treasuries are not on themselves sufficient to justify such limitation.984 
In its opinion, since serious infringements of Community law usually 
produce the most significant financial implications for Member States, 
limiting the effects of its rulings solely on financial grounds would lead to a 
paradoxical outcome, namely a lenient treatment of the most serious 
violations985. In effect, the message of the ECJ is quite clear: “to limit the 
effects of a judgment solely on the basis of such considerations would 
considerably diminish the judicial protection of the rights which taxpayers 
have under Community fiscal legislation”986. As a matter of fact, the ECJ 
prefers to rely on the principle of legal certainty to limit the retroactive 
effects of its rulings. Particularly, it requires parties concerned to have acted 
                                                 
981 Case C-319/92, Haim I, [1994] ECR I-425 
982 Haim II, 28. 
983 Case C-43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, [1976] ECR 455, para 69-75  
984 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119 
985 Joined Cases C-367 and 377/93, FG Roders BV, [1995] ECR I-2229, paras 46-50.   See 
also Case C-137/94, R v Secretary of Health, [ 1995] ECR I-3407 and Joined cases C-
197/94 and C-252/94, Société Bautiaa v Directeur des Services Fiscaux des Landes and 
Société Française Maritime v Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Finistère,  [1996] ECR I-
505 
986 Roders, 48.,  
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in good faith and the presence of serious difficulties987. Although it is true 
that in specific circumstances, repercussions for the state treasuries have 
been considered as “serious difficulties”, the requirement of good faith has 
been equally taken into account by the ECJ988. 
 
Therefore, the financial repercussions for the state treasuries are not 
a sufficient reason to justify limiting either retrospective relief or the non-
retroactivity of the ECJ’s rulings. As a result, the ECJ does not need to 
decide to which remedy state resources are allocated. Neither does the ECJ 
need to endorse the effectiveness of one remedy to the detriment of the 
other. Judicial protection is seen as a whole, to whose completion both 
remedies contribute on an equal footing.  
 
IV.-   Conclusions 
  
Even though both Courts have given opposite answers to question of 
state liability arising from breach of federal/Community law, one can draw 
some parallels between the two. Firstly, both principles have been 
interpreted extensively. Cases such as College Savings Bank (rejection of 
implied waiver) Florida Prepaid (strict interpretation of §5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment), Seminole Tribe (Congressional Plenary Powers 
under Article I cannot override this principle), and Alden (extension to this 
principle to state courts) demonstrate that the principle of state sovereign 
immunity has gained importance in the American constitutional landscape 
to the detriment of other constitutional principles, in particular, the 
supremacy of federal law. In the same way, Brasserie du Pecheur 
(universality of the principle), Hedley Lomas (discretion is determined by 
reference to Community law), Haim II (irrelevance of economic 
considerations) evince that the ruling of the ECJ in Francovich was not a 
shy statement, but the enouncement of a General Principle of Community 
law. 
                                                 
987 Case C-437/97, EKW [2000] ECR I-1157.  
988 Bidar, 67-69 
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Secondly, either where an individual brings an action for damages against a 
Member State under EC law or where an individual decides to sue a state 
official under Section §1983, the mere breach of Community/federal law 
does not per se give rise to reparation. In fact, both Courts have laid down a 
similar threshold of liability which requires the element of “fault”, 
understood not as intentions, but as an expected objective behaviour.  
Lastly, both federal systems have a centralised model of enforcing 
federal/Community law. As previously mentioned, the United States can 
bring proceedings against infringing States on the sole ground of enforcing a 
private right. Likewise, under Article 226 EC, the Commission can decide 
to start proceedings against an infringing Member State for failure to fulfil 
its obligations under the EC Treaty.  
 
 However, despite these few points in common, the truth is that major 
differences persist.  Indeed, although the threshold of liability under EC law 
and under Section §1983 may meet, the principles governing the quantum 
could not be more poles apart. Whereas in the light of the ECJ’s case-law, 
Member States would be precluded from arbitrarily capping compensation, 
not only do American States enjoy discretion as to the amount that they 
decide to cover, but they may also refuse to insure their officials. Therefore, 
whilst Section §1983 allows States to accommodate officials liability to 
their budgetary policy and not to an optimal degree of deterrence, the 
principle of state liability excludes any possibility of limiting compensation. 
According to the ECJ, compensation must be full and effective and thus, 
Member States have little to say as to the amount that they want to pay989.  
 
Furthermore, the Courts’ opposite approach is due, on the one hand, to 
structural differences between the European and American federal design 
and on the other hand, to the interaction between remedies and the state 
treasuries. The principle of commandeering entails that the effectiveness of 
Community law depends, to a great extent, on the observance of 
                                                 
989 See A.G.M., supra note 980, paragraphs 87-98. Also, an analogical application of the 
Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton & SW Hampshire Area Health Authority, [1993] 
ECR I-4367.  
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Community commands (Directives). Hence, in order to reinforce these 
commands, the ECJ considered that state liability was a necessary excipient. 
In other words, state liability could be seen as the appropriate answer to a 
structural need. Conversely, since the US Constitution precludes the United 
States from relying on the States as agents, it is for the Federal Government 
alone to implement federal law. State intervention is not needed to secure 
the effectiveness of federal law. Likewise, Köbler is a possible answer to the 
fact that the EC Treaty does not grant the ECJ with an appellate jurisdiction 
over national courts’ decisions. Nor does it provide private parties with 
remedies for violations of Article 234(3) committed by national courts of 
last instance. Thus, state liability for judicial acts appears to be a remedial 
solution to a structural gap. It creates a “de facto” appeal which is capable of 
submitting the highest national courts to the mandates of an incipient 
Supreme Court of the European Union. On the contrary, since the USSC has 
appellate jurisdiction to review the consistency of state court decisions with 
the US Constitution and federal law, additional means are not necessary to 
secure its authority. 
Moreover, since the USSC is keen on protecting the state treasuries, the 
judiciary is forced to choose between past remedies and future rights. This 
antagonism is solved in favour of prospective remedies which are deemed to 
favour constitutional innovation. On the contrary, since the state treasuries 
are not taken into consideration by the ECJ’s rationale, retrospective and 
prospective relief are seen as complementary and supplementary remedies.  
 
As a result, state liability in damages is a monetary remedy which 
illustrates the way in which the principle of primacy/supremacy of 
Community/federal law operates in a constitutional legal order. In this 
sense, as the American and European examples demonstrate, primacy or 
supremacy can be understood in two different ways. 
In Europe, the principle of primacy of Community law is intrinsically linked 
to dictum “ubi jus, ibi remedium”. Thus, primacy is respected in so far as for 
every violation of Community law, there is a correlative remedy. The 
strength of primacy amounts to the indissolubility of the binomial “right-
remedy”. In addition, the fact that there are already in place other remedies 
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is not an obstacle to create new ones, whose adequacy is greater. The more 
suitable remedies are, the best protected rights are and consequently, the 
more enhanced primacy of Community law is. In this regard, the principle 
of state liability clearly demonstrates the foregoing. At first stage, it was 
relied upon by the ECJ in order to cover a remedial gap. Later, taking the 
view that liability for damages was the most adequate instrument to solve 
past violations of EC law, the ECJ upheld its universal application.  
On the contrary, in America, the supremacy of federal law is interpreted as 
the capacity of submitting component states to the rule of law. Hence, the 
supremacy of federal law is respected where remedies are able to secure 
state compliance with federal law, regardless of whether past violations of 
federal rights remain unsolved. It follows that where alternative remedies 
(such as suits brought by the Federal Government, suits against state 
officials or the Ex-Parte Young Doctrine) seem sufficient to ensure 
observance of federal law, rendering State liable for damages is not 
necessary. As Alden demonstrates, remedial gaps or remedial inadequacy do 
not inter alia put into question that federal law is the “supreme law of the 
land”. 
Thus, whereas in Europe, primacy of Community law and judicial 
protection walk hand-to-hand, in America, it is not always the case. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The preceding chapters have sought to show how the United States 
Supreme Court (USSC) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) contribute 
to the vertical and horizontal allocation of powers.  The following normative 
and descriptive conclusions may be drawn from the results of this 
comparative analysis. 
 
In the US, standing is conceived as a structural safeguard that 
prevents federal courts from “governing through injunction”. By conferring 
standing only to litigants having suffered (or likely to suffer) a relevant 
injury, the USSC believes that judicial review does not fall into abstraction. 
Abstract adjudication is seen as a threat to the principle of separation of 
powers, since it would enable federal courts to engage in policy-making and 
policy-enforcing, functions constitutionally reserved to Congress and the US 
Executive respectively. Thus, standing confines federal courts to their 
traditional judicial functions when dealing with public law cases namely, 
redressing individual harms caused by public intervention.  
 
To this effect, while Members of Congress, the US Executive and 
States may recourse to federal courts with a view to redressing their own 
“private” injuries, separation of powers and federalism concerns render the 
USSC suspicious when they litigate representing the interests of third 
parties.  In spite of the Take Care Clause of Article II US Constitution, 
without statutory provisions authorising the US Executive to enforce a 
particular scheme, it is dubious that the latter enjoys standing. The reason 
given is that these suits may impinge upon congressional considerations, 
such as preference for private enforcement. In the same way, Congressmen 
alleging “dilution of their political power” lack standing. These lawsuits are 
deemed unfit for judicial resolution, and are redirected to the political 
process, where applicants enjoy sufficient mechanisms to recover the power 
lost. Standing is also denied to States challenging, as “parens patriae”, the 
constitutionality of a federal statute. This type of challenge is believed to 
generate an undue interference between the US government and its citizens.  
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However, from these concerns it does not follow that all conflicts involving 
federalism or separation of powers questions are always excluded from the 
purview of the federal judiciary. Provided that there is a relevant injury 
inflicted upon private individuals, federal courts are legitimised to decide on 
the merits. Suffice it to compare Raines v Byrd with Clinton v City of New 
York990. While in the first case standing was denied to Congressmen 
challenging a federal law enhancing the presidential veto, in the second case 
private applicants adversely affected by the use of the US President’s new 
veto powers had standing.  
 
The problem with the “Marbury-paradigm” of standing lies in that 
some injuries resulting from a violation of federal law may not be concrete 
enough to be litigated by private individuals, but they may, nevertheless, 
cause real harm to the general population as whole. Environmental injuries 
are a paradigmatic example. As Scalia opines, it may be argued that these 
“generalized grievances” are better addressed by the political process, where 
the majoritarian interests are better represented. Besides, at federal level, in 
so far as Congress has authorised the US Executive to enforce a federal 
statute, these injuries may be addressed under Article II US Constitution. 
However, what would happen where the Executive itself or a federal agency 
violates federal law? In Massachusetts v EPA991, the USSC provided the 
answer by broadly interpreting “parens patriae” standing. It is for States to 
step-up as congressional allies in checking that agencies do not abuse the 
powers delegated to them.  
 
In the EU, “locus standi” under article 230 EC is not read by the ECJ 
as drawing the line between politics and judicial review. Instead, it allocates 
jurisdiction between Community and national courts. Whereas, with the 
exception of decisions directly addressed to the applicants, the traditional 
judicial business of redressing private injuries is shifted to the national 
courts, article 230 EC welcomes disputes brought directly by the political 
actors even if they have no interests in the case.  
                                                 
990 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
991 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
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Following the Kelsenian model that inspired several European 
national constitutions, “free-standing” is granted to the Community 
Institutions and the Member States. Under this model, it is believed that the 
law, as an expression of the “volonté générale”, should be shielded from the 
capricious attacks of a few, which would disturb the proper functioning of 
the political institutions. Conversely, free standing should be given to the 
Member States and the Community Institutions, not only because of their 
role as “Guardians of the Treaty”, but also due to their active participation 
in law making. 
 
In the eyes of the USSC, the Community Courts would thus incur an 
excessive abstraction incompatible with sound adjudication. However, if 
one looks at the rulings of the USSC in cases like Lopez, New York v US and 
Alden992, the truth is that the factual context did not play a major role in 
deciding the merits. In structural cases, the USSC often embraces a 
formalistic approach insulated from the nuances of factual considerations. 
However, though the “utilitarian” reading of Article III may be put into 
question, its dogmatic foundation still makes sense. As Marbury suggests993, 
expounding the meaning of the US Constitution is not an end in itself, but a 
“by-product” to redress harms. Thus, in order to call in the Constitution, 
federal courts need a factual substratum where an injury occurred. 
Conversely, in Europe, interpreting the EC treaty is seen as independent and 
autonomous function of the judiciary. Moreover, when the Community 
Institutions or the Member States act as plaintiffs, there are no separation of 
powers and federalism concerns. On the contrary, as Les Verts and 
Chernobyl demonstrate994, not only does judicial access enables the political 
actors to safeguard their prerogatives, but it also ensures their 
accountability.  
 
                                                 
992 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 488 U.S. 1041 
(1992); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 
993 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
994 Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 ; Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] 
ECR I-2041 
 298 
As for the traditional role of solving injuries, the case-law under 
Plaumann shows that, without prejudice of Community measures directly 
addressed to private applicants, Luxembourg is rather an exceptional venue. 
As a matter of fact, by comparing cases like Greepeace and Laidlaw995, one 
concludes that standing under article 230 (4) EC is notoriously stricter than 
under Article III US Constitution. Therefore, as stressed by the ECJ in UPA 
and Jégo-Queré996, it is for the national law to assume the burden of 
complying with the principle of judicial protection, by affording applicants 
indirect challenges to Community Law.  
 
A related question in this regard is when national law must confer 
standing to an applicant wishing to rely on its EC rights. Cases like 
Verholen and Safalero997 indicate that Community law does not require 
national courts to allow “action popularis”. However, it was argued that 
imposing the conditions embedded in article 230 EC would be contrary to 
the principle of judicial protection. To this effect, if a Member State were to 
adopt standing rules similar to the ones laid down in Article III, it would 
comply with the principle of judicial protection.  
 
The problem with interpreting article 230 EC as enshrining a 
“jurisdictional shifting strategy” lies in the excessive reliance on the 
remedial capacities of the preliminary reference procedure. AG Jacobs is 
right in sustaining that article 234 EC is merely a tool of judicial 
cooperation. Hence, it would be best for the ECJ to emulate the rulings of 
USSC in ASARCO, Akins and Massachusetts v EPA998. Standing under 
article 230 EC should be self-sufficient when evaluating its compatibility 
with the principle of judicial protection. The ECJ should admit reforms that 
adapt its standing doctrine to new remedial needs without destroying its 
                                                 
995 Friends of the Earth, Inc. et al. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000); Case C-321/95 P Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission [1998] ECR 
I-1651 
996 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; Case 
C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425 
997 Joined Cases C-87/90 to C-89/90 Verholen and Others [1991] ECR I-3757; Case C-
13/01 Safalero [2003] ECR I-8679 
998 ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11 (1998), Massachusetts v EPA, Op cit. 
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paradigmatic features. Besides, given that article 263 TFEU points in this 
direction, the ECJ should not be so reluctant to modify its case-law 
accordingly. 
 
Since in the EU, standing does not operate as an implement of the 
separation of powers preventing the judiciary from participating in abstract 
discussions, the next logical step was to look for substantive questions 
deemed too political for judicial resolution. After explaining the case-law of 
the USSC under the political question doctrine, it was maintained that, 
either because the TEU excludes political questions or because their 
regulation is entrusted to national law, the ECJ lacks jurisdiction to decide 
similar questions as the ones raised in Luther, Powell or Coleman999. 
However, in accordance with Eman & Sevinger1000, the ECJ understands 
that its lack of jurisdiction does not mean inter alia that these questions are 
beyond judicial cognizance. It is for the national judiciaries in interpreting 
national law, and where appropriate for the ECtHR in interpreting the 
Convention, to determine if that is the case.  
 
Where the Community Courts enjoy jurisdiction, their approach is 
similar to the one adopted by the USSC in Baker1001. As famously 
articulated by Justice Holmes in footnote four of Carolene Products1002, it 
appears that the ECJ will not abdicate its reviewing powers where 
incumbent majorities become obstacles to the democratic process or where 
the protection of “discrete and insular” minorities is at risk. Les Verts and 
Martinez v Parliament1003 can be interpreted in this vein. The fact that both 
cases were at the epicentre of the political process did not prevent the 
Community Courts from applying a “representation-reinforcing” review, 
according to which judicial intervention sought to resolve flaws in the 
political process.  
                                                 
999 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) 
1000 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055 
1001 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
1002 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)  
1003 Les Verts, Op cit; Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and Others v 
Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823 confirmed by C-488/01 P Martinez v Parliament [2003] 
ECR I-13355 
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As for foreign policy, the USSC is reluctant to mediate in disputes 
involving the division of competences between Congress and the US 
President. Similar reasons as the ones adduced when denying standing to 
Members of Congress are put forward by the USSC. The Constitution has 
provided these two branches with sufficient checks and balances to be 
protected from each other. Additionally, the lack of judicially manageable 
standards and the need for the US to speak with “one single voice” also 
advise against federal courts becoming involved. Nevertheless, as Justice 
Brennan articulated in Baker, “it is an error to suppose that every case 
touching foreign relations is beyond judicial cognizance”1004. Cases like 
Hamdi and Hamdan1005 indicate that the USSC is not willing to forgo its 
role as guarantor of fundamental rights, even if its rulings lead to adverse 
repercussion in the international sphere or serious cleavages with the 
political branches.  
 
In the EU, the “external-relations factor” does not play a role when 
distributing political competences. Vertically, in addition to checking 
whether the Community acts within its attributed competences, Community 
Courts evaluate the degree of discretion enjoyed by the Member States 
when invoking foreign policy considerations. Horizontally, the ECJ 
allocates power not only among the institutions, but also among the pillars.  
 
However, apart from policing the boundaries, the ECJ lacks 
jurisdiction under the CFSP. This jurisdictional stripping is particularly 
alarming where CFSP measures not requiring further implementation 
restrict human rights. Indeed, inconsistencies with the principle of judicial 
protection may appear. By contrast to the flexibility enshrined in the 
political question doctrine, the ECJ is confined by jurisdictional walls 
impossible to climb. Accordingly, it would be preferable to grant full 
jurisdiction to the Community Courts over the CFSP, in so far as the 
Community Courts would embrace a political question doctrine. Against 
                                                 
1004 Baker, Op cit, 211 
1005 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 524 US 507 (2004); Handam v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006) 
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this grant of jurisdiction, one may argue that the Community judiciary 
would fail both ways, either by overly deferring to the Council or by 
initiating a reckless activism. However, in the light of cases like OMPI and 
Kadi1006, these fears do not seem to hold true. When enjoying jurisdiction, 
the Community Courts have proved capable of striking a right balance 
between “freedom and security”. While policy determinations are deemed 
political questions (whether there is a risk to the international community or 
whether imposing economic sanctions is an adequate strategy to combat 
terrorism), judicial oversight focuses on checking that the decision-making 
process of the political institutions complies with human rights standards 
(e.g. right of defence). Again, one cannot avoid drawing parallelism with the 
Carolene Products rationale. Not only do the Community Courts protect a 
minority (persons blacklisted) from immediate majoritarian concerns, but 
they also contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of the decisions adopted by 
the Community institutions.  
 
From the above, it appears that in cases located at the heart of the 
political process or touching sensitive areas of foreign relations, it is best for 
the courts to focus on improving the decision-making process of the 
political institutions. Using the words of Scott and Sturm, courts rather than 
imposing their own belief should also operate as “a catalyst”. Courts should 
not always impose what they think is the best solution. Instead, they should 
devote more attention to verifying that the political actors are adopting the 
right procedures to find it1007.  
 
When exploring how the USSC and the ECJ allocate regulatory 
powers between the Union and its Member States, this thesis looked at 
negative and positive integration. Regarding the former, it was concluded 
that the USSC reads the Dormant Commerce Clause (DCC) as prohibiting 
discrimination alone. It follows that, when “balancing” state autonomy 
                                                 
1006 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v Council [2006] ECR 
II-04665; Cases T-306/01 Yusuf v Council [2005] ECR II-3533 and T-315/01 Kadi v 
Council [2005] ECR II-3649 reversed by Case C-402/05P 
1007  J SCOTT & S STURM, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance, (2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L, pp 565-594 
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against market integration, the USSC has opted for defering to state 
legislatures. In the EU, article 28 EC goes beyond banning unequal 
treatment between import and domestic products. Balancing forms an 
essential part of the judicial arsenal to build-up market integration. 
 
These opposite answers reveal two important findings. Firstly, as AG 
Maduro puts it, given that the US internal market has reached “a point of no 
return”1008, the USSC no longer focuses on guaranteeing access to market, 
but on adopting rules that bring clarity and certainty to economic operators. 
On the contrary, Cassis was an eagerly awaited answer to break the path 
dependence of European traders and to overcome the malfunction of the 
political institutions. These circumstances forced the ECJ to coin rules 
ensuring the establishment of an incipient European market. Therefore, the 
different degrees of market integration help us to understand why Cassis1009 
entails a greater erosion of state regulatory sovereignty than Pike1010 does 
(or ever did).  
 
Since Keck1011 did not overrule Cassis but just limited its scope, the 
former amounts to a reformatory step away from “market-building” and 
towards a “market-maintenance”. It evinces that, though the current stage of 
the EU market has not reached the degree of integration of its US 
counterpart, its situation is not comparable to the date when Dassonville1012 
or Cassis were delivered. Nowadays, bringing some clarity into the scope of 
article 28 EC is also important for the ECJ. 
 
Secondly, the “discrimination-only” approach indicates that the 
USSC believes in the higher institutional capacities of state legislature when 
balancing state autonomy against the interests of an integrated market. On 
the contrary, the same cannot be said for the ECJ. Indeed, though Keck 
brought the ECJ closer to its American counterpart, Cassis remains largely 
                                                 
1008 MADURO, We, the Court: The European Court of Juystice and the European 
Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing,1998) 
1009 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral(‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649 
1010 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 
1011 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 
1012 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 
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good law. Accordingly, “balancing” is not seen as unfit for judicial 
determinations, it has just been excluded from “non-discriminatory selling 
arrangements”. Besides, contrary to the “virtual per se invalidity” rule 
applied by the USSC to discriminatory measures, in the EU, discrimination 
does not exclude “balancing”. Of course, the principle of proportionality 
applied to article 28 EC is a very strict one. National courts have a limited 
discretion, since only national measures being the least restrictive 
alternative will be upheld. Yet, judicial intervention is greater in the EU 
than in the US. National courts still have a say in determining what option 
can be qualified as a permissible restriction on free movement. 
 
Moreover, even if Keck has raised many criticisms, one cannot deny 
that its formalistic character has brought clarity into article 28 EC. How can 
Keck be improved without being overruled? This would mean that a new 
reform would have to be limited to cases falling outside the scope of article 
28 EC, that is, to “non-discriminatory selling arrangements”. Perhaps, the 
ECJ should follow the USSC in deferring to the higher institutional 
capacities of the national legislatures when “balancing”. However, national 
courts should still exercise some sort of control. What type? By contrast to 
Cassis, judicial review should not second-guess the outcome attained by the 
legislator. Instead, it was supported that national courts should apply a 
“process-oriented review”. Following this approach, national courts would 
limit themselves to verifying that legislative deliberations have taken into 
account the interests of the internal market. If the answer is in the negative, 
non-discriminatory selling arrangements would fall again into the scope of 
article 28 and be submitted to a fully fledged “balancing”. Thus, this 
approach would solve the under-inclusiveness of Keck, without returning to 
the unclarity and overbreadth of Dansonville. It would not replace a 
category of measures by others. Neither would it involve additional obscure 
legal concepts or categories. On the contrary, it would press national 
legislature “to think federal” when enacting legislation having an impact 
upon the internal market. Besides, while one may concede that this type of 
review would generate excessive judicial oversight of legislative 
deliberations, it would only be in the short term. In the long run, national 
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legislatures would become acquainted with the degree of information they 
need to provide. Of course, one may counter argue that this type of review 
would allow “re-entering by the window what Keck sought to exclude by 
the door”. In other words, national courts would start again to balance. 
However, imposing higher levels of deliberation does not amount to 
measuring whether national law is justified. The former focuses on the 
decision-making process, the latter in the outcome. As explained below, our 
“process-oriented review” would demand from the national legislatures 
what the principle of subsidiarity requires from the Community Institutions.. 
 
When examining positive integration, it was concluded that both the 
USSC and the ECJ have struggled in countering the competence creep of 
the central government. By juxtaposing Lopez against Raich1013, one has the 
impression that the principle of enumerated power does not suffice to limit 
the commercial powers of Congress. Perhaps, the Rehnquist Court missed 
twice a golden opportunity, when he failed to define “economic activities”. 
In any event, with a view to preserving the effectiveness of a general 
regulatory scheme, allowing the inclusion of “local non-economic” 
activities also appears to water-down the rigid limits Lopez sought to 
establish. Alternatively, as Scalia noted in Raich, Congress could also rely 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate activities having an impact 
upon interstate commerce, provided that [1] there is no breach of 
fundamental constitutional tenets; [2] that federal law is not a pretext for 
Congress to increase its powers; [3] or that the chain of causation is not too 
attenuated. Nevertheless, this alternative approach has been abandoned by 
the USSC, since the regulation of “local non-economic activities” is still 
possible under the Commerce Clause. 
 
Similar findings were made when examining the case-law of ECJ 
under article 95 EC. Although the case-law of the ECJ proves to be more 
stable, the ECJ has failed to clarify to what extent the limits of article 28 and 
95 EC overlap. Neither has it provided sufficient guidance as to when 
                                                 
1013 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
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distortions of competition become “appreciable”. Moreover, in Tobacco 
II1014, by lowering the threshold of activities considered “future obstacles” 
to trade, the ECJ appears to commit an oxymoron. How can mere disparities 
among national rules not be sufficient to invoke article 95 EC, while 
“potential obstacles” are? Further, just as reliance on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause has been neglected, so too have activities that could be 
regulated under article 308 EC been absorbed by article 95 EC. However, 
due to fact that article 308 EC requires unanimity whereas article 95 EC just 
QMV, the inclusion of activities being neither obstacles to free movement 
nor causing distortions of competition but if left unregulated would render 
harmonization ineffective under the scope of article 95 EC appears to be 
necessary. 
 
Since the principle of enumerated powers (attribution) does not seem 
to suffice by itself to contain the rampant powers of the Union, other ways 
which could better allocate powers between the centre and the periphery 
were explored. Contrary to what Weschler maintained1015, neither in the US 
nor in the EU, are political safeguards adequate to protect federalism. In the 
US, state governments’ interests do not necessarily coincide with the 
protection of States as “political institutions”. Secondly, since Senators are 
directly elected, they will support interests geographically concentrated in 
their State, but not their regulatory prerogatives. Thirdly, it is very unlikely 
for the US President to veto popular bills alluding to federalism concerns. 
Fourthly, political safeguards do not prevent “horizontal aggrandisements”. 
Lastly, since federalism is an intangible policy objective, Congress may 
forego it to benefit more pressing substantive issues. In EU, as Young 
posits1016, political safeguards have also failed. First, though state interests 
are better represented in the Council than in the Senate, the former may 
prevent radical intrusions into state autonomy. However, in order to obtain 
short term objectives, the European States may obviate long term 
                                                 
1014 Case C-380/03, Germany v Parliament and Council, [2006] ECR I-11573 
1015 H WESCHLER, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of The States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, (1954) 54 Colum.L.Rev., p 543 
1016 E YOUNG, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some 
Cautionary Tales From American Federalism, (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L Review, p 1612-1737  
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considerations on regulatory competences. Most importantly, the protection 
of federalism becomes less important when national executives rely on the 
Council to circumvent political obstacles at national level. Further, the shift 
from unanimity to QMV allows “horizontal aggrandisement”. Finally, 
neither the Commission nor the Parliament seems particularly devoted to 
protecting state autonomy. 
 
Another way of protecting federalism lies in controlling the exercise 
of commercial power by the Union. Therefore, it is not sufficient for the 
Union to act within its enumerated powers. In addition, its action must 
comply with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. As Gibbons v 
Odgen indicates, this second layer of competence control is absent in the 
US.  
 
By contrast to the EC Treaty, there is no principle of proportionality 
under the Commerce Clause. The USSC does not measure whether federal 
legislation is inadequate or excessive. The reason lies in that congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause is broader. It is not confined to 
harmonizing or remedying unconstitutional behaviour of the States. It is true 
that federal statutes may be directed toward establishing common standards, 
but Congress may also decide to favour diversification and even 
discrimination. Besides, since the Constitution does not prescribe any 
objective to be attained under the Commerce Clause, it would be almost 
impossible for the USSC to start reviewing congressional policy choices.  
Finally, reviewing the adequacy of economic regulation would revive the 
ghosts of Lochner1017, where the USSC was accused of acting arbitrarily. 
 
The principle of subsidiary, understood as limiting the exercise of 
Union competences to objectives which cannot be sufficiently achieved at 
state level, may be a good solution for both the US and the EU. However, 
this principle may be read as a “political question”, given that it is very 
difficult for the judicial department to design “judicial manageable” 
                                                 
1017 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
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standards capable of determining at which level of governance a policy is 
better achieved.  In the same way, courts also lack the institutional expertise 
and resources to take this decision, without appearing arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, even if one assumes the non-justiciability of this principle on 
“substantive grounds”, nothing would prevent either the ECJ or the USSC 
from applying it as a “procedural principle”. Thus, courts would not second-
guess the conclusions made by Congress and the EU legislator. Instead, they 
would press for qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrating why a 
policy cannot be sufficiently achieved at national level. It is a pity that, in 
Morrison1018 and subsequently in Raich, the USSC turned its back to this 
possibility. Of course, the USSC was right in holding that it has the last 
word when enforcing the principle of enumerated powers. Still, 
congressional findings could have been relied upon to determine whether 
state autonomy was paid due homage. In the same way, it is also 
unconvincing for the ECJ to rule that the existence of an obstacle to free 
movement justifies by itself compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Therefore, “process-federalism” would render subsidiarity judicially 
enforceable, without imposing policy choices. Indeed, the Protocol on 
Subsidiarity of the Treaty of Lisbon points in this direction. Not only does it 
enhance political debate by incorporating national parliaments, but the latter 
would also have access to the ECJ. Accordingly, it is not expected from the 
ECJ to give the final word on whether a policy may be sufficiently achieved 
at national level, but just to verify that the dissenting voices of national 
legislators have been taken into account and that an adequate rebuttal was 
provided.  
 
The last chapter sought to explain why the principle of state 
sovereignty precludes private applicants from seeking damages from 
American States, whereas state liability in damages is a General Principle of 
EU law. Two reasons were found. Firstly, the principle of anti-
commandeering prevents the US Government from issuing “Directives”. 
The US Government may not compel States to implement its policies. 
                                                 
1018 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
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Therefore, the “Francovich”1019 scenario does arise under US law. In the 
same way, by contrast to the USSC which may quash the decisions of 
inferior state and federal courts based on the US Constitution or federal law, 
Köbler1020 may be read as a functional substitute for the lack of appellate 
jurisdiction against decisions of national courts of last instance. Secondly, 
whereas the financial repercussions that actions in damages may have on the 
state treasuries are taken into account by the USSC when awarding 
remedies, it is not the case for the ECJ. Preserving the financial integrity of 
States forces the USSC to choose between prospective and retrospective 
relief and, in order to promote constitutional innovation, the USSC chooses 
the former. However, the Community judiciary opines that primacy of 
Community law is intrinsically linked to the dictum “ubis jus, ibis 
remedium”. Therefore, Community law would cease to be “the supreme law 
of the land”, where a violation of a private right is not accompanied by the 
possibility of full remedial relief. On the contrary, the USSC has opted for 
dissociating the Supremacy of federal law from the law of remedies. In the 
light of Alden1021, federal law remains supreme were States abide, regardless 
of whether past violations have been solved in full.  
 
As Young indicates, it seems that the principle of state sovereignty is 
not a positive way of protecting “States’ integrity”1022. By rendering States 
unaccountable for past violations of federal law, the USSC is not reserving 
an area where States may adopt policy decisions. It is simply shielding 
States from private suits in damages. Indeed, it would be best for States to 
be sued in damages, if the USSC adopted an adequate strategy halting the 
competence creep of the Federal Government. Besides, the ECJ is right in 
holding that the principle of state liability reduces the independence of 
neither national legislatures nor national judiciaries. The requirements laid 
down by the ECJ strike a proper balance between ensuring the proper 
functioning of all branches of government and an effective remedy for 
violations of Community rights. Accordingly, state autonomy would not 
                                                 
1019 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357 
1020 C-224/01 Köbler [ 2003] ECR I-10239 
1021 Alden, Op cit 
1022 E YOUNG, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, (2004) 83 Tex. L Rev, pp 1-166 
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become excessively eroded, did the USSC abandon the principle of state 
sovereignty. It would suffice for the USSC to impose a similar requirement 
as the “clear established” test laid down in §1983, in order to award 
damages against the State.  
 
From the foregoing, it follows that, when allocating powers, courts 
should not always look for “substantive” constitutional benchmarks, since 
sometimes they may turn to be either questions deemed too political for 
judicial resolution or insufficient to control congressional or Community 
legislative powers. Instead, the judicial department should also pay due 
regard to a “process” review. This type of review would work at two levels. 
At first stage, courts should solve flaws in the procedure by which the 
political institutions adopt their decisions. For instance, this would be the 
case where procedures neglect “discrete and insular” minorities, or where 
they entrench incumbent political majorities. Thus, judicial review would be 
principled upon understanding “democracy” as an intangible value that 
cannot succumb to majoritarian pressures. At a second stage, courts should 
also examine whether, in their deliberations, political actors pay due account 
to all interests at stake, particularly, to those not represented in the political 
process. While acknowledging that “process-review” would not become the 
panacea to the “double security” sought by Madison, it may nonetheless 
contribute to providing more complete and harmonic solutions in this 
regard. 
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ANNEX 
 
ANNEX CHAPTER I 
 
US Constitution 
 
Article 1, § 6, Clause 2 
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall 
have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during 
such time: and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a 
member of either House during his continuance in office” 
 
Article II § 3  
“(H)e shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed”. 
 
Article III § 1 
“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, 
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”  
 
Article III § 2 
 
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to 
controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between 
two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens 
of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants 
of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, 
citizens or subjects.  
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in 
which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In 
all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make.  
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such 
trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but 
when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as 
the Congress may by law have directed.” 
 
Fourteenth Amendment § 1 
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
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ANNEX CHAPTER II 
 
US Constitution 
 
Article I§2 
“No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of 
twenty five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.” 
 
1949 Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War 
 
Article 3 
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following 
acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
[…] 
 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
[…]” 
 
ANNEX CHAPTER V 
 
US Constitution 
 
Article I §8  
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare 
of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States.” 
 
Article I § 9 
“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations 
made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of 
all public money shall be published from time to time” 
 
Article III § 1 
“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.[…]” 
 
 
Article III § 2  
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“The judicial power shall extend to […] controversies [...] between a state and 
citizens of another state […]”. 
 
Article VI 
“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding” 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any 
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 
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